Pub Date : 2020-02-06DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198828952.003.0009
Scott C. James, L. Quaglia
This chapter uses the domestic political economy framework to consider the implications of Brexit for UK financial regulation. It outlines the likely future UK–EU relationship by analysing the preferences, role, and influence of key domestic groups on Brexit, and by assessing the EU’s framework for managing relations with third countries. We argue that elected officials pursued a ‘hard’ Brexit position in response to parliamentary constraints and pressure from financial regulators to avoid becoming rule-takers. The City of London authorities pushed strongly for a bespoke deal based on mutual recognition, although this masked significant intra-industry divisions. The EU’s insistence that the future relationship be based on the existing third-country regime reflected a desire to defend the single market, but also Franco-German incentives to compete for post-Brexit business. However, the coverage of third-country equivalence rules in finance, and the inclusion of financial services in trade agreements, remains limited.
本章使用国内政治经济学框架来考虑英国脱欧对英国金融监管的影响。通过分析主要国内团体对英国脱欧的偏好、作用和影响，以及评估欧盟管理与第三国关系的框架，该报告概述了未来可能的英欧关系。我们认为，民选官员采取“硬”脱欧立场是为了回应议会的限制和金融监管机构的压力，以避免成为规则执行者。伦敦金融城(City of London)当局强烈推动一项基于相互承认的定制协议，尽管这掩盖了巨大的行业内部分歧。欧盟坚持未来关系应以现有的第三国机制为基础，这反映了捍卫单一市场的愿望，也反映了法德两国争夺英国退欧后业务的动机。然而，金融领域第三国对等规则的覆盖面以及将金融服务纳入贸易协定的范围仍然有限。
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