It is difficult to appreciate how much the politics and policies of the Eurozone have changed since 2008. This paper focuses on the effects of austerity politics and policy on the citizenship rights of Europeans: their political rights to choose and influence their rulers; their civil rights to expression and organization; and their social rights to basic standards of living. It finds that the changes in EU and Eurozone institutions have sharply eroded those rights. By transferring power to largely undemocratic institutions such as the IMF and ECB, it diminishes the political rights of citizens who are restricted to voting for governments that lost importance. Austerity politics, including new fiscal governance provisions in the Treaties, curtail their social rights by making it harder for governments to correct and compensate inegalitarian market out comes. In sum, changes in the structure of the EU since 1998 have eroded both social and political citizenship for Europeans.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226012933.003.0012
A. Smith
An interpretation of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s theory of liberal democracy, drawn principally from his dissenting opinions in two landmark education cases: Milliken v. Bradley (1974) and San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1973). Milliken held that because the white-majority suburban districts in the greater Detroit area had not engaged in proven de jure racial discrimination, the federal court could not impose a multi-district remedy upon them. In his dissent, Marshall argues that the Milliken decision represents a “giant step backwards,” away from the desegregative and egalitarian orientation of Brown v. Board of Education (1954.) Marshall recites Brown’s holdings on violative stigmatic injury, and reasons that the multi-district remedy would have provided relief to Detroit’s African-American schoolchildren. Although Rodriguez dealt with the constitutionality of state school funding scheme, rather than racially segregative public school policies, Marshall sounded similar themes in his 1973 dissent. In Rodriguez, the Court decided that the Texan scheme met its rational basis test since it promoted “local control,” a permissible governmental purpose. Marshall reasoned that the Texan law was impermissibly arbitrary: its heavy reliance on property-tax based local contributions meant that the pupils living in property-poor districts were denied equal educational opportunity. Marshall argues that the right to education is implicitly guaranteed by the federal constitution, given the fact that access to an adequate education is indispensable for the exercise of protected political rights, including free speech and voting. Marshall defines education rights as an entitlement to a unique public good, insofar as securing access to an adequate and equitably funded education for the least advantaged children places them on the path to equal citizenship. Extending beyond Marshall’s actual opinions, the chapter argues that Marshall would argue that Parents Involved v. Seattle School District (2007), which struck down voluntary integrative pupil assignment, was wrongly decided. However, the spirit of Marshall’s theory lives on in the state courts’ decisions favoring the plaintiffs in state school finance case. There are particularly close parallels between Marshall’s discourse and the New York state court decision, Campaign for Fiscal Equity (2003), given the latter’s definition of the adequate education guaranteed under the New York constitution with reference to the high school graduate’s preparation for voting and jury service.
对瑟古德·马歇尔大法官的自由民主理论的解释，主要来自他在两个具有里程碑意义的教育案件中的反对意见:米利肯诉布拉德利案(1974年)和圣安东尼奥诉罗德里格斯案(1973年)。米利肯认为，由于大底特律地区白人占多数的郊区没有被证明存在法律上的种族歧视，联邦法院不能对他们施加多地区救济。在他的异议中，马歇尔认为，米利肯案的判决代表了一个“巨大的倒退”，背离了布朗诉教育委员会案(1954年)中废除种族隔离和平等主义的方向。马歇尔列举了布朗对侵犯性侮辱性伤害案的判决，并解释说，多地区的补救措施将为底特律的非裔美国学童提供救济。虽然罗德里格斯处理的是州立学校资助计划的合宪性，而不是种族隔离的公立学校政策，但马歇尔在1973年的异议中也表达了类似的主题。在罗德里格斯案中，法院裁定德州的方案符合其理性基础检验，因为它促进了“地方控制”，这是一种允许的政府目的。马歇尔认为，德州的法律过于武断，这是不允许的:它严重依赖财产税，这意味着生活在财产贫乏地区的学生被剥夺了平等的教育机会。马歇尔认为，受教育权受到联邦宪法的隐含保障，因为接受适当的教育是行使受保护的政治权利(包括言论自由和选举自由)所不可或缺的。马歇尔将受教育权定义为一种独特的公共利益的权利，只要确保最弱势儿童获得充分和公平资助的教育，就能使他们走上平等公民身份的道路。在马歇尔的实际观点之外，本章认为，马歇尔会认为，“家长参与诉西雅图学区案”(Parents Involved v. Seattle School District, 2007)推翻了学生自愿综合分配的判决是错误的。然而，马歇尔理论的精神在州法院在州立学校财政案件中有利于原告的判决中得以延续。马歇尔的论述与纽约州法院2003年的一项裁决“争取财政公平运动”(Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 2003)有着特别密切的相似之处，因为后者对纽约州宪法所保障的充分教育的定义，参考了高中毕业生为投票和陪审团服务所做的准备。
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