We experimentally study economic migrants’ willingness to take up work and integrate into society, and, in turn, destination country citizens’ willingness to allow economic migrants to pursue formal work and integrate into society and its social security and welfare system. We find clear evidence for a reciprocal relationship between the individuals in these roles. The labor market participation of economic migrants co-moves with destination countries’ openness to welcoming them. We conclude that supporting economic migrants in early labor market attachment is crucial to support a mutually beneficial co-existence in a society.
{"title":"Labor Market Choices of Migrants and Redistributive Policies","authors":"Kerstin Mitterbacher, Stefan Palan, Jürgen Fleiß","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3890497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3890497","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally study economic migrants’ willingness to take up work and integrate into society, and, in turn, destination country citizens’ willingness to allow economic migrants to pursue formal work and integrate into society and its social security and welfare system. We find clear evidence for a reciprocal relationship between the individuals in these roles. The labor market participation of economic migrants co-moves with destination countries’ openness to welcoming them. We conclude that supporting economic migrants in early labor market attachment is crucial to support a mutually beneficial co-existence in a society.","PeriodicalId":378533,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Legislative & Regulatory Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132618013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The question in which we are interested is how a market inhabited by multiple agents, about whom we are differentially uncertain, and who trade goods the use of which imposes a negative effect on others, is to be ideally regulated. We show that a priori asymmetric uncertainty, when combined with a posteriori observed outcomes, is a rich source of information that can be used to reduce aggregate uncertainty. The observation implies that whereas asymmetric information usually entails a cost on welfare, it can help achieve greater efficiency in regulation.
{"title":"Regulating Global Externalities","authors":"R. Heijmans, R. Gerlagh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3312185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3312185","url":null,"abstract":"The question in which we are interested is how a market inhabited by multiple agents, about whom we are differentially uncertain, and who trade goods the use of which imposes a negative effect on others, is to be ideally regulated. We show that a priori asymmetric uncertainty, when combined with a posteriori observed outcomes, is a rich source of information that can be used to reduce aggregate uncertainty. The observation implies that whereas asymmetric information usually entails a cost on welfare, it can help achieve greater efficiency in regulation.","PeriodicalId":378533,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Legislative & Regulatory Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127742555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This submission concerns the draft Personal Data Protection Bill which accompanies the July 2018 Report of the Committee of Experts on Data Protection (‘Srikrishna Report’) appointed by the Indian government. The submission makes five general comments about the Bill, on these topics: 1. The draft Bill is a serious and modern draft law, and should only be strengthened, not weakened by MeitY in preparing a Bill for submission to the legislature. The Indian government has compelling reasons to enact a Bill resembling this draft. 2. The Report and Bill both reflect a very different regulatory philosophy from the EU GDPR’s radical dispersal of decision-making responsibility (and liability for wrong decisions) to data controllers. The Indian model is more prescriptive, but a justifiable regulatory option, provided it does not include excessive discretion to the government or the Data Protection Authority. 3. The Bill's data localisation requirements adopt an unjustifiable generic approach to data localisation, through blanket local copy requirements (with exceptions to be specified by government), and export prohibitions also specified by government. 4. The very broad exemptions from most of the Act for processing in the interests of State security or relating to law enforcement, although purportedly constrained by legality, necessity and proportionality (are dangerously vague). 5. The lack of complete independence of the DPIA, and the lack of any legislatively guaranteed independence by the Adjudicating Officers, represent unsound policy in relation to bodies whose function is to regulate government as well as the private sector. The submission also includes fifteen more specific recommendations for improvements to the Bill.
{"title":"GDPR-Lite and Requiring Strengthening – Submission on the Draft Personal Data Protection Bill to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (India)","authors":"G. Greenleaf","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3252286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3252286","url":null,"abstract":"This submission concerns the draft Personal Data Protection Bill which accompanies the July 2018 Report of the Committee of Experts on Data Protection (‘Srikrishna Report’) appointed by the Indian government. \u0000The submission makes five general comments about the Bill, on these topics: \u00001. The draft Bill is a serious and modern draft law, and should only be strengthened, not weakened by MeitY in preparing a Bill for submission to the legislature. The Indian government has compelling reasons to enact a Bill resembling this draft. \u00002. The Report and Bill both reflect a very different regulatory philosophy from the EU GDPR’s radical dispersal of decision-making responsibility (and liability for wrong decisions) to data controllers. The Indian model is more prescriptive, but a justifiable regulatory option, provided it does not include excessive discretion to the government or the Data Protection Authority. \u00003. The Bill's data localisation requirements adopt an unjustifiable generic approach to data localisation, through blanket local copy requirements (with exceptions to be specified by government), and export prohibitions also specified by government. \u00004. The very broad exemptions from most of the Act for processing in the interests of State security or relating to law enforcement, although purportedly constrained by legality, necessity and proportionality (are dangerously vague). \u00005. The lack of complete independence of the DPIA, and the lack of any legislatively guaranteed independence by the Adjudicating Officers, represent unsound policy in relation to bodies whose function is to regulate government as well as the private sector. \u0000The submission also includes fifteen more specific recommendations for improvements to the Bill.","PeriodicalId":378533,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Legislative & Regulatory Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122908162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
FATCA and CRS have a major flaw that enables tax evaders to avoid reporting of their offshore financial assets. This noncompliance opportunity stems from the fact that many private entities are classified under FATCA and CRS as “financial institutions” (“FIs”), and as such these entities are required to report their beneficial owners. Where a tax evader holds financial assets through a private entity that he or she owns and manages, it is unlikely that this entity will report its owner to the tax authorities. At the same time, banks and other FIs that maintain the financial accounts of such entities are not required to report these entities’ beneficial owners. Therefore, to avoid reporting, tax evaders can simply hold financial assets through private entities that are classified as FIs. This noncompliance opportunity is a result of a wrong choice of who to regulate. The drafters of FATCA and CRS decided to impose obligations on many private entities to report their beneficial owners, instead of imposing these obligations on banks and other FIs that maintain the financial assets of such entities. This policy also results in higher compliance costs for compliant taxpayers, and larger distortions and deadweight loss. Thus, it benefits tax evaders and harms compliant taxpayers. This Article proposes solutions that the U.S. Treasury and the OECD should consider. Building on this analysis, this Article explores a general question of regulatory design: how to choose which group of agents should be required to satisfy a regulatory obligation where that obligation can be imposed on one of two or more alternative groups of agents. When making this decision, the designers of the regulation should consider the cost-effectiveness of compliance, the potential distortions, and the likelihood of noncompliance for each of the alternative groups.
{"title":"FATCA, CRS, and the Wrong Choice of Who to Regulate","authors":"Noam Noked","doi":"10.5744/FTR.2018.1016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5744/FTR.2018.1016","url":null,"abstract":"FATCA and CRS have a major flaw that enables tax evaders to avoid reporting of their offshore financial assets. This noncompliance opportunity stems from the fact that many private entities are classified under FATCA and CRS as “financial institutions” (“FIs”), and as such these entities are required to report their beneficial owners. Where a tax evader holds financial assets through a private entity that he or she owns and manages, it is unlikely that this entity will report its owner to the tax authorities. At the same time, banks and other FIs that maintain the financial accounts of such entities are not required to report these entities’ beneficial owners. Therefore, to avoid reporting, tax evaders can simply hold financial assets through private entities that are classified as FIs. \u0000 \u0000This noncompliance opportunity is a result of a wrong choice of who to regulate. The drafters of FATCA and CRS decided to impose obligations on many private entities to report their beneficial owners, instead of imposing these obligations on banks and other FIs that maintain the financial assets of such entities. This policy also results in higher compliance costs for compliant taxpayers, and larger distortions and deadweight loss. Thus, it benefits tax evaders and harms compliant taxpayers. This Article proposes solutions that the U.S. Treasury and the OECD should consider. \u0000 \u0000Building on this analysis, this Article explores a general question of regulatory design: how to choose which group of agents should be required to satisfy a regulatory obligation where that obligation can be imposed on one of two or more alternative groups of agents. When making this decision, the designers of the regulation should consider the cost-effectiveness of compliance, the potential distortions, and the likelihood of noncompliance for each of the alternative groups.","PeriodicalId":378533,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Legislative & Regulatory Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127391653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Armed with a set of economic theories and a desire to influence policy and improve lives, behavioral economists have developed a doctrine variously referred to as libertarian, light/soft, or asymmetric paternalism, and a series of policy proposals collectively referred to as the nudge agenda. To its advocates, the nudge agenda allows us to improve people’s choices and thereby their well-being on their own terms at minimal cost and without interfering with their liberty or autonomy. To its critics, the nudge agenda represents an ineffective and dangerous intrusion into the sphere of personal decision-making by bureaucrats who may be no better at making decisions than the people whose choices they are trying to improve. This paper reviews what libertarian paternalism and the nudge agenda are, how their foundations differ (or not) from those of neoclassical economics, and what their promises and limitations might be.
{"title":"Behavioral Welfare Economics, Libertarian Paternalism, and the Nudge Agenda","authors":"Erik Angner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2580523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2580523","url":null,"abstract":"Armed with a set of economic theories and a desire to influence policy and improve lives, behavioral economists have developed a doctrine variously referred to as libertarian, light/soft, or asymmetric paternalism, and a series of policy proposals collectively referred to as the nudge agenda. To its advocates, the nudge agenda allows us to improve people’s choices and thereby their well-being on their own terms at minimal cost and without interfering with their liberty or autonomy. To its critics, the nudge agenda represents an ineffective and dangerous intrusion into the sphere of personal decision-making by bureaucrats who may be no better at making decisions than the people whose choices they are trying to improve. This paper reviews what libertarian paternalism and the nudge agenda are, how their foundations differ (or not) from those of neoclassical economics, and what their promises and limitations might be.","PeriodicalId":378533,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Legislative & Regulatory Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116017080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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