{"title":"Value Blindness","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":403721,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117117106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Back Matter","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":403721,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130000703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Love and Happiness","authors":"Charlene Johnson","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":403721,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121284697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Epistemology","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":403721,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129974287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Concept of Value","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":403721,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133735846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":403721,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131492708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Acknowledgments","authors":"Martin Cajthaml","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvpbnncm.4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":403721,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120848177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-20DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199696536.003.0010
B. Weatherson
This chapter argues that epistemic akrasia is rationally permissible. The first task is to describe just what akrasia comes to. Loosely speaking, it is having a belief and thinking one should not have this belief, but there are three importantly different ways to make this precise. Unlike in the previous chapter, there is a systematic reason why none of these will pose a problem to normative externalism. There is no kind of akrasia that is licensed by normative externalism that is not made independently plausible by the failure of evidence to be, in Timothy Williamson’s sense, luminous. All of the arguments against akrasia work equally well, or perhaps we should say equally poorly, as arguments against the luminosity of evidence. The chapter ends with a discussion of the desire as belief arguments, and in particular with an argument that luminosity failures threaten the idea that expected values can be in any way guiding.
{"title":"Akrasia","authors":"B. Weatherson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780199696536.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696536.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that epistemic akrasia is rationally permissible. The first task is to describe just what akrasia comes to. Loosely speaking, it is having a belief and thinking one should not have this belief, but there are three importantly different ways to make this precise. Unlike in the previous chapter, there is a systematic reason why none of these will pose a problem to normative externalism. There is no kind of akrasia that is licensed by normative externalism that is not made independently plausible by the failure of evidence to be, in Timothy Williamson’s sense, luminous. All of the arguments against akrasia work equally well, or perhaps we should say equally poorly, as arguments against the luminosity of evidence. The chapter ends with a discussion of the desire as belief arguments, and in particular with an argument that luminosity failures threaten the idea that expected values can be in any way guiding.","PeriodicalId":403721,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125507870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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