Corporate ownership and financing in Japan in the 20th century are striking. In the first half of the 20th century equity markets were active in raising more than 50% of the external financing of Japanese companies. Ownership was dispersed both by the standards of other developed economies at the time and even by those of the UK and U.S. today. In the second half of the 20th century, bank finance dominated external finance and interlocking shareholdings by banks and companies became widespread. The change from equity to bank finance and from an outsider system of public equity markets to an insider system in the middle of the 20th century coincided precisely with a marked increase in investor protection. Informal institutional arrangements rather than formal investor protection explain the existence of equity in the first half of the century - business co-ordinators in the early 20th century and zaibatsu later. Insider ownership in the form of bank ownership and cross-shareholdings emerged in the second half of the century as a response to the failure of minority shareholder protection, the needs of Japanese institutions to raise new equity for fast growing firms, and for the financial restructuring of failing firms.
{"title":"Equity Markets and Institutions: The Case of Japan","authors":"J. Franks, C. Mayer, H. Miyajima","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1362613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1362613","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate ownership and financing in Japan in the 20th century are striking. In the first half of the 20th century equity markets were active in raising more than 50% of the external financing of Japanese companies. Ownership was dispersed both by the standards of other developed economies at the time and even by those of the UK and U.S. today. In the second half of the 20th century, bank finance dominated external finance and interlocking shareholdings by banks and companies became widespread. The change from equity to bank finance and from an outsider system of public equity markets to an insider system in the middle of the 20th century coincided precisely with a marked increase in investor protection. Informal institutional arrangements rather than formal investor protection explain the existence of equity in the first half of the century - business co-ordinators in the early 20th century and zaibatsu later. Insider ownership in the form of bank ownership and cross-shareholdings emerged in the second half of the century as a response to the failure of minority shareholder protection, the needs of Japanese institutions to raise new equity for fast growing firms, and for the financial restructuring of failing firms.","PeriodicalId":40570,"journal":{"name":"Securities Regulation Law Journal","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89914496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper introduces a cross-country law and finance analysis of the regulatory impact on the level of capital flows and the sensitivity of capital flows in response to prior performance (that is, the ‘flow-performance’ relationship) in the hedge fund industry. The data indicate that distribution channels in the form of wrappers (securities that combine different products) mitigate flow-performance sensitivity. Distribution channels via investment managers and fund distribution companies enhance flow-performance sensitivity. Funds registered in countries which have larger minimum capitalization requirements have higher levels of capital flows. Funds registered in countries which restrict the location of key service providers have lower levels of capital flows. Further, offshore fund flows and calendar effects evidenced in the data are consistent with tax factors influencing capital flows. The findings are robust to selection effects for offshore registrants, among other robustness checks.
{"title":"Capital Flows and Hedge Fund Regulation","authors":"Douglas J. Cumming, Na Dai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1026683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1026683","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a cross-country law and finance analysis of the regulatory impact on the level of capital flows and the sensitivity of capital flows in response to prior performance (that is, the ‘flow-performance’ relationship) in the hedge fund industry. The data indicate that distribution channels in the form of wrappers (securities that combine different products) mitigate flow-performance sensitivity. Distribution channels via investment managers and fund distribution companies enhance flow-performance sensitivity. Funds registered in countries which have larger minimum capitalization requirements have higher levels of capital flows. Funds registered in countries which restrict the location of key service providers have lower levels of capital flows. Further, offshore fund flows and calendar effects evidenced in the data are consistent with tax factors influencing capital flows. The findings are robust to selection effects for offshore registrants, among other robustness checks.","PeriodicalId":40570,"journal":{"name":"Securities Regulation Law Journal","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79696546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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