Pub Date : 2016-04-11DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579999
Marta Z. Kwiatkowska
We are witnessing a huge growth of cyber-physical systems, which are autonomous, mobile, endowed with sensing, controlled by software, and often wirelessly connected and Internet-enabled. They include factory automation systems, robotic assistants, self-driving cars, and wearable and implantable devices. Since they are increasingly often used in safety- or business-critical contexts, to mention invasive treatment or biometric authentication, there is an urgent need for modelling and verification technologies to support the design process, and hence improve the reliability and reduce production costs. This paper gives an overview of quantitative verification and synthesis techniques developed for cyber-physical systems, summarising recent achievements and future challenges in this important field.
{"title":"Advances and challenges of quantitative verification and synthesis for cyber-physical systems","authors":"Marta Z. Kwiatkowska","doi":"10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579999","url":null,"abstract":"We are witnessing a huge growth of cyber-physical systems, which are autonomous, mobile, endowed with sensing, controlled by software, and often wirelessly connected and Internet-enabled. They include factory automation systems, robotic assistants, self-driving cars, and wearable and implantable devices. Since they are increasingly often used in safety- or business-critical contexts, to mention invasive treatment or biometric authentication, there is an urgent need for modelling and verification technologies to support the design process, and hence improve the reliability and reduce production costs. This paper gives an overview of quantitative verification and synthesis techniques developed for cyber-physical systems, summarising recent achievements and future challenges in this important field.","PeriodicalId":422727,"journal":{"name":"2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS)","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131996681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-04-11DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580000
G. Malecha, Daniel Ricketts, Mario M. Alvarez, Sorin Lerner
The safety-critical aspects of cyber-physical systems motivate the need for rigorous analysis of these systems. In the literature this work is often done using idealized models of systems where the analysis can be carried out using high-level reasoning techniques such as Lyapunov functions and model checking. In this paper we present VERIDRONE, a foundational framework for reasoning about cyber-physical systems at all levels from high-level models to C code that implements the system. VERIDRONE is a library within the Coq proof assistant enabling us to build on its foundational implementation, its interactive development environments, and its wealth of libraries capturing interesting theories ranging from real numbers and differential equations to verified compilers and floating point numbers. These features make proof assistants in general, and Coq in particular, a powerful platform for unifying foundational results about safety-critical systems and ensuring interesting properties at all levels of the stack.
{"title":"Towards foundational verification of cyber-physical systems","authors":"G. Malecha, Daniel Ricketts, Mario M. Alvarez, Sorin Lerner","doi":"10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580000","url":null,"abstract":"The safety-critical aspects of cyber-physical systems motivate the need for rigorous analysis of these systems. In the literature this work is often done using idealized models of systems where the analysis can be carried out using high-level reasoning techniques such as Lyapunov functions and model checking. In this paper we present VERIDRONE, a foundational framework for reasoning about cyber-physical systems at all levels from high-level models to C code that implements the system. VERIDRONE is a library within the Coq proof assistant enabling us to build on its foundational implementation, its interactive development environments, and its wealth of libraries capturing interesting theories ranging from real numbers and differential equations to verified compilers and floating point numbers. These features make proof assistants in general, and Coq in particular, a powerful platform for unifying foundational results about safety-critical systems and ensuring interesting properties at all levels of the stack.","PeriodicalId":422727,"journal":{"name":"2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122824828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-04-11DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580001
H. Sandberg, André M. H. Teixeira
In this paper, we investigate detectability and identifiability of attacks on linear dynamical systems that are subjected to external disturbances. We generalize a concept for a security index, which was previously introduced for static systems. The index exactly quantifies the resources necessary for targeted attacks to be undetectable and unidentifiable in the presence of disturbances. This information is useful for both risk assessment and for the design of anomaly detectors. Finally, we show how techniques from the fault detection literature can be used to decouple disturbances and to identify attacks, under certain sparsity constraints.
{"title":"From control system security indices to attack identifiability","authors":"H. Sandberg, André M. H. Teixeira","doi":"10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580001","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate detectability and identifiability of attacks on linear dynamical systems that are subjected to external disturbances. We generalize a concept for a security index, which was previously introduced for static systems. The index exactly quantifies the resources necessary for targeted attacks to be undetectable and unidentifiable in the presence of disturbances. This information is useful for both risk assessment and for the design of anomaly detectors. Finally, we show how techniques from the fault detection literature can be used to decouple disturbances and to identify attacks, under certain sparsity constraints.","PeriodicalId":422727,"journal":{"name":"2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS)","volume":"37 15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125704030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-04-11DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579997
Saurabh Amin
The theory of robust control models the controller-disturbance interaction as a game where disturbance is nonstrategic. The proviso of a deliberately malicious (strategic) attacker should be considered to increase the robustness of infrastructure systems. This has become especially important since many IT systems supporting critical functionalities are vulnerable to exploits by attackers. While the usefulness of game theory methods for modeling cyber-security is well established in the literature, new game theoretic models of cyber-physical security are needed for deriving useful insights on "optimal" attack plans and defender responses, both in terms of allocation of resources and operational strategies of these players. This whitepaper presents some progress and challenges in using game-theoretic models for security of infrastructure networks. Main insights from the following models are presented: (i) Network security game on flow networks under strategic edge disruptions; (ii) Interdiction problem on distribution networks under node disruptions; (iii) Inspection game to monitor commercial non-technical losses (e.g. energy diversion); and (iv) Interdependent security game of networked control systems under communication failures. These models can be used to analyze the attacker-defender interactions in a class of cyber-physical security scenarios.
{"title":"Security games on infrastructure networks","authors":"Saurabh Amin","doi":"10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579997","url":null,"abstract":"The theory of robust control models the controller-disturbance interaction as a game where disturbance is nonstrategic. The proviso of a deliberately malicious (strategic) attacker should be considered to increase the robustness of infrastructure systems. This has become especially important since many IT systems supporting critical functionalities are vulnerable to exploits by attackers. While the usefulness of game theory methods for modeling cyber-security is well established in the literature, new game theoretic models of cyber-physical security are needed for deriving useful insights on \"optimal\" attack plans and defender responses, both in terms of allocation of resources and operational strategies of these players. This whitepaper presents some progress and challenges in using game-theoretic models for security of infrastructure networks. Main insights from the following models are presented: (i) Network security game on flow networks under strategic edge disruptions; (ii) Interdiction problem on distribution networks under node disruptions; (iii) Inspection game to monitor commercial non-technical losses (e.g. energy diversion); and (iv) Interdependent security game of networked control systems under communication failures. These models can be used to analyze the attacker-defender interactions in a class of cyber-physical security scenarios.","PeriodicalId":422727,"journal":{"name":"2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127057021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-04-11DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579998
Anupam Datta, S. Kar, B. Sinopoli, Sean Weerakkody
Our position is that a key component of securing cyber-physical systems (CPS) is to develop a theory of accountability that encompasses both control and computing systems. We envision that a unified theory of accountability in CPS can be built on a foundation of causal information flow analysis. This theory will support design and analysis of mechanisms at various stages of the accountability regime: attack detection, responsibility-assignment (e.g., attack identification or localization), and corrective measures (e.g., via resilient control) As an initial step in this direction, we summarize our results on attack detection in control systems. We use the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence as a causal information flow measure. We then recover, using information flow analyses, a set of existing results in the literature that were previously proved using different techniques. These results cover passive detection, stealthy attack characterization, and active detection. This research direction is related to recent work on accountability in computational systems [1], [2], [3], [4]. We envision that by casting accountability theories in computing and control systems in terms of causal information flow, we can provide a common foundation to develop a theory for CPS that compose elements from both domains.
{"title":"Accountability in cyber-physical systems","authors":"Anupam Datta, S. Kar, B. Sinopoli, Sean Weerakkody","doi":"10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7579998","url":null,"abstract":"Our position is that a key component of securing cyber-physical systems (CPS) is to develop a theory of accountability that encompasses both control and computing systems. We envision that a unified theory of accountability in CPS can be built on a foundation of causal information flow analysis. This theory will support design and analysis of mechanisms at various stages of the accountability regime: attack detection, responsibility-assignment (e.g., attack identification or localization), and corrective measures (e.g., via resilient control) As an initial step in this direction, we summarize our results on attack detection in control systems. We use the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence as a causal information flow measure. We then recover, using information flow analyses, a set of existing results in the literature that were previously proved using different techniques. These results cover passive detection, stealthy attack characterization, and active detection. This research direction is related to recent work on accountability in computational systems [1], [2], [3], [4]. We envision that by casting accountability theories in computing and control systems in terms of causal information flow, we can provide a common foundation to develop a theory for CPS that compose elements from both domains.","PeriodicalId":422727,"journal":{"name":"2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS)","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123416860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-04-11DOI: 10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580002
Walter Lucia, B. Sinopoli, G. Franzé
In this paper a novel set-theoretic control framework for Cyber-Physical Systems is presented. By resorting to set-theoretic ideas, an anomaly detector module and a control remediation strategy are formally derived with the aim to contrast cyber False Data Injection (FDI) attacks affecting the communication channels. The resulting scheme ensures Uniformly Ultimate Boundedness and constraints fulfillment regardless of any admissible attack scenario.
{"title":"A set-theoretic approach for secure and resilient control of Cyber-Physical Systems subject to false data injection attacks","authors":"Walter Lucia, B. Sinopoli, G. Franzé","doi":"10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SOSCYPS.2016.7580002","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper a novel set-theoretic control framework for Cyber-Physical Systems is presented. By resorting to set-theoretic ideas, an anomaly detector module and a control remediation strategy are formally derived with the aim to contrast cyber False Data Injection (FDI) attacks affecting the communication channels. The resulting scheme ensures Uniformly Ultimate Boundedness and constraints fulfillment regardless of any admissible attack scenario.","PeriodicalId":422727,"journal":{"name":"2016 Science of Security for Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop (SOSCYPS)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130714485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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