Pub Date : 2019-02-14DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198826903.003.0005
Quassim Cassam
This chapter discusses the view, associated with David Hume and Saul Kripke, that the supposed epistemic vice of dogmatism can play a positive role in protecting our knowledge. It discusses Kripke’s dogmatism paradox and Kuhn’s view that dogmatism can play a positive role in normal science. This chapter argues that the supposed epistemic benefits of dogmatism have been greatly exaggerated and its epistemic drawbacks underestimated. The appropriate response to the claims of Holocaust deniers and other conspiracy theorists is not to avoid or ignore them but to rebut them. Knowers have responsibilities, including the responsibility not to dismiss challenges to their beliefs without good reason.
{"title":"Vice and Knowledge","authors":"Quassim Cassam","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198826903.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198826903.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the view, associated with David Hume and Saul Kripke, that the supposed epistemic vice of dogmatism can play a positive role in protecting our knowledge. It discusses Kripke’s dogmatism paradox and Kuhn’s view that dogmatism can play a positive role in normal science. This chapter argues that the supposed epistemic benefits of dogmatism have been greatly exaggerated and its epistemic drawbacks underestimated. The appropriate response to the claims of Holocaust deniers and other conspiracy theorists is not to avoid or ignore them but to rebut them. Knowers have responsibilities, including the responsibility not to dismiss challenges to their beliefs without good reason.","PeriodicalId":431978,"journal":{"name":"Vices of the Mind","volume":"244 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122720607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-14DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198826903.003.0006
Quassim Cassam
This chapter explains and defends the distinction between blame and criticism and makes the case that epistemic vices can merit criticism even if they aren’t blameworthy. We are blameworthy for our epistemic vices only if they are epistemically harmful and we are, in the relevant sense, responsible for them. A distinction is drawn between responsibility for acquiring a vice (‘acquisition responsibility’) and responsibility for having a vice that one can change or revise (‘revision responsibility’). Revision responsibility requires the ability to control or modify the vice in question and there are three different varieties of control: voluntary, evaluative, and managerial. To the extent that we have effective control over our character vices that control is managerial rather than voluntary or evaluative.
{"title":"Vice and Responsibility","authors":"Quassim Cassam","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198826903.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198826903.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explains and defends the distinction between blame and criticism and makes the case that epistemic vices can merit criticism even if they aren’t blameworthy. We are blameworthy for our epistemic vices only if they are epistemically harmful and we are, in the relevant sense, responsible for them. A distinction is drawn between responsibility for acquiring a vice (‘acquisition responsibility’) and responsibility for having a vice that one can change or revise (‘revision responsibility’). Revision responsibility requires the ability to control or modify the vice in question and there are three different varieties of control: voluntary, evaluative, and managerial. To the extent that we have effective control over our character vices that control is managerial rather than voluntary or evaluative.","PeriodicalId":431978,"journal":{"name":"Vices of the Mind","volume":"313 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131646906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-14DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198826903.003.0001
Quassim Cassam
This chapter explains and defends obstructivism about epistemic vice, the view that epistemic vices are blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible character traits, attitudes, or ways of thinking that systematically obstruct the gaining, keeping, or sharing of knowledge. It explains how epistemic vices get in the way of knowledge and criticizes motivational accounts of epistemic vice. Obstructivism focuses on the epistemic consequences of epistemic vices and is a form of consequentialism. The focus in this chapter is on arrogance and its role in obstructing the acquisition and sharing of knowledge during preparations for the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. Epistemic vices are distinguished from mere cognitive defects and an account is given of different senses in which we might have responsibility for our own epistemic vices.
{"title":"The Anatomy of Vice","authors":"Quassim Cassam","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198826903.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198826903.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explains and defends obstructivism about epistemic vice, the view that epistemic vices are blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible character traits, attitudes, or ways of thinking that systematically obstruct the gaining, keeping, or sharing of knowledge. It explains how epistemic vices get in the way of knowledge and criticizes motivational accounts of epistemic vice. Obstructivism focuses on the epistemic consequences of epistemic vices and is a form of consequentialism. The focus in this chapter is on arrogance and its role in obstructing the acquisition and sharing of knowledge during preparations for the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. Epistemic vices are distinguished from mere cognitive defects and an account is given of different senses in which we might have responsibility for our own epistemic vices.","PeriodicalId":431978,"journal":{"name":"Vices of the Mind","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114576394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-24DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198826903.003.0002
Quassim Cassam
This chapter focuses on epistemic vices that are character traits and, in particular, on the epistemic vice of closed-mindedness. The nature and significance of this epistemic vice is explained by reference of the failure of Israeli intelligence to anticipate the 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack on Israel. Closed-mindedness is a high-fidelity epistemic vice, that is, one that requires a high degree of behavioural consistency. It is underpinned in many cases by a high need for closure and a low tolerance for ambiguity. Character accounts of epistemic vice are not undermined by situationism but they do need to acknowledge the insights of structuralism since flawed epistemic conduct can have structural as well as personal explanations.
{"title":"A Question of Character","authors":"Quassim Cassam","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198826903.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198826903.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on epistemic vices that are character traits and, in particular, on the epistemic vice of closed-mindedness. The nature and significance of this epistemic vice is explained by reference of the failure of Israeli intelligence to anticipate the 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack on Israel. Closed-mindedness is a high-fidelity epistemic vice, that is, one that requires a high degree of behavioural consistency. It is underpinned in many cases by a high need for closure and a low tolerance for ambiguity. Character accounts of epistemic vice are not undermined by situationism but they do need to acknowledge the insights of structuralism since flawed epistemic conduct can have structural as well as personal explanations.","PeriodicalId":431978,"journal":{"name":"Vices of the Mind","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116538930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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