Pub Date : 2019-10-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198851059.003.0001
Laura Rosella Schluderer
In line with the growing recognition of fifth century Pythagoreans as the main developers of a Pythagorean philosophy, the article offers a reconstruction of Philolaus’ metaphysical framework, arguing for its potential explanatory power and anticipating some key notions in ancient metaphysics. Starting from the scala naturae in B13, I reconstruct Philolaus’ overall metaphysical framework from his fragments, exploring how it might have worked when applied to micro-macrocosmic ontology. Key to this reconstruction is musical harmony. It is shown how, by using musical harmony as a paradigm and making explicit its mathematical structure, Philolaus (a) possessed a rather sophisticated explanatory framework, capable of accounting for the complex structure of the cosmos and of living beings; and (b) began to grasp the importance of a normative, abstract, structural principles working at a different metaphysical level from the constituents of things, thus anticipating Aristotle’s distinction between material and formal causes.
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Pub Date : 2019-10-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198851059.003.0002
D. Sedley
The Timaeus, I argue, encodes in its cryptic opening lines Plato’s confirmation that the dialogue represents his own views. This corresponds to the fact that a series of metaphysical, psychological, and ethical theses defended by the main speakers of other dialogues are displayed in Timaeus’ speech as components of a global system. Which in turn provides neglected support for the too often dismissed ‘mouthpiece theory’. Although these doctrines can look a little unfamiliar when they reappear in the Timaeus, that need not represent a change of mind on Plato’s part, just the fact that they are being viewed from the point of view of physics—the physics of tripartition, the physics of Form-participation, etc. Once we see how Timaeus’ presentation draws on Platonic doctrine, I argue, we can use this lesson to see how yet another Platonic doctrine, that of Recollection, puts in a hitherto unnoticed appearance in the dialogue.
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Pub Date : 2019-10-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198851059.003.0004
F. González
In a lengthy and important article, M. F. Burnyeat has argued that the passage found at Metaphysics 1048b18-36, in which Aristotle distinguishes sharply between kinēsis and energeia, though written by Aristotle, does not belong in its current context in Book Theta. The present paper aims to show that the philological, philosophical, and historical arguments adduced in favor of this thesis do not stand up to scrutiny. More positively, the paper aims to establish the indispensable role the passage plays within Book Theta in making the connection between energeia and being a telos, as well as the indispensable role it plays within the Metaphysics as a whole, by developing a conception of being as a complete activity that makes possible the characterization of the highest being as an unmoved mover.
在一篇冗长而重要的文章中，M. F. Burnyeat认为，亚里士多德在《形而上学》1048b18-36中对kinēsis和energeia进行了深刻区分的段落，虽然是亚里士多德写的，但不属于Theta书的当前背景。本文旨在表明，支持这一论点的语言学、哲学和历史论点经不起推究。更积极的是，本文旨在通过发展存在作为一个完整的活动的概念，使最高存在作为一个不动的行动者的特征成为可能，来确立这篇文章在西塔书中所扮演的不可或缺的角色，在建立能量和作为一个终极目标之间的联系方面，以及它在形而上学中作为一个整体所扮演的不可或缺的角色。
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Pub Date : 2019-10-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198851059.003.0003
Mehmet M. Erginel
In this paper I aim to show that the restoration model of pleasure as we find it in Plato’s Gorgias, Republic, Timaeus, and Philebus contains a common psychological core, despite the substantial developments and greater sophistication in the later works. I argue that, contrary to the scholarly consensus, all four dialogues take the necessary condition for pain to be a state of imbalance or disharmony rather than a process of destruction or deterioration. Given that the necessary condition for pleasure is a process of restoration, it follows that the restoration model offers a strikingly asymmetrical account of pleasure and pain. This unorthodox interpretation of pain is not only favoured by the textual evidence but is also more charitable, as it attributes to Plato a more plausible view of impure pleasures, a more realistic account of desire, and a more compelling argument for the greater pleasantness of the philosophical life.
{"title":"Plato on Pleasures Mixed with Pains","authors":"Mehmet M. Erginel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198851059.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851059.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I aim to show that the restoration model of pleasure as we find it in Plato’s Gorgias, Republic, Timaeus, and Philebus contains a common psychological core, despite the substantial developments and greater sophistication in the later works. I argue that, contrary to the scholarly consensus, all four dialogues take the necessary condition for pain to be a state of imbalance or disharmony rather than a process of destruction or deterioration. Given that the necessary condition for pleasure is a process of restoration, it follows that the restoration model offers a strikingly asymmetrical account of pleasure and pain. This unorthodox interpretation of pain is not only favoured by the textual evidence but is also more charitable, as it attributes to Plato a more plausible view of impure pleasures, a more realistic account of desire, and a more compelling argument for the greater pleasantness of the philosophical life.","PeriodicalId":432124,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 56","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121372311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198851059.003.0005
Diego E. Machuca
In his account of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus talks about the disturbance concerning matters of opinion that afflicts his dogmatic rivals and that he himself was afflicted by before his conversion to Pyrrhonism. The aim of the present paper is to identify the distinct sources of doxastic disturbance that can be found in that account, and to determine whether and, if so, how they are related. The thesis to be defended is that it is possible to discern three sources of doxastic disturbance and that two of them are to be explained by reference to the third, which is the real cause of mental distress. The paper also considers whether the thesis in question entails that there is no reason for the Pyrrhonist to suspend judgment across the board, but only to suspend judgment about evaluative matters.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198851059.003.0006
Tamer Nawar
In his Contra Academicos, Augustine offers one of the most detailed responses to scepticism to have come down to us from antiquity. In this paper, I examine Augustine’s defence of the existence of infallible knowledge in Contra Academicos 3, focusing on his semantic response to external world scepticism and his appeal to mathematical knowledge to argue against the sceptical thesis that nothing is known. I challenge a number of established views concerning the nature and merit of Augustine’s defence of knowledge and propose a new understanding of several important elements of Augustine’s thought concerning signification, cognition, and object-directed thought. I argue that once we properly understand Augustine’s views on these matters his arguments in defence of knowledge are more interesting and more successful than usually thought.
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