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Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Compatibilities and Incompatibilities 不可分割物品的两人公平划分:兼容性和不兼容性
Pub Date : 2021-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3911298
S. Brams, M. Kilgour, Christian Klamler
Suppose two players wish to divide a finite set of indivisible items, over which each distributes a specified number of points. Assuming the utility of a player’s bundle is the sum of the points it assigns to the items it contains, we analyze what divisions are fair. We show that if there is an envy-free (EF) allocation of the items, two other desirable properties — Pareto-optimality (PO) and maximinality (MM) — can also be satisfied, rendering these three properties compatible, but other properties — balance (BL), maximum Nash welfare (MNW), maximum total welfare (MTW), and lexicographic optimality (LO) — may fail. If there is no EF division, as is likely, it is always possible to satisfy EFx, a weaker form of EF, but an EFx allocation may not be PO, BL, MNW, MTW, or LO. Moreover, if one player considers an item worthless (i.e., assigns zero points to it), an EFx division may be Pareto dominated by a nonEFx allocation that is MNW. Although these incompatibilities suggest that there is no “perfect” 2-person fair division of indivisible items, EFx and MNW divisions — if they give different allocations when there is no EF-PO-MM division — seem the most compelling alternatives, with EFx, we conjecture, satisfying the Rawlsian objective of helping the worse-off player and MNW, a modification of MTW, suggesting a more Benthamite view.
假设两个玩家想要划分一组有限的不可分割的物品,每个人分配指定数量的点数。假设玩家捆绑包的效用是分配给它所包含的物品的点数之和,我们分析哪种划分是公平的。我们表明,如果存在无嫉妒(EF)分配项目,其他两个理想属性-帕累托最优性(PO)和最大性(MM) -也可以得到满足,使这三个属性兼容,但其他属性-平衡(BL),最大纳什福利(MNW),最大总福利(MTW)和字典最优性(LO) -可能会失败。如果没有EF划分(这是很可能的),总是有可能满足EFx (EF的一种较弱形式),但EFx分配可能不是PO、BL、MNW、MTW或LO。此外,如果一名玩家认为某件物品毫无价值(即,给它分配零分),那么EFx分配可能是由非EFx分配(即MNW)支配的帕累托分配。虽然这些不兼容性表明没有“完美”的2人公平分配不可分割的物品,EFx和MNW划分-如果他们在没有EF-PO-MM划分时给出不同的分配-似乎是最引人注目的替代方案,我们推测,EFx满足罗尔斯的目标,帮助情况较差的玩家和MNW, MTW的修改,建议更边沁的观点。
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引用次数: 0
Organization and Bargaining: Sales Process Choice at Auto Dealerships 组织与议价:汽车经销商的销售流程选择
Pub Date : 2012-11-19 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1691
V. M. Bennett
This paper examines how firms’ organizational form affects prices negotiated. Negotiated prices are one factor determining whether a vendor or customer captures the value from a transaction. Firms that systematically negotiate more effectively capture more value. Research has investigated individual- and market-level determinants of negotiation outcomes, but little has been done on the firm-level determinants of negotiated prices. I present a first look at one feature, sales process: whether salespeople handle the entire sale in parallel or customers begin with less experienced salespeople who can escalate difficult assignments. I model firms’ choice of sales process as a biform game and test predictions of the model using a combination of transaction-level data on new car purchases in the U.S. and a unique survey of dealership management practices. I find that a serial process has implications consistent with improving firms’ bargaining power and reducing customers’ outside option.
本文考察了企业组织形式对谈判价格的影响。协商价格是决定供应商或客户是否从交易中获取价值的一个因素。系统化谈判更有效的公司能获得更多的价值。研究调查了谈判结果的个人和市场层面的决定因素,但对谈判价格的公司层面决定因素的研究很少。我首先介绍了一个特征,销售流程:销售人员是并行处理整个销售,还是客户从经验不足的销售人员开始,他们会把困难的任务升级。我将公司对销售过程的选择建模为一个统一的游戏,并使用美国新车购买的交易级数据和对经销商管理实践的独特调查相结合来测试模型的预测。我发现,序列过程具有与提高企业议价能力和减少客户外部选择一致的含义。
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引用次数: 55
Revisiting 'The [Social-Cognitive] Nature of Salience': Social-Cognitive Effort Focuses Attention on the 'Next-Most Obvious' Bargaining Compromise -- Equal Shares 重新审视“突出性的[社会认知]本质”:社会认知努力将注意力集中在“下一个最明显的”讨价还价妥协上——平等份额
Pub Date : 2012-06-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2136587
John Voiklis, J. Nickerson
Collaborators often invest unequal resources towards a common good. Without agreement on sharing that good, collaboration might devolve into parallel, possibly competitive, individual efforts. Reaching agreement requires bargaining. Before bargaining, collaborators independently decide how much to demand and how little to accept. These decisions constitute a tacit form of bargaining. When collaborators cannot verify a common construal of fairness, tacit agreement on equal shares offers the next-most obvious (least unfair) compromise between conflicting interests. Across two experiments, we show that reasoning to this conclusion requires more social-cognitive effort than people automatically expend. Participants played a card game with an alleged opponent and shared the resulting prize. Social-cognitive practice prior to tacit bargaining increased egalitarian proposals. Experiment 2 ruled out facilitation through general-cognitive effort or improvements in social-reasoning skills. Instead, we found that cognitive perspective-takers minimize unfairness, while affective perspective-takers seek minimal fairness. We discuss the differing implications of these motivations.
合作者经常为共同利益投入不相等的资源。如果不能就分享成果达成一致,合作就可能演变成平行的、可能是竞争的、个人的努力。达成协议需要讨价还价。在讨价还价之前,合作者独立决定要求多少,接受多少。这些决定构成了一种默契的讨价还价形式。当合作者无法验证对公平的共同解释时,关于平等份额的默契提供了冲突利益之间第二明显(最不公平)的妥协。通过两个实验,我们表明,得出这个结论需要比人们自动花费更多的社会认知努力。参与者与所谓的对手玩纸牌游戏,并分享结果的奖金。在隐性谈判之前的社会认知实践增加了平等主义提议。实验2排除了通过一般认知努力或社会推理技能的提高来促进的可能性。相反,我们发现认知型观点采纳者会将不公平最小化,而情感型观点采纳者则会将公平最小化。我们将讨论这些动机的不同含义。
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引用次数: 0
Risk Allocation in Acquisitions: The Uses and Value of MAE-Exclusions. 收购中的风险分配:mae排除的用途和价值。
Pub Date : 2011-10-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1392304
Antonio J. Macias
Acquirers and targets define and allocate interim risk through Material-Adverse-Event (MAE) exclusions in merger agreements. I examine why MAE-exclusions exist based on the risk they address and assess whether such risk allocation affects the gains in the acquisition. Targets and acquirers seem to use MAE-exclusions to signal target quality to reduce information asymmetry, and to allocate exogenous risk on the acquirer. I find little support for the use of MAE-exclusions to create commitment to alleviate moral hazard. Moreover, higher protection for the acquirer against information asymmetry on the target increases the value created by the acquisition. Overall, acquirers and targets use MAE-exclusions to preserve value in acquisitions.
收购方和目标方通过并购协议中的重大不利事件(MAE)排除条款来定义和分配中期风险。我研究了为什么mae排除存在基于他们解决的风险,并评估这种风险分配是否会影响收购的收益。目标方和收购方似乎使用mae排除来表明目标质量,以减少信息不对称,并将外生风险分配给收购方。我发现很少有人支持使用mae排除来创造减轻道德风险的承诺。此外,对收购方针对目标信息不对称的更高保护增加了收购所创造的价值。总体而言,收购方和被收购方使用mae排除条款来保持收购的价值。
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引用次数: 1
A Human Relations Paradox 人际关系悖论
Pub Date : 2011-04-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1823342
H. Gersbach, H. Haller
We present a variant of a general equilibrium model with group formation to study how changes of non-consumptive benefits from group formation impact on the well-being of group members. We identify a human relations paradox: Positive externalities increase, but none of the group members gains in equilibrium. Moreover, a member who experiences an increase of positive emotional benefits in a group may become worse off in equilibrium.
为了研究群体形成过程中非消费性利益的变化对群体成员幸福感的影响,本文提出了群体形成一般均衡模型的一个变体。我们发现了一个人际关系悖论:正外部性增加了,但没有一个群体成员获得平衡。此外,在群体中体验到积极情绪收益增加的成员可能会在平衡中变得更糟。
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引用次数: 1
Merger Negotiations and Ex-Post Regret 并购谈判和事后后悔
Pub Date : 2006-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1053461
Dennis L. Gärtner, A. Schmutzler
We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess private information pertaining both to the profitability of the merged entity and to stand-alone profits, and investigate the extent to which this private information makes ex-post regret an unavoidable phenomenon in merger negotiations. To this end, we consider ex-post mechanisms, which use both players' reports to determine whether or not a merger will take place and what each player will earn in each case. When the outside option of at least one player is known, the efficient merger decision can be implemented by such a mechanism under plausible budget-balance requirements. When neither outside option is known, we show that the potential for regret-free implementation is much more limited, unless the budget balance condition is relaxed to permit money-burning in the case of false reports.
我们考虑这样一种情况,即两个潜在的合并伙伴各自拥有与被合并实体的盈利能力和独立利润有关的私人信息,并调查这些私人信息在多大程度上使事后后悔成为合并谈判中不可避免的现象。为此,我们考虑了事后机制,即使用双方的报告来确定合并是否会发生,以及每个参与者在每种情况下将获得多少收入。当至少有一个参与者的外部选择是已知的,在合理的预算平衡要求下,有效的合并决策可以通过这种机制来实现。当两种外部选择都不知道时,我们表明,除非放宽预算平衡条件,允许在虚假报告的情况下烧钱,否则无悔实施的可能性要有限得多。
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引用次数: 32
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Two-Party Negotiations eJournal
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