Abstract The right to self‐defense has played a major role in objections to gun regulation. Many contend that gun regulations threaten this right. While much philosophical discussion has focused on the relation between guns and this right, less attention has been paid to the argument for the right of self‐defense itself. In this article, I examine this argument. Gunrights defenders contend that the right of self‐defense is needed to explain why interferences in self‐defense are wrong. I propose an alternative explanation for such wrongs, one which does not posit the existence of a self‐defense right, and then show how it undermines their claim that there exists a strong presumption against gun regulation. I conclude by articulating the implications of this alternative explanatory account for other rights.
{"title":"Self‐defense, claim‐rights, and guns","authors":"Chetan Cetty","doi":"10.1111/phil.12351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12351","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The right to self‐defense has played a major role in objections to gun regulation. Many contend that gun regulations threaten this right. While much philosophical discussion has focused on the relation between guns and this right, less attention has been paid to the argument for the right of self‐defense itself. In this article, I examine this argument. Gunrights defenders contend that the right of self‐defense is needed to explain why interferences in self‐defense are wrong. I propose an alternative explanation for such wrongs, one which does not posit the existence of a self‐defense right, and then show how it undermines their claim that there exists a strong presumption against gun regulation. I conclude by articulating the implications of this alternative explanatory account for other rights.","PeriodicalId":43937,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135682372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Relational egalitarians claim that a situation is just only if everyone it involves relates to one another as equals. It implies that relational egalitarians believe the ideal of “living as equals” (for short) is desirable, and furthermore, necessary for justice. In this paper, I distinguish three accounts of the desirability of the ideal: the instrumental value account, the non‐instrumental value account, and the non‐consequentialist account. I argue that the former two accounts cannot provide satisfying reasons for being a relational egalitarian. Instead, the ideal of “living as equals” ought to be understood as fundamentally a moral requirement in a non‐consequentialist sense. In addition, a pluralist (though fundamentally non‐consequentialist) approach is welcome.
{"title":"Why be a relational egalitarian?","authors":"Xuanpu Zhuang","doi":"10.1111/phil.12350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12350","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Relational egalitarians claim that a situation is just only if everyone it involves relates to one another as equals. It implies that relational egalitarians believe the ideal of “living as equals” (for short) is desirable, and furthermore, necessary for justice. In this paper, I distinguish three accounts of the desirability of the ideal: the instrumental value account, the non‐instrumental value account, and the non‐consequentialist account. I argue that the former two accounts cannot provide satisfying reasons for being a relational egalitarian. Instead, the ideal of “living as equals” ought to be understood as fundamentally a moral requirement in a non‐consequentialist sense. In addition, a pluralist (though fundamentally non‐consequentialist) approach is welcome.","PeriodicalId":43937,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135254119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Can epistemology be shaped by the Christian faith? Is there anything specific to this faith that can give rise to an equally specific epistemology without compromising the autonomy that the latter requires from faith? In the footsteps of Aquinas's religious epistemology, I first focus on the fact that Christian faith seems to characterize intellectual activity in a way that appears to be irreconcilable with epistemological perspectives that are not shaped by faith. Second, I argue that it is possible to do justice to the irreconcilability in question by making reference to what radically distinguishes the Christian faith from the epistemological reflection. Finally, I focus on two ways in which the specific nature of Christian faith can shape and promote rationality, and give rise to a Christian epistemology.
{"title":"Christian epistemology. How faith can shape and promote rationality","authors":"Roberto Di Ceglie","doi":"10.1111/phil.12349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12349","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Can epistemology be shaped by the Christian faith? Is there anything specific to this faith that can give rise to an equally specific epistemology without compromising the autonomy that the latter requires from faith? In the footsteps of Aquinas's religious epistemology, I first focus on the fact that Christian faith seems to characterize intellectual activity in a way that appears to be irreconcilable with epistemological perspectives that are not shaped by faith. Second, I argue that it is possible to do justice to the irreconcilability in question by making reference to what radically distinguishes the Christian faith from the epistemological reflection. Finally, I focus on two ways in which the specific nature of Christian faith can shape and promote rationality, and give rise to a Christian epistemology.","PeriodicalId":43937,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135155350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract There is ongoing debate on whether Juche (주체/主體), the North Korean state ideology, is indigenous, Marxist‐Leninist, or Confucian—or if its a real philosophy at all. In this article, I introduce Juche and show how characteristics that philosophers identify to be unique or pronounced in premodern Korean philosophy can be found in Juche as well. Intellectual adaptation, pragmaticism, and an emphasis on continual improvement are prominent in both premodern Korean thought and Juche. Juche should be understood as a politically inflected outgrowth that is embedded within the larger context of Korean philosophy.
{"title":"Juche in the broader context of Korean philosophy","authors":"Hannah H. Kim","doi":"10.1111/phil.12345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12345","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is ongoing debate on whether Juche (주체/主體), the North Korean state ideology, is indigenous, Marxist‐Leninist, or Confucian—or if its a real philosophy at all. In this article, I introduce Juche and show how characteristics that philosophers identify to be unique or pronounced in premodern Korean philosophy can be found in Juche as well. Intellectual adaptation, pragmaticism, and an emphasis on continual improvement are prominent in both premodern Korean thought and Juche. Juche should be understood as a politically inflected outgrowth that is embedded within the larger context of Korean philosophy.","PeriodicalId":43937,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135153685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, I explore a number of issues related to a life lived with borderline personality disorder (BPD). Primarily, I am interested in discussing how one unwillingly changes their personal identity by forced medicating—demanded by others implicitly and explicitly. My motivation is something deep and invasive in me. I want to know, I have always wanted to know, why others want me to not be Me so badly. I have thought about this question for years, and though others may simply chalk it up to just one of the standard paranoid or narcissistic traits of borderline personality disorder, there is something more to this question that many of us agonize over most of our lives. There is a deeply normative component to this question that extends beyond the mere fear of abandonment; it is tied to a desire by others to erase—literally—who we are for their own comfort. In this sense, then, I invite you to travel along a path of what it can mean to be a BPDer, from a narrative, phenomenological, and cognitive lived, embodied perspective. My purpose is to show that the treatments for us that others desire cannot avoid (and usually do not want to avoid) the unraveling of who we really are. Whether we want to or not, we give up our self to keep other people with us. And for many, this is too much to ask, and can be one, though not the only, reason suicide and self‐harm seem to be necessary recourses. One in 10 people with BPD commit suicide. So this is a serious matter, indeed.
{"title":"“Am I safe enough for you now?” BPD and the forced erasure of personal identity","authors":"Shay Welch","doi":"10.1111/phil.12348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12348","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I explore a number of issues related to a life lived with borderline personality disorder (BPD). Primarily, I am interested in discussing how one unwillingly changes their personal identity by forced medicating—demanded by others implicitly and explicitly. My motivation is something deep and invasive in me. I want to know, I have always wanted to know, why others want me to not be Me so badly. I have thought about this question for years, and though others may simply chalk it up to just one of the standard paranoid or narcissistic traits of borderline personality disorder, there is something more to this question that many of us agonize over most of our lives. There is a deeply normative component to this question that extends beyond the mere fear of abandonment; it is tied to a desire by others to erase—literally—who we are for their own comfort. In this sense, then, I invite you to travel along a path of what it can mean to be a BPDer, from a narrative, phenomenological, and cognitive lived, embodied perspective. My purpose is to show that the treatments for us that others desire cannot avoid (and usually do not want to avoid) the unraveling of who we really are. Whether we want to or not, we give up our self to keep other people with us. And for many, this is too much to ask, and can be one, though not the only, reason suicide and self‐harm seem to be necessary recourses. One in 10 people with BPD commit suicide. So this is a serious matter, indeed.","PeriodicalId":43937,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134910757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article aims to elucidate the Chinese literatus Su Shi's painting theory using French philosopher Gilles Deleuze's concepts of “capturing forces” and “becoming.” In the relevant scholarship, Su Shi's esthetic thought has been illustrated as going beyond the truthful representation of forms, thereby capturing the underlying vitality of the targeted objects, which paved the way for what came to be known as “literati painting.” This artistic approach has been thought to express the artist's lofty and virtuous personality through the liveliness of the objects. I fully embrace the “capturing vitality” part of the literature, further fleshing it out not just by closely analyzing some of Su Shi's extant writings on painting but also by assessing them side by side with such European painters as Paul Cézanne and Francis Bacon. However, I find the “expressing personality” counterpart to be rather limited for interpreting Su Shi's esthetic thought and instead suggest the artistic effect of “becoming” as central to his ultimate esthetic aims.
{"title":"Becoming bamboo: Reassessing Su Shi's painting theory from Deleuze's angle","authors":"Kanghun Ahn","doi":"10.1111/phil.12339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12339","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article aims to elucidate the Chinese literatus Su Shi's painting theory using French philosopher Gilles Deleuze's concepts of “capturing forces” and “becoming.” In the relevant scholarship, Su Shi's esthetic thought has been illustrated as going beyond the truthful representation of forms, thereby capturing the underlying vitality of the targeted objects, which paved the way for what came to be known as “literati painting.” This artistic approach has been thought to express the artist's lofty and virtuous personality through the liveliness of the objects. I fully embrace the “capturing vitality” part of the literature, further fleshing it out not just by closely analyzing some of Su Shi's extant writings on painting but also by assessing them side by side with such European painters as Paul Cézanne and Francis Bacon. However, I find the “expressing personality” counterpart to be rather limited for interpreting Su Shi's esthetic thought and instead suggest the artistic effect of “becoming” as central to his ultimate esthetic aims.","PeriodicalId":43937,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135542747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dans le cadre du debat sur la nature de la personne et sur l'identite personnelle, l'A. souleve avec E. Olson et L. R. Baker la question souvent negligee de l'essence de la personne. Tandis que l'un defend l'identite entre l'homme et l'animal, et que l'autre defend l'idee de constitution en tant qu'animal humain, l'A. montre que la these de Baker rencontre de nombreuses difficultes concernant le statut des nouveaux-nes, l'ontologie de la premiere personne et l'identite de la vie mentale.
{"title":"Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply.","authors":"David DeGrazia","doi":"10.1111/1467-9191.00083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9191.00083","url":null,"abstract":"Dans le cadre du debat sur la nature de la personne et sur l'identite personnelle, l'A. souleve avec E. Olson et L. R. Baker la question souvent negligee de l'essence de la personne. Tandis que l'un defend l'identite entre l'homme et l'animal, et que l'autre defend l'idee de constitution en tant qu'animal humain, l'A. montre que la these de Baker rencontre de nombreuses difficultes concernant le statut des nouveaux-nes, l'ontologie de la premiere personne et l'identite de la vie mentale.","PeriodicalId":43937,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1467-9191.00083","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24530010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reproductive freedom and women's freedom: surrogacy and autonomy.","authors":"C T Sistare","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43937,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"1988-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24957568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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