This paper empirically investigates why Japanese banks have held large excess reserves for almost two decades, not only in crisis periods but also in peacetime. Examining the panel data for commercial banks over the period FY 1991–2007, we identify two factors that explain their demand for reserves: a short-term inter-bank money market rate (opportunity costs), and the Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (precautionary demands). The former is often pointed out as a factor by previous literature, while the latter is our contributed new finding to the literature on reserves accumulation. We found the positive relationship between banks’ capital and their excess reserve holding, or liquidity holdings. This finding has an implication for the current financial regulatory reforms, monetary and macro-prudential policies.
{"title":"Why Do Banks Hold Excess Reserves?: Precautionary Demands or Monetary Policy Factors?","authors":"Takeshi Osada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3021758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3021758","url":null,"abstract":"This paper empirically investigates why Japanese banks have held large excess reserves for almost two decades, not only in crisis periods but also in peacetime. Examining the panel data for commercial banks over the period FY 1991–2007, we identify two factors that explain their demand for reserves: a short-term inter-bank money market rate (opportunity costs), and the Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (precautionary demands). The former is often pointed out as a factor by previous literature, while the latter is our contributed new finding to the literature on reserves accumulation. We found the positive relationship between banks’ capital and their excess reserve holding, or liquidity holdings. This finding has an implication for the current financial regulatory reforms, monetary and macro-prudential policies.","PeriodicalId":441240,"journal":{"name":"Financial Regulations submissions","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123219432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper advocates two novel advantages of contingent convertible securities in capital structure in (1) signaling, and (2) information disclosure. First, in order to signal his type, the good banker should be punished for poor performance and rewarded otherwise. Since the banker knows better about events occurring in the near future (i.e., the interim states) than final cash flows to be realized in the distant future, the former are better performance indicators, thereby providing contingent securities with additional signaling power. Nevertheless, this advantage needs to be supported by a positive cost of misreporting interim states. Second, even if misreporting is costless, contingent capital structure still has an advantage over non-contingent capital in its ability to mitigate ex-post information asymmetries, since it has more degrees of freedom in setting payoffs to fine-tune the issuer's truth-telling incentives. This paper thus sheds some new light on the design of CoCos and the regulation of contingent capital.
{"title":"The Role of Contingent Capital Structure in Signaling and Information Disclosure","authors":"Suxiu Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2877846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2877846","url":null,"abstract":"This paper advocates two novel advantages of contingent convertible securities in capital structure in (1) signaling, and (2) information disclosure. First, in order to signal his type, the good banker should be punished for poor performance and rewarded otherwise. Since the banker knows better about events occurring in the near future (i.e., the interim states) than final cash flows to be realized in the distant future, the former are better performance indicators, thereby providing contingent securities with additional signaling power. Nevertheless, this advantage needs to be supported by a positive cost of misreporting interim states. Second, even if misreporting is costless, contingent capital structure still has an advantage over non-contingent capital in its ability to mitigate ex-post information asymmetries, since it has more degrees of freedom in setting payoffs to fine-tune the issuer's truth-telling incentives. This paper thus sheds some new light on the design of CoCos and the regulation of contingent capital.","PeriodicalId":441240,"journal":{"name":"Financial Regulations submissions","volume":"242 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120971197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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