Pub Date : 2020-10-15DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0013
Jody Azzouni
The hangman/surprise-examination/prediction paradox is solved. It is not solved by denying knowledge closure (although knowledge closure is false). It is not solved by denying KK or denying that knowing p implies other iterated knowing attitudes (although these are false). It is not solved by misleading evidence causing the students to lose knowledge because students cannot lose knowledge this way. It is solved by showing that a tacit assumption (what is being said to the students/prisoner is informative) is overlooked and that inferences by contradiction are invalid if assumptions are left out. The phenomenology of the surprise-exam paradox is explored to explain why this solution has been missed. Crucial is that in many cases the students/prisoner know(s) there will be a surprise exam/execution because of an inference from what the teacher/judge meant to say, and not directly by the literal application of what he did say.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"Jody Azzouni","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"The hangman/surprise-examination/prediction paradox is solved. It is not solved by denying knowledge closure (although knowledge closure is false). It is not solved by denying KK or denying that knowing p implies other iterated knowing attitudes (although these are false). It is not solved by misleading evidence causing the students to lose knowledge because students cannot lose knowledge this way. It is solved by showing that a tacit assumption (what is being said to the students/prisoner is informative) is overlooked and that inferences by contradiction are invalid if assumptions are left out. The phenomenology of the surprise-exam paradox is explored to explain why this solution has been missed. Crucial is that in many cases the students/prisoner know(s) there will be a surprise exam/execution because of an inference from what the teacher/judge meant to say, and not directly by the literal application of what he did say.","PeriodicalId":445481,"journal":{"name":"Attributing Knowledge","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121564378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-15DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0008
Jody Azzouni
The ordinary distinction between being justified and being able to give a justification is described. Being able to give a justification requires metacognition; being justified doesn’t. Animals are sometimes justified in what they believe; sometimes they’re not. A definition for justification is given by analyzing a justification j of a proposition p in terms of j providing a truth-conducive reason for p. Two forms of justification are revealed along the lines of how propositions are justified, an inferential form and a representational form. Infinitism, the suggestion that infinite chains of justifiers—both deductive and truth-enhancing—are cogent, is then explored. It’s shown both that infinitary chains of justifications can’t function as additional forms of justification and that they can’t be used as provisional justifications either.
{"title":"Inferential Justification","authors":"Jody Azzouni","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The ordinary distinction between being justified and being able to give a justification is described. Being able to give a justification requires metacognition; being justified doesn’t. Animals are sometimes justified in what they believe; sometimes they’re not. A definition for justification is given by analyzing a justification j of a proposition p in terms of j providing a truth-conducive reason for p. Two forms of justification are revealed along the lines of how propositions are justified, an inferential form and a representational form. Infinitism, the suggestion that infinite chains of justifiers—both deductive and truth-enhancing—are cogent, is then explored. It’s shown both that infinitary chains of justifications can’t function as additional forms of justification and that they can’t be used as provisional justifications either.","PeriodicalId":445481,"journal":{"name":"Attributing Knowledge","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115402699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-15DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0005
Jody Azzouni
Assertion is a phenomenological category—that is, assertions are experienced as such by speaker-hearers. Speech-act phenomenology is distinguished from semantic perception. We not only experience speech acts, we experience the words and sentences we utter as distinct objects with properties different from those of the speech acts. Using this distinction, evidence against agential-state assertion norms, such as a sincere-belief norm, a knowledge norm, or a warrant norm, etc., is given. Anonymous assertions or shapes resembling inscriptions produced by accident are experienced as assertions and as possessing meaning even when they are recognized to be products of sheer accidents and in reality without utterers. Spokespersons for companies, actors in advertisements for products, cartoon characters (that don’t exist), and flakes who can’t be trusted are all experienced nevertheless as asserting, and what they assert as assertions. The common-ground expectation view is supported. Compatibly with this, Moorean remarks are often naturally utterable.
{"title":"Assertion Norms","authors":"Jody Azzouni","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Assertion is a phenomenological category—that is, assertions are experienced as such by speaker-hearers. Speech-act phenomenology is distinguished from semantic perception. We not only experience speech acts, we experience the words and sentences we utter as distinct objects with properties different from those of the speech acts. Using this distinction, evidence against agential-state assertion norms, such as a sincere-belief norm, a knowledge norm, or a warrant norm, etc., is given. Anonymous assertions or shapes resembling inscriptions produced by accident are experienced as assertions and as possessing meaning even when they are recognized to be products of sheer accidents and in reality without utterers. Spokespersons for companies, actors in advertisements for products, cartoon characters (that don’t exist), and flakes who can’t be trusted are all experienced nevertheless as asserting, and what they assert as assertions. The common-ground expectation view is supported. Compatibly with this, Moorean remarks are often naturally utterable.","PeriodicalId":445481,"journal":{"name":"Attributing Knowledge","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123518717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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