Pub Date : 2024-06-10DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10639
M. Schechtman
This paper examines the role of episodic memory, and the broader notion of “mental time travel” (MTT), in constituting personal identity. After arguing that the construal of memory’s role in personal identity found in traditional psychological continuity theories of personal identity is both unrealistic and unsatisfying, the paper endeavors to provide a better account. This begins with recent work in the science and philosophy of memory that sees episodic memory as part of a broader faculty for MTT (which also involves imagination and counterfactual thought). Some of the basic ideas expressed in this work are developed into an account of the connection between MTT with “strong identification” and personal identity. According to this alternative approach, we regularly “borrow affect” from our pasts and futures through forms of remembering, imagining, and counterfactual thinking that involve a particular form of identification with our past and future selves. This activity generates a strong diachronic experience of self, which contributes in important ways to diachronic personal identity. The sense of self generated through MTT is, however, only one piece of a more comprehensive account of personal identity. The paper concludes by describing its place in the larger picture.
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Pub Date : 2024-02-05DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10257
Felipe Morales Carbonell
Do we have control over the content of our imaginings? More precisely: do we have control over what our imaginings are about? Intentionalists say yes. Until recently, intentionalism could be taken as the received view. Recently, authors like Munro & Strohminger (2021) have developed some arguments against it. Here, I tentatively join their ranks and develop a new way to think about the way in which imaginings develop their contents that also goes against intentionalism. My proposal makes use of what we may call a ballistic framework for mental dynamics, which I sketch to some length. In this model, imaginings are articulated by ballistic events sensitive to constraints that modify the trajectories that imaginings trace in a special working space. This framework leaves room for alternatives to pre-assigned-content models, such as Kung’s (2016). In the ballistic-based models sketched here, and against intentionalism, imaginings can fail to be about what we intend them to be about. The framework also has applications beyond the intentionalism debate, some of which I will sketch.
我们能控制想象的内容吗？更准确地说：我们能控制想象的内容吗？意向论者认为可以。直到最近，意向论一直被认为是公认的观点。最近，芒罗和斯特罗明格（Munro & Strohminger，2021 年）等作者提出了一些反对这一观点的论据。在此，我暂时加入他们的行列，并提出一种新的方法来思考想象如何发展其内容，这种方法也与意向主义背道而驰。我的提议利用了我们可以称之为心理动态的弹道框架，我将用一定的篇幅对其进行勾勒。在这个模型中，想象是通过对约束条件敏感的弹道事件衔接起来的，这些约束条件改变了想象在特殊工作空间中的轨迹。这一框架为预设内容模型（如 Kung 的模型（2016 年））的替代方案留出了空间。在这里勾勒的基于弹道的模型中，与意向主义相悖的是，想象可能与我们的意图无关。该框架在意向论辩论之外也有应用，我将简要介绍其中的一些。
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Pub Date : 2024-02-05DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10257
Felipe Morales Carbonell
Do we have control over the content of our imaginings? More precisely: do we have control over what our imaginings are about? Intentionalists say yes. Until recently, intentionalism could be taken as the received view. Recently, authors like Munro & Strohminger (2021) have developed some arguments against it. Here, I tentatively join their ranks and develop a new way to think about the way in which imaginings develop their contents that also goes against intentionalism. My proposal makes use of what we may call a ballistic framework for mental dynamics, which I sketch to some length. In this model, imaginings are articulated by ballistic events sensitive to constraints that modify the trajectories that imaginings trace in a special working space. This framework leaves room for alternatives to pre-assigned-content models, such as Kung’s (2016). In the ballistic-based models sketched here, and against intentionalism, imaginings can fail to be about what we intend them to be about. The framework also has applications beyond the intentionalism debate, some of which I will sketch.
我们能控制想象的内容吗？更准确地说：我们能控制想象的内容吗？意向论者认为可以。直到最近，意向论一直被认为是公认的观点。最近，芒罗和斯特罗明格（Munro & Strohminger，2021 年）等作者提出了一些反对这一观点的论据。在此，我暂时加入他们的行列，并提出一种新的方法来思考想象如何发展其内容，这种方法也与意向主义背道而驰。我的提议利用了我们可以称之为心理动态的弹道框架，我将用一定的篇幅对其进行勾勒。在这个模型中，想象是通过对约束条件敏感的弹道事件衔接起来的，这些约束条件改变了想象在特殊工作空间中的轨迹。这一框架为预设内容模型（如 Kung 的模型（2016 年））的替代方案留出了空间。在这里勾勒的基于弹道的模型中，与意向主义相悖的是，想象可能与我们的意图无关。该框架在意向论辩论之外也有应用，我将简要介绍其中的一些。
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Pub Date : 2024-01-22DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10205
Daniel Munro
This paper explores the relationship between religious belief and religious experience, bringing out a role for episodic memory that has been overlooked in the epistemology of religion. I do so by considering two questions. The first, the “Psychological Question,” asks what psychological role religious experiences play in causally bringing about religious beliefs. The second, the “Reliability Question,” asks: for a given answer to the Psychological Question about how religious beliefs are formed, are those beliefs formed using generally truth-conducive cognitive mechanisms or patterns of reasoning? I argue that the standard way of answering the Psychological Question overlooks the fact that religious beliefs are often formed via reflection on episodic memories of past religious experiences. Furthermore, recognizing this opens up room to make more meaningful progress on answering the Reliability Question.
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Pub Date : 2023-10-22DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2023.9936
Jennifer Corns
Promiscuous realism is the thesis that there are many equally legitimate ways of classifying the world’s entities. Advocates of promiscuous realism are typically taken to hold the further the- sis, often undistinguished, that kind terms usefully deployed in scientific generalisations are no more natural than those deployed for any other purposes. Call this further thesis promiscuous nat- uralism. I here defend a version of promiscuous realism which denies promiscuous naturalism. To do so, I introduce the notion of a promiscuous kind: a kind that is maximally usefully referenced in predictive and explanatory generalisations, none of which are scientific generalisations. I first defend the claim that pain is a promiscuous kind before extending these considerations to everyday mental kinds more generally. I draw on further reflections from both everyday life and contem- porary psychology to make credible the novel suggestion that our everyday theory of our minds is for the explanation and prediction of individuals. Combined with the complex idiosyncrasy of individual minds, this suggested aim of everyday theory gives us reason to think that promiscuity is prevalent among everyday mental kinds.
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