Pub Date : 2024-05-16DOI: 10.1177/00220027241253511
C. Ambrosius
This research highlights a neglected paradox of migration policies: whereas narratives on migrants as a security threat in their countries of destination find little support in empirical studies, forcing migrants to return may increase violence and crime back home. Using migrants’ exposure to deportation threats at destination as an exogenous source of identification, this paper traces the long shadow of immigration enforcement on violent crime in Mexico, recipient of more than 3.5 million deportees from the US over the period 2000–2015. Enforced return is associated with more homicides and a stronger presence of cartels in migrants’ municipalities of origin, as well as a higher sense of insecurity among the population and a higher probability of being assaulted. Identifying these local effects of enforced return are a first step towards unpacking the various direct and indirect channels through which immigration enforcement generates unintended negative outcomes in migrants’ communities of origin.
{"title":"Violent Crime and the Long Shadow of Immigration Enforcement","authors":"C. Ambrosius","doi":"10.1177/00220027241253511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241253511","url":null,"abstract":"This research highlights a neglected paradox of migration policies: whereas narratives on migrants as a security threat in their countries of destination find little support in empirical studies, forcing migrants to return may increase violence and crime back home. Using migrants’ exposure to deportation threats at destination as an exogenous source of identification, this paper traces the long shadow of immigration enforcement on violent crime in Mexico, recipient of more than 3.5 million deportees from the US over the period 2000–2015. Enforced return is associated with more homicides and a stronger presence of cartels in migrants’ municipalities of origin, as well as a higher sense of insecurity among the population and a higher probability of being assaulted. Identifying these local effects of enforced return are a first step towards unpacking the various direct and indirect channels through which immigration enforcement generates unintended negative outcomes in migrants’ communities of origin.","PeriodicalId":506926,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140967418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-12DOI: 10.1177/00220027241232955
Sedef A. Topal
Why do some rebel organizations form a united front when others confine themselves to a loose partnership? Existing research on rebel movements reveals that insurgents should quickly leave cooperative agreements if doing so will provide particular advantages in a post-conflict setting. Still, rebel groups may build diverse alliances, from joint attacks to shared command structures. If rebels are indeed purely pragmatic, why would they tie themselves to partnerships that hinder their ability to defect easily? In this article, I argue that three relational factors shape how armed groups cooperate: rebel-civilian relations (civilian support), inter-rebel relations (partners), and rebel-sponsor relations (external patrons). Groups connected through these social networks will be more likely to join a united opposition with their shared channels of trust. Developing a new dyadic dataset, I find that sharing allies or civilian support is positively associated with forming united fronts. Yet, state sponsorship does not produce similar results.
{"title":"Pathways to Cooperation: A Relational Theory of Rebel Alliance Formation","authors":"Sedef A. Topal","doi":"10.1177/00220027241232955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241232955","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some rebel organizations form a united front when others confine themselves to a loose partnership? Existing research on rebel movements reveals that insurgents should quickly leave cooperative agreements if doing so will provide particular advantages in a post-conflict setting. Still, rebel groups may build diverse alliances, from joint attacks to shared command structures. If rebels are indeed purely pragmatic, why would they tie themselves to partnerships that hinder their ability to defect easily? In this article, I argue that three relational factors shape how armed groups cooperate: rebel-civilian relations (civilian support), inter-rebel relations (partners), and rebel-sponsor relations (external patrons). Groups connected through these social networks will be more likely to join a united opposition with their shared channels of trust. Developing a new dyadic dataset, I find that sharing allies or civilian support is positively associated with forming united fronts. Yet, state sponsorship does not produce similar results.","PeriodicalId":506926,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"69 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139843398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-12DOI: 10.1177/00220027241232955
Sedef A. Topal
Why do some rebel organizations form a united front when others confine themselves to a loose partnership? Existing research on rebel movements reveals that insurgents should quickly leave cooperative agreements if doing so will provide particular advantages in a post-conflict setting. Still, rebel groups may build diverse alliances, from joint attacks to shared command structures. If rebels are indeed purely pragmatic, why would they tie themselves to partnerships that hinder their ability to defect easily? In this article, I argue that three relational factors shape how armed groups cooperate: rebel-civilian relations (civilian support), inter-rebel relations (partners), and rebel-sponsor relations (external patrons). Groups connected through these social networks will be more likely to join a united opposition with their shared channels of trust. Developing a new dyadic dataset, I find that sharing allies or civilian support is positively associated with forming united fronts. Yet, state sponsorship does not produce similar results.
{"title":"Pathways to Cooperation: A Relational Theory of Rebel Alliance Formation","authors":"Sedef A. Topal","doi":"10.1177/00220027241232955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241232955","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some rebel organizations form a united front when others confine themselves to a loose partnership? Existing research on rebel movements reveals that insurgents should quickly leave cooperative agreements if doing so will provide particular advantages in a post-conflict setting. Still, rebel groups may build diverse alliances, from joint attacks to shared command structures. If rebels are indeed purely pragmatic, why would they tie themselves to partnerships that hinder their ability to defect easily? In this article, I argue that three relational factors shape how armed groups cooperate: rebel-civilian relations (civilian support), inter-rebel relations (partners), and rebel-sponsor relations (external patrons). Groups connected through these social networks will be more likely to join a united opposition with their shared channels of trust. Developing a new dyadic dataset, I find that sharing allies or civilian support is positively associated with forming united fronts. Yet, state sponsorship does not produce similar results.","PeriodicalId":506926,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139783654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-05DOI: 10.1177/00220027241227907
Gabriella Levy, Rebecca Dudley, Chong Chen, David A. Siegel
How does third-party diplomatic and material support affect rebel groups’ use of terrorism in civil wars? We argue via a game-theoretic model that diplomatic support prompts prospective shifts in rebel tactics, from civilian to military targets, in anticipation of material support, while material support alters the cost structure of attacks, leading to the same tactical shift. We empirically test the model’s implications using an original dataset of UN resolutions about countries in civil wars as well as a case study of South Africa. In support of our theory, we find that both diplomatic resolutions and material interventions in favor of the rebels are associated with rebel tactical shifts, leading to decreased reliance on violence against civilians. These findings demonstrate the value of modeling civilian and military targeting as substitutes rather than examining civilian targeting in isolation.
{"title":"Diplomatic Statements and the Strategic Use of Terrorism in Civil Wars","authors":"Gabriella Levy, Rebecca Dudley, Chong Chen, David A. Siegel","doi":"10.1177/00220027241227907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241227907","url":null,"abstract":"How does third-party diplomatic and material support affect rebel groups’ use of terrorism in civil wars? We argue via a game-theoretic model that diplomatic support prompts prospective shifts in rebel tactics, from civilian to military targets, in anticipation of material support, while material support alters the cost structure of attacks, leading to the same tactical shift. We empirically test the model’s implications using an original dataset of UN resolutions about countries in civil wars as well as a case study of South Africa. In support of our theory, we find that both diplomatic resolutions and material interventions in favor of the rebels are associated with rebel tactical shifts, leading to decreased reliance on violence against civilians. These findings demonstrate the value of modeling civilian and military targeting as substitutes rather than examining civilian targeting in isolation.","PeriodicalId":506926,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"15 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139864116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-05DOI: 10.1177/00220027241227907
Gabriella Levy, Rebecca Dudley, Chong Chen, David A. Siegel
How does third-party diplomatic and material support affect rebel groups’ use of terrorism in civil wars? We argue via a game-theoretic model that diplomatic support prompts prospective shifts in rebel tactics, from civilian to military targets, in anticipation of material support, while material support alters the cost structure of attacks, leading to the same tactical shift. We empirically test the model’s implications using an original dataset of UN resolutions about countries in civil wars as well as a case study of South Africa. In support of our theory, we find that both diplomatic resolutions and material interventions in favor of the rebels are associated with rebel tactical shifts, leading to decreased reliance on violence against civilians. These findings demonstrate the value of modeling civilian and military targeting as substitutes rather than examining civilian targeting in isolation.
{"title":"Diplomatic Statements and the Strategic Use of Terrorism in Civil Wars","authors":"Gabriella Levy, Rebecca Dudley, Chong Chen, David A. Siegel","doi":"10.1177/00220027241227907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241227907","url":null,"abstract":"How does third-party diplomatic and material support affect rebel groups’ use of terrorism in civil wars? We argue via a game-theoretic model that diplomatic support prompts prospective shifts in rebel tactics, from civilian to military targets, in anticipation of material support, while material support alters the cost structure of attacks, leading to the same tactical shift. We empirically test the model’s implications using an original dataset of UN resolutions about countries in civil wars as well as a case study of South Africa. In support of our theory, we find that both diplomatic resolutions and material interventions in favor of the rebels are associated with rebel tactical shifts, leading to decreased reliance on violence against civilians. These findings demonstrate the value of modeling civilian and military targeting as substitutes rather than examining civilian targeting in isolation.","PeriodicalId":506926,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"10 14","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139804274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.1177/00220027241230897
Benjamin Helms, Sonal S. Pandya, Rajkumar Venkatesan
A growing body of research argues that external threats from the international system strengthen ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, personal values anchored in national identity. We evaluate a necessary implication of this argument, that these shifting values drive change in broader social behaviors. Our focus is revealed value change in a non-political setting: American consumers’ choice of supermarket brands that symbolize national identity. Our empirical analyses leverage US counties’ quasi-random exposure to US Iraq War casualties to identify the effects of local casualties on the weekly market share growth of “American” supermarket brands. We analyze weekly supermarket scanner data for a representative sample of over 1,100 US supermarkets and 8,000 brands. During 2003-2006, the weekly market share of American brands grew relative to non-American brands in casualty-exposed supermarkets. Variation in share growth across customer demographics is consistent with reactions to external threat. We rule out alternative mechanisms including partisan cues, other product characteristics, and animosity towards other countries. These findings strengthen IR’s theoretical microfoundations by showing that international politics can reshape values enough to change broader social behaviors.
{"title":"War on Aisle 5: Casualties, National Identity, and Consumer Behavior","authors":"Benjamin Helms, Sonal S. Pandya, Rajkumar Venkatesan","doi":"10.1177/00220027241230897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241230897","url":null,"abstract":"A growing body of research argues that external threats from the international system strengthen ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, personal values anchored in national identity. We evaluate a necessary implication of this argument, that these shifting values drive change in broader social behaviors. Our focus is revealed value change in a non-political setting: American consumers’ choice of supermarket brands that symbolize national identity. Our empirical analyses leverage US counties’ quasi-random exposure to US Iraq War casualties to identify the effects of local casualties on the weekly market share growth of “American” supermarket brands. We analyze weekly supermarket scanner data for a representative sample of over 1,100 US supermarkets and 8,000 brands. During 2003-2006, the weekly market share of American brands grew relative to non-American brands in casualty-exposed supermarkets. Variation in share growth across customer demographics is consistent with reactions to external threat. We rule out alternative mechanisms including partisan cues, other product characteristics, and animosity towards other countries. These findings strengthen IR’s theoretical microfoundations by showing that international politics can reshape values enough to change broader social behaviors.","PeriodicalId":506926,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"27 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139885699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.1177/00220027241230897
Benjamin Helms, Sonal S. Pandya, Rajkumar Venkatesan
A growing body of research argues that external threats from the international system strengthen ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, personal values anchored in national identity. We evaluate a necessary implication of this argument, that these shifting values drive change in broader social behaviors. Our focus is revealed value change in a non-political setting: American consumers’ choice of supermarket brands that symbolize national identity. Our empirical analyses leverage US counties’ quasi-random exposure to US Iraq War casualties to identify the effects of local casualties on the weekly market share growth of “American” supermarket brands. We analyze weekly supermarket scanner data for a representative sample of over 1,100 US supermarkets and 8,000 brands. During 2003-2006, the weekly market share of American brands grew relative to non-American brands in casualty-exposed supermarkets. Variation in share growth across customer demographics is consistent with reactions to external threat. We rule out alternative mechanisms including partisan cues, other product characteristics, and animosity towards other countries. These findings strengthen IR’s theoretical microfoundations by showing that international politics can reshape values enough to change broader social behaviors.
{"title":"War on Aisle 5: Casualties, National Identity, and Consumer Behavior","authors":"Benjamin Helms, Sonal S. Pandya, Rajkumar Venkatesan","doi":"10.1177/00220027241230897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241230897","url":null,"abstract":"A growing body of research argues that external threats from the international system strengthen ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, personal values anchored in national identity. We evaluate a necessary implication of this argument, that these shifting values drive change in broader social behaviors. Our focus is revealed value change in a non-political setting: American consumers’ choice of supermarket brands that symbolize national identity. Our empirical analyses leverage US counties’ quasi-random exposure to US Iraq War casualties to identify the effects of local casualties on the weekly market share growth of “American” supermarket brands. We analyze weekly supermarket scanner data for a representative sample of over 1,100 US supermarkets and 8,000 brands. During 2003-2006, the weekly market share of American brands grew relative to non-American brands in casualty-exposed supermarkets. Variation in share growth across customer demographics is consistent with reactions to external threat. We rule out alternative mechanisms including partisan cues, other product characteristics, and animosity towards other countries. These findings strengthen IR’s theoretical microfoundations by showing that international politics can reshape values enough to change broader social behaviors.","PeriodicalId":506926,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"31 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139825950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-24DOI: 10.1177/00220027241227897
Carl Müller-Crepon, Guy Schvitz, L. Cederman
Many European nation-states were historically homogenized through violent ethnic cleansing. Despite its historical importance, we lack systematic evidence of the conditions under which groups where targeted with cleansing and how it impacted states’ ethnic demography. Rising nationalism in the nineteenth century threatened multi-ethnic states with “right-sizing” through secessionism and irredentism. States therefore frequently turned to brutal “right-peopling”, in particular where cross-border minorities and those with a history of political independence increased the risk of territorial losses. We test this argument with new spatial, time-variant data on ethnic geography and ethnic cleansing from 1886 to the present. We find that minorities that politically dominated another state and those that have lost political independence were most at risk of ethnic cleansing, especially in times of interstate war. At the macro-level, our results show that ethnic cleansing increased European states’ ethnic homogeneity almost as much as border change. Both produced today’s nation-states by aligning states and ethnic nations.
{"title":"“Right-Peopling” the State: Nationalism, Historical Legacies, and Ethnic Cleansing in Europe, 1886-2020","authors":"Carl Müller-Crepon, Guy Schvitz, L. Cederman","doi":"10.1177/00220027241227897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241227897","url":null,"abstract":"Many European nation-states were historically homogenized through violent ethnic cleansing. Despite its historical importance, we lack systematic evidence of the conditions under which groups where targeted with cleansing and how it impacted states’ ethnic demography. Rising nationalism in the nineteenth century threatened multi-ethnic states with “right-sizing” through secessionism and irredentism. States therefore frequently turned to brutal “right-peopling”, in particular where cross-border minorities and those with a history of political independence increased the risk of territorial losses. We test this argument with new spatial, time-variant data on ethnic geography and ethnic cleansing from 1886 to the present. We find that minorities that politically dominated another state and those that have lost political independence were most at risk of ethnic cleansing, especially in times of interstate war. At the macro-level, our results show that ethnic cleansing increased European states’ ethnic homogeneity almost as much as border change. Both produced today’s nation-states by aligning states and ethnic nations.","PeriodicalId":506926,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"59 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139601278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-18DOI: 10.1177/00220027241228189
Marius Mehrl, Paul W. Thurner
International weapons transfers send military capabilities, make arms production economically feasible, and construct security relations. They influence buyers’ and sellers’ foreign policies, domestic politics, and military spending behavior. However, data availability has limited their study to the bipolar Cold War and unipolar post-Cold War periods. We thus introduce the Interwar Period International Trade in Arms (IPITA) data, covering dyadic transfers of small arms, light weapons, ammunition, explosives, and major conventional weapons in the years 1920–1939. The IPITA data will offer new avenues to study the drivers, dynamics, and consequences of arms transfers, both in past and future multipolar systems.
{"title":"The Interwar Period International Trade in Arms: A New Dataset","authors":"Marius Mehrl, Paul W. Thurner","doi":"10.1177/00220027241228189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241228189","url":null,"abstract":"International weapons transfers send military capabilities, make arms production economically feasible, and construct security relations. They influence buyers’ and sellers’ foreign policies, domestic politics, and military spending behavior. However, data availability has limited their study to the bipolar Cold War and unipolar post-Cold War periods. We thus introduce the Interwar Period International Trade in Arms (IPITA) data, covering dyadic transfers of small arms, light weapons, ammunition, explosives, and major conventional weapons in the years 1920–1939. The IPITA data will offer new avenues to study the drivers, dynamics, and consequences of arms transfers, both in past and future multipolar systems.","PeriodicalId":506926,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"109 17","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139615481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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