Extensive media coverage of immigration, that is, media salience, has been thought to heighten anti‐immigrant attitudes among native‐born citizens by creating an information environment that portrays immigration as society's greatest problem. However, past empirical findings on the relationship between media salience and anti‐immigrant attitudes have been mixed. Some studies have observed that media salience increases hostility towards immigrants, while others have found it has no significant influence. This study investigates the underlying reasons for these inconsistent findings and demonstrates the need to revisit the meaning of issue importance. It employs the concept of public issue salience, the perception that immigration is the most important problem or concern about immigration, to find evidence. It argues that when the immigrant issue is a pivotal point of political competition, the immigration issue signals conflicts, connoting negativity so public issue salience and anti‐immigrant attitudes are closely related. On the other hand, in an environment where political elites reach a consensus, the immigration issue remains neutral so that they can be disentangled. The scope of media salience changes accordingly as well. This study chooses the United Kingdom and Germany for comparative research due to their similarities in immigration histories and the success of far‐right parties as well as differences in their major political parties' reactions to the issue. I match individual‐level longitudinal survey data to media article data and find clear country differences. In the United Kingdom, where political parties are polarized over the issue, public issue salience and anti‐immigrant attitudes are closely related so that media salience heightens them. In Germany, where political elites across different ideologies hold welcoming stances, their relationship is moderate. Media salience merely increases the perceived importance and does not increase anti‐immigrant attitudes. Contributions and implications are discussed with respect to political elites' role.
{"title":"Why is immigration important to you? A revisit to public issue salience and elite cues","authors":"Soyeon Jin","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12708","url":null,"abstract":"Extensive media coverage of immigration, that is, media salience, has been thought to heighten anti‐immigrant attitudes among native‐born citizens by creating an information environment that portrays immigration as society's greatest problem. However, past empirical findings on the relationship between media salience and anti‐immigrant attitudes have been mixed. Some studies have observed that media salience increases hostility towards immigrants, while others have found it has no significant influence. This study investigates the underlying reasons for these inconsistent findings and demonstrates the need to revisit the meaning of issue importance. It employs the concept of public issue salience, the perception that immigration is the most important problem or concern about immigration, to find evidence. It argues that when the immigrant issue is a pivotal point of political competition, the immigration issue signals conflicts, connoting negativity so public issue salience and anti‐immigrant attitudes are closely related. On the other hand, in an environment where political elites reach a consensus, the immigration issue remains neutral so that they can be disentangled. The scope of media salience changes accordingly as well. This study chooses the United Kingdom and Germany for comparative research due to their similarities in immigration histories and the success of far‐right parties as well as differences in their major political parties' reactions to the issue. I match individual‐level longitudinal survey data to media article data and find clear country differences. In the United Kingdom, where political parties are polarized over the issue, public issue salience and anti‐immigrant attitudes are closely related so that media salience heightens them. In Germany, where political elites across different ideologies hold welcoming stances, their relationship is moderate. Media salience merely increases the perceived importance and does not increase anti‐immigrant attitudes. Contributions and implications are discussed with respect to political elites' role.","PeriodicalId":507837,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":"53 36","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141650051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does a leader's gender affect a country's performance during a health crisis, and through what mechanisms? This study finds a clear, substantial negative correlation between having a female leader in democracies and their COVID‐19 infections and mortality rates, rejecting multiple spurious claims. The research is the first to analyse four pandemic waves covering 2 years while performing inter‐wave analysis. The gendered performance gap continuously grew during the first three waves, moderated by vaccinations in the fourth wave. We found that trust and effectiveness mechanisms impacted the growth of the performance gap. As new variants of COVID‐19 continue to spread and new threats related to the climate crisis are threatening globally, understanding the impact of gender in leadership roles, particularly during global crises, can provide valuable insights for policy makers and national leaders.
{"title":"Effect of leader gender on countries' performance: Evidence from four COVID‐19 waves","authors":"Amir Freund, Yael Shomer","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12707","url":null,"abstract":"Does a leader's gender affect a country's performance during a health crisis, and through what mechanisms? This study finds a clear, substantial negative correlation between having a female leader in democracies and their COVID‐19 infections and mortality rates, rejecting multiple spurious claims. The research is the first to analyse four pandemic waves covering 2 years while performing inter‐wave analysis. The gendered performance gap continuously grew during the first three waves, moderated by vaccinations in the fourth wave. We found that trust and effectiveness mechanisms impacted the growth of the performance gap. As new variants of COVID‐19 continue to spread and new threats related to the climate crisis are threatening globally, understanding the impact of gender in leadership roles, particularly during global crises, can provide valuable insights for policy makers and national leaders.","PeriodicalId":507837,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":"325 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141686655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A certain type of citizen holds technocratic views. They favour pragmatic problem solving through scientific and technical expertise, and reject party politics for being harmful to the common good. Yet, empirical evidence on the ideological profile of these citizens is fragmented and inconclusive. Using an original survey in Western Europe, Australia and the United States, we test predictions about the left−right alignment of citizens with technocratic attitudes on the economic and cultural dimensions of politics. We argue that technocracy is not antithetical to ideology and that citizens holding technocratic attitudes are not immune to ideological positions. Findings show that technocratic citizens are more economically left‐wing than mainstream voters, contrary to common associations of technocracy with neoliberal economic principles. However, they are more centrist than populists. This highlights that, in addition to a representational challenge, technocracy mounts an ideological challenge to party‐based representative democracy. In times of cumulative crises, which put democracies under stress with demands for competence and effectiveness, these findings offer insights about the appeal of alternative forms of representation.
{"title":"The ideological profile of the technocratic citizen","authors":"Eri Bertsou, Daniele Caramani, J. Koedam","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12698","url":null,"abstract":"A certain type of citizen holds technocratic views. They favour pragmatic problem solving through scientific and technical expertise, and reject party politics for being harmful to the common good. Yet, empirical evidence on the ideological profile of these citizens is fragmented and inconclusive. Using an original survey in Western Europe, Australia and the United States, we test predictions about the left−right alignment of citizens with technocratic attitudes on the economic and cultural dimensions of politics. We argue that technocracy is not antithetical to ideology and that citizens holding technocratic attitudes are not immune to ideological positions. Findings show that technocratic citizens are more economically left‐wing than mainstream voters, contrary to common associations of technocracy with neoliberal economic principles. However, they are more centrist than populists. This highlights that, in addition to a representational challenge, technocracy mounts an ideological challenge to party‐based representative democracy. In times of cumulative crises, which put democracies under stress with demands for competence and effectiveness, these findings offer insights about the appeal of alternative forms of representation.","PeriodicalId":507837,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":"37 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141344208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research note investigates whether external military crises, short of war, in the neighbourhood of the European Union (EU) affects attitudes toward the EU. Specifically, I explore whether the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 fostered higher levels of trust in the EU and support for deeper integration among European citizens. Methodologically, I exploit the coincidental timing of the Russian annexation of Crimea on 18 March, 2014 with the fieldwork of the Eurobarometer survey (81.2) conducted in the spring of that year. The quasi‐experimental evidence establishes that European citizens who were surveyed after the Russian annexation became more trusting of the EU and presented a greater willingness for further European integration, particularly so among EU‐15 members. Moreover, the treatment effects were strongly moderated by individuals’ education levels, with the intervention exerting its greatest effect among the higher educated.
{"title":"Russian aggression and Europeans’ attitudes toward the EU – Evidence from the 2014 annexation of Crimea","authors":"O. Kiratli","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12662","url":null,"abstract":"This research note investigates whether external military crises, short of war, in the neighbourhood of the European Union (EU) affects attitudes toward the EU. Specifically, I explore whether the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 fostered higher levels of trust in the EU and support for deeper integration among European citizens. Methodologically, I exploit the coincidental timing of the Russian annexation of Crimea on 18 March, 2014 with the fieldwork of the Eurobarometer survey (81.2) conducted in the spring of that year. The quasi‐experimental evidence establishes that European citizens who were surveyed after the Russian annexation became more trusting of the EU and presented a greater willingness for further European integration, particularly so among EU‐15 members. Moreover, the treatment effects were strongly moderated by individuals’ education levels, with the intervention exerting its greatest effect among the higher educated.","PeriodicalId":507837,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":"119 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139839748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, scholars have observed that political parties’ policy positions frequently fit the preferences of well‐to‐do voters better than those of the less well‐to‐do; a phenomenon known as policy congruence inequality. While the existence of inequality in policy congruence is well‐established, we currently only have a modest understanding of the causes of it. We develop an argument proposing that the political mobilisation of citizens with low socioeconomic status (SES) both in the parliamentary channel, in the form of high turnout, and in the extra‐parliamentary channel, in the form of high union density, is pivotal. Both high turnout and union density force parties to pay more attention to the preferences of the disadvantaged, thereby creating lower policy congruence inequality. To test the argument, we have collected and harmonised election surveys and party manifestos covering 90 elections in Australia, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, covering several decades until today, yielding more than 120,000 voter–party dyads. Employing this new dataset, our results confirm that the political mobilisation of citizens with low SES is a strong predictor of policy congruence inequality. This finding nuances the conclusion of extant research by showing that low‐SES citizens are not always on the losing side politically. It also implies the important role of maintaining or maybe even increasing turnout and union membership among the disadvantaged in society. Places where either turnout or union density is slipping in these years are likely to witness further increases in policy congruence inequality in the years to come.
{"title":"Political mobilisation and socioeconomic inequality in policy congruence","authors":"David Weisstanner, Carsten Jensen","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12661","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, scholars have observed that political parties’ policy positions frequently fit the preferences of well‐to‐do voters better than those of the less well‐to‐do; a phenomenon known as policy congruence inequality. While the existence of inequality in policy congruence is well‐established, we currently only have a modest understanding of the causes of it. We develop an argument proposing that the political mobilisation of citizens with low socioeconomic status (SES) both in the parliamentary channel, in the form of high turnout, and in the extra‐parliamentary channel, in the form of high union density, is pivotal. Both high turnout and union density force parties to pay more attention to the preferences of the disadvantaged, thereby creating lower policy congruence inequality. To test the argument, we have collected and harmonised election surveys and party manifestos covering 90 elections in Australia, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, covering several decades until today, yielding more than 120,000 voter–party dyads. Employing this new dataset, our results confirm that the political mobilisation of citizens with low SES is a strong predictor of policy congruence inequality. This finding nuances the conclusion of extant research by showing that low‐SES citizens are not always on the losing side politically. It also implies the important role of maintaining or maybe even increasing turnout and union membership among the disadvantaged in society. Places where either turnout or union density is slipping in these years are likely to witness further increases in policy congruence inequality in the years to come.","PeriodicalId":507837,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":"34 15","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139818417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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