Pub Date : 2024-02-07DOI: 10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/005
Corrado Fizzarotti
Enactivism is a model of cognition that emphasises the dynamic interactions between organisms and their environment. This paper analyses the link between holism and individualism in animal and environmental ethics through the conceptual tools provided by the enactivist programme, particularly through a perspective of relational values emerging from the dynamic interactions of organisms with the environment. In our opinion, the more dynamic concept of value that enactivism implicitly offers can be helpful in resolving conflicts within green ethics. Concurrently, its reconceptualization of agency in simple organisms contributes to the discourse on the attribution of moral con‑ sideration to non‑human entities. These insights have implications for both the moral deliberation of the individual agent and decisions taken at the political level. We briefly address the associated philosophical and practical challenges in ethical deliberations.
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Pub Date : 2024-02-07DOI: 10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/001
Carrie Figdor
In this paper I will outline three conceptual schemes for thinking about cognition. One is the anthropocentric scheme that dominated our thinking for thousands of years: human cognition. Another is the approach founded in classical cognitive science and artificial intelligence: cybernetic cognition. The third is the framework of evolutionary biology that encompasses all traits of evolved organisms: phylogenetic cognition. I will explain all three and sketch their current relationships. Each scheme forms the conceptual ground of a valid research programme, but how these programmes and schemes will end up in relation to each other is an open question.
{"title":"What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Cognition?\u0000 Human, Cybernetic, and Phylogenetic Conceptual Schemes","authors":"Carrie Figdor","doi":"10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/001","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I will outline three conceptual schemes for thinking about cognition. One is the anthropocentric scheme that dominated our thinking for thousands of years: human cognition. Another is the approach founded in classical cognitive science and artificial intelligence: cybernetic cognition. The third is the framework of evolutionary biology that encompasses all traits of evolved organisms: phylogenetic cognition. I will explain all three and sketch their current relationships. Each scheme forms the conceptual ground of a valid research programme, but how these programmes and schemes will end up in relation to each other is an open question.","PeriodicalId":516938,"journal":{"name":"De-Humanizing Cognition, Intelligence, and Agency. A Critical Assessment Between Philosophy, Ethics, and Science","volume":"96 3-4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139895538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-07DOI: 10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/008
Filippo Batisti
This paper will serve two functions. First, as a foreword to the other es- says that compose this monographic issue of the journal. It will also provide a critical discussion on two major issues that emerged in the general. The first consists in seeing the philosophical outcomes of new developments in science through the lens of the language that is used to describe them. The second pertains to the metascientific level of the disagreement, as this new evidence challenges the established understanding of scientific practice and its philosophical foundations. The case of plant cognition will be examined in some detail to illustrate both issues.
{"title":"Do Willows Really Weep? Cognition, Its Grammar, and the Problem of Pluralism\u0000 Conceptual, Linguistic and Metascientific Disagreements in Recent Science","authors":"Filippo Batisti","doi":"10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/008","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will serve two functions. First, as a foreword to the other es- says that compose this monographic issue of the journal. It will also provide a critical discussion on two major issues that emerged in the general. The first consists in seeing the philosophical outcomes of new developments in science through the lens of the language that is used to describe them. The second pertains to the metascientific level of the disagreement, as this new evidence challenges the established understanding of scientific practice and its philosophical foundations. The case of plant cognition will be examined in some detail to illustrate both issues.","PeriodicalId":516938,"journal":{"name":"De-Humanizing Cognition, Intelligence, and Agency. A Critical Assessment Between Philosophy, Ethics, and Science","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139895365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-07DOI: 10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/003
Roberta Raffaetà
This article discusses how the post‑human turn in science and society is framing cognition, mind and intelligence taking as empirical case the gut‑brain axis developed within microbiome science. The article brings into dialogue authors from different disciplines that deal with the relationship between cognition and posthumanism, with the aim to indicate posthumanism’s potential but also to warn about the risk of its – more or less conscious – engulfment into a neoliberal framework. Bringing into dialogue an ontoepistemic and a sociopolitical analysis – debates that are too often kept separated – the article indicates that the ‘becoming environmental’ of cognition, mind and intelligence, far from simply being a dehumanizing gesture that causes anthropocentrism to crumble, is still a very human endeavour, deeply rooted in human history and its varied desires and political aspirations.
{"title":"Cognition and Intelligence After the Post-Human Turn\u0000 Insights from the Brain-Gut Axis","authors":"Roberta Raffaetà","doi":"10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/003","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses how the post‑human turn in science and society is framing cognition, mind and intelligence taking as empirical case the gut‑brain axis developed within microbiome science. The article brings into dialogue authors from different disciplines that deal with the relationship between cognition and posthumanism, with the aim to indicate posthumanism’s potential but also to warn about the risk of its – more or less conscious – engulfment into a neoliberal framework. Bringing into dialogue an ontoepistemic and a sociopolitical analysis – debates that are too often kept separated – the article indicates that the ‘becoming environmental’ of cognition, mind and intelligence, far from simply being a dehumanizing gesture that causes anthropocentrism to crumble, is still a very human endeavour, deeply rooted in human history and its varied desires and political aspirations.","PeriodicalId":516938,"journal":{"name":"De-Humanizing Cognition, Intelligence, and Agency. A Critical Assessment Between Philosophy, Ethics, and Science","volume":"48 3-4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139896044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-07DOI: 10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/006
Reshma Joy
In the history of philosophy, the concept of self has been perennially elusive. The philosophical quest to understand the self is rife with phenomenological and metaphysical analyses, often overlooking other kinds of selves present in the biological realm. To systematically explore this question of non-human selves, I categorize the literature on philosophical and biological notions of self into the biogenic, the zoogenic, and the anthropogenic approaches to self. This article attempts to chart the genesis, the continuum, and the lowest bound of the self. Further, I enumerate challenges in developing a biogenic approach to self or taking the concept of self all the way down in the phylogenetic tree.
{"title":"On the Genesis, Continuum, and the Lowest Bound of Selves","authors":"Reshma Joy","doi":"10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/006","url":null,"abstract":"In the history of philosophy, the concept of self has been perennially elusive. The philosophical quest to understand the self is rife with phenomenological and metaphysical analyses, often overlooking other kinds of selves present in the biological realm. To systematically explore this question of non-human selves, I categorize the literature on philosophical and biological notions of self into the biogenic, the zoogenic, and the anthropogenic approaches to self. This article attempts to chart the genesis, the continuum, and the lowest bound of the self. Further, I enumerate challenges in developing a biogenic approach to self or taking the concept of self all the way down in the phylogenetic tree.","PeriodicalId":516938,"journal":{"name":"De-Humanizing Cognition, Intelligence, and Agency. A Critical Assessment Between Philosophy, Ethics, and Science","volume":"151 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139895522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-07DOI: 10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/007
Maja Białek
How to deal with the controversies surrounding applying the concept of COGNITION to non-humans? I suggest a bottom-up approach that makes room for the pluralistic perspectives of non-human cognition researchers without disregarding philosophers’ worries about overextending the concept. My proposal is that COGNITION should be a holistic story, in which no part can be understood without the context of the whole. If such a project is to succeed, however, we need to deal with anthropomorphism – not of the well-known, superficial kind, but understood as a deeply embedded framework determining how we understand cognitive life in general. After explaining what this kind of meta-theoretical anthropomorphism is, I argue that investigating non-human cognition is the best way to make explicit many of our hidden assumptions and re-examine them. In the second section of the paper, I present how this approach can be effective in reconsidering Brandom’s proposal of how to define levels of concept use for the purposes of empirical research on non-humans.
{"title":"Extending the Concept of Cognition and Meta‑Theoretical Anthropomorphism","authors":"Maja Białek","doi":"10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2023/02/007","url":null,"abstract":"How to deal with the controversies surrounding applying the concept of COGNITION to non-humans? I suggest a bottom-up approach that makes room for the pluralistic perspectives of non-human cognition researchers without disregarding philosophers’ worries about overextending the concept. My proposal is that COGNITION should be a holistic story, in which no part can be understood without the context of the whole. If such a project is to succeed, however, we need to deal with anthropomorphism – not of the well-known, superficial kind, but understood as a deeply embedded framework determining how we understand cognitive life in general. After explaining what this kind of meta-theoretical anthropomorphism is, I argue that investigating non-human cognition is the best way to make explicit many of our hidden assumptions and re-examine them. In the second section of the paper, I present how this approach can be effective in reconsidering Brandom’s proposal of how to define levels of concept use for the purposes of empirical research on non-humans.","PeriodicalId":516938,"journal":{"name":"De-Humanizing Cognition, Intelligence, and Agency. A Critical Assessment Between Philosophy, Ethics, and Science","volume":"18 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139895552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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