Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria : Online)最新文献

To counteract excessive effort due to relative income comparison among identical agents, the literature suggests a tax response equal to the negative externality. Assuming a general income distribution, we show that an optimal tax must be higher under a general social welfare function, to not only reduce inefficiency but also inequality. We recommend a practical tax response to stronger comparison - to hold employment constant, which does not require unrealistic information including unobservable comparison. Surprisingly, the tax response will dominate the comparison effect and reduce labour supply or reverse "keeping up with the Joneses" on intensive margins, and also reverse the otherwise rising inequality.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s00712-023-00821-2.

We study precautionary saving in a two-period model that allows for nonlinear risks and nonseparable preferences. Permitting nonlinear risk effects is important because they are common in the developing world or when worldwide shocks hit economies, like the COVID-19 pandemic. Allowing nonseparable preferences is also important because they admit the incorporation of intergenerational transfer, habit persistence and other specific features of intertemporal decision making. We decompose the risk shock using Davis's (Int Econ Rev 30(1):131-136, 1989) compensation method and analyze the income and substitution effect of an increase in risk. We prove that the substitution effect is always negative and, therefore, the income effect must be positive and larger in size to have a precautionary net effect. We then apply the method to various sources of risk, such as income, interest rate and wealth risk. We analyze the magnitude of each effect and find the conditions required to guarantee precautionary saving in each case. Our results are presented as signs of covariances, which provides a new perspective on precautionary saving.

Measures reduce health risk but limit economic activities and affect disproportionately the contact-intensive sectors whose economic activities involve more person-to-person interactions. The analysis shows that the size of the contact-intensive sectors shapes the stringency of measures due to the economic interactions between the contact-intensive sectors and other sectors although they constitute a minority of the labor force. Exploiting variation in measures and economic conditions across states, an empirical analysis shows that the number of contact-intensive workers has a negative effect on the stringency of measures.

In this paper we consider a differentiated oligopoly with two product varieties that are supplied by two groups of firms. After computing the Cournot solution of the game, we study its sensitivity to different sources of competition, namely the degree of product substitutability and market composition. Market composition can change either via new firms entering one industry or via firms switching production techniques, thus modifying the intensity of intra-brand competition. After studying the welfare consequences of an intensification of competition, we identify the equilibrium market composition when firms are driven by profit considerations. All the results are expressed in terms of the degree of product substitutability and of what we define "weighted relative efficiency" (WRE), which is a parameter combining both firm characteristics and market conditions.