Pub Date : 2017-09-01DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.07.002
Weixing Cai , Edward Lee , Zhenyu Wu , Alice Liang Xu , Cheng (Colin) Zeng
We evaluate whether voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure is influenced by the economic incentives of controlling shareholders. To examine this research question, we apply the natural experiment setting based on the Split Share Structure Reform in China. Following this Reform, Chinese state shareholders are allowed to trade their shares in the stock market, which increases their incentives to maximize the market value of the firms that they control. We present empirical evidence of increased CSR disclosure among listed state-owned enterprises after this Reform. This evidence suggests that the economic incentives of key stakeholders are associated with voluntary CSR disclosures.
{"title":"Do Economic Incentives of Controlling Shareholders Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure? A Natural Experiment","authors":"Weixing Cai , Edward Lee , Zhenyu Wu , Alice Liang Xu , Cheng (Colin) Zeng","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.07.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.07.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We evaluate whether voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure is influenced by the economic incentives of controlling shareholders. To examine this research question, we apply the natural experiment setting based on the Split Share Structure Reform in China. Following this Reform, Chinese state shareholders are allowed to trade their shares in the stock market, which increases their incentives to maximize the market value of the firms that they control. We present empirical evidence of increased CSR disclosure among listed state-owned enterprises after this Reform. This evidence suggests that the economic incentives of key stakeholders are associated with voluntary CSR disclosures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 3","pages":"Pages 238-250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.07.002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42712905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2016.11.001
Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou
This study examines whether the strength of legal enforcement at the country level plays a role in the value-relevance of accounting quality for loan pricing determination, using an international sample of firms reporting under IFRS. The underlying hypothesis is that stronger vs. weaker enforcement should affect the informativeness of financial statements, due to their increased credibility, and thus results in a stronger influence of accounting quality on loan pricing, in case this information is considered more reliable by potential lenders. Evidence indicates that accounting quality is consequential for the determination of loan spread only in combination with the level of legal enforcement, and this only holds for the countries with stronger legal enforcement. This evidence indicates that financial statement quality information is value-relevant and has a significant impact on the determination of loan pricing only if this information is considered to be credible enough by loan providers in a country, and this is the case when legal enforcement is stronger.
{"title":"Accounting Quality and Loan Pricing: The Effect of Cross-country Differences in Legal Enforcement","authors":"Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.11.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2016.11.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines whether the strength of legal enforcement at the country level plays a role in the value-relevance of accounting quality for loan pricing determination, using an international sample of firms reporting under IFRS. The underlying hypothesis is that stronger vs. weaker enforcement should affect the informativeness of financial statements, due to their increased credibility, and thus results in a stronger influence of accounting quality on loan pricing, in case this information is considered more reliable by potential lenders. Evidence indicates that accounting quality is consequential for the determination of loan spread only in combination with the level of legal enforcement, and this only holds for the countries with stronger legal enforcement. This evidence indicates that financial statement quality information is value-relevant and has a significant impact on the determination of loan pricing only if this information is considered to be credible enough by loan providers in a country, and this is the case when legal enforcement is stronger.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 2","pages":"Pages 178-200"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2016.11.001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125712900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.006
Anna Alon
{"title":"","authors":"Anna Alon","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 2","pages":"Pages 224-225"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46470999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.001
Paul K. Chaney
{"title":"Discussion of “Accounting quality and loan pricing: The effect of cross-country differences in legal enforcement”","authors":"Paul K. Chaney","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 2","pages":"Pages 201-204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49061346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.002
Martin Bierey , Martin Schmidt
This paper analyzes troubled banks' use of accounting discretion and its interaction with regulatory intervention in a time of financial distress. We analyze impairment losses that Europe's largest banks recognized on Greek Government Bonds (GGB) during 2011, the time during which GGB were considered impaired. Our findings reveal considerable variation in the impairment ratios across banks. Banks with larger GGB exposures, for which a full impairment would deplete a large share of regulatory capital, recognize significantly lower impairment ratios. Furthermore, we find that troubled banks delay full impairments until state aid is provided. Troubled banks recognize significantly lower impairment ratios in the quarter before they are provided with state aid, but substantially increase their impairment ratios afterwards. This pattern is consistent with the notion that troubled banks initially understate impairments to conceal the full extent of their financial difficulties from less sophisticated non-regulator outsiders (e.g., depositors and the general public), which increases regulators' ability to practice forbearance by not intervening immediately.
{"title":"Banks' Use of Accounting Discretion and Regulatory Intervention: The Case of European Banks' Impairments on Greek Government Bonds","authors":"Martin Bierey , Martin Schmidt","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analyzes troubled banks' use of accounting discretion and its interaction with regulatory intervention in a time of financial distress. We analyze impairment losses that Europe's largest banks recognized on Greek Government Bonds (GGB) during 2011, the time during which GGB were considered impaired. Our findings reveal considerable variation in the impairment ratios across banks. Banks with larger GGB exposures, for which a full impairment would deplete a large share of regulatory capital, recognize significantly lower impairment ratios. Furthermore, we find that troubled banks delay full impairments until state aid is provided. Troubled banks recognize significantly lower impairment ratios in the quarter before they are provided with state aid, but substantially increase their impairment ratios afterwards. This pattern is consistent with the notion that troubled banks initially understate impairments to conceal the full extent of their financial difficulties from less sophisticated non-regulator outsiders (e.g., depositors and the general public), which increases regulators' ability to practice forbearance by not intervening immediately.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 2","pages":"Pages 122-141"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.01.002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92034678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.003
Min Zhang , Haoran Xu , Xu Li
This study adds to the literature on mandatory rotation of audit partners in Chinese companies by examining the effect of the pre-rotation relationships between incoming and outgoing partners. We consider the rotating partners to have prior working relationship if they were cosigners of audit reports before the rotation. We find two different outcomes of having prior working relationship: (a) increasing the likelihood that outgoing partners rotate back after the cooling off period, and (b) lower audit quality improvement after rotation. These findings bring into question the extent to which rotating partners with prior working relationships are truly independent.
{"title":"The Effect of Previous Working Relationship between Rotating Partners on Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation","authors":"Min Zhang , Haoran Xu , Xu Li","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study adds to the literature on mandatory rotation of audit partners in Chinese companies by examining the effect of the pre-rotation relationships between incoming and outgoing partners. We consider the rotating partners to have prior working relationship if they were cosigners of audit reports before the rotation. We find two different outcomes of having prior working relationship: (a) increasing the likelihood that outgoing partners rotate back after the cooling off period, and (b) lower audit quality improvement after rotation. These findings bring into question the extent to which rotating partners with prior working relationships are truly independent.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 2","pages":"Pages 101-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43981540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.05.001
Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou
{"title":"Response to Discussion of “Accounting Quality and Loan Pricing: The Effect of Cross-country Differences in Legal Enforcement”","authors":"Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.05.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.05.001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 2","pages":"Pages 205-208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.05.001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92133504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.004
Paul Pacter
{"title":"IASB Corner","authors":"Paul Pacter","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 2","pages":"Pages 209-220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92111173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.005
Wendy Green
{"title":"","authors":"Wendy Green","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 2","pages":"Pages 222-223"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47082290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-06-01DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.002
Xingqiang Du , Wei Jian , Shaojuan Lai
In this study, we use a sample of Chinese companies to examine the monitoring role of foreign directors in deterring earnings management. Our findings show that earnings management is significantly negatively associated with the presence and ratio of foreign directors on corporate boards. We further find that, under these conditions, earnings management is less pronounced in state-owned enterprises as compared to others. These findings are robust to various specifications of earnings management as well as to the approach used in matching the treatment and control samples. Interestingly, the negative impact of board membership of foreign directors on earnings management varies with audit quality, IFRS convergence, investor protection and the similarity or difference of the time zones of the foreign directors and China.
{"title":"Do Foreign Directors Mitigate Earnings Management? Evidence From China","authors":"Xingqiang Du , Wei Jian , Shaojuan Lai","doi":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this study, we use a sample of Chinese companies to examine the monitoring role of foreign directors in deterring earnings management. Our findings show that earnings management is significantly negatively associated with the presence and ratio of foreign directors on corporate boards. We further find that, under these conditions, earnings management is less pronounced in state-owned enterprises as compared to others. These findings are robust to various specifications of earnings management as well as to the approach used in matching the treatment and control samples. Interestingly, the negative impact of board membership of foreign directors on earnings management varies with audit quality, IFRS convergence, investor protection and the similarity or difference of the time zones of the foreign directors and China.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101232,"journal":{"name":"The International Journal of Accounting","volume":"52 2","pages":"Pages 142-177"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.intacc.2017.04.002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48724590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}