Industry-wide voluntary agreements are touted as a means for corporations to take more corporate social responsibility (CSR). We study what type of joint CSR agreement induces competitors to increase CSR efforts in a model of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products. Consumers have a willingness to pay for more responsibly manufactured products. Firms are driven by profit, and are also possibly intrinsically motivated, to invest in CSR efforts. We find that cooperative agreements directly on the level of CSR reduce CSR efforts compared to competition. Such agreements throttle both for-profit and intrinsic motivation for CSR. CSR efforts only increase if agreements are permitted solely on output. Such production agreements, however, reduce total welfare in the market and raise antitrust concerns. Taking externalities into account may help justify a production agreement under a broader welfare standard, but not agreements on CSR directly. Moreover, simply requiring a higher CSR level by regulation while preserving competition always gives higher within-market welfare.
{"title":"Corporate Social Responsibility by Joint Agreement","authors":"M. Schinkel, L. Treuren","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3878784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3878784","url":null,"abstract":"Industry-wide voluntary agreements are touted as a means for corporations to take more corporate social responsibility (CSR). We study what type of joint CSR agreement induces competitors to increase CSR efforts in a model of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products. Consumers have a willingness to pay for more responsibly manufactured products. Firms are driven by profit, and are also possibly intrinsically motivated, to invest in CSR efforts. We find that cooperative agreements directly on the level of CSR reduce CSR efforts compared to competition. Such agreements throttle both for-profit and intrinsic motivation for CSR. CSR efforts only increase if agreements are permitted solely on output. Such production agreements, however, reduce total welfare in the market and raise antitrust concerns. Taking externalities into account may help justify a production agreement under a broader welfare standard, but not agreements on CSR directly. Moreover, simply requiring a higher CSR level by regulation while preserving competition always gives higher within-market welfare.","PeriodicalId":102586,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115840085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The digital economy is at the forefront of the agenda of decisionmakers worldwide following several expert reports on competition in digital markets, underscoring competition issues. The question shifts then from why to how to adapt competition to the digital economy. Digital competition and digital regulation? Europe, the United Kingdom, China, Germany, Italy, Austria, the United States consider ex-ante regulations and ex-post competition laws to tackle issues in digital markets. Australia and Greece also envisage to legislate. The journey only begins. Some legislations are proposals, while others are already enacted. At this stage, changes are likely in the future, even regarding enacted legislations, following developments in other countries, and discussions during the legislative processes. In this context, the paper offers a primer to digital competition and regulation with a holistic analysis of the principal features rather than an in-depth analysis of each legislation. From a law and economics standpoint, it thus explains rather than compares the legislations and puts forward some improvements. Section II analyzes the legislations. It examines the instruments, goals, scope, and content. Section III proposes some improvements to the legislations to minimize error costs at no or low costs for undertakings with substantial benefits for end-users and businesses. It suggests ensuring convergence of legal regime and enforcement, effective consumer choice, and indirect entry. Section IV concludes.
{"title":"Digital Competition and Regulation in the World: A Primer","authors":"Christophe Carugati","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3866438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3866438","url":null,"abstract":"The digital economy is at the forefront of the agenda of decisionmakers worldwide following several expert reports on competition in digital markets, underscoring competition issues. The question shifts then from why to how to adapt competition to the digital economy. Digital competition and digital regulation? Europe, the United Kingdom, China, Germany, Italy, Austria, the United States consider ex-ante regulations and ex-post competition laws to tackle issues in digital markets. Australia and Greece also envisage to legislate. The journey only begins. Some legislations are proposals, while others are already enacted. At this stage, changes are likely in the future, even regarding enacted legislations, following developments in other countries, and discussions during the legislative processes. In this context, the paper offers a primer to digital competition and regulation with a holistic analysis of the principal features rather than an in-depth analysis of each legislation. From a law and economics standpoint, it thus explains rather than compares the legislations and puts forward some improvements. Section II analyzes the legislations. It examines the instruments, goals, scope, and content. Section III proposes some improvements to the legislations to minimize error costs at no or low costs for undertakings with substantial benefits for end-users and businesses. It suggests ensuring convergence of legal regime and enforcement, effective consumer choice, and indirect entry. Section IV concludes.","PeriodicalId":102586,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130499760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sungyong Chang, Hyunseob Kim, Jaeyong Song, Keun Lee
We examine the role of latecomers’ optimal resource allocation between innovation and imitation in latecomers’ catch-up under diverse technological regimes. Building on Nelson and Winter (1982), we develop computational models of technological leadership change. The results suggest that one-sided dependency upon either imitation or innovation deters technological leadership change. At an early stage with low-level technologies, latecomers should focus on imitation; then, as the technological gap decreases, they should allocate more R&D resource to innovation. We also examine the role of several variables, such as appropriability, cumulativeness, and cycle time of technologies (CTT), as related to technological regimes. The simulation results show that while low appropriability tends to increase the probability of technological leadership change, it makes imitation a more e˙ective strategy compared to innovation; in addition, while a higher level of cumulativeness tends to reduce the probability of leadership change, it makes imitation a more valuable option because innovation becomes more diÿcult for latecomers. We also find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the CTT and the probability of technological leadership change. When the CTT is short, it makes sense for latecomers to allocate more resources to imitation, especially when their technology level is initially low.
{"title":"Dynamics of Imitation versus Innovation in Technological Leadership Change: Latecomers’ Catch-up Strategies in Diverse Technological Regimes","authors":"Sungyong Chang, Hyunseob Kim, Jaeyong Song, Keun Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3871232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3871232","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the role of latecomers’ optimal resource allocation between innovation and imitation in latecomers’ catch-up under diverse technological regimes. Building on Nelson and Winter (1982), we develop computational models of technological leadership change. The results suggest that one-sided dependency upon either imitation or innovation deters technological leadership change. At an early stage with low-level technologies, latecomers should focus on imitation; then, as the technological gap decreases, they should allocate more R&D resource to innovation. We also examine the role of several variables, such as appropriability, cumulativeness, and cycle time of technologies (CTT), as related to technological regimes. The simulation results show that while low appropriability tends to increase the probability of technological leadership change, it makes imitation a more e˙ective strategy compared to innovation; in addition, while a higher level of cumulativeness tends to reduce the probability of leadership change, it makes imitation a more valuable option because innovation becomes more diÿcult for latecomers. We also find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the CTT and the probability of technological leadership change. When the CTT is short, it makes sense for latecomers to allocate more resources to imitation, especially when their technology level is initially low.","PeriodicalId":102586,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117137346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article studies how institutional dynamics might affect and be affected by the implementation of climate-related financial policies. First, we propose a three-dimensional framework to distinguish: i) motives for policy implementation (prudential or promotional); ii) policy instruments (informational, incentive-based or quantity-based); and iii) implementing authorities (political or delegated). Second, we use this framework to show how sustainable financial interventions in certain jurisdictions - most notably, Europe - rely predominantly on informational policy instruments to achieve both promotional and prudential objectives. Policymakers in other jurisdictions - e.g. China - also employ incentive- or quantity-based instruments to achieve promotional objectives. Third, we identify two main institutional explanations for this European ‘promotional gap’: i) a reduced intervention of political authorities on the allocation of financial resources; and ii) a stronger independence of technical delegated authorities supervising financial dynamics. This governance configuration leads to an institutional deadlock in which only measures fitting with both political and delegated authorities' objectives can be implemented. Finally, we identify and discuss the possible institutional scenarios that could originate from the current setting, and stress the need for close cooperation between political and delegated authorities.
{"title":"It Takes Two to Dance: Institutional Dynamics and Climate-Related Financial Policies","authors":"M. Baer, Emanuele Campiglio, J. Deyris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3843170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3843170","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article studies how institutional dynamics might affect and be affected by the implementation of climate-related financial policies. First, we propose a three-dimensional framework to distinguish: i) motives for policy implementation (prudential or promotional); ii) policy instruments (informational, incentive-based or quantity-based); and iii) implementing authorities (political or delegated). Second, we use this framework to show how sustainable financial interventions in certain jurisdictions - most notably, Europe - rely predominantly on informational policy instruments to achieve both promotional and prudential objectives. Policymakers in other jurisdictions - e.g. China - also employ incentive- or quantity-based instruments to achieve promotional objectives. Third, we identify two main institutional explanations for this European ‘promotional gap’: i) a reduced intervention of political authorities on the allocation of financial resources; and ii) a stronger independence of technical delegated authorities supervising financial dynamics. This governance configuration leads to an institutional deadlock in which only measures fitting with both political and delegated authorities' objectives can be implemented. Finally, we identify and discuss the possible institutional scenarios that could originate from the current setting, and stress the need for close cooperation between political and delegated authorities.","PeriodicalId":102586,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)","volume":"330 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122834813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the economic consequences of manipulation of social insurance benefits. Using administrative data of the public long-term care insurance (LTCI) in Japan, we document novel discontinuity and bunching in the distribution of health scores that determine benefit levels for LTCI. The observed distribution suggests that LTCI recipients tend to receive more generous benefits than they should because medical examiners manipulate recipients' health score. To quantify the impact of manipulation on long-term care (LTC) expenditures, we develop partial identification and nonparametric estimation methods that allow for flexible restrictions on counterfactual distribution. Our baseline estimation indicates that the manipulation increases monthly LTC expenditures per recipient by 60.2-227.9 USD (3.7-15.5%). We also find that the lower bound on manipulation effects is robust to various restrictions.
{"title":"Economic Consequences of Manipulation of Social Insurance Benefits","authors":"Takuya Ishihara, Masaki Takahashi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3784394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3784394","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the economic consequences of manipulation of social insurance benefits. Using administrative data of the public long-term care insurance (LTCI) in Japan, we document novel discontinuity and bunching in the distribution of health scores that determine benefit levels for LTCI. The observed distribution suggests that LTCI recipients tend to receive more generous benefits than they should because medical examiners manipulate recipients' health score. To quantify the impact of manipulation on long-term care (LTC) expenditures, we develop partial identification and nonparametric estimation methods that allow for flexible restrictions on counterfactual distribution. Our baseline estimation indicates that the manipulation increases monthly LTC expenditures per recipient by 60.2-227.9 USD (3.7-15.5%). We also find that the lower bound on manipulation effects is robust to various restrictions.","PeriodicalId":102586,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134157675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Digital markets pose fundamental challenges for abuse of dominance enforcement. This paper will explore these challenges, and set out some strategies that authorities can consider in their casework.
On the one hand, digital markets may be more likely to manifest the kind of harm that abuse of dominance laws were designed to prevent. If competition authorities are unable to apply these prohibitions to digital business models, it may lead to questions about the broader relevance of abuse of dominance as a competition enforcement tool. As a result, some have called for more extensive enforcement in this area.
On the other hand, the analysis of this harm can be potentially complex, and give rise to the risk of error (resulting in either over- or under-enforcement). Aggressive enforcement that is not founded in economic theories of harm, or which does not address the risk of over-enforcement, may end up harming the consumers it was meant to protect, and undermine support for competition enforcement more generally.
To balance these risks, it seems that both (1) an openness to abuse of dominance theories of harm, and (2) great care in selecting which cases to bring, are needed. Different jurisdictions make different assessments of where the balance of under- and over-enforcement risks lies. These assessments cannot be separated from the underlying legislative, historical, and philosophical context of competition law in each jurisdiction. They may also be updated in response to ex-post assessments of past interventions, evidence about trends in market power. However, there are areas of convergence in terms of the need for effects-based analysis in most cases, and the need to avoid action that creates disincentives for innovation. At the same time, there are cases in which alternative competition policy tools could be either more justified, more timely, or more resource-efficient.
Going forward, competition authorities seeking to address abuses of dominance in digital markets would benefit from deeper international co-operation, given the international scope of many digital firms. In addition, there remain significant opportunities for the development of new methodologies that help authorities assess the unique circumstances in digital markets, and identify clearer conditions in which harm will emerge.
{"title":"Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets: OECD Background Paper","authors":"J. Mancini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3862453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3862453","url":null,"abstract":"Digital markets pose fundamental challenges for abuse of dominance enforcement. This paper will explore these challenges, and set out some strategies that authorities can consider in their casework. <br><br>On the one hand, digital markets may be more likely to manifest the kind of harm that abuse of dominance laws were designed to prevent. If competition authorities are unable to apply these prohibitions to digital business models, it may lead to questions about the broader relevance of abuse of dominance as a competition enforcement tool. As a result, some have called for more extensive enforcement in this area. <br><br>On the other hand, the analysis of this harm can be potentially complex, and give rise to the risk of error (resulting in either over- or under-enforcement). Aggressive enforcement that is not founded in economic theories of harm, or which does not address the risk of over-enforcement, may end up harming the consumers it was meant to protect, and undermine support for competition enforcement more generally.<br><br>To balance these risks, it seems that both (1) an openness to abuse of dominance theories of harm, and (2) great care in selecting which cases to bring, are needed. Different jurisdictions make different assessments of where the balance of under- and over-enforcement risks lies. These assessments cannot be separated from the underlying legislative, historical, and philosophical context of competition law in each jurisdiction. They may also be updated in response to ex-post assessments of past interventions, evidence about trends in market power. However, there are areas of convergence in terms of the need for effects-based analysis in most cases, and the need to avoid action that creates disincentives for innovation. At the same time, there are cases in which alternative competition policy tools could be either more justified, more timely, or more resource-efficient. <br><br>Going forward, competition authorities seeking to address abuses of dominance in digital markets would benefit from deeper international co-operation, given the international scope of many digital firms. In addition, there remain significant opportunities for the development of new methodologies that help authorities assess the unique circumstances in digital markets, and identify clearer conditions in which harm will emerge.","PeriodicalId":102586,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134214059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Uber, the most prolific of a new breed of transportation network companies, has been the target of two distinct strands of litigation in recent years that get at a question at the heart of the company’s business model. On the one hand, drivers have sued Uber for intentionally misclassifying them as contractors to dodge employer obligations. On the other, consumers have taken Uber to court for fixing the prices of millions of independent competitors, in clear violation of antitrust law. Uber’s situation seems legally untenable; either drivers are independent businesspeople and Uber is running a massive price-fixing conspiracy, or drivers are employees and the company owes millions in worker benefits and payroll taxes.
However, antitrust and labor law have both evolved over the last half-century to be far more permissive of innovative (some would say exploitative) business models. This leaves a regulatory void in which companies like Uber get all the benefits of a coordinated, top-down command structure without incurring either antitrust liability or employer obligations. This void poses a competition problem and a labor problem. Workers that have no real power to negotiate their rates or make market-based decisions are left without the protections of labor and employment law.
This note argues for a common set of definitions across antitrust and labor law to close the regulatory gap. These definitions should be nuanced, and might include intermediate categories like “dependent contractors.” These definitions should be guided by evidence of genuine ability or inability to make market decisions, particularly whether workers can set their own prices. But most importantly, they should be uniformly recognized by labor and antitrust courts. This will allow for innovative companies like Uber to choose. They can relinquish economic decision-making to their workers and maintain their low-commitment technology company status, or have greater coordination rights vis-à-vis their workforce and accept the employer obligations that come with them.
{"title":"Bridging the Coasean Divide: A Shared Economic Lexicon for Antitrust & Worker Protection Law","authors":"Conor J. May","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3707813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3707813","url":null,"abstract":"Uber, the most prolific of a new breed of transportation network companies, has been the target of two distinct strands of litigation in recent years that get at a question at the heart of the company’s business model. On the one hand, drivers have sued Uber for intentionally misclassifying them as contractors to dodge employer obligations. On the other, consumers have taken Uber to court for fixing the prices of millions of independent competitors, in clear violation of antitrust law. Uber’s situation seems legally untenable; either drivers are independent businesspeople and Uber is running a massive price-fixing conspiracy, or drivers are employees and the company owes millions in worker benefits and payroll taxes.<br><br>However, antitrust and labor law have both evolved over the last half-century to be far more permissive of innovative (some would say exploitative) business models. This leaves a regulatory void in which companies like Uber get all the benefits of a coordinated, top-down command structure without incurring either antitrust liability or employer obligations. This void poses a competition problem and a labor problem. Workers that have no real power to negotiate their rates or make market-based decisions are left without the protections of labor and employment law.<br><br>This note argues for a common set of definitions across antitrust and labor law to close the regulatory gap. These definitions should be nuanced, and might include intermediate categories like “dependent contractors.” These definitions should be guided by evidence of genuine ability or inability to make market decisions, particularly whether workers can set their own prices. But most importantly, they should be uniformly recognized by labor and antitrust courts. This will allow for innovative companies like Uber to choose. They can relinquish economic decision-making to their workers and maintain their low-commitment technology company status, or have greater coordination rights vis-à-vis their workforce and accept the employer obligations that come with them.","PeriodicalId":102586,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133781537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Like every democratically elected president in Taiwan before her, in her first term, President Tsai proposed and implemented various industrial policies designed to create new or bolster hopefully emergent industries. Unfortunately, industrial policy has proven to be increasingly irrelevant in terms of failing to deliver on upgrading new or inchoate industries in Taiwan. This increasing irrelevance of industrial policy preceded Tsai’s administration and has deep structural and institutional roots. To the extent that industrial policy was impactful during Tsai’s first term, it did so by supporting existing industries and firms, such as TSMC, and via the continued hidden industrial policy of currency intervention to promote exports. Taiwan’s economy and Tsai’s administration did benefit from Trump’s trade war with China. Recent trends such as the return of Taiwanese manufacturing from China would not have occurred without the trade war. However, any future broader decoupling between the US and China’s economies beyond that of Trump’s limited trade war could badly hurt Taiwan.
{"title":"The Increasing Irrelevance of Industrial Policy in Taiwan, 2016–2020","authors":"Douglas B. Fuller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3894525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3894525","url":null,"abstract":"Like every democratically elected president in Taiwan before her, in her first term, President Tsai proposed and implemented various industrial policies designed to create new or bolster hopefully emergent industries. Unfortunately, industrial policy has proven to be increasingly irrelevant in terms of failing to deliver on upgrading new or inchoate industries in Taiwan. This increasing irrelevance of industrial policy preceded Tsai’s administration and has deep structural and institutional roots. To the extent that industrial policy was impactful during Tsai’s first term, it did so by supporting existing industries and firms, such as TSMC, and via the continued hidden industrial policy of currency intervention to promote exports. Taiwan’s economy and Tsai’s administration did benefit from Trump’s trade war with China. Recent trends such as the return of Taiwanese manufacturing from China would not have occurred without the trade war. However, any future broader decoupling between the US and China’s economies beyond that of Trump’s limited trade war could badly hurt Taiwan.","PeriodicalId":102586,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125424033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Competitiveness and industrial policy seem to play a critical role in the development and mutation of different spatialized socio-economic systems. This article aims to review the literature on these two concepts and suggest a novel theoretical framework. First, we identify that, in the relevant literature, industrial policy acquires progressively a repositioned content, described as a new, holistic, multidimensional, or integrated policy that can help create and sustain the competitiveness of the firms, industries, localities, nations, or other socio-economic agglomerations. In this context, we explore the form of an actual integrated industrial policy and propose the theoretical framework of the competitiveness web, in which the co-evolution of micro-meso-macro levels are explored, by placing the dynamics of business innovation at the dialectic center of the overall developmental process. This integrated industrial policy to strengthen competitiveness must also be able to promote innovation in the different local and regional ecosystems and, therefore, we conceive a policy mechanism in the form of the Institutes of Local Development and Innovation (ILDI). The primary purpose of these institutes is to diagnose and strengthen the Stra.Tech.Man physiology (strategy-technology-management synthesis) of the local socio-economic organizations. We believe that this new approach to the integrated industrial policy to strengthen the local competitiveness can contribute to facilitating the adaptation of the socio-economic systems, and especially the less dynamic and developed, to the new emerging challenges of the crisis and restructuring of globalization in the pandemic era.
{"title":"Thoughts on Competitiveness and Integrated Industrial Policy: A Field of Mutual Convergences","authors":"Charis Vlados, Dimos Chatzinikolaou","doi":"10.5430/rwe.v11n3p12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5430/rwe.v11n3p12","url":null,"abstract":"Competitiveness and industrial policy seem to play a critical role in the development and mutation of different spatialized socio-economic systems. This article aims to review the literature on these two concepts and suggest a novel theoretical framework. First, we identify that, in the relevant literature, industrial policy acquires progressively a repositioned content, described as a new, holistic, multidimensional, or integrated policy that can help create and sustain the competitiveness of the firms, industries, localities, nations, or other socio-economic agglomerations. In this context, we explore the form of an actual integrated industrial policy and propose the theoretical framework of the competitiveness web, in which the co-evolution of micro-meso-macro levels are explored, by placing the dynamics of business innovation at the dialectic center of the overall developmental process. This integrated industrial policy to strengthen competitiveness must also be able to promote innovation in the different local and regional ecosystems and, therefore, we conceive a policy mechanism in the form of the Institutes of Local Development and Innovation (ILDI). The primary purpose of these institutes is to diagnose and strengthen the Stra.Tech.Man physiology (strategy-technology-management synthesis) of the local socio-economic organizations. We believe that this new approach to the integrated industrial policy to strengthen the local competitiveness can contribute to facilitating the adaptation of the socio-economic systems, and especially the less dynamic and developed, to the new emerging challenges of the crisis and restructuring of globalization in the pandemic era.","PeriodicalId":102586,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121629236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article aims to propose an integrated policy framework for competitiveness and entrepreneurship at a unified macro-meso-micro level. The article presents the evolution of the definition of competitiveness and competitiveness policy and focuses next on modern definitions of macro-policies, meso-policies, and micro-policies by presenting their conceptual synthesis based on the literature. Then, by building on the approach of “competitiveness web,” it presents the implications that such an overarching concept can have on the micro-meso-macro level of entrepreneurship strengthening policies. In this context, it leverages the “Stra.Tech.Man” approach to entrepreneurship dynamics, which implies that business innovation derives from the synthesis of the innate spheres of strategy, technology, and management. At the same time, it proposes the micro-meso-level policy of “Local Development and Innovation Institutes” in the overall context of the competitiveness web. The proposed “competitiveness web” policy framework can address the issue of fostering entrepreneurship in today’s environment of globalization because it takes into account all the building blocks of socio-economic systems by describing the general framework of the policies at the micro-meso-macro socioeconomic levels.
{"title":"Macro, Meso, and Micro Policies for Strengthening Entrepreneurship: Towards an Integrated Competitiveness Policy","authors":"Charis Vlados, Dimos Chatzinikolaou","doi":"10.30845/jbep.v7n1a1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30845/jbep.v7n1a1","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to propose an integrated policy framework for competitiveness and entrepreneurship at a unified macro-meso-micro level. The article presents the evolution of the definition of competitiveness and competitiveness policy and focuses next on modern definitions of macro-policies, meso-policies, and micro-policies by presenting their conceptual synthesis based on the literature. Then, by building on the approach of “competitiveness web,” it presents the implications that such an overarching concept can have on the micro-meso-macro level of entrepreneurship strengthening policies. In this context, it leverages the “Stra.Tech.Man” approach to entrepreneurship dynamics, which implies that business innovation derives from the synthesis of the innate spheres of strategy, technology, and management. At the same time, it proposes the micro-meso-level policy of “Local Development and Innovation Institutes” in the overall context of the competitiveness web. The proposed “competitiveness web” policy framework can address the issue of fostering entrepreneurship in today’s environment of globalization because it takes into account all the building blocks of socio-economic systems by describing the general framework of the policies at the micro-meso-macro socioeconomic levels.","PeriodicalId":102586,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)","volume":"427 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122815189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：