Pub Date : 2018-12-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0008
Lindsey A. O’Rourke
This chapter argues that presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson did not foresee a direct Soviet threat in the Dominican Republic when they decided to intervene. Instead, America pursued the maintenance of a hierarchical regional order in the Western Hemisphere. With this end in view, U.S. policymakers feared that if a socialist or communist regime came to power in the Dominican Republic, its success could spark left-wing revolts in neighboring countries, leading to a cascade of defections from the U.S.-led order and potentially the collapse of U.S. regional hegemony. As such, the chapter investigates a series of hegemonic operations against the Dominican Republic during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Eisenhower initiated a coup d'état plot against America's one-time ally General Rafael Trujillo that came to fruition under Kennedy and resulted in Trujillo's 1961 assassination. In 1962, Kennedy launched a second covert operation to manipulate the country's upcoming presidential elections. After these covert efforts failed to produce a stable government, Johnson overtly intervened during a 1965 crisis to prevent leftist forces from assuming power. Afterward, he reverted to covert conduct to manipulate Dominican elections in 1966 and 1968.
{"title":"Dictators and Democrats in the Dominican Republic","authors":"Lindsey A. O’Rourke","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson did not foresee a direct Soviet threat in the Dominican Republic when they decided to intervene. Instead, America pursued the maintenance of a hierarchical regional order in the Western Hemisphere. With this end in view, U.S. policymakers feared that if a socialist or communist regime came to power in the Dominican Republic, its success could spark left-wing revolts in neighboring countries, leading to a cascade of defections from the U.S.-led order and potentially the collapse of U.S. regional hegemony. As such, the chapter investigates a series of hegemonic operations against the Dominican Republic during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Eisenhower initiated a coup d'état plot against America's one-time ally General Rafael Trujillo that came to fruition under Kennedy and resulted in Trujillo's 1961 assassination. In 1962, Kennedy launched a second covert operation to manipulate the country's upcoming presidential elections. After these covert efforts failed to produce a stable government, Johnson overtly intervened during a 1965 crisis to prevent leftist forces from assuming power. Afterward, he reverted to covert conduct to manipulate Dominican elections in 1966 and 1968.","PeriodicalId":103970,"journal":{"name":"Covert Regime Change","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116162374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0005
Lindsey A. O’Rourke
This chapter provides a historical overview of America's experience with regime change during the Cold War. Looking at the broad trends in America's regime change policy highlights the shifting security interests driving U.S. behavior over this period, the reasons why leaders preferred covert conduct, and the general utility of covert operations. The chapter is split into three sections. These correspond to the three types of security interests motivating these operations: offensive, preventive, and hegemonic. Each section outlines the motives behind that type of regime change, followed by a discussion of how each type of operation fulfilled the two prerequisites for intervention introduced in Chapter 2: namely, that they were in response to a chronic, security-oriented interstate dispute and that the intervening state must have identified a plausible political alternative to the target regime. Although the chapter deals with both covert and overt cases, the six overt cases receive closer individual attention because they pose a stronger challenge to the assertion that states generally prefer to conduct their regime changes covertly.
{"title":"Overview of US-Backed Regime Changes during the Cold War","authors":"Lindsey A. O’Rourke","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides a historical overview of America's experience with regime change during the Cold War. Looking at the broad trends in America's regime change policy highlights the shifting security interests driving U.S. behavior over this period, the reasons why leaders preferred covert conduct, and the general utility of covert operations. The chapter is split into three sections. These correspond to the three types of security interests motivating these operations: offensive, preventive, and hegemonic. Each section outlines the motives behind that type of regime change, followed by a discussion of how each type of operation fulfilled the two prerequisites for intervention introduced in Chapter 2: namely, that they were in response to a chronic, security-oriented interstate dispute and that the intervening state must have identified a plausible political alternative to the target regime. Although the chapter deals with both covert and overt cases, the six overt cases receive closer individual attention because they pose a stronger challenge to the assertion that states generally prefer to conduct their regime changes covertly.","PeriodicalId":103970,"journal":{"name":"Covert Regime Change","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128969762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0001
Lindsey A. O’Rourke
This chapter discusses covert regime change and how little attention it has received in international affairs. Despite the fact that covert regime changes have long played a central role in international politics, comprehensive theories to explain how, when, and why states launch these operations are lacking, possibly because of the special challenges involved in studying covert actions. Nonetheless, American actions during the Cold War offer a unique opportunity to study the covert actions of a great power. Indeed, the United States and other great powers will likely continue to undertake both covert and overt missions regularly. To understand modern world affairs, it is therefore necessary to determine how and why states launch these operations. Toward that end, the chapter briefly lays out the causes, conduct, and consequences of foreign-imposed covert regime change.
{"title":"The False Promise of Covert Regime Change","authors":"Lindsey A. O’Rourke","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses covert regime change and how little attention it has received in international affairs. Despite the fact that covert regime changes have long played a central role in international politics, comprehensive theories to explain how, when, and why states launch these operations are lacking, possibly because of the special challenges involved in studying covert actions. Nonetheless, American actions during the Cold War offer a unique opportunity to study the covert actions of a great power. Indeed, the United States and other great powers will likely continue to undertake both covert and overt missions regularly. To understand modern world affairs, it is therefore necessary to determine how and why states launch these operations. Toward that end, the chapter briefly lays out the causes, conduct, and consequences of foreign-imposed covert regime change.","PeriodicalId":103970,"journal":{"name":"Covert Regime Change","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121386723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0009
Lindsey A. O’Rourke
This chapter briefly discusses the state of America's attempts at covert regime changes during the Cold War, before turning to the state of covert operations in the post-Cold War era. It shows that the vast majority of America's covert and overt regime changes during the Cold War did not work out as their planners intended. Washington launched these regime changes to resolve security-oriented interstate disputes by installing foreign leaders with similar policy preferences. American experiences during the Cold War, however, illustrate that this was often quite difficult in practice. And yet, as the chapter reveals, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of America's aggressive pursuit of regime change. In the twenty-seven years since the fall of the Soviet Union, Washington has continued to habitually intervene both covertly and overtly throughout the world. Although U.S. policymakers' appetite for regime change has not diminished, America's post-Cold War interventions have taken on new forms.
{"title":"Covert Regime Change after the Cold War","authors":"Lindsey A. O’Rourke","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter briefly discusses the state of America's attempts at covert regime changes during the Cold War, before turning to the state of covert operations in the post-Cold War era. It shows that the vast majority of America's covert and overt regime changes during the Cold War did not work out as their planners intended. Washington launched these regime changes to resolve security-oriented interstate disputes by installing foreign leaders with similar policy preferences. American experiences during the Cold War, however, illustrate that this was often quite difficult in practice. And yet, as the chapter reveals, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of America's aggressive pursuit of regime change. In the twenty-seven years since the fall of the Soviet Union, Washington has continued to habitually intervene both covertly and overtly throughout the world. Although U.S. policymakers' appetite for regime change has not diminished, America's post-Cold War interventions have taken on new forms.","PeriodicalId":103970,"journal":{"name":"Covert Regime Change","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131490303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0007
Lindsey A. O’Rourke
This chapter investigates how and why presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson escalated America's role in Vietnam and the role that America's covert operations in North and South Vietnam between 1954 and 1964 played in that process. It argues that U.S. leaders launched these operations in an effort to pave the way for an honorable withdrawal from the region. Paradoxically, however, the missions had precisely the opposite effect of their intentions. To explore this situation further, the chapter proceeds in four parts. First comes a discussion of case selection and alternative explanations. Next is an analysis of the emergence of the containment strategy in Southeast Asia and America's escalating involvement in Vietnam. The third details how top-level U.S. policymakers debated launching regime changes against North and South Vietnam at five key points between 1954 and 1963. Finally, the chapter concludes by investigating why policymakers preferred to conduct these operations covertly and why the United States later limited its efforts to overthrow Ho Chi Minh.
{"title":"Containment, Coup d’État, and the Covert War in Vietnam","authors":"Lindsey A. O’Rourke","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter investigates how and why presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson escalated America's role in Vietnam and the role that America's covert operations in North and South Vietnam between 1954 and 1964 played in that process. It argues that U.S. leaders launched these operations in an effort to pave the way for an honorable withdrawal from the region. Paradoxically, however, the missions had precisely the opposite effect of their intentions. To explore this situation further, the chapter proceeds in four parts. First comes a discussion of case selection and alternative explanations. Next is an analysis of the emergence of the containment strategy in Southeast Asia and America's escalating involvement in Vietnam. The third details how top-level U.S. policymakers debated launching regime changes against North and South Vietnam at five key points between 1954 and 1963. Finally, the chapter concludes by investigating why policymakers preferred to conduct these operations covertly and why the United States later limited its efforts to overthrow Ho Chi Minh.","PeriodicalId":103970,"journal":{"name":"Covert Regime Change","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130844472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0003
Lindsey A. O’Rourke
This chapter explores why states intervene covertly versus overtly during their regime changes. First, it discusses the two major tactical factors weighed by policymakers. It then looks at leaders' broader geostrategic considerations. Afterward, the chapter explains why both tactical and strategic considerations favor covert conduct, and it discusses the conditions under which states will intervene overtly. Next, the five types of covert tactics employed by states during their regime changes are laid out. Finally, the chapter argues that the conduct of a regime change is best thought of as falling along a continuum between truly covert and directly overt action, and it investigates the phenomenon of “pseudo-covert operations,” that is, regime changes where the intervening state officially denies its role even though all parties involved seem to know of its participation.
{"title":"Conduct","authors":"Lindsey A. O’Rourke","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501730658.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores why states intervene covertly versus overtly during their regime changes. First, it discusses the two major tactical factors weighed by policymakers. It then looks at leaders' broader geostrategic considerations. Afterward, the chapter explains why both tactical and strategic considerations favor covert conduct, and it discusses the conditions under which states will intervene overtly. Next, the five types of covert tactics employed by states during their regime changes are laid out. Finally, the chapter argues that the conduct of a regime change is best thought of as falling along a continuum between truly covert and directly overt action, and it investigates the phenomenon of “pseudo-covert operations,” that is, regime changes where the intervening state officially denies its role even though all parties involved seem to know of its participation.","PeriodicalId":103970,"journal":{"name":"Covert Regime Change","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115587959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501730689-010
{"title":"8. Dictators and Democrats in the Dominican Republic","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501730689-010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501730689-010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":103970,"journal":{"name":"Covert Regime Change","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133905709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}