Takeover Litigation continues to be a much discussed issue in Delaware and among the corporate bar. This report provides preliminary statistics for takeover litigation in 2011.
{"title":"Takeover Litigation in 2011","authors":"Matthew D. Cain, Steven Davidoff Solomon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1998482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1998482","url":null,"abstract":"Takeover Litigation continues to be a much discussed issue in Delaware and among the corporate bar. This report provides preliminary statistics for takeover litigation in 2011.","PeriodicalId":117639,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123463729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The economic analysis of delay in legal procedures has received considerable attention in the past. Most of these works focus on the determinants of delay in litigation but very little analysis has been dedicated to examining tactical delay caused by the parties to the litigation. This paper offers an empirical example to fill some of this gap by analyzing strategic delay in pre-trial administrative litigation. The paper shows that in European merger litigation parties may decide to tactically challenge discovery attempts, which causes a delay that is strategically used to gain more time to settle the case and to avoid a lengthy in-depth investigation, similar to the prediction of Miceli’s (1999) theoretical model. This type of delay can be beneficial to merging parties and to society as well.
{"title":"Tacitcal Dilatory Practice in Litigation: Evidence from EC Merger Proceedings","authors":"Peter L. Ormosi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1975260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1975260","url":null,"abstract":"The economic analysis of delay in legal procedures has received considerable attention in the past. Most of these works focus on the determinants of delay in litigation but very little analysis has been dedicated to examining tactical delay caused by the parties to the litigation. This paper offers an empirical example to fill some of this gap by analyzing strategic delay in pre-trial administrative litigation. The paper shows that in European merger litigation parties may decide to tactically challenge discovery attempts, which causes a delay that is strategically used to gain more time to settle the case and to avoid a lengthy in-depth investigation, similar to the prediction of Miceli’s (1999) theoretical model. This type of delay can be beneficial to merging parties and to society as well.","PeriodicalId":117639,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114459182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the Team Production and Director Primacy Models of corporate governance, finds them wanting, and explains why corporate governance is moving toward shareholder primacy and why this will benefit not only investors but the whole American economy.The director primacy model posits that shareholders are so ill-informed and so divided in their interests that they would self-destruct if they controlled the firm. Accordingly they tie their own hands by ceding control to a board of independent directors. Advocates of the team production theory often agree with the foregoing but stress the importance to the firm of other constituencies, or stakeholders, including suppliers, customers, creditors and, especially, employees. To obtain the needed commitments from these stakeholders firms must credibly promise to treat them well, but these arrangements are too complex to be specified in contracts. If shareholders controlled the firm, they could renege on their implicit promises to stakeholders. Accordingly, firms hand control to a board of disinterested directors who act as mediating hierarchs to balance the interests of all constituencies.These theories are riddled with internal contradictions and fail many tests of empirical verification. In my article I expose these problems and show that the current reality of corporate governance is not control by independent, disinterested directors but by CEOs. I then discuss why the alternative -- shareholder primacy -- has not been achieved. I describe both the obstacles to shareholder control and current trends that are facilitating a stronger investor voice. Finally, I suggest that these trends and new ideas may soon lead to real shareholder primacy, and that this will benefit not only investors but the whole American economy.
{"title":"Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance","authors":"G. Dent","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.995186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.995186","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the Team Production and Director Primacy Models of corporate governance, finds them wanting, and explains why corporate governance is moving toward shareholder primacy and why this will benefit not only investors but the whole American economy.The director primacy model posits that shareholders are so ill-informed and so divided in their interests that they would self-destruct if they controlled the firm. Accordingly they tie their own hands by ceding control to a board of independent directors. Advocates of the team production theory often agree with the foregoing but stress the importance to the firm of other constituencies, or stakeholders, including suppliers, customers, creditors and, especially, employees. To obtain the needed commitments from these stakeholders firms must credibly promise to treat them well, but these arrangements are too complex to be specified in contracts. If shareholders controlled the firm, they could renege on their implicit promises to stakeholders. Accordingly, firms hand control to a board of disinterested directors who act as mediating hierarchs to balance the interests of all constituencies.These theories are riddled with internal contradictions and fail many tests of empirical verification. In my article I expose these problems and show that the current reality of corporate governance is not control by independent, disinterested directors but by CEOs. I then discuss why the alternative -- shareholder primacy -- has not been achieved. I describe both the obstacles to shareholder control and current trends that are facilitating a stronger investor voice. Finally, I suggest that these trends and new ideas may soon lead to real shareholder primacy, and that this will benefit not only investors but the whole American economy.","PeriodicalId":117639,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115161571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical integration in a large sample of vertically related takeovers. The efficiency rationale, as discussed under the transaction cost economics and property rights theories, posits that vertical integration mitigates contractual inefficiencies between suppliers and customers (termed as holdup) and provides incentives to undertake relationship-specific investments. In contrast, the foreclosure and collusion rationales suggest that vertical integration is anticompetitive in nature. Specifically, the foreclosure argument suggests that vertical integration is used to raise costs of rival firms, and the collusion argument suggests that vertical integration facilitates coordination between the integrated firm and its rivals. To distinguish between the three hypotheses, we examine (1) the announcement period wealth effects to the merging firms, rival firms, and customer firms; and (2) the operating performance changes to the merging firms in vertical takeovers. We find that firms expand their vertical boundaries consistent with an efficiency enhancing rationale. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.
{"title":"An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers","authors":"Jaideep Shenoy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1089043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1089043","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical integration in a large sample of vertically related takeovers. The efficiency rationale, as discussed under the transaction cost economics and property rights theories, posits that vertical integration mitigates contractual inefficiencies between suppliers and customers (termed as holdup) and provides incentives to undertake relationship-specific investments. In contrast, the foreclosure and collusion rationales suggest that vertical integration is anticompetitive in nature. Specifically, the foreclosure argument suggests that vertical integration is used to raise costs of rival firms, and the collusion argument suggests that vertical integration facilitates coordination between the integrated firm and its rivals. To distinguish between the three hypotheses, we examine (1) the announcement period wealth effects to the merging firms, rival firms, and customer firms; and (2) the operating performance changes to the merging firms in vertical takeovers. We find that firms expand their vertical boundaries consistent with an efficiency enhancing rationale. \u0000 \u0000This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.","PeriodicalId":117639,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)","volume":"76 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120898288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The case for one share/one vote regulation is quite robust to the way the takeover game is played, provided one goes all the way and allows not just toeholds or multiple bids and revisions but also bargaining. But the alternative rule that exclusion should never harm the non-voting shares, or that these shares should be taken over at the pre-bid price, will do equally well, without so severely curtailing a firm's room for security design. Under either rule, all privately beneficial takeovers are socially desirable and vice versa, and the value gains are shared fairly between the current shareholders and the bidder.
{"title":"Privately and Socially Optimal Take-Overs when Acquisition and Exclusion Strategies are Endogenous","authors":"P. Sercu, Tom Vinaimont","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.967594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.967594","url":null,"abstract":"The case for one share/one vote regulation is quite robust to the way the takeover game is played, provided one goes all the way and allows not just toeholds or multiple bids and revisions but also bargaining. But the alternative rule that exclusion should never harm the non-voting shares, or that these shares should be taken over at the pre-bid price, will do equally well, without so severely curtailing a firm's room for security design. Under either rule, all privately beneficial takeovers are socially desirable and vice versa, and the value gains are shared fairly between the current shareholders and the bidder.","PeriodicalId":117639,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123986836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We compare the efficiency with which management discretion and shareholder choice regulate hostile tender offers. This is the first paper in a long running debate that rigorously compares these legal rules to analyze both the critical informational assumptions and the interplay of those assumptions with principles of financial market efficiency. A critical innovation of our model is its focus on an informed management's choice among alternative corporate policies under the protection of the business judgment rule, but where agency costs exist. We assume that corporate assets and reinvestment opportunities are efficiently priced by financial markets, but that markets never learn the value of foregone investments. In this case, shareholder choice may create an agency problem whereby managers forego positive net present value investments that increase the risk of a hostile bid. We are able to determine analytic conditions under which the expected cost of this agency problem exceeds that of the standard agency problem usually identified with management discretion.
{"title":"Why Defer to Managers? A Strong-Form Efficiency Model","authors":"R. Kihlstrom, M. Wachter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.803564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.803564","url":null,"abstract":"We compare the efficiency with which management discretion and shareholder choice regulate hostile tender offers. This is the first paper in a long running debate that rigorously compares these legal rules to analyze both the critical informational assumptions and the interplay of those assumptions with principles of financial market efficiency. A critical innovation of our model is its focus on an informed management's choice among alternative corporate policies under the protection of the business judgment rule, but where agency costs exist. We assume that corporate assets and reinvestment opportunities are efficiently priced by financial markets, but that markets never learn the value of foregone investments. In this case, shareholder choice may create an agency problem whereby managers forego positive net present value investments that increase the risk of a hostile bid. We are able to determine analytic conditions under which the expected cost of this agency problem exceeds that of the standard agency problem usually identified with management discretion.","PeriodicalId":117639,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126764746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A major problem of modern corporate governance is how to reconcile making corporate managers more accountable to shareholders with ensuring that managers respond to society's needs. Managerial agency costs and the existence of markets for social responsibility argue against drastically reducing managers' accountability to shareholders. But it is still not clear precisely where to draw the line between accountability and responsibility. This article's main contribution is showing how resolving this issue turns on analyzing the available options for making managers accountable to shareholders. The logistics of modern corporate governance, particularly including the inherent weakness of fiduciary duties, shareholder voting and the market for corporate control, significantly free managers from shareholder control regardless of whether society demands this freedom. Social responsibility's importance to corporate governance ultimately depends on whether high-powered partnership-type accountability mechanisms such as mandatory distributions and cash-out rights are feasible in public corporations given the double corporate tax and business arguments for locking capital in the firm.
{"title":"Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance","authors":"Larry E. Ribstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.746844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.746844","url":null,"abstract":"A major problem of modern corporate governance is how to reconcile making corporate managers more accountable to shareholders with ensuring that managers respond to society's needs. Managerial agency costs and the existence of markets for social responsibility argue against drastically reducing managers' accountability to shareholders. But it is still not clear precisely where to draw the line between accountability and responsibility. This article's main contribution is showing how resolving this issue turns on analyzing the available options for making managers accountable to shareholders. The logistics of modern corporate governance, particularly including the inherent weakness of fiduciary duties, shareholder voting and the market for corporate control, significantly free managers from shareholder control regardless of whether society demands this freedom. Social responsibility's importance to corporate governance ultimately depends on whether high-powered partnership-type accountability mechanisms such as mandatory distributions and cash-out rights are feasible in public corporations given the double corporate tax and business arguments for locking capital in the firm.","PeriodicalId":117639,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122083879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we illustrate the role of cross-border mergers in the process of corporate governance convergence. We explore in detail the corporate governance provisions in Rhone-Poulenc, a French company, and Hoechst, a German firm, and the resulting structure after the two firms merged in 1999 to create Aventis, legally a French corporation. We show that, despite the nationality of the firm, the corporate governance structure of Aventis is a combination of the corporate governance systems of Hoechst and Rhone-Poulenc, where the newly merged firm adopted the most protective provisions of the two merging firms. In some cases this resulted in Aventis' borrowing from the corporate governance structure of Hoechst while in others Aventis replicated Rhone-Poulenc's structure. Most interesting is the situation where Aventis introduced improved provisions over both systems. The resulting corporate governance system in Aventis is significantly more protective than the default French legal system of investor protection.
{"title":"Corporate Governance Convergence Through Cross-Border Mergers: The Case of Aventis","authors":"C. Cabolis, Arturo Bris","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.586921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.586921","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we illustrate the role of cross-border mergers in the process of corporate governance convergence. We explore in detail the corporate governance provisions in Rhone-Poulenc, a French company, and Hoechst, a German firm, and the resulting structure after the two firms merged in 1999 to create Aventis, legally a French corporation. We show that, despite the nationality of the firm, the corporate governance structure of Aventis is a combination of the corporate governance systems of Hoechst and Rhone-Poulenc, where the newly merged firm adopted the most protective provisions of the two merging firms. In some cases this resulted in Aventis' borrowing from the corporate governance structure of Hoechst while in others Aventis replicated Rhone-Poulenc's structure. Most interesting is the situation where Aventis introduced improved provisions over both systems. The resulting corporate governance system in Aventis is significantly more protective than the default French legal system of investor protection.","PeriodicalId":117639,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122596036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Among the arguments that have been put forward to support the view that takeover defenses increase shareholder returns when a company becomes a takeover target, the "bargaining power hypothesis" is the most commonly cited argument today. Under this theory, takeover defenses allow the target to extract more in a negotiated acquisition because the bidder's no-deal alternative, to make a hostile bid, is worsened. Despite its centrality to the current debate on takeover defenses, the bargaining power hypothesis has never been subjected to a careful theoretical analysis or to a comprehensive empirical test. In this Article I present a model of bargaining in the "shadow" of takeover defenses that introduces alternatives away from the table, hostile bid costs, asymmetric information, and agency costs into the standard bargaining model. I confirm the features of this model using interviews with the heads of mergers and acquisitions at ten major New York City investment banks, which collectively account for 96% of U.S. M&A deal volume. I also present econometric evidence that is consistent with this model. The theoretical model, practitioner interviews, and econometric evidence presented here indicate that the bargaining power hypothesis is unlikely to be valid in many if not most negotiated acquisitions. This conclusion has implications for whether defenses increase or decrease shareholder wealth, and whether the recent pro-takeover movements in the Delaware courts will lead to negative consequences for target shareholders in negotiated acquisitions.
{"title":"Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses","authors":"Guhan Subramanian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.442721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.442721","url":null,"abstract":"Among the arguments that have been put forward to support the view that takeover defenses increase shareholder returns when a company becomes a takeover target, the \"bargaining power hypothesis\" is the most commonly cited argument today. Under this theory, takeover defenses allow the target to extract more in a negotiated acquisition because the bidder's no-deal alternative, to make a hostile bid, is worsened. Despite its centrality to the current debate on takeover defenses, the bargaining power hypothesis has never been subjected to a careful theoretical analysis or to a comprehensive empirical test. In this Article I present a model of bargaining in the \"shadow\" of takeover defenses that introduces alternatives away from the table, hostile bid costs, asymmetric information, and agency costs into the standard bargaining model. I confirm the features of this model using interviews with the heads of mergers and acquisitions at ten major New York City investment banks, which collectively account for 96% of U.S. M&A deal volume. I also present econometric evidence that is consistent with this model. The theoretical model, practitioner interviews, and econometric evidence presented here indicate that the bargaining power hypothesis is unlikely to be valid in many if not most negotiated acquisitions. This conclusion has implications for whether defenses increase or decrease shareholder wealth, and whether the recent pro-takeover movements in the Delaware courts will lead to negative consequences for target shareholders in negotiated acquisitions.","PeriodicalId":117639,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115393085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Institutional investors have been slow to respond to the widespread presence of takeover defenses in the charters of firms whose shares they hold through private equity funds, and their response to date has been tepid compared to their efforts in the proxy context. Institutions' hesitancy may reflect a rational unwillingness among private equity funds, as well as the institutions' own investment staff, to require portfolio companies to go public with takeover-friendly charters. This article develops a hypothesis to explain the common presence of defenses in the charters of firms that go public with private equity investment and the half-hearted response of institutional investors to this situation. Under this hypothesis - based on private equity funds' need to maintain a reputation for dealing well with successful managers of portfolio companies - it is privately rational but socially inefficient for private equity funds to have their portfolio companies adopt takeover defenses. The implication of the hypothesis is that institutional investors may face at least as difficult a challenge in ridding IPO charters of takeover defenses as they face in urging managers of already-public firms to eliminate defenses from their charters.
{"title":"Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage","authors":"M. Klausner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.452722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.452722","url":null,"abstract":"Institutional investors have been slow to respond to the widespread presence of takeover defenses in the charters of firms whose shares they hold through private equity funds, and their response to date has been tepid compared to their efforts in the proxy context. Institutions' hesitancy may reflect a rational unwillingness among private equity funds, as well as the institutions' own investment staff, to require portfolio companies to go public with takeover-friendly charters. This article develops a hypothesis to explain the common presence of defenses in the charters of firms that go public with private equity investment and the half-hearted response of institutional investors to this situation. Under this hypothesis - based on private equity funds' need to maintain a reputation for dealing well with successful managers of portfolio companies - it is privately rational but socially inefficient for private equity funds to have their portfolio companies adopt takeover defenses. The implication of the hypothesis is that institutional investors may face at least as difficult a challenge in ridding IPO charters of takeover defenses as they face in urging managers of already-public firms to eliminate defenses from their charters.","PeriodicalId":117639,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Takeover Law (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128433502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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