Pub Date : 2019-08-06DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0010
T. Tyler
Two models of legal authority are compared: coercive and consensual. The coercive model functions through the ability of officials to create and maintain a credible risk of punishment for wrongdoing. It operates through perceptions of risk. The consensual model is based on peoples’ willing acceptance of the obligation to follow the law. People accept that personal obligation when they regard the law as legitimate. Data from several large-scale surveys suggest the importance of legitimacy to compliance and cooperation and in particular provide a better basis for understanding willing cooperation than does a risk-based model. A further analysis of the antecedents of legitimacy demonstrates that procedural justice is the key antecedent of legitimacy.
{"title":"Evaluating Consensual Models of Governance","authors":"T. Tyler","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Two models of legal authority are compared: coercive and consensual. The coercive model functions through the ability of officials to create and maintain a credible risk of punishment for wrongdoing. It operates through perceptions of risk. The consensual model is based on peoples’ willing acceptance of the obligation to follow the law. People accept that personal obligation when they regard the law as legitimate. Data from several large-scale surveys suggest the importance of legitimacy to compliance and cooperation and in particular provide a better basis for understanding willing cooperation than does a risk-based model. A further analysis of the antecedents of legitimacy demonstrates that procedural justice is the key antecedent of legitimacy.","PeriodicalId":119174,"journal":{"name":"Political Legitimacy","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125054717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-06DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0009
Jennifer Rubenstein
Should large-scale, Western-based humanitarian and development INGOs such as Oxfam and Doctors Without Borders be evaluated based on whether they are politically legitimate? The philosophical literature on political legitimacy has addressed this question with regard to non-state actors in general, but has not said much specifically about INGOs. The INGO literature has discussed issues of political legitimacy, but has focused almost exclusively on one dimension of the concept—the criteria that INGOs must meet to be politically legitimate—while largely overlooking two other dimensions: that political legitimacy is (a) a minimum threshold for (b) the moral right to rule. Bringing the full “three-dimensional” concept of political legitimacy developed in the political philosophy literature to bear on INGOs is valuable in several ways: It flips the script of traditional charity-based approaches, treats aid recipients and other subjects of INGO rule as moral and political agents capable of making and acting on moral judgments, provides a locus of agreement for people who otherwise disagree about INGOs, and works synergistically with democratic criteria for INGO political legitimacy.
{"title":"The Political Legitimacy of International NGOs","authors":"Jennifer Rubenstein","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Should large-scale, Western-based humanitarian and development INGOs such as Oxfam and Doctors Without Borders be evaluated based on whether they are politically legitimate? The philosophical literature on political legitimacy has addressed this question with regard to non-state actors in general, but has not said much specifically about INGOs. The INGO literature has discussed issues of political legitimacy, but has focused almost exclusively on one dimension of the concept—the criteria that INGOs must meet to be politically legitimate—while largely overlooking two other dimensions: that political legitimacy is (a) a minimum threshold for (b) the moral right to rule. Bringing the full “three-dimensional” concept of political legitimacy developed in the political philosophy literature to bear on INGOs is valuable in several ways: It flips the script of traditional charity-based approaches, treats aid recipients and other subjects of INGO rule as moral and political agents capable of making and acting on moral judgments, provides a locus of agreement for people who otherwise disagree about INGOs, and works synergistically with democratic criteria for INGO political legitimacy.","PeriodicalId":119174,"journal":{"name":"Political Legitimacy","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127263451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-06DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0012
S. Gordon, G. Huber
We employ key concepts in the normative study of legitimate authority to place the empirical analysis of legitimacy on firmer analytical foundations. Our critical review of empirical research on support for courts, regimes generally, and international organizations highlights the slippage between normative and positive approaches, while simultaneously drawing attention to problems of measurement and critical inferential problems rooted in limitations of research design. We then describe a simple theoretical model that formalizes these considerations. The model reveals conditions under which it is possible to isolate the effect of an authority’s legitimacy on citizen behavior net of extrinsic compliance motivations as well as environments in which examination of the antecedents of legitimate authority is most likely to be fruitful.
{"title":"The Empirical Study of Legitimate Authority Normative Guidance for Positive Analysis","authors":"S. Gordon, G. Huber","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"We employ key concepts in the normative study of legitimate authority to place the empirical analysis of legitimacy on firmer analytical foundations. Our critical review of empirical research on support for courts, regimes generally, and international organizations highlights the slippage between normative and positive approaches, while simultaneously drawing attention to problems of measurement and critical inferential problems rooted in limitations of research design. We then describe a simple theoretical model that formalizes these considerations. The model reveals conditions under which it is possible to isolate the effect of an authority’s legitimacy on citizen behavior net of extrinsic compliance motivations as well as environments in which examination of the antecedents of legitimate authority is most likely to be fruitful.","PeriodicalId":119174,"journal":{"name":"Political Legitimacy","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125755683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-06DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0006
F. Peter
The aim of this chapter is to provide an epistemological argument for why public reasons matter for political legitimacy. A key feature of the public reason conception of legitimacy is that political decisions must be justified to the citizens. They must be justified in terms of reasons that are either shared qua reasons or that, while not shared qua reasons, support the same political decision. Call the relevant reasons public reasons. Critics of the public reason conception, by contrast, argue that political legitimacy requires justification simpliciter—political decisions must be justified in terms of the reasons that apply. Call the relevant reasons objective reasons. The debate between defenders and critics of a public reason conception of political legitimacy thus focuses on whether objective reasons or public reasons are the right basis for the justification of political decisions. I will grant to critics of a public reason conception that there are objective reasons and allow that such reasons can affect the legitimacy of political decisions. But I will show, focusing on the epistemic circumstances of political decision-making, that it does not follow that the justification of those decisions is necessarily in terms of those reasons.
{"title":"Political Legitimacy Under Epistemic Constraints","authors":"F. Peter","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this chapter is to provide an epistemological argument for why public reasons matter for political legitimacy. A key feature of the public reason conception of legitimacy is that political decisions must be justified to the citizens. They must be justified in terms of reasons that are either shared qua reasons or that, while not shared qua reasons, support the same political decision. Call the relevant reasons public reasons. Critics of the public reason conception, by contrast, argue that political legitimacy requires justification simpliciter—political decisions must be justified in terms of the reasons that apply. Call the relevant reasons objective reasons. The debate between defenders and critics of a public reason conception of political legitimacy thus focuses on whether objective reasons or public reasons are the right basis for the justification of political decisions. I will grant to critics of a public reason conception that there are objective reasons and allow that such reasons can affect the legitimacy of political decisions. But I will show, focusing on the epistemic circumstances of political decision-making, that it does not follow that the justification of those decisions is necessarily in terms of those reasons.","PeriodicalId":119174,"journal":{"name":"Political Legitimacy","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129290040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-06DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0008
Micah Schwartzman
The case of President Trump’s travel ban raises the question of whether the intentions of public officials matter in determining the legitimacy of their actions. In recent years, philosophers and legal scholars have argued that intentions are never directly relevant to the moral permissibility of actions. This permissibility objection can be applied to theories of political legitimacy that make intentions relevant in specifying moral conditions for the exercise of political power. After surveying various ways in which intentions might figure into theories of legitimacy, I present the permissibility objection and then argue that it cannot be sustained in reflective equilibrium. Using examples of discretionary discrimination, including the travel ban, I argue that intentions are relevant to determining the legitimacy of official conduct. I then defend a doctrine of moral taint, which holds that skepticism about the actions of public officials is appropriate when they have previously taken similar actions on the basis of wrongful intentions.
{"title":"Official Intentions and Political Legitimacy","authors":"Micah Schwartzman","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The case of President Trump’s travel ban raises the question of whether the intentions of public officials matter in determining the legitimacy of their actions. In recent years, philosophers and legal scholars have argued that intentions are never directly relevant to the moral permissibility of actions. This permissibility objection can be applied to theories of political legitimacy that make intentions relevant in specifying moral conditions for the exercise of political power. After surveying various ways in which intentions might figure into theories of legitimacy, I present the permissibility objection and then argue that it cannot be sustained in reflective equilibrium. Using examples of discretionary discrimination, including the travel ban, I argue that intentions are relevant to determining the legitimacy of official conduct. I then defend a doctrine of moral taint, which holds that skepticism about the actions of public officials is appropriate when they have previously taken similar actions on the basis of wrongful intentions.","PeriodicalId":119174,"journal":{"name":"Political Legitimacy","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126676461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-06DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0011
Jeffrey A. Lenowitz
For decades, Tom Tyler had led the charge of making legitimacy and procedural justice core concepts and variables in the empirical study of compliance and cooperation in the social sciences. In this chapter, after laying out a conceptual map of the three types of legitimacy and the roles that procedures can play in legitimation, I show that much of Tyler’s work focuses on providing support for two assertions: that a belief in the legitimacy of local authorities leads people to comply, cooperate, and positively engage with them, and that fair procedures are a powerful way to make people develop these beliefs. I then argue that both of these claims are misleading. On the one hand, Tyler’s operationalization of legitimacy distorts it beyond common meaning. On the other hand, Tyler only measures and shows the effects of perceptions of procedural justice, and thus merely gives reason to focus on reforming institutions such that they appear just, rather than become just. The only way to avoid this unhappy Machiavellian outcome, I argue, is to once again bring in moral argumentation to discussions of institutional reform.
{"title":"On the Empirical Measurement of Legitimacy","authors":"Jeffrey A. Lenowitz","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"For decades, Tom Tyler had led the charge of making legitimacy and procedural justice core concepts and variables in the empirical study of compliance and cooperation in the social sciences. In this chapter, after laying out a conceptual map of the three types of legitimacy and the roles that procedures can play in legitimation, I show that much of Tyler’s work focuses on providing support for two assertions: that a belief in the legitimacy of local authorities leads people to comply, cooperate, and positively engage with them, and that fair procedures are a powerful way to make people develop these beliefs. I then argue that both of these claims are misleading. On the one hand, Tyler’s operationalization of legitimacy distorts it beyond common meaning. On the other hand, Tyler only measures and shows the effects of perceptions of procedural justice, and thus merely gives reason to focus on reforming institutions such that they appear just, rather than become just. The only way to avoid this unhappy Machiavellian outcome, I argue, is to once again bring in moral argumentation to discussions of institutional reform.","PeriodicalId":119174,"journal":{"name":"Political Legitimacy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115045689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-06DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0003
J. Quong
This chapter provides a response to Anna Stilz’s chapter in this volume, “Legitimacy and Self-Determination.” I argue that Stilz’s Kantian approach to political autonomy and self-determination is vulnerable to a serious dilemma. Her account either cannot explain various intuitively wrongful instances of colonialism and annexation, or else it can only do so by departing from its Kantian foundations. I then defend a functionalist approach to political legitimacy, one that appeals to the pro tanto wrongness of involuntarily changing people’s political status. I argue, contra Stilz, that such a functionalist approach can adequately explain why certain cases of colonialism and territorial annexation are wrongful.
{"title":"In Defense of Functionalism","authors":"J. Quong","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides a response to Anna Stilz’s chapter in this volume, “Legitimacy and Self-Determination.” I argue that Stilz’s Kantian approach to political autonomy and self-determination is vulnerable to a serious dilemma. Her account either cannot explain various intuitively wrongful instances of colonialism and annexation, or else it can only do so by departing from its Kantian foundations. I then defend a functionalist approach to political legitimacy, one that appeals to the pro tanto wrongness of involuntarily changing people’s political status. I argue, contra Stilz, that such a functionalist approach can adequately explain why certain cases of colonialism and territorial annexation are wrongful.","PeriodicalId":119174,"journal":{"name":"Political Legitimacy","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134167711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-06DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0005
Ekow N. Yankah
Philosophically, we live in a liberal age, one that accords individual rights primacy of place among political values. Accordingly, contemporary conceptions of political and legal obligation treat sovereignty as perplexing, straining to justify how authority can impose on individual freedom and obligate one to obey law. From Hobbes to Kant to Rawls, liberal thinkers have had to stitch together a civic sovereign from the free will of each individual. As against the machinations required to justify sovereignty beginning from the liberal premise of individual freedom, I suggest a fundamental reexamining of liberal freedom. In its place, I will argue for a return to a classic conception of Athenian or Aristotelian republicanism as the basis of political obligation. Reigning for perhaps millennia, yet strangely absent from contemporary theory, the ancient view argues that political obligation is based on our natural and unavoidable interconnectedness. Aristotle’s persuasive arguments that human beings need political communities to survive and flourish, now fortified by modern social science, illustrates why sovereignty is not a puzzle but rather a natural extension of our civic interconnectedness and gives rise to political obligation.
{"title":"The Sovereign and the Republic a","authors":"Ekow N. Yankah","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophically, we live in a liberal age, one that accords individual rights primacy of place among political values. Accordingly, contemporary conceptions of political and legal obligation treat sovereignty as perplexing, straining to justify how authority can impose on individual freedom and obligate one to obey law. From Hobbes to Kant to Rawls, liberal thinkers have had to stitch together a civic sovereign from the free will of each individual. As against the machinations required to justify sovereignty beginning from the liberal premise of individual freedom, I suggest a fundamental reexamining of liberal freedom. In its place, I will argue for a return to a classic conception of Athenian or Aristotelian republicanism as the basis of political obligation. Reigning for perhaps millennia, yet strangely absent from contemporary theory, the ancient view argues that political obligation is based on our natural and unavoidable interconnectedness. Aristotle’s persuasive arguments that human beings need political communities to survive and flourish, now fortified by modern social science, illustrates why sovereignty is not a puzzle but rather a natural extension of our civic interconnectedness and gives rise to political obligation.","PeriodicalId":119174,"journal":{"name":"Political Legitimacy","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125544101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-06DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0007
Daniel Viehoff
This chapter proposes that legitimacy (on at least one understanding of the protean term) is centrally a right to err: a right to make mistakes that set back interests of others that are ordinarily protected by rights. Legitimacy so understood is importantly distinct from authority, the normative power to impose binding (or enforceable) rules at will. Specifically, legitimate institutions have a distinctive liberty right to set back others’ interests that other agents normally lack. Their subjects in turn lack certain permissions to avoid, or redirect, the costs of the institutions’ mistakes in ways that would otherwise be permissible. Legitimate institutions have this liberty right because, and insofar as, they act for their subjects (in a specific sense) and do so only for the subjects’ sake. As a matter of fairness, (some of) the costs of the institutions’ actions are borne by the subjects for whom they are undertaken. In turn, where an institution fails to act for its subjects in the relevant way, it (and its officials) may have to bear the costs of its errors, which the subject is morally permitted to redirect by acts of resistance.
{"title":"Legitimacy as a Right To Err","authors":"Daniel Viehoff","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter proposes that legitimacy (on at least one understanding of the protean term) is centrally a right to err: a right to make mistakes that set back interests of others that are ordinarily protected by rights. Legitimacy so understood is importantly distinct from authority, the normative power to impose binding (or enforceable) rules at will. Specifically, legitimate institutions have a distinctive liberty right to set back others’ interests that other agents normally lack. Their subjects in turn lack certain permissions to avoid, or redirect, the costs of the institutions’ mistakes in ways that would otherwise be permissible. Legitimate institutions have this liberty right because, and insofar as, they act for their subjects (in a specific sense) and do so only for the subjects’ sake. As a matter of fairness, (some of) the costs of the institutions’ actions are borne by the subjects for whom they are undertaken. In turn, where an institution fails to act for its subjects in the relevant way, it (and its officials) may have to bear the costs of its errors, which the subject is morally permitted to redirect by acts of resistance.","PeriodicalId":119174,"journal":{"name":"Political Legitimacy","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133271709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-06DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0004
A. Greene
This chapter develops and defends a new account of political legitimacy. I argue that a regime is legitimate insofar as it achieves quality assent to rule. Assent to rule is an evaluative assessment of the regime, by its subjects, about whether the regime realizes some goods through the exercise of power and authority. Assent is quality assent just when it is consistent with what I call the minimal claim of ruling, namely, the provision of basic security for all subjects. When legitimacy is characterized in these terms, its achievement will be naturally correlated with the realization of key political goods: non-alienation, stability, and political alignment among subjects. What makes this account distinctive, and attractive, is that it captures the crucial insights from both sides of the theoretical divide in the existing literature on political legitimacy, namely (i) that legitimacy is a good-making feature of a regime, but also (ii) that legitimacy depends upon people’s subjective attitudes.
{"title":"Is Political Legitimacy Worth Promoting?","authors":"A. Greene","doi":"10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479888696.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter develops and defends a new account of political legitimacy. I argue that a regime is legitimate insofar as it achieves quality assent to rule. Assent to rule is an evaluative assessment of the regime, by its subjects, about whether the regime realizes some goods through the exercise of power and authority. Assent is quality assent just when it is consistent with what I call the minimal claim of ruling, namely, the provision of basic security for all subjects. When legitimacy is characterized in these terms, its achievement will be naturally correlated with the realization of key political goods: non-alienation, stability, and political alignment among subjects. What makes this account distinctive, and attractive, is that it captures the crucial insights from both sides of the theoretical divide in the existing literature on political legitimacy, namely (i) that legitimacy is a good-making feature of a regime, but also (ii) that legitimacy depends upon people’s subjective attitudes.","PeriodicalId":119174,"journal":{"name":"Political Legitimacy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114700445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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