Pub Date : 2020-09-10DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0004
W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord
We introduce and discuss the problems of intertheoretic incomparability and merely ordinal theories. We then introduce the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and social choice, and explain how this analogy can help us to overcome these problems. The rest of the chapter is spent fleshing out how this idea can help us to develop a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty that is applicable even when all theories under consideration are merely ordinal, and even when there is neither level-nor unit- comparability between those theories. We consider whether My Favourite Theory or My Favourite Option might be the right theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty in conditions of merely ordinal theories and incomparability, but reject both of these accounts. We defend the idea that, when maximizing choice worthiness is not possible, one should use the Borda Rule instead.
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Pub Date : 2020-09-10DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0006
W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord
In this chapter we consider the extent to which different theories are unit-comparable, and what makes them comparable when they are. We consider three arguments for the conclusion that intertheoretic comparisons are always impossible: the appeal to cases argument, the swamping argument, and the arbitrary unit arguments. We argue against all three arguments. We distinguish between structural and non-structural accounts of intertheoretic comparisons. We argue in favour of non-structural accounts: we argue that intertheoretic comparisons are grounded in substantive facts about the theories themselves (rather than merely statistical properties of their choice worthiness function). We discuss a number of possible accounts of intertheoretic comparisons, ultimately arguing in favour of a ‘universal scale’ account.
{"title":"Intertheoretic Comparisons of Choice-Worthiness","authors":"W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter we consider the extent to which different theories are unit-comparable, and what makes them comparable when they are. We consider three arguments for the conclusion that intertheoretic comparisons are always impossible: the appeal to cases argument, the swamping argument, and the arbitrary unit arguments. We argue against all three arguments. We distinguish between structural and non-structural accounts of intertheoretic comparisons. We argue in favour of non-structural accounts: we argue that intertheoretic comparisons are grounded in substantive facts about the theories themselves (rather than merely statistical properties of their choice worthiness function). We discuss a number of possible accounts of intertheoretic comparisons, ultimately arguing in favour of a ‘universal scale’ account.","PeriodicalId":120783,"journal":{"name":"Moral Uncertainty","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121626455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-10DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0010
W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord
In this chapter, we show how the theory we’ve given can shed light on the question of how to value gaining new moral information. We explain how we should assess the expected utility of new empirical information, and how we could use an analogous framework to work out the expected choice worthiness of new moral information. We apply this framework to two examples: the choice of how a large foundation should spend its resources, and the choice of career for an individual. Finally, we consider to what extent the lessons from this framework change when we consider ‘imperfect’ information.
{"title":"Moral Information","authors":"W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, we show how the theory we’ve given can shed light on the question of how to value gaining new moral information. We explain how we should assess the expected utility of new empirical information, and how we could use an analogous framework to work out the expected choice worthiness of new moral information. We apply this framework to two examples: the choice of how a large foundation should spend its resources, and the choice of career for an individual. Finally, we consider to what extent the lessons from this framework change when we consider ‘imperfect’ information.","PeriodicalId":120783,"journal":{"name":"Moral Uncertainty","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122877205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-10DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0002
W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord
In this chapter we introduce the topic of moral uncertainty, argue that moral uncertainty is a real and significant issue, and argue that there are non-trivial answers to the question, ‘Given that we are morally uncertain, how ought we to act in light of that uncertainty?’ In particular, we argue that there is an answer to the question of what a morally conscientious agent rationally should do when she is morally uncertain. We shall also consider and defend against some recent objections to the very project of trying to develop an account of decision-making under moral uncertainty: we’ll call these the fetishism objection; the regress objection; the blameworthiness objection; the conscientiousness objection; and the disanalogy with prudence objection.
{"title":"Why We Should Take Moral Uncertainty Seriously","authors":"W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter we introduce the topic of moral uncertainty, argue that moral uncertainty is a real and significant issue, and argue that there are non-trivial answers to the question, ‘Given that we are morally uncertain, how ought we to act in light of that uncertainty?’ In particular, we argue that there is an answer to the question of what a morally conscientious agent rationally should do when she is morally uncertain. We shall also consider and defend against some recent objections to the very project of trying to develop an account of decision-making under moral uncertainty: we’ll call these the fetishism objection; the regress objection; the blameworthiness objection; the conscientiousness objection; and the disanalogy with prudence objection.","PeriodicalId":120783,"journal":{"name":"Moral Uncertainty","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114497617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-10DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0003
W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord
In this chapter we argue that, in conditions of interval-scale measurability and unit-comparability, one should maximize expected choice worthiness. Though this position has often been suggested in the literature and is often taken to be the ‘default’ view, it has so far received little in the way of positive argument in its favour. We start, in section I, by providing new arguments against two rival theories that have been proposed in the literature—the accounts which we call My Favourite Theory and My Favourite Option. Then we give a novel argument for the view that, under moral uncertainty, one should take into account both probabilities of different theories and magnitudes of choice-worthiness. Finally, we argue in favour of maximizing expected choice-worthiness (MEC).
{"title":"Maximizing Expected Choiceworthiness","authors":"W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter we argue that, in conditions of interval-scale measurability and unit-comparability, one should maximize expected choice worthiness. Though this position has often been suggested in the literature and is often taken to be the ‘default’ view, it has so far received little in the way of positive argument in its favour. We start, in section I, by providing new arguments against two rival theories that have been proposed in the literature—the accounts which we call My Favourite Theory and My Favourite Option. Then we give a novel argument for the view that, under moral uncertainty, one should take into account both probabilities of different theories and magnitudes of choice-worthiness. Finally, we argue in favour of maximizing expected choice-worthiness (MEC).","PeriodicalId":120783,"journal":{"name":"Moral Uncertainty","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116889760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-10DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0011
W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord
We summarize the argument of the book: the case for taking moral uncertainty seriously, and the case for an information-sensitive account: the correct rule for making decisions under moral uncertainty depends crucially on the information provided by the moral theories in which one has credence. We then note some open questions that would require further work to address, such as how to axiomatize decision-making under moral uncertainty, how we should assign deontic statuses, such as permissible and impermissible, under moral uncertainty, and what a reasonable credence distribution across different moral theories looks like. We end by considering what implications our argument has for the value of doing moral philosophy, suggesting we should conclude that further normative research is one of the most important moral priorities of our time.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"W. MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"We summarize the argument of the book: the case for taking moral uncertainty seriously, and the case for an information-sensitive account: the correct rule for making decisions under moral uncertainty depends crucially on the information provided by the moral theories in which one has credence. We then note some open questions that would require further work to address, such as how to axiomatize decision-making under moral uncertainty, how we should assign deontic statuses, such as permissible and impermissible, under moral uncertainty, and what a reasonable credence distribution across different moral theories looks like. We end by considering what implications our argument has for the value of doing moral philosophy, suggesting we should conclude that further normative research is one of the most important moral priorities of our time.","PeriodicalId":120783,"journal":{"name":"Moral Uncertainty","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133463375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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