This study explores the application of Power Transition Theory (PTT) to cyberspace, aiming to establish a comprehensive framework for understanding and measuring cyber power. Utilizing PTT’s national power model, the research treats states as rational and unitary actors, integrating the rational actor model to assess state behavior in cyberspace. The objectives include defining cyber power, developing a novel metric for its evaluation, and categorizing states within a hierarchical structure of cyber power. By analyzing key components such as data resources, digital economic strength, and cyber political capacity, the study provides a nuanced understanding of cyber power dynamics. The results demonstrate that the traditional IR theories retain relevance in the cyber domain, offering a valuable lens for comprehending global cyber governance and geopolitical competition. This foundational work sets the stage for future analyses of power transitions within cyberspace, highlighting the critical interplay between traditional power metrics and emerging digital landscapes.
本研究探讨了权力过渡理论（PTT）在网络空间中的应用，旨在建立一个理解和衡量网络权力的综合框架。本研究利用 PTT 的国家权力模型，将国家视为理性和单一的行为体，整合理性行为体模型来评估国家在网络空间中的行为。研究目标包括定义网络力量、开发评估网络力量的新指标，以及在网络力量的等级结构中对国家进行分类。通过分析数据资源、数字经济实力和网络政治能力等关键要素，该研究提供了对网络权力动态的细致理解。研究结果表明，传统的国际关系理论在网络领域仍具有现实意义，为理解全球网络治理和地缘政治竞争提供了一个有价值的视角。这项奠基性工作为今后分析网络空间中的权力过渡奠定了基础，突出了传统权力衡量标准与新兴数字景观之间的重要相互作用。
{"title":"Assessing Power and Hierarchy in Cyberspace: An Approach of Power Transition Theory","authors":"Enescan Lorci","doi":"10.60097/acig/190481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60097/acig/190481","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the application of Power Transition Theory (PTT) to cyberspace, aiming to establish a comprehensive framework for understanding and measuring cyber power. Utilizing PTT’s national power model, the research treats states as rational and unitary actors, integrating the rational actor model to assess state behavior in cyberspace. The objectives include defining cyber power, developing a novel metric for its evaluation, and\u0000categorizing states within a hierarchical structure of cyber power. By analyzing key components such as data resources, digital economic strength, and cyber political capacity, the study provides a nuanced understanding of cyber power dynamics. The results demonstrate that the traditional IR theories retain relevance in the cyber domain, offering a valuable lens for comprehending global cyber governance and geopolitical competition. This foundational work sets the stage for future analyses of power transitions within cyberspace, highlighting the critical interplay between traditional power metrics and emerging digital landscapes.","PeriodicalId":123092,"journal":{"name":"Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance","volume":"84 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141798194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to Special Issue on The Russian-Ukrainian War: Effects on Global Cybersecurity and Digital Infrastructure","authors":"Jacek Leśkow","doi":"10.60097/acig/191475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60097/acig/191475","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":123092,"journal":{"name":"Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance","volume":"20 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141806188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study attempts to explore the extent to which EU support during the decentralisation process in Ukraine facilitates local authorities’ digitalisation and strengthens their resilience against cyber attacks. The Ukrainian cyber attack cases are becoming more frequent in 2022 and 2023 in terms of war, especially on the websites of local authorities. The article demonstrates that decentralisation with the support of the EU-funded U-LEAD assistance programme provides an opportunity to bring state services closer to citizens and, accordingly, increase the efficiency of their provision. Decentralisation and digitalisation go hand in hand in the process of implementation in Ukraine. The digitalisation in this direction of local administrations becomes a tool for achieving this goal because it allows local administrations to offer more of their services in a digital format, which ensures the resilience of the development of local authorities. At the same time, the local authorities are less protected against cyber attacks, especially during the war. The article employs a semi-structured interview method to analyse data, revealing that representatives from local authorities participate in various training courses to enhance cybersecurity skills. However, the challenges vary and include issues such as lack of personnel, lack of funding, complex application procedures, lack of coordination, and technical capacity limitations. Indeed, Ukraine is still in the process of improving its own model of cyber defence for local authorities and the country as a whole in terms of countering Russian aggression, using among others practices of NATO and EU countries in the specified field.
{"title":"Stronger together? EU Support for Ukrainian Local Authorities Facing Cyber Attacks (2022-2023)","authors":"I. Fyshchuk","doi":"10.60097/acig/190344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60097/acig/190344","url":null,"abstract":"This study attempts to explore the extent to which EU support during the decentralisation process in Ukraine facilitates local authorities’ digitalisation and strengthens their resilience against cyber attacks. The Ukrainian cyber attack cases are becoming more frequent in 2022 and 2023 in terms of war, especially on the websites of local authorities. The article demonstrates that decentralisation with the support of the EU-funded U-LEAD assistance programme provides an opportunity to bring state services closer to citizens and, accordingly, increase the efficiency of their provision. Decentralisation and digitalisation go hand in hand in the process of implementation in Ukraine. The digitalisation in this direction of local administrations becomes a tool for achieving this goal because it allows local administrations to offer more of their services in a digital format, which ensures the resilience of the development of local authorities. At the same time, the local authorities are less protected against cyber attacks, especially during the war. The article employs a semi-structured interview method to analyse data, revealing that representatives from local authorities participate in various training courses to enhance cybersecurity skills. However, the challenges vary and include issues such as lack of personnel, lack of funding, complex application procedures, lack of coordination, and technical capacity limitations. Indeed, Ukraine is still in the process of improving its own model of cyber defence for local authorities and the country as a whole in terms of countering Russian aggression, using among others practices of NATO and EU countries in the specified field.","PeriodicalId":123092,"journal":{"name":"Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance","volume":"128 41","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141811319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As citizens are faced with an overabundance of information, their reliance on intuitive sorting strategies and platform-enabled content selection and delivery increases correspondingly. Under such circumstances, political action tends to be based on haphazard encounters with opinion-congruent content than on anything else, giving rise to so-called post-truth condition and, in turn, opening up conditions for manipulating such information encounters as part of information warfare operations. In particular, this novel environment necessitates a rethinking of informational agency, locating it within interactions between humans and technological artefacts, whereby humans as generators of data and algorithms as tools that structure the information domain based on such data co-construct political and social spaces. The impact of digital technologies is further amplified by the advent of synthetic (Artificial Intelligence-generated) media, which is foreseen to bring about epistemic confusion, that is, increasing inability to separate between reality and fiction. Under such conditions, and in any situations of actual or perceived crisis and tension, audiences are inclined to rely on narratives as coping strategies, which is where information warfare operations come to the fore. Either capitalising on the existing fertile ground or having manufactured a condition of crisis and distrust, such operations are geared towards hijacking audience cognitive processes with narratives that suit their perpetrators.
{"title":"Post-Truth and Information Warfare in their Technological Context","authors":"Ignas Kalpokas","doi":"10.60097/acig/190407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60097/acig/190407","url":null,"abstract":"As citizens are faced with an overabundance of information, their reliance on intuitive sorting strategies and platform-enabled content selection and delivery increases correspondingly. Under such circumstances, political action tends to be based on haphazard encounters with opinion-congruent content than on anything else, giving rise to so-called post-truth condition and, in turn, opening up conditions for manipulating such information encounters as part of information warfare operations. In particular, this novel environment necessitates a rethinking of informational agency, locating it within interactions between humans and technological artefacts, whereby humans as generators of data and algorithms as tools that structure the information domain based on such data co-construct political and social spaces. The impact of digital technologies is further amplified by the advent of synthetic (Artificial Intelligence-generated) media, which is foreseen to bring about epistemic confusion, that is, increasing inability to separate between reality and fiction. Under such conditions, and in any situations\u0000of actual or perceived crisis and tension, audiences are inclined to rely on narratives as coping strategies, which is where information warfare operations come to the fore. Either capitalising on the existing fertile ground or having manufactured a condition of crisis and distrust, such operations are geared towards hijacking audience cognitive processes with narratives that suit their perpetrators.","PeriodicalId":123092,"journal":{"name":"Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance","volume":"6 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141817430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The socio-economic development that has taken place in recent years takes into account cybersecurity issues. Cybersecurity has many different dimensions, including the economic dimension. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has shown that modern war is not only conventional, but also cybernetic. Earlier, the massive shift to remote communication systems forced by COVID also increased the demand for cybersecurity. This means that cybersecurity com- panies receive new orders, which can have a positive impact on their financial results. In the opinion of many experts, investing in such companies could be a good business. The research conducted in this article focuses on testing assumptions related to the rec- ognition of investments in technology companies as prospective investments. Therefore, this study examines the impact of Russia- Ukraine war (from February 2022 to December 2024) and the COVID pandemic (from March 2020 to February 2022) on the valuation of cybersecurity companies. The period from January 2015 to February 2020 was used as the comparative period. The research material consists of companies and stock indices from the American and Polish markets. The results of the research are inconclusive. In fact, there are some examples of companies that took advantage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to achieve above-average returns. Such a business is risky, which is why these companies are achiev- ing above-average returns with increased shares price volatility. However, it turns out that automatically assigning a company to the cyber or IT category does not mean that it will be a good invest- ment in times of war or pandemic.
{"title":"Investment in Cybersecurity Companies in Times of Political and Economic Instability","authors":"G. Przekota","doi":"10.60097/acig/190342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60097/acig/190342","url":null,"abstract":"The socio-economic development that has taken place in\u0000recent years takes into account cybersecurity issues. Cybersecurity\u0000has many different dimensions, including the economic dimension.\u0000The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has shown that modern war is not\u0000only conventional, but also cybernetic. Earlier, the massive shift to\u0000remote communication systems forced by COVID also increased\u0000the demand for cybersecurity. This means that cybersecurity com-\u0000panies receive new orders, which can have a positive impact on\u0000their financial results. In the opinion of many experts, investing in\u0000such companies could be a good business. The research conducted\u0000in this article focuses on testing assumptions related to the rec-\u0000ognition of investments in technology companies as prospective\u0000investments. Therefore, this study examines the impact of Russia-\u0000Ukraine war (from February 2022 to December 2024) and the COVID\u0000pandemic (from March 2020 to February 2022) on the valuation of\u0000cybersecurity companies. The period from January 2015 to February\u00002020 was used as the comparative period. The research material\u0000consists of companies and stock indices from the American and\u0000Polish markets. The results of the research are inconclusive. In\u0000fact, there are some examples of companies that took advantage\u0000of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to achieve above-average returns.\u0000Such a business is risky, which is why these companies are achiev-\u0000ing above-average returns with increased shares price volatility.\u0000However, it turns out that automatically assigning a company to the\u0000cyber or IT category does not mean that it will be a good invest-\u0000ment in times of war or pandemic.","PeriodicalId":123092,"journal":{"name":"Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance","volume":" 16","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141826627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Shared understanding of the operational environment in the cyber domain is the key enabler of NATO’s cyber posture. However, there have been no attempts to evaluate empirically the impact of the war in Ukraine on intra-Alliance coherence. This study applies a novel methodology based on computation text analysis to evaluate the trends within the recently adopted national cyber strategies with regards to the description of threats, risks, and actors involved in carrying out these threats – in particular, Italy, Latvia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The analysis shows that before the large-scale invasion, the congruence was low between the two continental European states vis-a-vis the UK and the US on threat and risk assessment. After the invasion, these dif- ferences became smaller and the language of the updated National Cyber Security Strategies became more homogeneous as mea- sured by the cosine similarity scores. There are still differences in the discussion of relevant actors in cyberspace. The methodology applied here can be extended to measure the cohesiveness of the Alliance’s cyber posture along other dimensions.
{"title":"Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and National Cyber Security Strategies: Quantitative Compar-ison","authors":"Olesya Vinhas de Souza","doi":"10.60097/acig/190346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60097/acig/190346","url":null,"abstract":"Shared understanding of the operational environment\u0000in the cyber domain is the key enabler of NATO’s cyber posture.\u0000However, there have been no attempts to evaluate empirically the\u0000impact of the war in Ukraine on intra-Alliance coherence. This study\u0000applies a novel methodology based on computation text analysis\u0000to evaluate the trends within the recently adopted national cyber\u0000strategies with regards to the description of threats, risks, and\u0000actors involved in carrying out these threats – in particular, Italy,\u0000Latvia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The analysis\u0000shows that before the large-scale invasion, the congruence was low\u0000between the two continental European states vis-a-vis the UK and\u0000the US on threat and risk assessment. After the invasion, these dif-\u0000ferences became smaller and the language of the updated National\u0000Cyber Security Strategies became more homogeneous as mea-\u0000sured by the cosine similarity scores. There are still differences in\u0000the discussion of relevant actors in cyberspace. The methodology\u0000applied here can be extended to measure the cohesiveness of the\u0000Alliance’s cyber posture along other dimensions.","PeriodicalId":123092,"journal":{"name":"Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance","volume":" 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141827334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Situational awareness (SA) has become one of the key concepts in military sector. The Russian-Ukrainian war led to the development of information technology in Ukraine to manage troops and combat situations. The army was supported by numerous volun- teer initiatives involving IT professionals. As a result, Ukrainian army has received modern software solutions based on the principles of SA for use in real combat conditions. The purpose of the study is to analyse the development of military and civilian SA information sys- tems during the war between Russia and Ukraine. In the course of the study, the methods of system analysis of the problem of SA were used. The research classifies information solutions, assesses the dis- tribution of products by different classification sectors, and conducts a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis of the developed products. Using the example of the most common solutions, the main features of existing software products and the technologies on which they operate were identified. Prospects for the development of solutions, their contribution to military manage- ment, and problematic issues are identified.
态势感知（SA）已成为军事领域的关键概念之一。俄乌战争促使乌克兰发展信息技术，以管理部队和作战情况。军队得到了众多信息技术专业人员自愿参与的倡议的支持。因此，乌克兰军队获得了基于SA 原则的现代软件解决方案，可用于实战条件。本研究的目的是分析俄罗斯和乌克兰战争期间军用和民用 SA 信息系统的发展情况。在研究过程中，使用了系统分析 SA 问题的方法。研究对信息解决方案进行了分类，评估了不同分类部门的产品分布情况，并对开发的产品进行了优势、劣势、机会和威胁（SWOT）分析。以最常用的解决方案为例，确定了现有软件产品的主要特点及其运行技术。确定了解决方案的发展前景、对军事管理的贡献以及存在的问题。
{"title":"Military Situation Awareness: Ukrainian Experience","authors":"V. Putrenko, Nataliia Pashynska","doi":"10.60097/acig/190341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60097/acig/190341","url":null,"abstract":"Situational awareness (SA) has become one of the key\u0000concepts in military sector. The Russian-Ukrainian war led to the\u0000development of information technology in Ukraine to manage troops\u0000and combat situations. The army was supported by numerous volun-\u0000teer initiatives involving IT professionals. As a result, Ukrainian army\u0000has received modern software solutions based on the principles of\u0000SA for use in real combat conditions. The purpose of the study is to\u0000analyse the development of military and civilian SA information sys-\u0000tems during the war between Russia and Ukraine. In the course of\u0000the study, the methods of system analysis of the problem of SA were\u0000used. The research classifies information solutions, assesses the dis-\u0000tribution of products by different classification sectors, and conducts\u0000a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis\u0000of the developed products. Using the example of the most common\u0000solutions, the main features of existing software products and the\u0000technologies on which they operate were identified. Prospects for\u0000the development of solutions, their contribution to military manage-\u0000ment, and problematic issues are identified.","PeriodicalId":123092,"journal":{"name":"Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance","volume":" 33","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141830066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The methodology of a quantitative assessment of organ- isation’s network cyber threats was developed in order to quanti- tatively assess and compare the cybersecurity threat landscape in conditions of limited data while applying the risk-oriented approach. It can be used either for assessing the level of network cyber threats of a particular organisation (as a quantitative measure of the criti- cality of cyber threats that are detected within the organisation’s network) or for comparing the level of network cyber threats of several organisations during the same or different time periods, giving grounds for supporting the process of making manage- rial decisions regarding the organisation’s cybersecurity strategy. The proposed scheme of the algorithm can be used to automate the calculation process. The assessment of network cyber threats that are considered in the article is not a full-fledged measure of the cyber risk because the methodology was developed consider- ing the common circumstances of the deficiency of the risk context data. Nevertheless, the results of the methodology implementation partially reflect the overall level of the organisation’s cyber risk and are expected to be used in the case when the full-featured proper cyber threats assessment can’t be organised for some reason.
{"title":"Methodology of Quantitative Assessment of Network Cyber Threats Using a Risk-Based Approach","authors":"Artem Zhylin, Hanna Holych","doi":"10.60097/acig/190345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60097/acig/190345","url":null,"abstract":"The methodology of a quantitative assessment of organ-\u0000isation’s network cyber threats was developed in order to quanti-\u0000tatively assess and compare the cybersecurity threat landscape in\u0000conditions of limited data while applying the risk-oriented approach.\u0000It can be used either for assessing the level of network cyber threats\u0000of a particular organisation (as a quantitative measure of the criti-\u0000cality of cyber threats that are detected within the organisation’s\u0000network) or for comparing the level of network cyber threats of\u0000several organisations during the same or different time periods,\u0000giving grounds for supporting the process of making manage-\u0000rial decisions regarding the organisation’s cybersecurity strategy.\u0000The proposed scheme of the algorithm can be used to automate\u0000the calculation process. The assessment of network cyber threats\u0000that are considered in the article is not a full-fledged measure of\u0000the cyber risk because the methodology was developed consider-\u0000ing the common circumstances of the deficiency of the risk context\u0000data. Nevertheless, the results of the methodology implementation\u0000partially reflect the overall level of the organisation’s cyber risk and\u0000are expected to be used in the case when the full-featured proper\u0000cyber threats assessment can’t be organised for some reason.","PeriodicalId":123092,"journal":{"name":"Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141649222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nowadays, the number of sophisticated cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure or banking systems is increas- ing. Cases of successful attacks are not uncommon, as statistics in Ukraine demonstrate, and they are becoming more frequent and advanced. This results in an increased risk for companies listed on the stock exchange. The article provides examples of cyberattacks in Ukraine, including those using ransomware, attempts to infiltrate energy systems, and attacks on government institutions. It is noted that the presence of cyber threats is strongly linked to the politi- cal and international situation of the country. Analyses conducted focus on the examination of cyber threat events in Ukraine and their impact on the WIG_UKRAIN stock index from 2015 to 2023. The evalu- ation includes the index’s return rates on the day of the cyber threat occurrence, the following day, and the average return rate within five sessions after the threat. An analogous study for the WIG index is adopted as a benchmark. Based on the obtained results, it can be said that before the year 2022, cyberattacks on Ukraine did not have a significant impact on the value of the Ukrainian company stock index. The situation changed after 2022, where each potentially economi- cally harmful cyberattack contributed to the decrease in the value of Ukrainian-listed companies. Generally, the start of hostilities in 2022 significantly increased the volatility of the WIG_UKRAIN index quota- tions. This is to be expected, as markets react badly to uncertainty.
{"title":"Assessment of the cybersecurity of Ukrainian public companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange S.A.","authors":"Anna Anna Szczepańska-Przekota","doi":"10.60097/acig/190343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60097/acig/190343","url":null,"abstract":"Nowadays, the number of sophisticated cyberattacks\u0000targeting critical infrastructure or banking systems is increas-\u0000ing. Cases of successful attacks are not uncommon, as statistics in\u0000Ukraine demonstrate, and they are becoming more frequent and\u0000advanced. This results in an increased risk for companies listed on\u0000the stock exchange. The article provides examples of cyberattacks\u0000in Ukraine, including those using ransomware, attempts to infiltrate\u0000energy systems, and attacks on government institutions. It is noted\u0000that the presence of cyber threats is strongly linked to the politi-\u0000cal and international situation of the country. Analyses conducted\u0000focus on the examination of cyber threat events in Ukraine and their\u0000impact on the WIG_UKRAIN stock index from 2015 to 2023. The evalu-\u0000ation includes the index’s return rates on the day of the cyber threat\u0000occurrence, the following day, and the average return rate within five\u0000sessions after the threat. An analogous study for the WIG index is\u0000adopted as a benchmark. Based on the obtained results, it can be\u0000said that before the year 2022, cyberattacks on Ukraine did not have a\u0000significant impact on the value of the Ukrainian company stock index.\u0000The situation changed after 2022, where each potentially economi-\u0000cally harmful cyberattack contributed to the decrease in the value of\u0000Ukrainian-listed companies. Generally, the start of hostilities in 2022\u0000significantly increased the volatility of the WIG_UKRAIN index quota-\u0000tions. This is to be expected, as markets react badly to uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":123092,"journal":{"name":"Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance","volume":"58 35","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141644303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the main lessons learned in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine starting in February 2022 is that for- eign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations are closely coupled with cyber threats. Regardless of whether cyberattacks are followed by an information manipulation compo- nent and vice versa, the merger of the two can be an early indica- tor of the potential for a conflict to escalate from the cyber area to the ground. Our article is premised on the idea that today’s highly technologised information ecosystem is a fertile ground for cyberattacks and information manipulation in the context of FIMI; more specifically, it enables cognitive hacking, meaning hacking the human mind and human cognition altogether through techno- logical disruption and cyber pressure. Starting from this premise, the aim of the article is to highlight the technological determi- nants of cognitive hacking and identify silent or emerging threats that bypass technological sensors and seek to disrupt and manip- ulate the information environment. The empirical part is based on observation as a descriptive method, which is used to analyse a case of cognitive hacking carried out via a YouTube malvertis- ing campaign targeting Romanian users. This case study is anal- ysed qualitatively by matching the DISinformation Analysis & Risk Management (DISARM) framework with evidence collected through Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools, following an innovative analysis structured according to the purposes, actions, results and techniques (PART) model. The extensive analysis of the identified case shows that applying the DISARM framework to cyber-enabled operations can be useful for anticipating and responding to FIMI threats, even when such operations do not appear to have a spe- cific, immediately identifiable purpose.
{"title":"Cyber influence defense: Applying the DISARM framework to a cognitive hacking case from the Romanian digital space","authors":"Alina Bârgăoanu, Mihaela Pană","doi":"10.60097/acig/190196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60097/acig/190196","url":null,"abstract":"One of the main lessons learned in the context of Russia’s\u0000full-scale invasion of Ukraine starting in February 2022 is that for-\u0000eign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations\u0000are closely coupled with cyber threats. Regardless of whether\u0000cyberattacks are followed by an information manipulation compo-\u0000nent and vice versa, the merger of the two can be an early indica-\u0000tor of the potential for a conflict to escalate from the cyber area\u0000to the ground. Our article is premised on the idea that today’s\u0000highly technologised information ecosystem is a fertile ground for\u0000cyberattacks and information manipulation in the context of FIMI;\u0000more specifically, it enables cognitive hacking, meaning hacking\u0000the human mind and human cognition altogether through techno-\u0000logical disruption and cyber pressure. Starting from this premise,\u0000the aim of the article is to highlight the technological determi-\u0000nants of cognitive hacking and identify silent or emerging threats\u0000that bypass technological sensors and seek to disrupt and manip-\u0000ulate the information environment. The empirical part is based on observation as a descriptive method, which is used to analyse\u0000a case of cognitive hacking carried out via a YouTube malvertis-\u0000ing campaign targeting Romanian users. This case study is anal-\u0000ysed qualitatively by matching the DISinformation Analysis & Risk\u0000Management (DISARM) framework with evidence collected through\u0000Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools, following an innovative\u0000analysis structured according to the purposes, actions, results and\u0000techniques (PART) model. The extensive analysis of the identified\u0000case shows that applying the DISARM framework to cyber-enabled\u0000operations can be useful for anticipating and responding to FIMI\u0000threats, even when such operations do not appear to have a spe-\u0000cific, immediately identifiable purpose.","PeriodicalId":123092,"journal":{"name":"Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance","volume":"23 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141658941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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