Pub Date : 2018-09-28DOI: 10.1142/9789813276833_0003
{"title":"Developing Nation Nuclear Policies","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/9789813276833_0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813276833_0003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":124695,"journal":{"name":"Crossing the Red Line","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124154900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-28DOI: 10.1142/9789813276833_0008
M. D. Griffin
{"title":"Rocket Fundamentals","authors":"M. D. Griffin","doi":"10.1142/9789813276833_0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813276833_0008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":124695,"journal":{"name":"Crossing the Red Line","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126502176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-28DOI: 10.1142/9789813276833_0005
S. Weintraub
ON 30 NOVEMBER 1950 at a press conference in Washington, D.C., President Harry S. Truman inadvertently suggested that General Douglas MacArthur as "military commander in the field" had the authority to unleash atomic bombs. That same day, General George E. Stratemeyer in Tokyo sent a cable to General Hoyt S. Vandenberg requesting that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) should be "prepared to dispatch without delay medium bomb groups to the Far East .... This augmentation should include atomic capabilities."1 MacArthur's staff was clearly rattled about the possibility of Dunkirks in Korea, or a humiliating armistice. At 8:30 a.m. the next day in Washington, a high-level meeting that included just about every policy maker but the president convened in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conference room in the Pentagon. Chairman General Omar Bradley worried whether MacArthur could hold at any point in North Korea, and whether Chinese air power would have to be interdicted so that troops at worst might withdraw safely. "To do so might draw in the Soviet air [force]. If this is true, we might have to defer striking." Army Chief of Staff Lawton Collins supported Bradley. "If we hit back, it is a strong provocation of the Chinese and may possibly bring in Soviet air and even submarines. The only chance then left to save as - if that happened -- is the use or the threat of use of the A-Bomb. We should therefore hold back from bombing in China even if that means that our ground forces must take some punishment from the air." He was beginning to think that Korea "was not worth a nickel." "If we do hit back," Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned, "it may bring in Russian air support of the Chinese and we would go from the frying pan into the fire." "We would have to evacuate [Korea] and probably would be engaged in war [with Russia]," Gencral Bedell Smith. the new CIA chief, predicted. At that, Collins contended that the United States would have to "consider the threat or the [actual] use of the A-Bomb, It would [otherwise] be very difficult to get our troops out."2 Later In the day, Bernard Baruch, long a White House adviser on military and atomic matters, visited Defense Secretary George Marshall, who had been at the JCS meeting, to press on him the feeling in the country, "in view of what is regarded as a very desperate situation"- the massive Chinese intervention -"for use of the atomic bomb." Marshall observed that he didn't think it would "do any good in the circumstances," and questioned what it could be "dropped on." The Chinese, he claimed, "were totally unmoved by this threat.... Their propaganda against American aggression was stepped up." Marshall scoffed at the Nehru-Panikkar claims of neutrality as an "Indian rope trick." While atomic talk was swirling about Washington and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee was flying to the United States to confront Truman, General Curtis LeMay, SAC chief and former commander of the 20th Air Force, which had de
1950年11月30日，在华盛顿特区的一次新闻发布会上，哈里·s·杜鲁门总统无意中暗示道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟将军作为“战地军事指挥官”有权投放原子弹。同一天，在东京的乔治·e·斯特拉特迈耶将军给霍伊特·s·范登堡将军发了一封电报，要求战略空军司令部(SAC)“准备立即向远东派遣中型炸弹群....”这种增强应该包括原子功能。麦克阿瑟的参谋们显然对朝鲜可能出现的敦刻尔克或屈辱的停战感到不安。第二天上午8点30分，在五角大楼的参谋长联席会议(Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS)会议室举行了一场高层会议，除了总统之外，几乎所有的政策制定者都参加了会议。主席奥马尔·布拉德利将军担心麦克阿瑟能否坚守在朝鲜的任何地点，以及中国的空中力量是否必须被拦截，以便在最坏的情况下部队可以安全撤离。“这样做可能会吸引苏联空军。如果这是真的，我们可能不得不推迟罢工。”陆军参谋长劳顿·柯林斯支持布拉德利。“如果我们反击，这是对中国的强烈挑衅，可能会引来苏联的空中甚至潜艇。如果发生这种情况，那么唯一可以挽救的机会就是使用或威胁使用原子弹。因此，我们应该避免轰炸中国，即使这意味着我们的地面部队必须受到空中的一些惩罚。”他开始认为朝鲜“一文不值”。“如果我们真的反击，”美国国务卿迪安·艾奇逊(Dean Acheson)警告说，“这可能会招致俄罗斯对中国的空中支援，我们将从煎锅里掉进火里。”史密斯将军说:“我们将不得不撤离(朝鲜)，而且很可能(与俄罗斯)开战。”新任中央情报局局长预测道。对此，柯林斯认为，美国将不得不“考虑威胁或[实际]使用原子弹，否则将很难将我们的军队撤出。”当天晚些时候，长期担任白宫军事和原子事务顾问的伯纳德·巴鲁克(Bernard Baruch)拜访了正在参加参谋长联席会议的国防部长乔治·马歇尔(George Marshall)，向他强调了美国国内的感受，“鉴于被视为非常绝望的局面”——中国的大规模干预——“为了使用原子弹”。马歇尔说，他不认为它“在这种情况下会有任何好处”，并质疑它能“被抛弃”什么。他声称，中国人“对这种威胁完全不为所动....他们加强了反对美国侵略的宣传。”马歇尔嘲笑尼赫鲁-帕尼克卡尔的中立主张是“印度的绳索把戏”。当时华盛顿正在讨论原子弹问题，英国首相克莱门特·艾德礼正飞往美国与杜鲁门会面，SAC主席、曾在广岛和长崎部署原子弹的第20空军前司令柯蒂斯·勒梅将军回应了斯特拉特梅耶的信息。LeMay说，SAC的理解是，根据JCS早些时候的一份咨询报告，核武器不会被使用，除非是在“针对中国的全面原子运动”中。如果形势真的发生了变化，他希望能参与部署。他夸口说，他和他的手下是仅有的掌握投掷原子弹所需知识的人在12月3日准备艾德礼的匆忙访问时，国务院官员提醒联合参谋部“英国人普遍不信任麦克阿瑟，担心他可能根据军事需要做出的政治决定”。与此相关的是英国对[建立]缓冲区的信念，以及他们反对[联合国]越过鸭绿江的攻击。还涉及到对使用原子弹对亚洲人的影响的恐惧，甚至公开考虑使用原子弹。”艾奇逊接着说，英国的关切“非常真诚”。…
{"title":"North Korea and the Bomb","authors":"S. Weintraub","doi":"10.1142/9789813276833_0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813276833_0005","url":null,"abstract":"ON 30 NOVEMBER 1950 at a press conference in Washington, D.C., President Harry S. Truman inadvertently suggested that General Douglas MacArthur as \"military commander in the field\" had the authority to unleash atomic bombs. That same day, General George E. Stratemeyer in Tokyo sent a cable to General Hoyt S. Vandenberg requesting that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) should be \"prepared to dispatch without delay medium bomb groups to the Far East .... This augmentation should include atomic capabilities.\"1 MacArthur's staff was clearly rattled about the possibility of Dunkirks in Korea, or a humiliating armistice. At 8:30 a.m. the next day in Washington, a high-level meeting that included just about every policy maker but the president convened in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conference room in the Pentagon. Chairman General Omar Bradley worried whether MacArthur could hold at any point in North Korea, and whether Chinese air power would have to be interdicted so that troops at worst might withdraw safely. \"To do so might draw in the Soviet air [force]. If this is true, we might have to defer striking.\" Army Chief of Staff Lawton Collins supported Bradley. \"If we hit back, it is a strong provocation of the Chinese and may possibly bring in Soviet air and even submarines. The only chance then left to save as - if that happened -- is the use or the threat of use of the A-Bomb. We should therefore hold back from bombing in China even if that means that our ground forces must take some punishment from the air.\" He was beginning to think that Korea \"was not worth a nickel.\" \"If we do hit back,\" Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned, \"it may bring in Russian air support of the Chinese and we would go from the frying pan into the fire.\" \"We would have to evacuate [Korea] and probably would be engaged in war [with Russia],\" Gencral Bedell Smith. the new CIA chief, predicted. At that, Collins contended that the United States would have to \"consider the threat or the [actual] use of the A-Bomb, It would [otherwise] be very difficult to get our troops out.\"2 Later In the day, Bernard Baruch, long a White House adviser on military and atomic matters, visited Defense Secretary George Marshall, who had been at the JCS meeting, to press on him the feeling in the country, \"in view of what is regarded as a very desperate situation\"- the massive Chinese intervention -\"for use of the atomic bomb.\" Marshall observed that he didn't think it would \"do any good in the circumstances,\" and questioned what it could be \"dropped on.\" The Chinese, he claimed, \"were totally unmoved by this threat.... Their propaganda against American aggression was stepped up.\" Marshall scoffed at the Nehru-Panikkar claims of neutrality as an \"Indian rope trick.\" While atomic talk was swirling about Washington and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee was flying to the United States to confront Truman, General Curtis LeMay, SAC chief and former commander of the 20th Air Force, which had de","PeriodicalId":124695,"journal":{"name":"Crossing the Red Line","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130737088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-28DOI: 10.1142/9789813276833_0007
{"title":"How Many Bombs Could North Korea Have?","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/9789813276833_0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813276833_0007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":124695,"journal":{"name":"Crossing the Red Line","volume":"389 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123513916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-28DOI: 10.1142/9789813276833_0004
{"title":"Controlling the Spread of Nuclear Weapons","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/9789813276833_0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813276833_0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":124695,"journal":{"name":"Crossing the Red Line","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130019053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-28DOI: 10.1142/9789813276833_0011
{"title":"The Future Control of Nuclear Weapons","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/9789813276833_0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813276833_0011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":124695,"journal":{"name":"Crossing the Red Line","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116839613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-28DOI: 10.1142/9789813276833_0013
{"title":"Afterword","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/9789813276833_0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813276833_0013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":124695,"journal":{"name":"Crossing the Red Line","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121357174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-28DOI: 10.1142/9789813276833_fmatter
{"title":"FRONT MATTER","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/9789813276833_fmatter","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813276833_fmatter","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":124695,"journal":{"name":"Crossing the Red Line","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127042340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-28DOI: 10.1142/9789813276833_0009
{"title":"The North Korean Rocket Program","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/9789813276833_0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813276833_0009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":124695,"journal":{"name":"Crossing the Red Line","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131962875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-28DOI: 10.1142/9789813276833_bmatter
{"title":"BACK MATTER","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/9789813276833_bmatter","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813276833_bmatter","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":124695,"journal":{"name":"Crossing the Red Line","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129574787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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