{"title":"The Final Organization","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.15","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":127182,"journal":{"name":"From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers","volume":"390 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116661966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Physical Surroundings","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":127182,"journal":{"name":"From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131343629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Industry","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":127182,"journal":{"name":"From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126973745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Violent Interlude","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":127182,"journal":{"name":"From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132039219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.25","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":127182,"journal":{"name":"From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130084911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Collapse of the W.B.A.","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":127182,"journal":{"name":"From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116234259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Act: • Defines “mine manager;” • Requires facilities to submit emergency action plans when making an application for a license; • Establishes content requirements for the emergency action plan and where copies of the plan are made available; • Requires the implementation of emergency evacuation plans and firefighting programs; • Requires that by September 1, 2006, licensed facilities will be able to activate emergency action plans; • Requires mapping working sections in a mine and the designating escapeways; • Requires escapeway drills at all licensed coal mines; • Provides for telephone or equivalent two-way communication facilities in underground and surface coal mines by September 1, 2006; • Requires ventilation plans and roof control plans be submitted along with requests for licenses and include entrapments, roof falls, and inundation of the mine with liquid or gas in the events that trigger a mine rescue; • Requires mine ventilation plans and revisions to existing mine ventilation plans be submitted to and approved by the executive director of the Office of Mine Safety and Licensing; • Prohibits mine licensees from storing self-contained self-rescuers farther apart than 25 feet; • Provides that self-contained self-rescuers be deployed at not more than 45 minute walking intervals, be placed in storage units to prevent their destruction, and have luminescent signs, alarms, and strobe lights; • Prohibits using return airway as an escapeway and requires devices that direct miners to the surface at 100-foot intervals; • Prohibits riding under a trolley wire; • Defines “serious physical injury;” • Requires reporting accidents that involves serious physical injury or loss of life within 15 minutes after actual knowledge of the occurrence; and • Establishes a $100,000 dollar penalty for failure to report.
{"title":"Mine Safety","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.16","url":null,"abstract":"This Act: • Defines “mine manager;” • Requires facilities to submit emergency action plans when making an application for a license; • Establishes content requirements for the emergency action plan and where copies of the plan are made available; • Requires the implementation of emergency evacuation plans and firefighting programs; • Requires that by September 1, 2006, licensed facilities will be able to activate emergency action plans; • Requires mapping working sections in a mine and the designating escapeways; • Requires escapeway drills at all licensed coal mines; • Provides for telephone or equivalent two-way communication facilities in underground and surface coal mines by September 1, 2006; • Requires ventilation plans and roof control plans be submitted along with requests for licenses and include entrapments, roof falls, and inundation of the mine with liquid or gas in the events that trigger a mine rescue; • Requires mine ventilation plans and revisions to existing mine ventilation plans be submitted to and approved by the executive director of the Office of Mine Safety and Licensing; • Prohibits mine licensees from storing self-contained self-rescuers farther apart than 25 feet; • Provides that self-contained self-rescuers be deployed at not more than 45 minute walking intervals, be placed in storage units to prevent their destruction, and have luminescent signs, alarms, and strobe lights; • Prohibits using return airway as an escapeway and requires devices that direct miners to the surface at 100-foot intervals; • Prohibits riding under a trolley wire; • Defines “serious physical injury;” • Requires reporting accidents that involves serious physical injury or loss of life within 15 minutes after actual knowledge of the occurrence; and • Establishes a $100,000 dollar penalty for failure to report.","PeriodicalId":127182,"journal":{"name":"From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126109891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reorganization and Collapse","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":127182,"journal":{"name":"From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123272968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The importance of the bonus structure in a public sector dominated economy has been noted by many writers. Since economic reforms in the USSR and many other socialist countries were initiated in the early 1960's, there have been a few studies analyzing the bonus schemes in Soviet-type economies. (See S. Gindin, Michael Ellman, Michael Keren, James A. Mirrlees, and Wayne A. Leeman.) The trend toward profit-related bonus schemes has been continuing in socialist economies, except China's industrial sector which completely dropped the bonus as a revisionist deviation. There are two basic problems involved: one is the bonus which induces a greater effort than the normal exertion, and the other is the tautness (or slackness) of the plan that discourages (or encourages) the effort. Gindin noted the effort-inducing effect of the bonus and the fear of a potentially higher new plan target when the current plan is fulfilled or overfulfilled. His model explains the managers' and planners' conflicting interest, which is inherent in a planned economy.' Leeman discussed some bonus formulae in a Soviet-type economy. He noted that if the reward were given only to the fulfillment of physical output targets, managers would tend to ignore the volume, and if the reward were based on the volume, then managers would be indifferent to plans. However, he also noted that the bonus for overfulfillment induces the managers to understate their capacities. There is a conflict in the output-plan and profit-related bonus.2 Ellman (1973) further analyzed the bonus based on the profit which reduces managers' incentive to understate the capacity. Ellman (1971) also made a detailed analysis of the institutional background of the USSR economy of the late 1960's that provides invaluable understanding of the Soviet reward system. Keren's highly analytical paper emphasizes the tautness of plans and the effortinducing bonus. Basically Keren tried to show that there exists, given a bonus, the highest permissible target, and also to show that there exists an "optimum size of bonus" which elicits the maximum exertion (effort) given the planned target.3 Mirrlees, in a recent paper, demonstrated that when the uncertainty about agents' characteristics is ignored, a nearly optimal incentive system is ". . . to threaten dire punishment of the unlucky (or lazy) and give everyone else the same payment, the payment being just high enough to make sure that people are willing to offer themselves as agents despite the threatened penalties" (p. 5). In this note, a bonus scheme which possesses some desirable characteristics is presented. It will be shown that managers operating under this reward system will have no incentive to understate or overstate their production capacity and they will strive to attain their target profits set by the planning authority. 4 * Professor of economics, Colorado State University. This work was supported by a National Science Foundation grant to the University of Minneso
许多作家都注意到了奖金结构在公共部门主导的经济中的重要性。由于苏联和其他许多社会主义国家的经济改革是在20世纪60年代初开始的,因此对苏联型经济体的奖金制度进行了一些研究。(参见S. gintin, Michael Ellman, Michael Keren, James A. Mirrlees和Wayne A. Leeman。)在社会主义经济中,与利润挂钩的奖金制度的趋势一直在继续,但中国的工业部门作为一种修正主义的偏差,完全取消了奖金制度。这涉及到两个基本问题:一个是奖金会促使员工付出比正常情况下更大的努力,另一个是计划的紧绷(或松弛)会阻碍(或鼓励)员工付出努力。金丁指出了奖金的努力诱导效应,以及当当前计划完成或超额完成时,人们对可能更高的新计划目标的恐惧。他的模型解释了管理者和计划者之间的利益冲突,这是计划经济所固有的。Leeman讨论了苏联式经济中的一些奖金公式。他指出,如果奖励只给完成实物产出目标的人,经理们就会倾向于忽略数量,如果奖励是基于数量的,那么经理们就会对计划漠不关心。然而,他也指出,超额完成奖金会导致管理者低估自己的能力。产出计划和与利润相关的奖金有冲突Ellman(1973)进一步分析了基于利润的奖金减少了管理者低估产能的动机。Ellman(1971)还对1960年代末苏联经济的制度背景进行了详细的分析,为理解苏联的奖励制度提供了宝贵的信息。凯伦的分析性很强的论文强调了计划的严密性和努力奖金。基本上,凯伦试图证明,在给定奖金的情况下,存在最高允许目标,同时也存在“最佳奖金规模”,即在给定计划目标的情况下,激发最大的努力(努力)在最近的一篇论文中,米尔利斯证明,当代理人特征的不确定性被忽略时,一个近乎最优的激励系统是“……威胁对不幸(或懒惰)的人进行可怕的惩罚,并给其他人同样的报酬,报酬高到足以确保人们不顾威胁的惩罚愿意把自己作为代理人”(第5页)。在这篇笔记中,提出了一个具有一些可取特征的奖金方案。这将表明,在这种奖励制度下运作的管理人员将没有动机低估或夸大其生产能力,他们将努力实现计划当局设定的目标利润。科罗拉多州立大学经济学教授。这项工作得到了国家科学基金会对明尼苏达大学的资助。我要感谢列昂尼德·赫维奇的支持和鼓励。我也感谢一位匿名审稿人,他为本文的修改提供了意见,但我对其内容负有全部责任。Gindin的效用函数,第147-48页
{"title":"The Reward System","authors":"L. Fan","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.9","url":null,"abstract":"The importance of the bonus structure in a public sector dominated economy has been noted by many writers. Since economic reforms in the USSR and many other socialist countries were initiated in the early 1960's, there have been a few studies analyzing the bonus schemes in Soviet-type economies. (See S. Gindin, Michael Ellman, Michael Keren, James A. Mirrlees, and Wayne A. Leeman.) The trend toward profit-related bonus schemes has been continuing in socialist economies, except China's industrial sector which completely dropped the bonus as a revisionist deviation. There are two basic problems involved: one is the bonus which induces a greater effort than the normal exertion, and the other is the tautness (or slackness) of the plan that discourages (or encourages) the effort. Gindin noted the effort-inducing effect of the bonus and the fear of a potentially higher new plan target when the current plan is fulfilled or overfulfilled. His model explains the managers' and planners' conflicting interest, which is inherent in a planned economy.' Leeman discussed some bonus formulae in a Soviet-type economy. He noted that if the reward were given only to the fulfillment of physical output targets, managers would tend to ignore the volume, and if the reward were based on the volume, then managers would be indifferent to plans. However, he also noted that the bonus for overfulfillment induces the managers to understate their capacities. There is a conflict in the output-plan and profit-related bonus.2 Ellman (1973) further analyzed the bonus based on the profit which reduces managers' incentive to understate the capacity. Ellman (1971) also made a detailed analysis of the institutional background of the USSR economy of the late 1960's that provides invaluable understanding of the Soviet reward system. Keren's highly analytical paper emphasizes the tautness of plans and the effortinducing bonus. Basically Keren tried to show that there exists, given a bonus, the highest permissible target, and also to show that there exists an \"optimum size of bonus\" which elicits the maximum exertion (effort) given the planned target.3 Mirrlees, in a recent paper, demonstrated that when the uncertainty about agents' characteristics is ignored, a nearly optimal incentive system is \". . . to threaten dire punishment of the unlucky (or lazy) and give everyone else the same payment, the payment being just high enough to make sure that people are willing to offer themselves as agents despite the threatened penalties\" (p. 5). In this note, a bonus scheme which possesses some desirable characteristics is presented. It will be shown that managers operating under this reward system will have no incentive to understate or overstate their production capacity and they will strive to attain their target profits set by the planning authority. 4 * Professor of economics, Colorado State University. This work was supported by a National Science Foundation grant to the University of Minneso","PeriodicalId":127182,"journal":{"name":"From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers","volume":"74 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123184427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Productive System","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv941x1v.8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":127182,"journal":{"name":"From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131504552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}