Pub Date : 2021-07-20DOI: 10.4324/9781003202851-14
Craig Warmke
According to most interpreters, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) held a strong form of idealism according to which simple mental substances and their features exhaust fundamental reality. Leibniz called these substances monads (from the Greek word monas, ‘one’ or ‘unit’), and he assigns them two main features: (i) perceptual representations, and (ii) tendencies to move from one set of representations to the next. In more traditional interpretations of Leibniz, although monads are ultimately immaterial and non-located, material reality and everything in it derives from them and their two main features (Adams, 1994; Baxter, 1995; Rutherford, 1995, 2008; Cover & O’Leary-Hawthorne, 1999; Duarte, 2015, 2017; Look, 2010, 2013; Look & Rutherford, 2007: pp. xix–lxxii; Mercer, 2001; Pearce, 2016; Puryear, 2016; Sleigh, 1990; Whipple, 2017). Not all interpreters entirely agree with this assessment. Some argue that Leibniz held nonidealist views (Arthur, 1998; Bolton, 2004; Broad, 1975; Fichant, 2003; Garber, 1985, 2009; Hartz, 1998, 2007; Hartz & Wilson, 2005; Jolley, 1986; Lodge, 2014; Loptson, 1999; Loptson & Arthur, 2006; Phemister, 1999, 2005). Others argue that Leibniz’s views developed substantially over time or that he never clearly settled on one side or the other (Garber, 2004, 2005, 2009: pp. 382–388; Hartz, 2007; Lodge, 2005; Wilson, 1999). Recently, McDonough (2013) has argued that Leibniz remained deliberately non-committal between idealism and non-idealism and that his deeply held views were compatible with both. At the heart of these disagreements lies Leibniz’s treatment of corporeal substance.1 Despite Leibniz’s frequent claim that the universe ultimately boils down to monads, he also sometimes appears to say that the world’s fundamental furniture includes extended, corporeal substances. Was Leibniz an idealist, then, or not? I do think Leibniz was an idealist. John Whipple (2015, 2017) argues compellingly that some of the apparently anti-idealist passages in Leibniz stem from a range of rhetorical and pedagogical strategies meant to bridge the gap between his idealism and the non-idealism of his interlocutors. When we factor in these strategies, as well as the wider body of work, it seems to me much more likely than not that Leibniz was a firmly committed idealist, especially in his later years. However, even if we grant that Leibniz was an idealist, di"cult questions remain about his particular brand of idealism. In this chapter, I try to o#er, in the sense of Rutherford 11 LEIBNIZIAN IDEALISM
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Pub Date : 2021-07-20DOI: 10.4324/9781003202851-32
A. Levi
{"title":"Idealism and Judaism","authors":"A. Levi","doi":"10.4324/9781003202851-32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003202851-32","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134971,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124455621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-20DOI: 10.4324/9781003202851-16
S. Hamilton, C. Hancock
{"title":"Confessionalism and causation in Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758)","authors":"S. Hamilton, C. Hancock","doi":"10.4324/9781003202851-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003202851-16","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134971,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129216415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-20DOI: 10.5040/9781501317576.ch-008
S. Psillos
{"title":"Idealism and science","authors":"S. Psillos","doi":"10.5040/9781501317576.ch-008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781501317576.ch-008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134971,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124912198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-20DOI: 10.4324/9781003202851-48
J. Moreland
{"title":"Substance dualism and the idealism/physicalism debate","authors":"J. Moreland","doi":"10.4324/9781003202851-48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003202851-48","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134971,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125066062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-20DOI: 10.4324/9781003202851-18
Keith Ward
It has become common in philosophy to see Immanuel Kant as a sophisticated proponent of a worldview that is shared by some scientists while Bishop G. Berkeley is referred to only as a slightly crazy adherent of the view that matter does not exist at all. Kant nevertheless called his theory ‘transcendental idealism’ and distinguished it from the ‘problematic idealism’ of Descartes and from the ‘dogmatic idealism’ of Berkeley. Berkeley often refers to his own system as ‘immaterialism,’ and this certainly suggests the idea that there is no material world. On the other hand, Berkeley most often claimed to be a common-sense philosopher, who would not deny things that common sense would affirm. Berkeley can say so much, even on the most simplistic interpretation, save that he claims to know that the ‘something’ is God.
在哲学界，伊曼努尔·康德(Immanuel Kant)是一些科学家共同持有的世界观的老练支持者，而主教g·伯克利(Bishop G. Berkeley)则被认为是物质根本不存在这一观点的略微疯狂的拥护者，这已经变得很普遍。尽管如此，康德还是称他的理论为“先验唯心主义”，并将其与笛卡尔的“问题唯心主义”和伯克利的“教条唯心主义”区分开来。伯克利经常把他自己的体系称为“非唯物主义”，这当然暗示了没有物质世界的想法。另一方面，贝克莱经常声称自己是一位常识哲学家，他不会否认常识所肯定的事情。伯克利除了声称知道“某物”就是上帝之外，甚至在最简单的解释上也能说很多。
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Pub Date : 2021-07-20DOI: 10.4324/9781003202851-29
Theodore James Whapham
{"title":"Pannenberg the idealist?","authors":"Theodore James Whapham","doi":"10.4324/9781003202851-29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003202851-29","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134971,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133871395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-20DOI: 10.4324/9781003202851-13
J. Borcherding
{"title":"A most subtle matter","authors":"J. Borcherding","doi":"10.4324/9781003202851-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003202851-13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":134971,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134068346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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