Pub Date : 2019-11-07DOI: 10.1017/9781108525077.005
Patrick Lee
The New Natural Law (NNL) theory, sometimes also called the New Classical Natural Law theory, is the name given a particular revival and revision of Thomistic Natural Law theory, initiated in the 1960s by Germain Grisez. Grisez’s initial collaborators included Joseph Boyle, John Finnis and Olaf Tollefsen. More recently, Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Fr. Peter Ryan, S.J., Gerard Bradley, William E. May, Christian Brugger, and Christopher Tollefsen have done work on the NNL. Articulation and defense of the theory began with the publication of Grisez’s interpretative essay on St. Thomas’s first principle of practical reason, in 1965.1 Although that essay established some of the controversial theses of the new view, in particular, that the foundation of practical reason is in a foundational practical recognition of certain basic goods, and that no inference from theoretical truths concerning human nature is necessary or possible, Grisez was there attempting to provide an accurate interpretation of St. Thomas’s thought. Subsequent work, while deeply indebted to St. Thomas, has not been primarily exegetical,2 and in some particulars clearly conflicts with the positions of St. Thomas. The distinctive, and often disputed, areas of contribution by the New Natural Lawyers include at least the following five, which will be the focus of the remainder of this article:
新自然法(NNL)理论，有时也被称为新古典自然法理论，是在20世纪60年代由Germain Grisez发起的托马斯自然法理论的复兴和修订的名称。Grisez最初的合作者包括Joseph Boyle, John Finnis和Olaf Tollefsen。最近，Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Fr. Peter Ryan, s.j.， Gerard Bradley, William E. May, Christian Brugger和Christopher Tollefsen都对NNL进行了研究。对这一理论的阐述和辩护始于1965年格里斯兹发表的关于圣托马斯实践理性第一原则的解释性文章。尽管这篇文章确立了新观点的一些有争议的论点，特别是，实践理性的基础是对某些基本商品的基本实践认识，并且关于人性的理论真理没有推论是必要的或可能的，格里塞在那里试图提供一个准确的解释圣托马斯的思想。随后的工作，而深深感激圣托马斯，一直没有主要训诂，2，并在一些细节明显与圣托马斯的立场冲突。新自然法学家独特的、经常有争议的贡献至少包括以下五个方面，这将是本文剩余部分的重点:
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Pub Date : 2019-11-07DOI: 10.1017/9781108525077.016
Tom Angier
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Pub Date : 2019-11-07DOI: 10.1017/9781108525077.003
Steven J. Jensen
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Pub Date : 2019-11-07DOI: 10.1017/9781108525077.004
J. Olsthoorn
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Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.1017/9781108525077.010
A. Emon
This chapter will introduce the basic, theoretical architecture of competing Islamic natural law theories from the pre-modern period (ninth to fourteenth centuries). Specifically, it will outline juristic debates in the usul al-fiqh genre on reason as a source of law, where revelation is silent. Thereafter it will reflect on a range of doctrinal debates inwhichmany of those same pre-modern jurists came to a legal determination without reference to scriptural (or any other) texts. Drawing on a curious heuristic they labelled huquq Allah and huquq al-ʿibad (the claims of God and the claims of individuals), I will show that despite not invoking (expressly or otherwise) any natural law account of Islamic law, jurists nonetheless developed law based on a mode of rationality that could be called anything from ‘rational’ to ‘common-sense’ to ‘pragmatic’. Whether or not the huquq Allah/huquq al-ʿibad heuristic is proof positive of natural law in Islam is less important than recognising the scope of questions that have yet to be examined. But as I will suggest in the third and concluding part, there are political reasons (some of which enjoy disciplinary cover) that help explain why some questions are not asked, and why some answers are deemed naïve, if not impolitic.
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