This chapter provides an international law response to the dramatic increase in state-sponsored cyber espionage in recent years. The chapter pursues three objectives. First, to provide a working definition of the concept of cyber espionage in order to provide some much-needed clarification to the meaning of this practice and, further, to refine the research scope of this chapter. Second, to present cyber espionage as a pernicious practice that represents a threat to international peace and security and which is thus in need of international regulation. Third, to assess whether cyber espionage is already prohibited by international law. In particular, this chapter contends that cyber espionage is an inherently coercive act that compromises the political integrity of sovereign states and to this end constitutes a violation of the principle of non-intervention. In contrast, the chapter argues that because cyber espionage results in the copying of confidential information and does not produce kinetic damage, cyber espionage does not amount to an unlawful use of force under Article 2(4) UN Charter and thus cannot amount to an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 UN Charter.
{"title":"Cyber Espionage and International Law","authors":"R. Buchan","doi":"10.5040/9781782257370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781782257370","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides an international law response to the dramatic increase in state-sponsored cyber espionage in recent years. The chapter pursues three objectives. First, to provide a working definition of the concept of cyber espionage in order to provide some much-needed clarification to the meaning of this practice and, further, to refine the research scope of this chapter. Second, to present cyber espionage as a pernicious practice that represents a threat to international peace and security and which is thus in need of international regulation. Third, to assess whether cyber espionage is already prohibited by international law. In particular, this chapter contends that cyber espionage is an inherently coercive act that compromises the political integrity of sovereign states and to this end constitutes a violation of the principle of non-intervention. In contrast, the chapter argues that because cyber espionage results in the copying of confidential information and does not produce kinetic damage, cyber espionage does not amount to an unlawful use of force under Article 2(4) UN Charter and thus cannot amount to an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 UN Charter.","PeriodicalId":147844,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131034289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-26DOI: 10.4337/9781782547396.00015
K. Ambos
The primary objective of this chapter is to give a reliable overview of the state of the art with regard to 'computer network attacks' (CNAs) or cyber-attacks. A CNA constitutes the strongest form of what is regarded to be cyber warfare, i.e., the use of technical means to wage war against an adversary in cyberspace. The focus on CNAs is explained by the fact that only these forms of crimes in cyberspace are normally serious enough to qualify as international crimes and thus be covered by an international criminal jurisdiction like the ICC. As to ‘international criminal responsibility’ the current debate in the cyber context is mostly concerned with the application of the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law (IHL) to CNAs (infra Section 2). Less intense is the debate regarding a possible criminal responsibility for a crime of aggression (infra Section 3). Finally, there is virtually no debate regarding the commission of crimes against humanity by way of CNAs but it is worthwhile taking a brief look at this possibility too (infra Section 4). There are, of course, other issues regarding international criminal responsibility in cyberspace but they must be left to further inquiries.
{"title":"International criminal responsibility in cyberspace","authors":"K. Ambos","doi":"10.4337/9781782547396.00015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547396.00015","url":null,"abstract":"The primary objective of this chapter is to give a reliable overview of the state of the art with regard to 'computer network attacks' (CNAs) or cyber-attacks. A CNA constitutes the strongest form of what is regarded to be cyber warfare, i.e., the use of technical means to wage war against an adversary in cyberspace. The focus on CNAs is explained by the fact that only these forms of crimes in cyberspace are normally serious enough to qualify as international crimes and thus be covered by an international criminal jurisdiction like the ICC. As to ‘international criminal responsibility’ the current debate in the cyber context is mostly concerned with the application of the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law (IHL) to CNAs (infra Section 2). Less intense is the debate regarding a possible criminal responsibility for a crime of aggression (infra Section 3). Finally, there is virtually no debate regarding the commission of crimes against humanity by way of CNAs but it is worthwhile taking a brief look at this possibility too (infra Section 4). There are, of course, other issues regarding international criminal responsibility in cyberspace but they must be left to further inquiries.","PeriodicalId":147844,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117084936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-26DOI: 10.4337/9781782547396.00024
Eric P. J. Myjer
The mention of a potential preventive US reaction with extremely powerful cyber weapons against the possibility of a cyber threat brings back memories of the early deterrence discussions with regard to nuclear weapons. What deterrence basically comes down to is making clear to any potential opponent that if you dare to attack me, you may expect, at a minimum, a reply in kind that will be devastating to your potential. It also includes the message that even if attacked my capacity to make such a reply will be preserved in a guaranteed second strike, so a first strike will not give any advantage. With regard to nuclear weapons the ICJ considered deterrence but did not conclude that the threat or use of nuclear weapons, which was the deterrent threat, was contrary to public international law in cases where the survival of the state was at stake. This is the reason to see whether indeed a parallel can be drawn between the deterrent strategies in the nuclear realm and a perceived cyber attack by a state in cyberspace and projected generic (preventive) replies by states to such threats, or attacks. Is such a deterrent strategy viable? Would importing deterrence in the cyber realm improve cyber security? And how does public international law qualify such deterrent strategy (is it in accordance with public international law)? These and other legal questions are prompted by the technological developments in the digital area that have created the possibilities for its use as new weapons.
{"title":"Some thoughts on cyber deterrence and public international law","authors":"Eric P. J. Myjer","doi":"10.4337/9781782547396.00024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547396.00024","url":null,"abstract":"The mention of a potential preventive US reaction with extremely powerful cyber weapons against the possibility of a cyber threat brings back memories of the early deterrence discussions with regard to nuclear weapons. What deterrence basically comes down to is making clear to any potential opponent that if you dare to attack me, you may expect, at a minimum, a reply in kind that will be devastating to your potential. It also includes the message that even if attacked my capacity to make such a reply will be preserved in a guaranteed second strike, so a first strike will not give any advantage. With regard to nuclear weapons the ICJ considered deterrence but did not conclude that the threat or use of nuclear weapons, which was the deterrent threat, was contrary to public international law in cases where the survival of the state was at stake. This is the reason to see whether indeed a parallel can be drawn between the deterrent strategies in the nuclear realm and a perceived cyber attack by a state in cyberspace and projected generic (preventive) replies by states to such threats, or attacks. Is such a deterrent strategy viable? Would importing deterrence in the cyber realm improve cyber security? And how does public international law qualify such deterrent strategy (is it in accordance with public international law)? These and other legal questions are prompted by the technological developments in the digital area that have created the possibilities for its use as new weapons.","PeriodicalId":147844,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132653064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-26DOI: 10.4337/9781782547396.00023
C. Focarelli
Is self-defence against a cyber attack permitted? What about a cyber counter-attack against a conventional or cyber attack? Under Article 51 UN Charter self-defence is permitted ‘if an armed attack occurs’. Many scholars agree that a cyber attack amounts to an ‘armed attack’ when it causes harm or damage approximately comparable to a ‘kinetic’ or conventional attack and in particular when it hits ‘critical infrastructures’. Also in cyberspace, when permitted, individual or collective self-de¬fence has to meet the requirements of necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Two further major problems linked with self-defence against cyber attacks discussed in this chapter relate to the permissibility of anticipatory self-defence and self-defence against non-state actors or against the breach by a state of its duty of prevention of cross-border harmful private acts. The chapter concludes with some scepticism about the ‘use of force’ and analogy-based approaches in the literature suggesting that the law enforcement paradigm and non-forcible responses are preferable to the escalating militarization of cyberspace and noting that even when self-defence is permitted in cyberspace the necessity requirement demands of states to abide by a continuing obligation to implement passive and active electronic defences. In any case the prevailing approach serves, in addition to trying to identify reasonable rules, a twofold purpose, that is, deterring possible attacks and promoting the rules which could possibly govern major cyber attacks at the moment when they occur so as to have at that very moment the international community ‘prepared’ to share the view that the attack is indeed ‘equivalent’ to a kinetic attack which justifies a kinetic response.
{"title":"Self-defence in cyberspace","authors":"C. Focarelli","doi":"10.4337/9781782547396.00023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547396.00023","url":null,"abstract":"Is self-defence against a cyber attack permitted? What about a cyber counter-attack against a conventional or cyber attack? Under Article 51 UN Charter self-defence is permitted ‘if an armed attack occurs’. Many scholars agree that a cyber attack amounts to an ‘armed attack’ when it causes harm or damage approximately comparable to a ‘kinetic’ or conventional attack and in particular when it hits ‘critical infrastructures’. Also in cyberspace, when permitted, individual or collective self-de¬fence has to meet the requirements of necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Two further major problems linked with self-defence against cyber attacks discussed in this chapter relate to the permissibility of anticipatory self-defence and self-defence against non-state actors or against the breach by a state of its duty of prevention of cross-border harmful private acts. The chapter concludes with some scepticism about the ‘use of force’ and analogy-based approaches in the literature suggesting that the law enforcement paradigm and non-forcible responses are preferable to the escalating militarization of cyberspace and noting that even when self-defence is permitted in cyberspace the necessity requirement demands of states to abide by a continuing obligation to implement passive and active electronic defences. In any case the prevailing approach serves, in addition to trying to identify reasonable rules, a twofold purpose, that is, deterring possible attacks and promoting the rules which could possibly govern major cyber attacks at the moment when they occur so as to have at that very moment the international community ‘prepared’ to share the view that the attack is indeed ‘equivalent’ to a kinetic attack which justifies a kinetic response.","PeriodicalId":147844,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126264181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-26DOI: 10.4337/9781782547396.00030
D. Turns
This chapter considers the potential for the contemporary and future application of the international law of neutrality in the context of cyber warfare. The relevant provisions are mostly contained in treaties and other legal instruments that are now more than a century old, such as the Hague Conventions of 1907. Although customarily thought of as old-fashioned and arguably irrelevant to the age of cyber in its obsession with safeguarding the territorial sovereignty of neutral States, the law of neutrality is at least quite likely to be of direct application in future armed conflicts situated in cyberspace. This stems in part from the politico-economic realities of an increasingly interconnected international society in today’s world, which may cause States to continue to insist on their neutrality in the conflicts of the future. But it is also largely a function of the provisions of the law itself, particularly the jus in bello: the routing of hostile data through cyber infrastructure belonging to a neutral State and the legal status of “hacktivists” in neutral territory could be examples. The existing law, old as it is, can be applied by analogy to cyber hostilities.
{"title":"Cyber war and the law of neutrality","authors":"D. Turns","doi":"10.4337/9781782547396.00030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547396.00030","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers the potential for the contemporary and future application of the international law of neutrality in the context of cyber warfare. The relevant provisions are mostly contained in treaties and other legal instruments that are now more than a century old, such as the Hague Conventions of 1907. Although customarily thought of as old-fashioned and arguably irrelevant to the age of cyber in its obsession with safeguarding the territorial sovereignty of neutral States, the law of neutrality is at least quite likely to be of direct application in future armed conflicts situated in cyberspace. This stems in part from the politico-economic realities of an increasingly interconnected international society in today’s world, which may cause States to continue to insist on their neutrality in the conflicts of the future. But it is also largely a function of the provisions of the law itself, particularly the jus in bello: the routing of hostile data through cyber infrastructure belonging to a neutral State and the legal status of “hacktivists” in neutral territory could be examples. The existing law, old as it is, can be applied by analogy to cyber hostilities.","PeriodicalId":147844,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115389389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-26DOI: 10.4337/9781782547396.00027
Louise Arimatsu
This chapter considers how the classification of armed conflict applies to cyber warfare. Classifying the particular conflict – in other words determining whether it is one fought between States or between a State and organized armed group or between such groups – is necessary to determine what body of law applies to the hostilities. The chapter considers whether the prospect of cyber warfare presents particular problems for classification.
{"title":"Classifying cyber warfare","authors":"Louise Arimatsu","doi":"10.4337/9781782547396.00027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547396.00027","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers how the classification of armed conflict applies to cyber warfare. Classifying the particular conflict – in other words determining whether it is one fought between States or between a State and organized armed group or between such groups – is necessary to determine what body of law applies to the hostilities. The chapter considers whether the prospect of cyber warfare presents particular problems for classification.","PeriodicalId":147844,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130897063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-26DOI: 10.4337/9781782547396.00012
C. Antonopoulos
The commission of internationally wrongful acts in cyberspace may lead to the responsibility of States. However, there appears to be substantial difficulty in applying the existing legal framework introduced in the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (2001). This difficulty concerns the rules on attribution of an act in cyberspace to a particular State. Attribution in the law as it currently stands is focused on the link of natural persons to a specific State; but this is nearly impossible to establish in the case of cyber acts for they are ascribed to computers, the users of which remain largely unidentified. Therefore, as computers constituting the source of wrongful acts may be traced to the territory of particular States the best solution would be to establish a breach of the duty of due diligence on the part of the State from the which injurious cyber acts emanate. Evidence in this respect would seek to prove that the State from which the injurious act emanated had knowledge that the act occurred in its territory and a more flexible approach to its evaluation should be admitted.
{"title":"State responsibility in cyberspace","authors":"C. Antonopoulos","doi":"10.4337/9781782547396.00012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547396.00012","url":null,"abstract":"The commission of internationally wrongful acts in cyberspace may lead to the responsibility of States. However, there appears to be substantial difficulty in applying the existing legal framework introduced in the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (2001). This difficulty concerns the rules on attribution of an act in cyberspace to a particular State. Attribution in the law as it currently stands is focused on the link of natural persons to a specific State; but this is nearly impossible to establish in the case of cyber acts for they are ascribed to computers, the users of which remain largely unidentified. Therefore, as computers constituting the source of wrongful acts may be traced to the territory of particular States the best solution would be to establish a breach of the duty of due diligence on the part of the State from the which injurious cyber acts emanate. Evidence in this respect would seek to prove that the State from which the injurious act emanated had knowledge that the act occurred in its territory and a more flexible approach to its evaluation should be admitted.","PeriodicalId":147844,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121868525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-26DOI: 10.4337/9781782547396.00035
C. Henderson
With the rise in prominence of issues of cybersecurity many measures have been adopted at the national and regional level. Action at the United Nations, however, has been relatively sluggish. For the most part activities since the Russia Federation initially introduced a draft resolution in 1998 have been impeded due to fundamental differences between the Russian Federation and the United States. However, since 2010 when the US for the first time acted as a co-sponsor to this resolution there has been a discernable momentum within the UN on issues of cybersecurity. The cyber attacks in Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Iran in 2010, along with the revelations regarding states spying on one another, have only increased this momentum. As such, activity can be seen in various committees of the UN General Assembly including consensus being reached within several Groups of Governmental Experts on various issues. However, issues of cybersecurity have also been witnessed in the UN Security Council in the context of terrorist activity, the Economic and Social Council and various subsidiary organs and specialized agencies. With such a complex system of bodies addressing the issues, however, dialogue and communication between the various UN organs, bodies and groups now needs to be improved to enable further integrated concerted action and norm development. Furthermore, with discernable opposition to a comprehensive treaty on cybersecurity other forms of action, both regionally and bilaterally, also looks set to continue.
{"title":"The United Nations and the regulation of cyber-security","authors":"C. Henderson","doi":"10.4337/9781782547396.00035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547396.00035","url":null,"abstract":"With the rise in prominence of issues of cybersecurity many measures have been adopted at the national and regional level. Action at the United Nations, however, has been relatively sluggish. For the most part activities since the Russia Federation initially introduced a draft resolution in 1998 have been impeded due to fundamental differences between the Russian Federation and the United States. However, since 2010 when the US for the first time acted as a co-sponsor to this resolution there has been a discernable momentum within the UN on issues of cybersecurity. The cyber attacks in Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Iran in 2010, along with the revelations regarding states spying on one another, have only increased this momentum. As such, activity can be seen in various committees of the UN General Assembly including consensus being reached within several Groups of Governmental Experts on various issues. However, issues of cybersecurity have also been witnessed in the UN Security Council in the context of terrorist activity, the Economic and Social Council and various subsidiary organs and specialized agencies. With such a complex system of bodies addressing the issues, however, dialogue and communication between the various UN organs, bodies and groups now needs to be improved to enable further integrated concerted action and norm development. Furthermore, with discernable opposition to a comprehensive treaty on cybersecurity other forms of action, both regionally and bilaterally, also looks set to continue.","PeriodicalId":147844,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131245034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-03-31DOI: 10.4337/9781782547396.00022
Marco Roscini
The provisions on the use of force contained in the UN Charter apply to cyber operations conducted by states against other states even though the rules were adopted well before the advent of cyber technologies. This chapter argues that a cyber operation is a use of armed force when it entails the use of a ‘weapon’ accompanied by a coercive intention. This occurs not only in the case of cyber attacks designed to cause physical damage to property, loss of life or injury of persons, but also of cyber attacks employing capabilities that render ineffective or unusable critical infrastructures so to cause significant disruption of essential services, even when they do not materially damage those infrastructures. Indeed, the increasing digitalization of today’s societies has made it possible to cause considerable harm to states through non-destructive means: physical infrastructures can be incapacitated by affecting their operating systems, with consequent disruption of services but without the need to destroy them. An evolutive interpretation of Article 2(4) should take this into account. On the other hand, cyber exploitation carried out to collect information may be a violation of the sovereignty of the targeted state when it entails an unauthorized intrusion into the cyber infrastructure located on its territory, but not intervention and even less a use of force, as it lacks the coercive element and does not involve the use of a destructive payload capable of resulting in physical damage to property, loss of life, injury of persons, or malfunction of infrastructure.
{"title":"Cyber operations as a use of force","authors":"Marco Roscini","doi":"10.4337/9781782547396.00022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547396.00022","url":null,"abstract":"The provisions on the use of force contained in the UN Charter apply to cyber operations conducted by states against other states even though the rules were adopted well before the advent of cyber technologies. This chapter argues that a cyber operation is a use of armed force when it entails the use of a ‘weapon’ accompanied by a coercive intention. This occurs not only in the case of cyber attacks designed to cause physical damage to property, loss of life or injury of persons, but also of cyber attacks employing capabilities that render ineffective or unusable critical infrastructures so to cause significant disruption of essential services, even when they do not materially damage those infrastructures. Indeed, the increasing digitalization of today’s societies has made it possible to cause considerable harm to states through non-destructive means: physical infrastructures can be incapacitated by affecting their operating systems, with consequent disruption of services but without the need to destroy them. An evolutive interpretation of Article 2(4) should take this into account. On the other hand, cyber exploitation carried out to collect information may be a violation of the sovereignty of the targeted state when it entails an unauthorized intrusion into the cyber infrastructure located on its territory, but not intervention and even less a use of force, as it lacks the coercive element and does not involve the use of a destructive payload capable of resulting in physical damage to property, loss of life, injury of persons, or malfunction of infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":147844,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114653455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4337/9781789904253.00016
David P. Fidler
{"title":"Cyberspace and human rights","authors":"David P. Fidler","doi":"10.4337/9781789904253.00016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781789904253.00016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":147844,"journal":{"name":"Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122015617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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