Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198850670.003.0008
Robert Stalnaker
Two puzzles are described: a problem about necessary a posteriori truths and a problem about propositional attitudes with singular propositions as their contents. Two strategies for solving them are compared. The first is the diagonalization strategy, which distinguishes possible worlds that are compatible with what is actually expressed by a given sentential clause from possible worlds that are compatible with what would be expressed by the clause if that possible world were actual. The second strategy is the fragmentation strategy, which represents the intentional states described by sentential clauses as separate nonintegrated representational states. It is argued that these are complementary, not competing, strategies. Both play a role in the solutions to the problems. In conclusion, it is suggested that these strategies can also help to clarify a number of further problems—about self-locating attitudes, about the nature of computation, and about knowledge of phenomenal experience.
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Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198850670.003.0005
A. Egan
This chapter motivates a fragmentationist research program by identifying a cluster of problems that such a research program is better positioned to address or resolve than a unified model—all instances of the phenomenon of subjects having information that’s available to them for some behavior-guiding purposes but that isn’t available for every purpose. It also identifies some of the challenges and research questions that the fragmentationist program will need to address and where the space of possible answers is not yet well charted. One cluster of such problems is about how to construct fragmented models of belief, and another cluster is about normative questions that arise concerning the rational evaluation of fragmented beliefs and believers.
{"title":"Fragmented Models of Belief","authors":"A. Egan","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198850670.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198850670.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter motivates a fragmentationist research program by identifying a cluster of problems that such a research program is better positioned to address or resolve than a unified model—all instances of the phenomenon of subjects having information that’s available to them for some behavior-guiding purposes but that isn’t available for every purpose. It also identifies some of the challenges and research questions that the fragmentationist program will need to address and where the space of possible answers is not yet well charted. One cluster of such problems is about how to construct fragmented models of belief, and another cluster is about normative questions that arise concerning the rational evaluation of fragmented beliefs and believers.","PeriodicalId":149092,"journal":{"name":"The Fragmented Mind","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134021614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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