Pub Date : 2020-02-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501745171-008
K. Young, W. Schilling
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Pub Date : 2020-01-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0006
Ken Young, W. Schilling
This chapter examines the arguments that had divided U.S. atomic science against a changing landscape of decision. These include: arguments about the feasibility of the Super, a matter only decisively settled by the first test, and about its cost, in monetary terms and in terms of precious plutonium foregone. Two other key arguments are reviewed. The first is that even if the Super proved feasible and cost effective, it had little military utility. The second is that even were deployment in war to be considered desirable, so massive a weapon would be undeliverable. On each of these issues the ground shifted under the feet of the participants in the space of just five years.
{"title":"Dissent and Development","authors":"Ken Young, W. Schilling","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the arguments that had divided U.S. atomic science against a changing landscape of decision. These include: arguments about the feasibility of the Super, a matter only decisively settled by the first test, and about its cost, in monetary terms and in terms of precious plutonium foregone. Two other key arguments are reviewed. The first is that even if the Super proved feasible and cost effective, it had little military utility. The second is that even were deployment in war to be considered desirable, so massive a weapon would be undeliverable. On each of these issues the ground shifted under the feet of the participants in the space of just five years.","PeriodicalId":149467,"journal":{"name":"Super Bomb","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122296130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0007
Ken Young, W. Schilling
This chapter shows how the struggle for influence over thermonuclear weapons moved onto new territory, where many of those who had opposed the decision to develop the Super expressed their continuing dissent through the politics of national security policy. The same figures emerged as critics of the air force doctrine of strategic bombardment, and of Strategic Air Command, in which its application was vested. In pointing up the prospects for employing nuclear weapons more effectively in the land battle, the dissenters attracted some support from army officers, while their arguments were anathema to air force generals. As Oppenheimer and another member of his General Advisory Committee took control of a study of tactical weaponry, the air force began to move against what was seen as dangerous, possibly subversive, amateurism. The offense was compounded by the promotion of an approach to air defense that was seen as another direct challenge to Strategic Air Command (SAC) through a disavowal of the deterrent force of strategic bombardment. The first steps were thus taken on a path that would lead to Oppenheimer's “trial” before the Atomic Energy Commission's Personnel Security Board.
{"title":"Tactical Diversions","authors":"Ken Young, W. Schilling","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter shows how the struggle for influence over thermonuclear weapons moved onto new territory, where many of those who had opposed the decision to develop the Super expressed their continuing dissent through the politics of national security policy. The same figures emerged as critics of the air force doctrine of strategic bombardment, and of Strategic Air Command, in which its application was vested. In pointing up the prospects for employing nuclear weapons more effectively in the land battle, the dissenters attracted some support from army officers, while their arguments were anathema to air force generals. As Oppenheimer and another member of his General Advisory Committee took control of a study of tactical weaponry, the air force began to move against what was seen as dangerous, possibly subversive, amateurism. The offense was compounded by the promotion of an approach to air defense that was seen as another direct challenge to Strategic Air Command (SAC) through a disavowal of the deterrent force of strategic bombardment. The first steps were thus taken on a path that would lead to Oppenheimer's “trial” before the Atomic Energy Commission's Personnel Security Board.","PeriodicalId":149467,"journal":{"name":"Super Bomb","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129160180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0003
Ken Young, W. Schilling
This chapter looks into the business of campaigning for or against nuclear development. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its committees were at the epicenter of this debate. Here, the array of advice and potential pressure on the question of the Super as it existed in late 1949 offered no clear direction to the president. Powerful congressional opinion challenged the advice of the most powerfully placed scientists, but that had not yet been sufficient to swing Truman behind the Super's development. His views, however, began to take shape in mid-January after receiving a report on the military aspects. Furthermore, the scientific General Advisory Committee (GAC), chaired by the former Los Alamos laboratory director J. Robert Oppenheimer, enjoyed a privileged position that it used to block, as it seemed, further activity beyond the theoretical work already accomplished at Los Alamos.
本章探讨了支持或反对核发展的活动。原子能委员会(AEC)及其下属委员会是这场辩论的中心。在这里，关于1949年末存在的超级问题的一系列建议和潜在压力没有给总统提供明确的方向。强大的国会意见挑战了最有权势的科学家的建议，但这还不足以使杜鲁门支持超级引擎的发展。但是，他的意见在1月中旬收到一份关于军事方面的报告后开始形成。此外，由前洛斯阿拉莫斯实验室主任罗伯特·奥本海默(J. Robert Oppenheimer)担任主席的科学综合咨询委员会(GAC)享有特权地位，似乎曾经阻止在洛斯阿拉莫斯已经完成的理论工作之外的进一步活动。
{"title":"Advising on the Super","authors":"Ken Young, W. Schilling","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter looks into the business of campaigning for or against nuclear development. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its committees were at the epicenter of this debate. Here, the array of advice and potential pressure on the question of the Super as it existed in late 1949 offered no clear direction to the president. Powerful congressional opinion challenged the advice of the most powerfully placed scientists, but that had not yet been sufficient to swing Truman behind the Super's development. His views, however, began to take shape in mid-January after receiving a report on the military aspects. Furthermore, the scientific General Advisory Committee (GAC), chaired by the former Los Alamos laboratory director J. Robert Oppenheimer, enjoyed a privileged position that it used to block, as it seemed, further activity beyond the theoretical work already accomplished at Los Alamos.","PeriodicalId":149467,"journal":{"name":"Super Bomb","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131467798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0005
Ken Young, W. Schilling
This chapter examines the controversy's real or assumed moral and political aspects. Moral repugnance inflected the scientific judgments of Oppenheimer's General Advisory Committee, triggering discussion of the relative moral significance of thermonuclear bombing, the use of the atomic bomb, and the mass urban bombing campaigns of 1942–1945. More immediate concerns centered on the impact a decision to develop thermonuclear weapons might have on the pattern of international relations. Given a paucity of intelligence, the effects on the Soviet Union's own weapons program, and thereby on the United States' vulnerability, could only be guessed at. The chapter thus considers if the development of the Super would restore the status quo ante-1949 or lead to a thermonuclear arms race and ultimate stalemate—or even the end of the world.
{"title":"Moral and Political Consequences","authors":"Ken Young, W. Schilling","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the controversy's real or assumed moral and political aspects. Moral repugnance inflected the scientific judgments of Oppenheimer's General Advisory Committee, triggering discussion of the relative moral significance of thermonuclear bombing, the use of the atomic bomb, and the mass urban bombing campaigns of 1942–1945. More immediate concerns centered on the impact a decision to develop thermonuclear weapons might have on the pattern of international relations. Given a paucity of intelligence, the effects on the Soviet Union's own weapons program, and thereby on the United States' vulnerability, could only be guessed at. The chapter thus considers if the development of the Super would restore the status quo ante-1949 or lead to a thermonuclear arms race and ultimate stalemate—or even the end of the world.","PeriodicalId":149467,"journal":{"name":"Super Bomb","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133144044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0004
Ken Young, W. Schilling
This chapter recounts the arrival at the decision. Before the commissioners, split three to two against the Super, resumed their discussions in November 1949, Truman had been made aware of the differences of views. Meanwhile, Oppenheimer threatened to put the General Advisory Committee's opposing view directly to the president rather than going through the commission, in the event of the full Atomic Energy Commission deciding in favor of the Super. By the end of January 1950, the tide of opinion within the closed circle of participants was beginning to flow against the dissenters. They were skillfully outmaneuvered to provide the authoritative advice that Truman needed to close the debate and authorize not just the expansion of theoretical work, but the path ahead to development and testing.
{"title":"A Decision Reached","authors":"Ken Young, W. Schilling","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501745164.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter recounts the arrival at the decision. Before the commissioners, split three to two against the Super, resumed their discussions in November 1949, Truman had been made aware of the differences of views. Meanwhile, Oppenheimer threatened to put the General Advisory Committee's opposing view directly to the president rather than going through the commission, in the event of the full Atomic Energy Commission deciding in favor of the Super. By the end of January 1950, the tide of opinion within the closed circle of participants was beginning to flow against the dissenters. They were skillfully outmaneuvered to provide the authoritative advice that Truman needed to close the debate and authorize not just the expansion of theoretical work, but the path ahead to development and testing.","PeriodicalId":149467,"journal":{"name":"Super Bomb","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125290132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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