Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197605561.003.0008
Guy Elgat
The concluding chapter addresses an apparent aporia: on the one hand, we have the Nietzschean argument that one must be causa sui for guilt to be justified, but on the other hand, we have the Heideggerian argument that not being causa sui is a necessary condition for guilt to be possible. The conclusion explains why this is only an apparent aporia. An alternative conception of guilt is sketched, one that rejects Nietzsche’s view of guilt as a form of self-punishment but retains Heidegger’s view that guilt expresses our normative commitments. This conception shows how guilt might nevertheless be justified.
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Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197605561.003.0006
Guy Elgat
In this chapter, a detailed reconstruction of Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt is provided. The following notions are examined: internalization of cruelty, the ethics of custom, the debtor-creditor relationship, the creation of the “sovereign individual,” free will, and the notion of Christian guilt. One of the main claims made is that Nietzsche’s genealogy can be seen to go deeper than Rée’s in that it provides us with a genealogy of social and mental structures that Rée’s genealogy presupposes. On the other hand, as the chapter argues, at various crucial junctions, Nietzsche can be read as helping himself to a Rée-ian form of explanation. Before turning to Nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt in his On the Genealogy of Morals and other writings, the chapter examines his earlier critique of Schopenhauer in Human, All Too Human and his critique of the idea of causa sui in Beyond Good and Evil.
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Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197605561.003.0005
Guy Elgat
In this chapter, Paul Rée’s views on guilt, responsibility, free will, and punishment are considered. Three subsidiary aims of the discussion are to show that, first, Rée’s works are worth paying attention to in their own right and not merely as a foil for Nietzsche’s ideas; second, that Nietzsche’s criticisms of Rée’s views fall short of the mark; and third, that in contrast to the views of some interpreters, Rée’s thought does undergo development in the course of his career. The discussion presents a radically different approach to guilt from the one encountered in the chapters on Kant, Schelling, and Schopenhauer. This approach spurns all metaphysical speculation and attempts to consider guilt as a natural phenomenon, that is, a phenomenon that does not require for its explanation an appeal to some noumenal or intelligible realm where agents perform timeless deeds but is to be explained as a thoroughly this-worldly psychological phenomenon.
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Pub Date : 2021-12-23DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197605561.003.0002
Guy Elgat
This chapter’s argument is that for Immanuel Kant, empirical guilt requires determination of responsibility, where responsibility involves free agency. It argues that empirical guilt could only be justified for Kant in the final analysis if the agent is responsible and consequently guilty for his or her own “original sin” or radical evil (ontological guilt), where this responsibility and guilt imply an intelligible free deed, a position Kant defends in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. It is here that Kant can be seen to put forward a transcendental argument from (ontological) guilt to intelligible freedom. The chapter concludes by arguing that Kant, however, does not ultimately succeed in showing why guilt (empirical and ontological) is justified and that even though he can be seen to approach the idea of the subject as causa sui that later thinkers endorse, he does not embrace it fully.
{"title":"Kant","authors":"Guy Elgat","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197605561.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197605561.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter’s argument is that for Immanuel Kant, empirical guilt requires determination of responsibility, where responsibility involves free agency. It argues that empirical guilt could only be justified for Kant in the final analysis if the agent is responsible and consequently guilty for his or her own “original sin” or radical evil (ontological guilt), where this responsibility and guilt imply an intelligible free deed, a position Kant defends in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. It is here that Kant can be seen to put forward a transcendental argument from (ontological) guilt to intelligible freedom. The chapter concludes by arguing that Kant, however, does not ultimately succeed in showing why guilt (empirical and ontological) is justified and that even though he can be seen to approach the idea of the subject as causa sui that later thinkers endorse, he does not embrace it fully.","PeriodicalId":149563,"journal":{"name":"Being Guilty","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127373620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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