Pub Date : 2019-09-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0005
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
Chapter 5 examines the proliferation dispute between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The Nixon administration’s efforts to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War, draw down US troops in East and Southeast Asia, and seek a rapprochement with China precipitated this dispute. ROK president Park Chung-hee authorized a secret nuclear weapons program in 1972. The Ford administration used a mix of threats to suspend bilateral nuclear cooperation and promises to stabilize US troop levels to get Park to cancel the purchase of a French reprocessing plant in 1975 and 1976. The dispute erupted anew in 1977, when Carter proposed withdrawing all US troops and tactical nuclear weapons. The crisis was finally resolved in 1981, when the Reagan administration pledged to maintain troop levels in exchange for ROK president Chun Doo-hwan’s redirecting nuclear energy research to civilian purposes.
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Pub Date : 2019-09-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0006
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
Chapter 6 examines the nonproliferation dispute between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan between 1967 and 1987. Like the South Korean case, the Nixon administration’s efforts to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War, draw down US troop levels in East and Southeast Asia, and seek a rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China precipitated this dispute. The overriding goal of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations was to enlist China as an ally of convenience against the Soviet Union, but without completely abandoning Taiwan. The Ford and the Carter administrations used a mix of threats to suspend bilateral nuclear cooperation and promises of limited arms transfers to convince ROC premier (and later president) Chiang Ching-kuo to abandon nuclear weapons research in the late 1970s. Reports that Taiwan achieved a “controlled” nuclear reaction in 1987 led the Reagan administration to demand ROC president Lee Teng-hui renounce all nuclear weapons research.
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Pub Date : 2019-09-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0003
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
Chapter 3 posits that the overriding objective of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations was to avoid containment failure in the Middle East. Thwarting the Israeli nuclear weapons program was a secondary objective. As Soviet arms sales to Egypt and Syria accelerated in the mid-1960s, the regional power distribution became unfavorable and the time horizons of threats to US interests grew shorter. The Johnson administration abandoned Kennedy’s demands for inspections of the Dimona reactor and instead sold M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawks, and later F-12 Phantoms to bolster Israel’s defenses. Congress, however, made it difficult for the Johnson and the Nixon administrations to link arms transfers to Israeli concessions on the nuclear issue. Chapter 3 examines the evolution of the US-Israeli strategic relationship against the backdrop of the Cold War from Kennedy’s demands for inspections in 1961 through the October 1973 Middle East War.
{"title":"The United States and Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1961–1973","authors":"Jeffrey W. Taliaferro","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 3 posits that the overriding objective of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations was to avoid containment failure in the Middle East. Thwarting the Israeli nuclear weapons program was a secondary objective. As Soviet arms sales to Egypt and Syria accelerated in the mid-1960s, the regional power distribution became unfavorable and the time horizons of threats to US interests grew shorter. The Johnson administration abandoned Kennedy’s demands for inspections of the Dimona reactor and instead sold M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawks, and later F-12 Phantoms to bolster Israel’s defenses. Congress, however, made it difficult for the Johnson and the Nixon administrations to link arms transfers to Israeli concessions on the nuclear issue. Chapter 3 examines the evolution of the US-Israeli strategic relationship against the backdrop of the Cold War from Kennedy’s demands for inspections in 1961 through the October 1973 Middle East War.","PeriodicalId":150717,"journal":{"name":"Defending Frenemies","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126734117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0002
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
Chapter 2 develops neoclassical realist theory. It explicates how the two systemic variables—the current distribution of power in a region and the time horizons for threats to the hegemon’s interests in that region—can create incentives for US presidential administrations to favor coercive or accommodative strategies toward a vulnerable ally seeking nuclear weapons. When confronted with such high domestic mobilization hurdles to their preferred strategies, however, administrations will pursue hybrid strategies—ones that combine accommodative and coercive elements—toward an ally. This chapter unpacks the measurement of the variables and the types of empirical evidence that might confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses. It also outlines three alternative explanations (nuclear domino theory, security commitment theory, and credible sanctions theory) and the types of evidence that might confirm or disconfirm their hypotheses.
{"title":"Neoclassical Realist Theory, Alliance Politics, and Nonproliferation","authors":"Jeffrey W. Taliaferro","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 2 develops neoclassical realist theory. It explicates how the two systemic variables—the current distribution of power in a region and the time horizons for threats to the hegemon’s interests in that region—can create incentives for US presidential administrations to favor coercive or accommodative strategies toward a vulnerable ally seeking nuclear weapons. When confronted with such high domestic mobilization hurdles to their preferred strategies, however, administrations will pursue hybrid strategies—ones that combine accommodative and coercive elements—toward an ally. This chapter unpacks the measurement of the variables and the types of empirical evidence that might confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses. It also outlines three alternative explanations (nuclear domino theory, security commitment theory, and credible sanctions theory) and the types of evidence that might confirm or disconfirm their hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":150717,"journal":{"name":"Defending Frenemies","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129797878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-13DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0004
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
Chapter 4 examines the proliferation dispute between the United States and Pakistan. As with the Middle East, averting containment failure in South Asia was the overriding aim of the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. Slowing or halting the clandestine Pakistani nuclear weapons program was always a subordinate goal. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the turning point. Chapter 4 examines the oscillations in US nonproliferation policies toward Pakistan, from the Ford administration’s offer of advanced fighters for nuclear restraint in 1975–1976, to the Carter administration’s imposition of sanctions in early1979, to the Reagan administration’s provision of a $1.4 billion foreign military assistance package and efforts to circumvent nonproliferation legislation in exchange for Pakistani dictator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s pledge not to cross four nuclear “red lines” from 1981 to 1988, to the George H. W. Bush administration’s resumption of sanctions after the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1990.
{"title":"The United States and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1975–1990","authors":"Jeffrey W. Taliaferro","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190939304.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 4 examines the proliferation dispute between the United States and Pakistan. As with the Middle East, averting containment failure in South Asia was the overriding aim of the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. Slowing or halting the clandestine Pakistani nuclear weapons program was always a subordinate goal. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the turning point. Chapter 4 examines the oscillations in US nonproliferation policies toward Pakistan, from the Ford administration’s offer of advanced fighters for nuclear restraint in 1975–1976, to the Carter administration’s imposition of sanctions in early1979, to the Reagan administration’s provision of a $1.4 billion foreign military assistance package and efforts to circumvent nonproliferation legislation in exchange for Pakistani dictator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s pledge not to cross four nuclear “red lines” from 1981 to 1988, to the George H. W. Bush administration’s resumption of sanctions after the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1990.","PeriodicalId":150717,"journal":{"name":"Defending Frenemies","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132686791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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