Coercion resistance is an important and one of themost intricate security requirements of electronicvoting protocols. Several definitions of coercionresistance have been proposed in the literature,including definitions based on symbolic models.However, existing definitions in such models arerather restricted in their scope and quite complex.In this paper, we therefore propose a new definitionof coercion resistance in a symbolic setting, basedon an epistemic approach. Our definition isrelatively simple and intuitive. It allows for afine-grained formulation of coercion resistance andcan be stated independently of a specific, symbolicprotocol and adversary model. As a proof of concept,we apply our definition to three votingprotocols. In particular, we carry out the firstrigorous analysis of the recently proposed Civitassystem. We precisely identify those conditions underwhich this system guarantees coercion resistance orfails to be coercion resistant. We also analyzeprotocols proposed by Lee et al. and Okamoto.
抗强制性是电子投票协议的一个重要且最复杂的安全要求之一。文献中提出了几种矫顽力电阻的定义，包括基于符号模型的定义。然而，这些模型中的现有定义在范围上相当有限，而且相当复杂。因此，在本文中，我们基于认识论的方法，在符号设置中提出了强制抵抗的新定义。我们的定义相对简单和直观。它允许对强制抵抗进行细粒度的表述，并且可以独立于特定的符号协议和对手模型进行陈述。作为概念证明，我们将定义应用于三个投票协议。特别是，我们对最近提出的公民制度进行了首次严格的分析。我们精确地确定了在哪些条件下，这个系统保证了强制抵抗或不能强制抵抗。我们还分析了Lee et al.和Okamoto提出的协议。
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