The U.S. Marine Corps spent the years between the world wars developing a doctrine of opposed landings from the sea in an arena where the ocean provided the only maneuver space, but the opposed amphibious operation is not the province of ocean-borne amphibious assaults alone. The land-water interface impacts warfare well inland from the coast, and much can be learned from the application of riverine and lacustrine amphibious assaults found in history. One such example is the siege of Enniskillen Castle in Ireland in 1594. English operations at Enniskillen demonstrated the value of coordinated waterborne and land-based forces at the tactical level. Considering English lacustrine operations in the Irish Nine Years’ War (1593–1603) and U.S. riverine warfare experiences in the American Civil War and Vietnam War can inform Marine planners as they develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Marine Littoral Regiments.
{"title":"The Siege of Enniskillen Castle, 1594: An Object Lesson in Combat Across the Land-Water Interface","authors":"J. McGrath","doi":"10.35318/mch.2023090101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2023090101","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. Marine Corps spent the years between the world wars developing a doctrine of opposed landings from the sea in an arena where the ocean provided the only maneuver space, but the opposed amphibious operation is not the province of ocean-borne amphibious assaults alone. The land-water interface impacts warfare well inland from the coast, and much can be learned from the application of riverine and lacustrine amphibious assaults found in history. One such example is the siege of Enniskillen Castle in Ireland in 1594. English operations at Enniskillen demonstrated the value of coordinated waterborne and land-based forces at the tactical level. Considering English lacustrine operations in the Irish Nine Years’ War (1593–1603) and U.S. riverine warfare experiences in the American Civil War and Vietnam War can inform Marine planners as they develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Marine Littoral Regiments.","PeriodicalId":161827,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps History","volume":"147 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132373467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using the 4th Tank Battalion as a case study, this article argues that U.S. Marine tankers in World War II possessed a uniquely American mechanical aptitude that allowed them to make necessary modifications to their tanks that were crucial to combat effectiveness in the Pacific. Having grown up during the Great Depression and possessing a “use it up, wear it out, make it do, or do without,” mentality, these tankers recognized what could be done to improve their tanks, and applying American ingenuity, fabricated armor and tank-to-infantry communications systems, among other innovations to enhance their abilities as warfighters. While this trait was not necessarily unique to the 4th Tank Battalion, their leaders, Captain Robert M. Neiman and Lieutenant Henry L. Bellmon in particular, encouraged such activity, and the battalion was certainly among the most mechanically creative among the Marine tank battalions in the Pacific.
{"title":"The 4th Tank Battalion in the Pacific: A Case Study in Field-Inspired Ingenuity","authors":"Robert P. Wetteman Jr.","doi":"10.35318/mch.2023090102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2023090102","url":null,"abstract":"Using the 4th Tank Battalion as a case study, this article argues that U.S. Marine tankers in World War II possessed a uniquely American mechanical aptitude that allowed them to make necessary modifications to their tanks that were crucial to combat effectiveness in the Pacific. Having grown up during the Great Depression and possessing a “use it up, wear it out, make it do, or do without,” mentality, these tankers recognized what could be done to improve their tanks, and applying American ingenuity, fabricated armor and tank-to-infantry communications systems, among other innovations to enhance their abilities as warfighters. While this trait was not necessarily unique to the 4th Tank Battalion, their leaders, Captain Robert M. Neiman and Lieutenant Henry L. Bellmon in particular, encouraged such activity, and the battalion was certainly among the most mechanically creative among the Marine tank battalions in the Pacific.","PeriodicalId":161827,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps History","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129687759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the past 60 years, our understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis has evolved from the initial portrayal of the situation as an American victory achieved by brilliant crisis management by John F. Kennedy and his advisors to a more deeply researched and nuanced description of a dangerous draw reached only after misconceptions, miscalculation, last-minute compromise, and good luck.
在过去的60年里，我们对古巴导弹危机的理解已经从最初的描述演变为约翰·f·肯尼迪(John F. Kennedy)和他的顾问们通过出色的危机管理取得了美国的胜利，到更深入的研究和细致的描述，即一场只有在误解、误判、最后一刻妥协和好运之后才能达成的危险平局。
{"title":"The Cuban Missile Crisis at 60: Where Do We Stand?","authors":"","doi":"10.35318/mch.2023090103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2023090103","url":null,"abstract":"During the past 60 years, our understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis has evolved from the initial portrayal of the situation as an American victory achieved by brilliant crisis management by John F. Kennedy and his advisors to a more deeply researched and nuanced description of a dangerous draw reached only after misconceptions, miscalculation, last-minute compromise, and good luck.","PeriodicalId":161827,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps History","volume":"110 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120850716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAP) during the Vietnam War offer a unique lens through which to explore what makes a body of disparate individuals unify into an effective fighting force. How did small units with virtually no supervision coalesce into cohesive and lethal military organizations, and how did they maintain focus on helping villagers while repeatedly battling irregular enemy forces, most of whom were indistinguishable from the local populace? This article posits that living among the South Vietnamese and fighting at the village level fostered a personal attachment to the war that did not exist among American servicemembers elsewhere. CAP Marines maintained higher levels of task cohesion than their non-CAP counterparts, ensuring that they often remained effective fighting forces until the program's termination in 1971.
{"title":"\"To Take Some of That Fear Away\": Task Cohesion and Combat Effectiveness Among Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam, 1965–71","authors":"Cavender S. Sutton","doi":"10.35318/mch.2022080205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2022080205","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAP) during the Vietnam War offer a unique lens through which to explore what makes a body of disparate individuals unify into an effective fighting force. How did small units with virtually no supervision coalesce into cohesive and lethal military organizations, and how did they maintain focus on helping villagers while repeatedly battling irregular enemy forces, most of whom were indistinguishable from the local populace? This article posits that living among the South Vietnamese and fighting at the village level fostered a personal attachment to the war that did not exist among American servicemembers elsewhere. CAP Marines maintained higher levels of task cohesion than their non-CAP counterparts, ensuring that they often remained effective fighting forces until the program's termination in 1971.","PeriodicalId":161827,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps History","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122462386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:The battle for the Tarawa atoll—and, specifically, the V Amphibious Corps assault on the island of Betio during World War II—resulted in an enormous and highly publicized loss of American lives. Grieving families were assured that every possible care was given to their fallen Marines and sailors, and photographs of beautiful cemeteries appeared in magazines and print. This belied the reality of the situation: most of the "graves" were only memorials, and a postwar effort to recover the dead was markedly unsuccessful. Representatives from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps pointed fingers until Navy inspector general Charles A. Lockwood issued a report blaming "a series of errors … and a series of unavoidable circumstances" for the fiasco. This article examines the factors contributing to the nonrecoverability of hundreds of the fallen and describes the challenges facing researchers and archaeologists who continue the search for the lost graves of Betio.
摘要:塔拉瓦环礁之战，特别是第二次世界大战期间第V两栖部队对比蒂奥岛的攻击，导致了美国人巨大的生命损失。悲痛的家属得到保证，他们的阵亡海军陆战队员和水兵得到了一切可能的照顾，美丽的墓地照片出现在杂志和印刷品上。这掩盖了现实情况:大多数“坟墓”只是纪念碑，战后恢复死者的努力明显不成功。美国陆军、海军和海军陆战队的代表互相指责，直到海军监察长查尔斯·a·洛克伍德(Charles a . Lockwood)发表了一份报告，将这次惨败归咎于“一系列错误……以及一系列不可避免的情况”。本文考察了导致数百个堕落的坟墓无法恢复的因素，并描述了继续寻找比蒂奥丢失的坟墓的研究人员和考古学家所面临的挑战。
{"title":"Field Burials, Memorial Graves, and the Postwar Search for Tarawa's Fallen","authors":"G. W. Roecker","doi":"10.35318/mch.2022080203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2022080203","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The battle for the Tarawa atoll—and, specifically, the V Amphibious Corps assault on the island of Betio during World War II—resulted in an enormous and highly publicized loss of American lives. Grieving families were assured that every possible care was given to their fallen Marines and sailors, and photographs of beautiful cemeteries appeared in magazines and print. This belied the reality of the situation: most of the \"graves\" were only memorials, and a postwar effort to recover the dead was markedly unsuccessful. Representatives from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps pointed fingers until Navy inspector general Charles A. Lockwood issued a report blaming \"a series of errors … and a series of unavoidable circumstances\" for the fiasco. This article examines the factors contributing to the nonrecoverability of hundreds of the fallen and describes the challenges facing researchers and archaeologists who continue the search for the lost graves of Betio.","PeriodicalId":161827,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps History","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129784930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:During the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. Marine Corps deployed a Hawk air defense missile battery from the 3d Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to protect the U.S. naval base from a surprise low-level air attack by Soviet and Cuban aircraft. The battalion was alerted and airlifted from Twentynine Palms, California, to Cherry Point, North Carolina, with its Battery C deployed forward into Cuba. The deployment validated the readiness of the Corps' LAAM battalions to employ the Hawk system in support of expeditionary forces. However, the story of the LAAM battalions and deployment of 3d LAAM to Guantánamo Bay is not well known or documented because few official records of the LAAM battalions from the early 1960s exist. This article uses Marine Corps Base Twentynine Palms's newspaper to provide context along with veterans' first-hand experiences to fill in the details of the LAAM battalions before and during the Cuban missile crisis.
{"title":"Marine Hawk Missiles in Guantánamo Bay during the Cuban Missile Crisis","authors":"Major Marc Romanych","doi":"10.35318/mch.2022080204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2022080204","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:During the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. Marine Corps deployed a Hawk air defense missile battery from the 3d Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to protect the U.S. naval base from a surprise low-level air attack by Soviet and Cuban aircraft. The battalion was alerted and airlifted from Twentynine Palms, California, to Cherry Point, North Carolina, with its Battery C deployed forward into Cuba. The deployment validated the readiness of the Corps' LAAM battalions to employ the Hawk system in support of expeditionary forces. However, the story of the LAAM battalions and deployment of 3d LAAM to Guantánamo Bay is not well known or documented because few official records of the LAAM battalions from the early 1960s exist. This article uses Marine Corps Base Twentynine Palms's newspaper to provide context along with veterans' first-hand experiences to fill in the details of the LAAM battalions before and during the Cuban missile crisis.","PeriodicalId":161827,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps History","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121021657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:With the onset of America's involvement in World War II in December 1941, there was a marked upswing in the popularity of all patriotic music, including the "Marines' Hymn." This article provides insight into the story of the "Marines' Hymn" during World War II, including the increase in demand for published sheet music editions and the numerous suggestions of new lyrics to reflect the wartime experiences of Marines around the globe. It also highlights the role played by Marine Corps leadership in encouraging the hymn's popularity, both at home and in the directives given to their combat correspondents reporting from the front.
{"title":"\"The Song They Lived By\": The \"Marines' Hymn\" during World War II","authors":"L. Bowers","doi":"10.35318/mch.2022080202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2022080202","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:With the onset of America's involvement in World War II in December 1941, there was a marked upswing in the popularity of all patriotic music, including the \"Marines' Hymn.\" This article provides insight into the story of the \"Marines' Hymn\" during World War II, including the increase in demand for published sheet music editions and the numerous suggestions of new lyrics to reflect the wartime experiences of Marines around the globe. It also highlights the role played by Marine Corps leadership in encouraging the hymn's popularity, both at home and in the directives given to their combat correspondents reporting from the front.","PeriodicalId":161827,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps History","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125813053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Marines deployed to Verdun in the Toulon sector during World War I got a unique introduction to the reality of modern warfare there. During this training and acclimatization period, they experienced the hardships of trench warfare and their first combat and casualties of the war. Yet, most World War I histories omit the preparatory experiences of the 4th Brigade of U.S. Marines at Toulon and the valuable lessons this training period conferred, an oversight which this article seeks to begin to correct.
{"title":"The Forgotten Front: The 4th Brigade of Marines in the Toulon Sector: March–May 1918","authors":"J. Gregory","doi":"10.35318/mch.2022080201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2022080201","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Marines deployed to Verdun in the Toulon sector during World War I got a unique introduction to the reality of modern warfare there. During this training and acclimatization period, they experienced the hardships of trench warfare and their first combat and casualties of the war. Yet, most World War I histories omit the preparatory experiences of the 4th Brigade of U.S. Marines at Toulon and the valuable lessons this training period conferred, an oversight which this article seeks to begin to correct.","PeriodicalId":161827,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps History","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128841512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:At the culmination of the Second World War, the Marines of the III Amphibious Corps (III AC) were preparing to assault the Japanese homeland. With the abrupt conclusion of hostilities in September 1945, they were ordered instead to war-ravaged North China. The mission in North China was amorphous—protecting infrastructure and key terrain during the reemergent Chinese Civil War. As Marines labored to resist the expansion of their mission, the lifting of wartime censorship protocols enabled them to voice concern to their families and Congress. Mothers and citizen groups also challenged the young Harry S. Truman administration on the merits and morality of the North China intervention. Set at the dawn of the Cold War, this article investigates the role of unlikely political actors—Marines and mothers—in shaping American policy in North China from 1945 to 1946. Combating narratives of inevitable quagmire, the Marines in North China are examined as important agents in the restraint of American power at contingent moments. This piece argues that the Truman administration failed to make an affirmative case for intervention and was, in part, constrained by popular opinion.
摘要:在第二次世界大战的高潮，第三两栖兵团(III AC)的海军陆战队正准备攻击日本本土。随着1945年9月战争的突然结束，他们被命令前往饱受战争蹂躏的华北。中国北方的任务是在重新爆发的中国内战期间保护基础设施和关键地形。当海军陆战队努力抵制扩大任务时，战时审查协议的解除使他们能够向家人和国会表达关切。母亲和公民团体也质疑年轻的哈里·s·杜鲁门(Harry S. Truman)政府对中国北方干预的是非曲性和道德性。本文以冷战初期为背景，调查了1945年至1946年间，海军陆战队员和母亲这两个不太可能的政治角色在塑造美国在华北的政策中所扮演的角色。与不可避免的泥潭叙事相反，中国北方的海军陆战队被视为在偶然时刻制约美国力量的重要代理人。这篇文章认为，杜鲁门政府未能提出积极的干预理由，而且在一定程度上受到了民意的制约。
{"title":"Marines and Mothers: Agency, Activism, and Resistance to the American North China Intervention, 1945–46","authors":"James R. Compton","doi":"10.35318/mch.2022080102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2022080102","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:At the culmination of the Second World War, the Marines of the III Amphibious Corps (III AC) were preparing to assault the Japanese homeland. With the abrupt conclusion of hostilities in September 1945, they were ordered instead to war-ravaged North China. The mission in North China was amorphous—protecting infrastructure and key terrain during the reemergent Chinese Civil War. As Marines labored to resist the expansion of their mission, the lifting of wartime censorship protocols enabled them to voice concern to their families and Congress. Mothers and citizen groups also challenged the young Harry S. Truman administration on the merits and morality of the North China intervention. Set at the dawn of the Cold War, this article investigates the role of unlikely political actors—Marines and mothers—in shaping American policy in North China from 1945 to 1946. Combating narratives of inevitable quagmire, the Marines in North China are examined as important agents in the restraint of American power at contingent moments. This piece argues that the Truman administration failed to make an affirmative case for intervention and was, in part, constrained by popular opinion.","PeriodicalId":161827,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps History","volume":"21 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133621438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract:Quite often, representations of the Marine Corps during World War II included gendered elements that reflected the institution’s beliefs about men and women, their place in society, and acceptable gender roles. The U.S. military has long struggled with negotiating gender, and the hypermasculine nature of the military— and the emphasis the Marine Corps, in particular, placed on maintaining ideal masculinity—influenced the relationship between masculinity and femininity for servicemembers, and the images produced by and about the Marine Corps impacted the appearance of gender norms in the military context. Women Marines’ presence both challenged and reinforced the Corps’ hypermasculine reputation and image as warriors by means of the representation of women’s bodies and labor.
{"title":"“Beauty Isn’t Prerequisite for Girl Marines”: Images of Female Marines During World War II","authors":"Sarah E. Patterson","doi":"10.35318/mch.2022080101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2022080101","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Quite often, representations of the Marine Corps during World War II included gendered elements that reflected the institution’s beliefs about men and women, their place in society, and acceptable gender roles. The U.S. military has long struggled with negotiating gender, and the hypermasculine nature of the military— and the emphasis the Marine Corps, in particular, placed on maintaining ideal masculinity—influenced the relationship between masculinity and femininity for servicemembers, and the images produced by and about the Marine Corps impacted the appearance of gender norms in the military context. Women Marines’ presence both challenged and reinforced the Corps’ hypermasculine reputation and image as warriors by means of the representation of women’s bodies and labor.","PeriodicalId":161827,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps History","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123462604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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