Digital assets are hot right now. Whether cryptocurrencies, like bitcoin, or initial coin offerings and tokens, this new asset class has captured the imagination of American investors. While it remains to be seen if this phenomenon has staying power, there is no doubt that these assets and their promoters have attracted the attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission. But neither Congress nor the SEC has formally elucidated which digital assets are securities and which are not. This Article seeks to provide clarity in determining which digital assets are securities. It proposes two tests that operationalize the Supreme Court’s test in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. The first test is the Bahamas Test, which asks whether a digital asset is sufficiently decentralized such that it is not a security. The second test is the Substantial Steps Test which is used to determine whether an investment is made with an expectation of profit. This Article takes a rules-based approach to provide clarity and begin a conversation about crafting more predictable jurisprudence and regulation in this area.
数字资产现在很火。无论是比特币等加密货币，还是首次代币发行(ico)和代币，这种新的资产类别都吸引了美国投资者的想象力。尽管这种现象是否会持续下去还有待观察，但毫无疑问，这些资产及其推动者已经引起了美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)的注意。但国会和美国证券交易委员会都没有正式阐明哪些数字资产是证券，哪些不是。本文旨在明确确定哪些数字资产是证券。它提出了两个测试，以实施最高法院在SEC诉W. J. Howey Co.一案中的测试。第一个测试是巴哈马测试，该测试询问数字资产是否足够分散，以至于它不是一种证券。第二个测试是实质性步骤测试，用于确定投资是否有盈利预期。本文采用基于规则的方法来提供清晰度，并开始讨论如何在这一领域制定更可预测的法律和法规。
{"title":"A Regulatory Classification of Digital Assets: Toward an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and Other Digital Assets","authors":"M. Henderson, Max Raskin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3265295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3265295","url":null,"abstract":"Digital assets are hot right now. Whether cryptocurrencies, like bitcoin, or initial coin offerings and tokens, this new asset class has captured the imagination of American investors. While it remains to be seen if this phenomenon has staying power, there is no doubt that these assets and their promoters have attracted the attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission. But neither Congress nor the SEC has formally elucidated which digital assets are securities and which are not. \u0000 \u0000This Article seeks to provide clarity in determining which digital assets are securities. It proposes two tests that operationalize the Supreme Court’s test in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. The first test is the Bahamas Test, which asks whether a digital asset is sufficiently decentralized such that it is not a security. The second test is the Substantial Steps Test which is used to determine whether an investment is made with an expectation of profit. This Article takes a rules-based approach to provide clarity and begin a conversation about crafting more predictable jurisprudence and regulation in this area.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114738844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The new creations and innovations which are formulated in the minds of the human minds are recognized as a mode of an intangible property which, people can enjoy a specific set of rights over them. These are called 'intellectual property' as it is attached with the intellect of the people. There are many form of intellectual property which has been granted to the people who are interested in creating and innovating new things. 'Patent is an intellectual property right which protects the innovators' and inventors' rights over new creations or inventions. 'Patenting medical products' have become one of the debated area in the field of Intellectual Property Rights Law, as some people advocate the same while some object. The appropriateness of granting patent rights over medical products will be discussed in this essay.
{"title":"Patenting Medical Products","authors":"P. Wijesinghe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3143435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3143435","url":null,"abstract":"The new creations and innovations which are formulated in the minds of the human minds are recognized as a mode of an intangible property which, people can enjoy a specific set of rights over them. These are called 'intellectual property' as it is attached with the intellect of the people. There are many form of intellectual property which has been granted to the people who are interested in creating and innovating new things. 'Patent is an intellectual property right which protects the innovators' and inventors' rights over new creations or inventions. 'Patenting medical products' have become one of the debated area in the field of Intellectual Property Rights Law, as some people advocate the same while some object. The appropriateness of granting patent rights over medical products will be discussed in this essay.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116194885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Japanese communities with nuclear reactors have the reactors because they applied for them, and they applied for them for the money. Among Japanese municipalities, they were some of the most dysfunctional before the reactors had even arrived. Communities depend on young families for the social capital that holds them intact, and these were the communities from which those families had already begun to leave. After the reactors arrived, young families continued to disappear. Unemployment rose. Divorce rates climbed. And in time, the communities had little -- other than reactor-revenue -- to which they could turn.
{"title":"Are Reactors Like Casinos? A Culture of Dependency in Japan","authors":"J. Ramseyer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2927168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2927168","url":null,"abstract":"Japanese communities with nuclear reactors have the reactors because they applied for them, and they applied for them for the money. Among Japanese municipalities, they were some of the most dysfunctional before the reactors had even arrived. Communities depend on young families for the social capital that holds them intact, and these were the communities from which those families had already begun to leave. After the reactors arrived, young families continued to disappear. Unemployment rose. Divorce rates climbed. And in time, the communities had little -- other than reactor-revenue -- to which they could turn.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130915140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Interpreting the language of contracts is the most common and least satisfactory task courts perform in contract disputes. This article proposes to take much of this task out of the hands of lawyers and judges, entrusting it instead to the public. The article develops and tests a novel regime — the “survey interpretation method” — in which interpretation disputes are resolved though large surveys of representative respondents, by choosing the meaning that a majority supports. The article demonstrates the rich potential under this method to examine variations of the contractual language that could have made an intended meaning clearer. A similar survey regime has been applied successfully in trademark and unfair competition law to interpret precontractual messages, and the article shows how it could be extended to interpret contractual texts. To demonstrate the technique, the article applies the survey interpretation method to five real cases in which courts struggled to interpret contracts. It then provides normative, pragmatic, and doctrinal supports for the proposed regime.
{"title":"Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and Experiments","authors":"O. Ben‐Shahar, L. Strahilevitz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2905873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2905873","url":null,"abstract":"Interpreting the language of contracts is the most common and least satisfactory task courts perform in contract disputes. This article proposes to take much of this task out of the hands of lawyers and judges, entrusting it instead to the public. The article develops and tests a novel regime — the “survey interpretation method” — in which interpretation disputes are resolved though large surveys of representative respondents, by choosing the meaning that a majority supports. The article demonstrates the rich potential under this method to examine variations of the contractual language that could have made an intended meaning clearer. A similar survey regime has been applied successfully in trademark and unfair competition law to interpret precontractual messages, and the article shows how it could be extended to interpret contractual texts. To demonstrate the technique, the article applies the survey interpretation method to five real cases in which courts struggled to interpret contracts. It then provides normative, pragmatic, and doctrinal supports for the proposed regime.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126647567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the 1970s, while a leftist military dictatorship ruled Peru, more than 22 million acres of cultivated or grazing farmland -- one-third of Peru’s total agricultural acreage -- were expropriated from thousands of large owners as part of a property reform intended to benefit up to 400,000 landless peasant families. The compensation provided to landowners was miserly, however: on average, it was less than one-tenth the then-prevailing market price of water-accessible, cultivated land. Moreover, about 85 percent of total recognized land values were settled not in cash but with long-term Agrarian Debt Bonds, which committed future governments to honor fixed coupons on obligations maturing in 20 to 30 years. These bonds became worthless during the 1980s, however, because hyperinflation raged and the Peruvian currency lost most of its value. In the wake of the filing of hundreds of lawsuits seeking judicial redress, in 2001 the country’s Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the government should resume payment of the land-reform debt after updating its nominal value on an actuarial basis. And yet, successive administrations did not act on this ruling, despite the fact that since the mid-1990s Peru has exhibited vigorous economic growth, significantly strengthened public finances, and substantially improved creditworthiness, such that governments have had more than the necessary ample fiscal resources to redeem the land-reform bonds at their full, original value. This paper examines the evidence and concludes that we are in the presence of a case of blatant unwillingness to pay, one which undermines Peru’s claim to be a nation that is creditworthy, investor-friendly, and respectful of the rule of law.
{"title":"Peru's Selective Default: A Stain on its Creditworthiness","authors":"Arturo C. Porzecanski","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2728395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2728395","url":null,"abstract":"In the 1970s, while a leftist military dictatorship ruled Peru, more than 22 million acres of cultivated or grazing farmland -- one-third of Peru’s total agricultural acreage -- were expropriated from thousands of large owners as part of a property reform intended to benefit up to 400,000 landless peasant families. The compensation provided to landowners was miserly, however: on average, it was less than one-tenth the then-prevailing market price of water-accessible, cultivated land. Moreover, about 85 percent of total recognized land values were settled not in cash but with long-term Agrarian Debt Bonds, which committed future governments to honor fixed coupons on obligations maturing in 20 to 30 years. These bonds became worthless during the 1980s, however, because hyperinflation raged and the Peruvian currency lost most of its value. In the wake of the filing of hundreds of lawsuits seeking judicial redress, in 2001 the country’s Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the government should resume payment of the land-reform debt after updating its nominal value on an actuarial basis. And yet, successive administrations did not act on this ruling, despite the fact that since the mid-1990s Peru has exhibited vigorous economic growth, significantly strengthened public finances, and substantially improved creditworthiness, such that governments have had more than the necessary ample fiscal resources to redeem the land-reform bonds at their full, original value. This paper examines the evidence and concludes that we are in the presence of a case of blatant unwillingness to pay, one which undermines Peru’s claim to be a nation that is creditworthy, investor-friendly, and respectful of the rule of law.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134049903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Malayasian Abstract: Hapusnya Hak Tanggungan karena berakhirnya jangka waktu HGU ( Hak Guna Usaha), HGB (Hak Guna Bangunan) dan Hak Pakai yang dibebani Hak Tanggungan tidak menyebabkan hapusnya utang yang dijamin(Pasal 18 Ayat (4) UUHT ). Dengan ketentuan ini, apabila jangka waktu HGU, HGB dan Hak pakai, maka hak tanggungan yang dibebankan terhadap tanah tersebut menjadi hapus. Artinya perjanjian tambahan ini hapus. Sebaliknya perjanjian pokok (perjanjian kredit) tidak serta merta menjadi hapus, dan berjalan terus. Dalam hal ini mengakibatkan pihak kreditor berada pada posisi yang lemah karena utang belum dilunasi, Hak Tanggungan atas tanah yang dijadikan jaminan menjadi hapus. Pihak kreditor yang tadinya berposisi sebagai Kreditor yang bersifat Preferen atas pelunasan utang tersebut dengan jaminan tanah tersebut, dengan hapusnya Hak Tanggungan atas tanah tersebut, maka pihak kreditor preferen menjadi kreditor yang bersifat kongkuren atas pelunasan utang dari kekayaan debitor. Penelitian ini membahas upaya hukum normatif untuk melakukan pemberi pinjaman untuk menghindari kemungkinan risiko penghapusan hak atas tanah berdasarkan Undang-Undang Nomor 42 Tahun 1996 1.) Pembuatan Janji Memperpanjang Hak Atas tanah Pada Akta Pembebanan Hak Tanggungan, 2.) Pembuatan Surat Kuasa Membebankan Hak Tanggungan saat Perubahan HGB menjadi Hak Milik Atas Rumah Tinggal, 3) Pengansuransian Obyek Hak Tanggungan untuk Keuntungan Pemegang Hak Tanggungan,4). Meminta Jaminan Tambahan Kepada Debitor.Kata Kunci : Hipotik, Kreditor, Hak Atas Tanah.English Abstract: Mortgage abolishment because the expiration of the Right of Exploitation (HGU), Right of Building (HGB), and Right of Use burdened not cause the abolishment of collateralized debt obligations. Duration HGU, HGB and wear rights expire, then the mortgage that is charged against the land becomes clear. This additional agreement means clear. Instead principal agreement (credit agreement) is not necessarily to be clear, and move on. In this case resulted in the creditors are in a weak position because of unpaid debts, Mortgage over land as collateral to remove. This study discusses the normative legal efforts to do the lender to avoid the possible risk of the abolishment of land rights based on Law Number 42 Year 1996, which includes the manufacture of promise land extend rights in the imposition of mortgage deed, power of attorney making mortgage charging time HGB changes become ownership rights residential, Object insurance burden for advantage mortgage holder mortgage, debitor to request additional collateral.
Malayasian Abstract:由于HGU(商业权能)、HGB(建筑权能)和受控制权能的使用权终止而产生的负面影响，没有导致保证的债务减少(第18节(第4节)。根据这些规定，如果涉及HGU、HGB和使用权，对该土地的任何关税将被取消。这意味着这些附加协议被删除了。相反，核心协议(信用协议)不会立即被删除，并继续运行。在这种情况下，由于未偿还的债务，债权人处于不利地位，以保证其土地的所有权被取消。曾经是债权人的债权人，通过土地保障、土地所有权丧失来偿还债务，任命债权人成为债权人的法定债权人。本研究探讨了基于1996年第42条第1款的规范法律努力，以避免可能的剥夺其土地权利的风险。在担保书上的土地继承权延长，第2章。授权书规定，当HGB更改为住宅产权时，就会取消抵押品赎回权。要求债务人额外保释。关键词:抵押贷款，债权人，土地权利。英语摘要:因对权利扩张、建设(HGU)和正当使用而抵押贷款，而不是因为被稀释的债务债务。对HGU、HGB和穿衣服权利的抵押贷款被清除。这一加权意味着不明确。不需要清理，然后继续前进。在这种情况下，由于无人认领的债务人丧失了抵押品赎回权，比如抵押品赎回权。这个研究discusses《兰德normative合法efforts to do to什么abolishment岗位风险》的土地权利改编自劳42号manufacture》1996年,哪种includes imposition》承诺土地extend rights in抵押贷款抵押贷款的行为,律师的力量让充电时间HGB改变成为ownership rights住宅区,物体保险负担抵押贷款抵押贷款advantage holder,债务人来说要求间接措施。
{"title":"Upaya Pemegang Hak Tanggungan Mengantisipasi Hapusnya Hak Atas Tanah Sebagai Obyek Hak Tanggungan (Effort of Warranties Right Holder to Anticipate of Loss Land Rights as Object of Warranties)","authors":"Acep Rohendi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2748077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2748077","url":null,"abstract":"Malayasian Abstract: Hapusnya Hak Tanggungan karena berakhirnya jangka waktu HGU ( Hak Guna Usaha), HGB (Hak Guna Bangunan) dan Hak Pakai yang dibebani Hak Tanggungan tidak menyebabkan hapusnya utang yang dijamin(Pasal 18 Ayat (4) UUHT ). Dengan ketentuan ini, apabila jangka waktu HGU, HGB dan Hak pakai, maka hak tanggungan yang dibebankan terhadap tanah tersebut menjadi hapus. Artinya perjanjian tambahan ini hapus. Sebaliknya perjanjian pokok (perjanjian kredit) tidak serta merta menjadi hapus, dan berjalan terus. Dalam hal ini mengakibatkan pihak kreditor berada pada posisi yang lemah karena utang belum dilunasi, Hak Tanggungan atas tanah yang dijadikan jaminan menjadi hapus. Pihak kreditor yang tadinya berposisi sebagai Kreditor yang bersifat Preferen atas pelunasan utang tersebut dengan jaminan tanah tersebut, dengan hapusnya Hak Tanggungan atas tanah tersebut, maka pihak kreditor preferen menjadi kreditor yang bersifat kongkuren atas pelunasan utang dari kekayaan debitor. Penelitian ini membahas upaya hukum normatif untuk melakukan pemberi pinjaman untuk menghindari kemungkinan risiko penghapusan hak atas tanah berdasarkan Undang-Undang Nomor 42 Tahun 1996 1.) Pembuatan Janji Memperpanjang Hak Atas tanah Pada Akta Pembebanan Hak Tanggungan, 2.) Pembuatan Surat Kuasa Membebankan Hak Tanggungan saat Perubahan HGB menjadi Hak Milik Atas Rumah Tinggal, 3) Pengansuransian Obyek Hak Tanggungan untuk Keuntungan Pemegang Hak Tanggungan,4). Meminta Jaminan Tambahan Kepada Debitor.Kata Kunci : Hipotik, Kreditor, Hak Atas Tanah.English Abstract: Mortgage abolishment because the expiration of the Right of Exploitation (HGU), Right of Building (HGB), and Right of Use burdened not cause the abolishment of collateralized debt obligations. Duration HGU, HGB and wear rights expire, then the mortgage that is charged against the land becomes clear. This additional agreement means clear. Instead principal agreement (credit agreement) is not necessarily to be clear, and move on. In this case resulted in the creditors are in a weak position because of unpaid debts, Mortgage over land as collateral to remove. This study discusses the normative legal efforts to do the lender to avoid the possible risk of the abolishment of land rights based on Law Number 42 Year 1996, which includes the manufacture of promise land extend rights in the imposition of mortgage deed, power of attorney making mortgage charging time HGB changes become ownership rights residential, Object insurance burden for advantage mortgage holder mortgage, debitor to request additional collateral.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115972825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International organizations use a bewildering variety of voting rules — with different thresholds, weighting systems, veto points, and other rules that distribute influence unequally among participants. We provide a brief survey of the major voting systems, and show that all are controversial and unsatisfactory in various ways. While it is tempting to blame great powers or the weakness of international law for these problems, we argue that the root source is intellectual rather than political — the difficulty of designing a voting system that both allows efficient collective decisions and protects the legitimate interests of members. We show how a new type of voting system — quadratic voting — could in theory resolve these problems, and while it may be too new or unusual to implement any time soon, it provides insights into the defects of the existing systems.
{"title":"Voting Rules in International Organizations","authors":"E. Posner, A. Sykes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2383469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2383469","url":null,"abstract":"International organizations use a bewildering variety of voting rules — with different thresholds, weighting systems, veto points, and other rules that distribute influence unequally among participants. We provide a brief survey of the major voting systems, and show that all are controversial and unsatisfactory in various ways. While it is tempting to blame great powers or the weakness of international law for these problems, we argue that the root source is intellectual rather than political — the difficulty of designing a voting system that both allows efficient collective decisions and protects the legitimate interests of members. We show how a new type of voting system — quadratic voting — could in theory resolve these problems, and while it may be too new or unusual to implement any time soon, it provides insights into the defects of the existing systems.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133530101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Durbin Amendment had three major goals. First, to relieve merchants from high interchange fees, which would, in turn, enable merchants to pass these cost savings on to consumers, who would see lower retail prices. Second, to increase transparency in the way in which interchange fees are set. Third, to increase competition among networks, such as Visa and MasterCard. More concisely, the goal of the Durbin Amendment was to "transfer wealth from the Issuing banks to the merchants with the hope that it will result in lower prices for consumers through lower fees to merchants."This Paper seeks to shed light both on the efficacy of the Durbin Amendment in achieving its goals and its unintended consequences. Part I provides a background of the debit card industry, examining how the industry is structured, how it works, and it’s rapid growth leading up to the Durbin Amendment’s passage. Part II delves into the Durbin Amendment, analyzing its goals, what it does, and what it does not do (its exemptions). Part III turns to the criticism levied at the Durbin Amendment and provides several hypotheses regarding what economists expected to observe post-Durbin Amendment, including: a lack of regulation’s prerequisite of a market failure; two-sided markets; and the constitution takings challenge to the Durbin Amendment. Part IV turns to the effects of the Durbin Amendment, examining its effect on all five participants in the debit-card market: banks, merchants, networks, payment processors, and consumers. Part IV also provides data regarding interchange regulation in other countries, focusing specifically on Australia and Canada. Part V vindicates TCF National Bank’s constitutional challenge by showing how the confiscatory rate set by the Durbin Amendment (or, more precisely, by the Fed) incentivized new players to enter the fray. The major winner has been prepaid cards, whose market penetration has more than doubled since the Durbin Amendment’s enactment. More specifically, the major benefactors have been nonbanks and three-party prepaid issuers who have issued prepaid cards, as both parties remain beyond the Durbin Amendment’s regulatory purview, allowing them to provide more services and to earn non-capped inter-change fees. Additionally, the other major benefactors how been the entrants into new payment systems, including Square, Isis, Google Wallet, PayPal (although not new), and American Express’s Serve.Updated draft (not completed) to include discussion of recent discussion of DC District Court decision in NACS et al v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
{"title":"The Durbin Amendment, Two-Sided Markets, and Wealth Transfers: An Examination of Unintended Consequences Three Years Later","authors":"Bradley Hubbard","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2285105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2285105","url":null,"abstract":"The Durbin Amendment had three major goals. First, to relieve merchants from high interchange fees, which would, in turn, enable merchants to pass these cost savings on to consumers, who would see lower retail prices. Second, to increase transparency in the way in which interchange fees are set. Third, to increase competition among networks, such as Visa and MasterCard. More concisely, the goal of the Durbin Amendment was to \"transfer wealth from the Issuing banks to the merchants with the hope that it will result in lower prices for consumers through lower fees to merchants.\"This Paper seeks to shed light both on the efficacy of the Durbin Amendment in achieving its goals and its unintended consequences. Part I provides a background of the debit card industry, examining how the industry is structured, how it works, and it’s rapid growth leading up to the Durbin Amendment’s passage. Part II delves into the Durbin Amendment, analyzing its goals, what it does, and what it does not do (its exemptions). Part III turns to the criticism levied at the Durbin Amendment and provides several hypotheses regarding what economists expected to observe post-Durbin Amendment, including: a lack of regulation’s prerequisite of a market failure; two-sided markets; and the constitution takings challenge to the Durbin Amendment. Part IV turns to the effects of the Durbin Amendment, examining its effect on all five participants in the debit-card market: banks, merchants, networks, payment processors, and consumers. Part IV also provides data regarding interchange regulation in other countries, focusing specifically on Australia and Canada. Part V vindicates TCF National Bank’s constitutional challenge by showing how the confiscatory rate set by the Durbin Amendment (or, more precisely, by the Fed) incentivized new players to enter the fray. The major winner has been prepaid cards, whose market penetration has more than doubled since the Durbin Amendment’s enactment. More specifically, the major benefactors have been nonbanks and three-party prepaid issuers who have issued prepaid cards, as both parties remain beyond the Durbin Amendment’s regulatory purview, allowing them to provide more services and to earn non-capped inter-change fees. Additionally, the other major benefactors how been the entrants into new payment systems, including Square, Isis, Google Wallet, PayPal (although not new), and American Express’s Serve.Updated draft (not completed) to include discussion of recent discussion of DC District Court decision in NACS et al v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121489549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Litigation aims at resolving conflicts. In this chapter we survey the law and economics literature on litigation to illustrate the scope of application of rent-seeking models and their analytical power in the study of law and procedural issues of litigation, including applications in adversarial and inquisitorial procedures, fee-shifting, consolidation and bifurcation of trials and tort liability. We present a unified model of rent-seeking recasting the various perspectives in the literature, to illustrate the power of rent-seeking models in addressing different dimensions of substantive and procedural legal problems.
{"title":"Litigation as Rent-Seeking","authors":"F. Parisi, Barbara Luppi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2224179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2224179","url":null,"abstract":"Litigation aims at resolving conflicts. In this chapter we survey the law and economics literature on litigation to illustrate the scope of application of rent-seeking models and their analytical power in the study of law and procedural issues of litigation, including applications in adversarial and inquisitorial procedures, fee-shifting, consolidation and bifurcation of trials and tort liability. We present a unified model of rent-seeking recasting the various perspectives in the literature, to illustrate the power of rent-seeking models in addressing different dimensions of substantive and procedural legal problems.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126566392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Local, disparate preferences are normally satisfied by variety in law, but in some circumstances, harmonization can bethe means by which a majority advances its members' local preferences. One unappreciated method involves the imposition of external costs by a majority on a minority. In its most common and extreme form, a majority imposes a tax on the population in order to finance a benefit that is limited to the majority. The asymmetry between burdens and benefits may be sufficiently great to generate inefficient expenditures. It is more difficult but not impossible to impose external costs through regulation. Commercial law is not free from this danger, because it reflects preferences about consumer protection, which is to say such things as wealth distribution and paternalism, and it pits interest groups against one another, as in the case of employees and tort claimants in the event of bankruptcy. Commercial law is therefore an area where groups might sometimes gain from diversity in legal rules, but might at other times find that harmonization allows a majority to benefit yet more. It is therefore difficult to know whether harmonization, which has many other causes, is beneficial or corrosive. When the majority of voters are relatively homogeneous, as is arguably the case among member countries in the European Union, the possibility of harmonization - or simply centralized decisionmaking - as a means of imposing external costs seems especially likely. There are means of reducing the danger, but harmonization itself should be expected to increase the influence of the central bureaucracy.
{"title":"Harmonization, Preferences, and the Calculus of Consent in Commercial and Other Law","authors":"Saul Levmore","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2079295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2079295","url":null,"abstract":"Local, disparate preferences are normally satisfied by variety in law, but in some circumstances, harmonization can bethe means by which a majority advances its members' local preferences. One unappreciated method involves the imposition of external costs by a majority on a minority. In its most common and extreme form, a majority imposes a tax on the population in order to finance a benefit that is limited to the majority. The asymmetry between burdens and benefits may be sufficiently great to generate inefficient expenditures. It is more difficult but not impossible to impose external costs through regulation. Commercial law is not free from this danger, because it reflects preferences about consumer protection, which is to say such things as wealth distribution and paternalism, and it pits interest groups against one another, as in the case of employees and tort claimants in the event of bankruptcy. Commercial law is therefore an area where groups might sometimes gain from diversity in legal rules, but might at other times find that harmonization allows a majority to benefit yet more. It is therefore difficult to know whether harmonization, which has many other causes, is beneficial or corrosive. When the majority of voters are relatively homogeneous, as is arguably the case among member countries in the European Union, the possibility of harmonization - or simply centralized decisionmaking - as a means of imposing external costs seems especially likely. There are means of reducing the danger, but harmonization itself should be expected to increase the influence of the central bureaucracy.","PeriodicalId":161847,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124154009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：