Pub Date : 2021-04-20DOI: 10.4324/9781315062471-20
Sebastian Rosato
This chapter examines German-Russian relations during the Bismarck era (1871-90). The bulk of the chapter draws on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how key German and Russian decision makers thought about each other’s intentions in the periods before and after the formation of the First Dreikaiserbund, the Congress of Berlin, the creation of the Second Dreikaiserbund, and the making of the Reinsurance Treaty. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that Berlin and St. Petersburg were far from confident that the other side had benign intentions throughout the Bismarck era, the chapter concludes by describing the shape of the resulting German-Russian security competition.
{"title":"The Bismarck Era","authors":"Sebastian Rosato","doi":"10.4324/9781315062471-20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315062471-20","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines German-Russian relations during the Bismarck era (1871-90). The bulk of the chapter draws on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how key German and Russian decision makers thought about each other’s intentions in the periods before and after the formation of the First Dreikaiserbund, the Congress of Berlin, the creation of the Second Dreikaiserbund, and the making of the Reinsurance Treaty. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that Berlin and St. Petersburg were far from confident that the other side had benign intentions throughout the Bismarck era, the chapter concludes by describing the shape of the resulting German-Russian security competition.","PeriodicalId":166961,"journal":{"name":"Intentions in Great Power Politics","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125650949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines Anglo-American relations during the great rapprochement (1895-1906). The bulk of the chapter draws on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how key British and American decision makers thought about each other’s intentions in five episodes: the onset and aftermath of the crisis over Venezuela; the events surrounding the Spanish-American War; the negotiations regarding a trans-isthmian canal; the inception and resolution of a dispute over the Canada-Alaska boundary; and Anglo-American relations in the Far East between the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese Wars. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that London and Washington were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions in each episode, the chapter concludes by describing the shape of the resulting Anglo-American security competition in the Western Hemisphere, before examining Britain’s decision to quit that contest in 1904-6.
{"title":"The Great Rapprochement","authors":"Sebastian Rosato","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1k03gb9.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1k03gb9.8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines Anglo-American relations during the great rapprochement (1895-1906). The bulk of the chapter draws on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how key British and American decision makers thought about each other’s intentions in five episodes: the onset and aftermath of the crisis over Venezuela; the events surrounding the Spanish-American War; the negotiations regarding a trans-isthmian canal; the inception and resolution of a dispute over the Canada-Alaska boundary; and Anglo-American relations in the Far East between the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese Wars. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that London and Washington were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions in each episode, the chapter concludes by describing the shape of the resulting Anglo-American security competition in the Western Hemisphere, before examining Britain’s decision to quit that contest in 1904-6.","PeriodicalId":166961,"journal":{"name":"Intentions in Great Power Politics","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130385836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines Franco-German and U.S.-Japanese relations in the early interwar period (1919-30). The chapter begins by drawing on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how key French and German decision makers thought about each other’s intentions, focusing on these episodes: the negotiation, signature, and aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles; the onset, development, and resolution of the Ruhr Crisis; and the Locarno era. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that Paris and Berlin were far from confident that the other side had benign intentions throughout the early interwar period, the chapter then describes the shape of the resulting Franco-German security competition. The second half of the chapter repeats the analysis performed in the first half, this time with respect to the United States and Japan, focusing on the following episodes: the aftermath of World War I; the creation and operation of the Washington Treaty system; and the three years between the Geneva and London Naval conferences.
{"title":"The Early Interwar Period","authors":"Sebastian Rosato","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1k03gb9.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1k03gb9.9","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines Franco-German and U.S.-Japanese relations in the early interwar period (1919-30). The chapter begins by drawing on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how key French and German decision makers thought about each other’s intentions, focusing on these episodes: the negotiation, signature, and aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles; the onset, development, and resolution of the Ruhr Crisis; and the Locarno era. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that Paris and Berlin were far from confident that the other side had benign intentions throughout the early interwar period, the chapter then describes the shape of the resulting Franco-German security competition. The second half of the chapter repeats the analysis performed in the first half, this time with respect to the United States and Japan, focusing on the following episodes: the aftermath of World War I; the creation and operation of the Washington Treaty system; and the three years between the Geneva and London Naval conferences.","PeriodicalId":166961,"journal":{"name":"Intentions in Great Power Politics","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134259428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-20DOI: 10.12987/9780300258684-005
{"title":"3 The Bismarck Era","authors":"","doi":"10.12987/9780300258684-005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300258684-005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":166961,"journal":{"name":"Intentions in Great Power Politics","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124987455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-20DOI: 10.12987/yale/9780300253023.003.0008
Sebastian Rosato
This chapter employs intentions pessimism to predict the future of U.S.-China relations. It begins with a review of the theory and a summary of the historical case studies described in chapters 3-6, focusing on the fact that great powers have invariably been uncertain about each other’s intentions, a situation that has caused them to compete for security. The chapter then turns to U.S.-China relations from 2000 to 2020 and shows that the United States has already begun to compete with China, because Washington is acutely uncertain about Beijing’s intentions. The final section addresses the issue of the future, demonstrating that U.S. decision makers will in all likelihood be far from confident that their Chinese counterparts have benign intentions, and arguing that if China completes its rise this uncertainty will make for a considerably more intense security competition and a higher chance of war than is the case today.
{"title":"On the United States and China","authors":"Sebastian Rosato","doi":"10.12987/yale/9780300253023.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300253023.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter employs intentions pessimism to predict the future of U.S.-China relations. It begins with a review of the theory and a summary of the historical case studies described in chapters 3-6, focusing on the fact that great powers have invariably been uncertain about each other’s intentions, a situation that has caused them to compete for security. The chapter then turns to U.S.-China relations from 2000 to 2020 and shows that the United States has already begun to compete with China, because Washington is acutely uncertain about Beijing’s intentions. The final section addresses the issue of the future, demonstrating that U.S. decision makers will in all likelihood be far from confident that their Chinese counterparts have benign intentions, and arguing that if China completes its rise this uncertainty will make for a considerably more intense security competition and a higher chance of war than is the case today.","PeriodicalId":166961,"journal":{"name":"Intentions in Great Power Politics","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133672934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-20DOI: 10.12987/9780300258684-004
{"title":"2 Against Optimism","authors":"","doi":"10.12987/9780300258684-004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300258684-004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":166961,"journal":{"name":"Intentions in Great Power Politics","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114185709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-20DOI: 10.12987/9780300258684-fm
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.12987/9780300258684-fm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300258684-fm","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":166961,"journal":{"name":"Intentions in Great Power Politics","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124228590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-20DOI: 10.12987/9780300258684-003
{"title":"1 Intentions Pessimism","authors":"","doi":"10.12987/9780300258684-003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300258684-003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":166961,"journal":{"name":"Intentions in Great Power Politics","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121271654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-20DOI: 10.12987/9780300258684-007
{"title":"5 The Early Interwar Period","authors":"","doi":"10.12987/9780300258684-007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300258684-007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":166961,"journal":{"name":"Intentions in Great Power Politics","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134642882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-20DOI: 10.12987/yale/9780300253023.003.0007
Sebastian Rosato
This chapter examines U.S.-Soviet relations at the end of the Cold War (1985-90). The bulk of the chapter draws on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how American and Soviet decision makers viewed each other’s intentions, focusing on the Soviet Union’s early unilateral arms control initiatives; Moscow’s efforts to forge a “grand compromise”; the negotiation and aftermath of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; and Moscow’s retrenchment, including its withdrawal from Afghanistan and announcement that it would make significant cuts to its conventional forces in Europe. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that Washington and Moscow were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions in each case, the chapter then describes the resulting U.S.-Soviet security competition. Finally, the chapter examines the last two years of the Cold War and demonstrates that although neither side came close to trusting the other, only the United States continued to compete for security, because the Soviet Union could not afford to sustain the effort.
{"title":"The End of the Cold War","authors":"Sebastian Rosato","doi":"10.12987/yale/9780300253023.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300253023.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines U.S.-Soviet relations at the end of the Cold War (1985-90). The bulk of the chapter draws on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how American and Soviet decision makers viewed each other’s intentions, focusing on the Soviet Union’s early unilateral arms control initiatives; Moscow’s efforts to forge a “grand compromise”; the negotiation and aftermath of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; and Moscow’s retrenchment, including its withdrawal from Afghanistan and announcement that it would make significant cuts to its conventional forces in Europe. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that Washington and Moscow were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions in each case, the chapter then describes the resulting U.S.-Soviet security competition. Finally, the chapter examines the last two years of the Cold War and demonstrates that although neither side came close to trusting the other, only the United States continued to compete for security, because the Soviet Union could not afford to sustain the effort.","PeriodicalId":166961,"journal":{"name":"Intentions in Great Power Politics","volume":"246 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133939715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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