This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact daniel-bell@utulsa.edu. Recommended Citation Jordan M. Steiker, Peculiar Times for a Peculiar Institution, reviewing David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America's Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition, 48 Tulsa L. Rev. 357 (2012).
这篇书评是由TU Law数字共享资源免费提供给您的。它已被接受纳入塔尔萨法律评论由TU法律数字共享的授权管理员。欲了解更多信息，请联系daniel-bell@utulsa.edu。推荐引文Jordan M. Steiker，特殊制度的特殊时代，评论David Garland，特殊制度:废除时代的美国死刑，48 Tulsa L. Rev. 357(2012)。
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This article examines the changing relationships between museums and indigenous peoples over the past two centuries, with a specific focus upon the relationship of American museums to Native peoples within the United States. In the 19th century, the role of the American Museum was to acquire objects that could offer knowledge about natural history or world cultures to facilitate certain public values. With respect to Native peoples, the 19th century practices of American museum often institutionalized a hierarchical relationship consistent with the exploitative tenets of European colonialism and Imperialism. In comparison, modern museums must engage the multiple experiences of the diverse groups that are present within the nation-state, as well as disparate populations across the globe. Groups often disagree about the meaning of the past, as well as the articulation of their contemporary identity. In this respect, modern museums often participate in reshaping public values through the combined processes of repatriation and reconciliation. Through the process of repatriation, museums honor the human rights of Native peoples by transferring possession of ancestral human remains and cultural objects that were wrongfully appropriated in the past. Through the process of reconciliation, museums foster new relationships between Native peoples and the nation-state that more accurately reflect their distinctive historical experience and contemporary identity as separate sovereigns. This article argues that museums have an important role to play in the contemporary effort of Native Nations to assert their cultural sovereignty and reclaim their own histories. Specifically, the article examines the role of the National Museum of the American Indian and the role of tribal museums in fostering tribal cultural sovereignty.
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This review essay explores the extent to which Adam Winkler and Robert H. Churchill address the resurgence of the Second Amendment debate in their respective books, Gunfight: The Battle Over the Right to Bear Arms in America, and To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant's Face: Libertarian Political Violence and the Origins of the Militia Movement in light of the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. Cottrol approves of Winkler's Gunfight as an excellent review of the background and view of the oral argument presented to the Supreme Court in Heller, but critiques it as falling short of an in-depth explanation of the intellectual history of the Second Amendment. Cottrol includes a favorable critique of Churchill's To Shake their Guns as a more thorough look at the intellectual history and development of the militia movement in the 1990s.
这篇评论文章探讨了亚当·温克勒和罗伯特·h·丘吉尔在各自的著作《枪战:美国携带武器权利之战》和《在暴君面前挥舞枪支:根据最高法院对哥伦比亚特区诉海勒案的判决，自由主义政治暴力和民兵运动的起源》中对第二修正案辩论的复苏的程度。control赞同温克勒的《枪战》，认为它是对海勒案最高法院口头辩论的背景和观点的极好回顾，但批评它缺乏对第二修正案思想史的深入解释。《控制》一书对丘吉尔的《摇一摇枪》(To Shake their Guns)进行了有益的批判，更全面地审视了20世纪90年代民兵运动的思想史和发展。
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In the United States, the state and federal courts often has been the first port of call for activists hoping to advance the cause of same-sex couples. State courts, in particular, have ruled on occasion that guarantees of equal rights or due process contained in state constitutions require recognition of same-sex marriage or civil unions. These court decisions, in turn, have sparked a legislative backlash. Legislators and voters have rejected these court decisions by amending state constitutions to limit the rights of same-sex couples. The European Union represents, in some ways, the mirror image of the United States experience. The EU 'legislators' - represented by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament - have adopted 'progressive' legislation, including laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. The European Court of Justice, however, has provided very narrow interpretations of the content of these 'equal rights' guarantees. In particular, the Court of Justice has ruled that discrimination against same-sex couples - in denial of employment rights available to opposite-sex unmarried couples, for example - does not constitute discrimination based on sexual orientation. This article traces the development of the EU position, and compares and contrasts it with similar developments in the US courts and legislatures.
{"title":"Judicial Impediments to Legislating Equality for Same-Sex Couples in the European Union","authors":"Bruce Carolan","doi":"10.21427/D74196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21427/D74196","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, the state and federal courts often has been the first port of call for activists hoping to advance the cause of same-sex couples. State courts, in particular, have ruled on occasion that guarantees of equal rights or due process contained in state constitutions require recognition of same-sex marriage or civil unions. These court decisions, in turn, have sparked a legislative backlash. Legislators and voters have rejected these court decisions by amending state constitutions to limit the rights of same-sex couples. The European Union represents, in some ways, the mirror image of the United States experience. The EU 'legislators' - represented by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament - have adopted 'progressive' legislation, including laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. The European Court of Justice, however, has provided very narrow interpretations of the content of these 'equal rights' guarantees. In particular, the Court of Justice has ruled that discrimination against same-sex couples - in denial of employment rights available to opposite-sex unmarried couples, for example - does not constitute discrimination based on sexual orientation. This article traces the development of the EU position, and compares and contrasts it with similar developments in the US courts and legislatures.","PeriodicalId":170753,"journal":{"name":"Tulsa Law Review","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129739913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014), Judge Katzmann argues that because the Constitution authorizes Congress to prescribe its own procedures, judges should pay close attention to the internal nitty-gritty of the legislative process when determining what interpretive fidelity to Congress entails. In particular, he writes that, because Congress treats legislative history “as essential in understanding [statutory] meaning,” a textualist judge who refuses to consult that resource “may... undermine the constitutional understanding that Congress's statute-making should be respected as a democratic principle.” In taking this position, Judge Katzmann joins an array of scholars who want judges to take better account of the impact of congressional rules of procedure, the way legislative staffers understand drafting practices on the ground, and the role norms of legislative behavior play in shaping statutes. This new line of inquiry might be described as a “Legislative Process school,” which tries to link the meaning constructed by interpreters more tightly to the precise means by which drafters generate that meaning. The review essay raises the following question about the Legislative Process school’s position on legislative history: Namely, if legislative history is as central to the legislative process as the Legislative Process school suggests — that is, if the most important forms of legislative history (viz. committee reports) are generated by key legislators to advise other legislators of a statute's meaning, if rank-and-file members base their votes on the legislative history, and if legislative history is more probative of the legislative “deal” than is the statute itself — then why does Congress choose to vote on the dry, technical bill alone, and not on the legislative history or, indeed, on both sets of texts in tandem? Both the bill and the accompanying committee reports are texts; both are generated by the legislative process; both are available before the final vote. So what are we to make of the fact that Congress typically chooses to vote on the bill alone? That question is sharpened, moreover, by Congress's continued failure to put legislative history to a vote three decades into a textualist campaign that has put legislative history on uncertain footing in the federal courts. Absent a convincing answer, one might wonder whether pivotal legislators think it unlikely that they could pass the full complement of legislative history — or even high value items such as committee reports — if they put those materials to a vote instead of, or even alongside, the text.
在罗伯特·a·卡兹曼(Robert A. Katzmann)的《法官规约》(Judge Statutes, 2014)中，卡兹曼法官认为，由于宪法授权国会规定自己的程序，法官在确定对国会的解释性忠诚时，应密切关注立法程序的内部本质。特别是，他写道，由于国会将立法史“视为理解[法定]意义的必要条件”，一位拒绝查阅该资源的文本主义法官“可能……破坏了宪法的理解，即国会的立法应该被尊重为一项民主原则。”在这一立场上，卡兹曼法官加入了一群学者的行列，他们希望法官更好地考虑国会程序规则的影响，立法人员了解实际起草实践的方式，以及立法行为规范在制定法规方面所起的作用。这种新的研究方向可以被描述为“立法过程学派”，它试图将口译员构建的意义与起草者产生该意义的精确方法更紧密地联系起来。这篇评论文章就立法过程学派在立法史上的立场提出了以下问题:也就是说，如果立法史像立法过程学派所建议的那样是立法过程的核心——也就是说，如果立法史的最重要形式(即委员会报告)是由关键立法者生成的，以向其他立法者建议法规的含义，如果普通成员的投票基于立法史，如果立法史比法规本身更能证明立法“交易”那么，为什么国会选择单独对枯燥的技术法案进行投票，而不是对立法历史进行投票，或者实际上是对两套文本同时进行投票?法案和随附的委员会报告都是文本;两者都是由立法程序产生的;在最终投票之前，这两种方法都可以使用。那么，我们如何理解国会通常选择单独对该法案进行投票的事实呢?此外，国会三十年来一直未能就立法历史进行投票，这使得立法历史在联邦法院的立足点不确定，这使这个问题更加尖锐。如果没有令人信服的答案，人们可能会想，关键的立法者是否认为，如果他们将这些材料而不是文本，甚至与文本一起进行投票，他们不太可能通过立法历史的全部补充，甚至是像委员会报告这样的高价值项目。
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1017/9781108147668.008
R. Gordon
This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact daniel-bell@utulsa.edu. Recommended Citation Robert W. Gordon, Morton Horwitz and His Critics: A Conflict of Narratives, 37 Tulsa L. Rev. 915 (2013).
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