Pub Date : 2021-07-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0006
Michael A. Hunzeker
This chapter investigates the case of the French Army on the Western Front. It argues that the French Army was arguably the most decentralized and adaptive army on the Western Front. French infantry units experimented sooner and more aggressively than their British and German counterparts. The chapter then analyses the army's assault tactics and elastic defenses, as well as the army's moderately decentralized command and control for most of the war. The chapter also discusses French Army's high command — the Grand Quartier Général (GQG). It recounts how the GQG struggled to isolate, identify, and promote the sort of assault, combined-arms, and defensive tactics needed. The chapter highlights two factors to take into account when testing assessment, command, and training (ACT) theory against the French Army. First, political and strategic imperatives limited the army's doctrinal options. Second, is that the French Army occupies a blind spot in the English-language military historiography on tactical change during the First World War.
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Pub Date : 2021-07-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0003
Michael A. Hunzeker
This chapter provides a basic overview of the tactical dilemma facing the British, French, and German armies on the Western Front. It investigates how the troop-to-space ratio and the imbalance between strategic and tactical mobility — combined with firepower contributed to the stalemate on the Western Front. Beyond these daunting firepower and organizational challenges, the chapter also looks at a number of coordination problems being faced by the commanders during the war: infantry–artillery coordination, the challenge around achieving surprise, and logistics. It also examines the two unenviable trade-offs encountered by the commanders which revolved around depth and breadth. The chapter then shifts to discuss the challenges of the defenders and how they had to constantly adapt during the war. It identifies the optimal doctrine for ending the stalemate. Finally, the chapter analyzes the British, French, and German armies' set of solutions to these problems and challenges: assault tactics, combined-arms, and elastic defense in depth.
{"title":"Learning on the Western Front","authors":"Michael A. Hunzeker","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides a basic overview of the tactical dilemma facing the British, French, and German armies on the Western Front. It investigates how the troop-to-space ratio and the imbalance between strategic and tactical mobility — combined with firepower contributed to the stalemate on the Western Front. Beyond these daunting firepower and organizational challenges, the chapter also looks at a number of coordination problems being faced by the commanders during the war: infantry–artillery coordination, the challenge around achieving surprise, and logistics. It also examines the two unenviable trade-offs encountered by the commanders which revolved around depth and breadth. The chapter then shifts to discuss the challenges of the defenders and how they had to constantly adapt during the war. It identifies the optimal doctrine for ending the stalemate. Finally, the chapter analyzes the British, French, and German armies' set of solutions to these problems and challenges: assault tactics, combined-arms, and elastic defense in depth.","PeriodicalId":187046,"journal":{"name":"Dying to Learn","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130926672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-15DOI: 10.1515/9781501758478-fm
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501758478-fm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501758478-fm","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":187046,"journal":{"name":"Dying to Learn","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126172316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-15DOI: 10.1515/9781501758478-003
Michael A. Hunzeker
{"title":"Introduction. Wartime Learning","authors":"Michael A. Hunzeker","doi":"10.1515/9781501758478-003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501758478-003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":187046,"journal":{"name":"Dying to Learn","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128281693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0002
Michael A. Hunzeker
This chapter explains assessment, command, and training (ACT) theory in detail, describing its predictions and the kinds of evidence that confirm or reject its validity. The chapter covers a detailed discussion of definitions, case selection, and scope conditions. ACT theory seeks to explain why some wartime militaries are better than others at learning so as to correctly update how they fight. With such knowledge, the chapter modifies the definitions of learning and doctrine to understand how a specific subset of organizations (militaries) learn while under extraordinary conditions (warfare). It focuses specifically on one type of learning: how militaries update, revise, and otherwise change their war-fighting doctrines. The chapter then explores how learning helps a military force become more effective on the battlefield. It details how the wartime militaries, assessment mechanisms, and centralized training are particularly relevant to both battlefield effectiveness and doctrinal learning.
{"title":"Assessment, Command, and Training Theory","authors":"Michael A. Hunzeker","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explains assessment, command, and training (ACT) theory in detail, describing its predictions and the kinds of evidence that confirm or reject its validity. The chapter covers a detailed discussion of definitions, case selection, and scope conditions. ACT theory seeks to explain why some wartime militaries are better than others at learning so as to correctly update how they fight. With such knowledge, the chapter modifies the definitions of learning and doctrine to understand how a specific subset of organizations (militaries) learn while under extraordinary conditions (warfare). It focuses specifically on one type of learning: how militaries update, revise, and otherwise change their war-fighting doctrines. The chapter then explores how learning helps a military force become more effective on the battlefield. It details how the wartime militaries, assessment mechanisms, and centralized training are particularly relevant to both battlefield effectiveness and doctrinal learning.","PeriodicalId":187046,"journal":{"name":"Dying to Learn","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134018153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-15DOI: 10.1515/9781501758478-007
Michael A. Hunzeker
{"title":"Chapter 4 The British Army on the Western Front","authors":"Michael A. Hunzeker","doi":"10.1515/9781501758478-007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501758478-007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":187046,"journal":{"name":"Dying to Learn","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117222318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-15DOI: 10.1515/9781501758478-005
Michael A. Hunzeker
{"title":"Chapter 2 Learning on the Western Front","authors":"Michael A. Hunzeker","doi":"10.1515/9781501758478-005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501758478-005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":187046,"journal":{"name":"Dying to Learn","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129815728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-15DOI: 10.1515/9781501758478-011
{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9781501758478-011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501758478-011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":187046,"journal":{"name":"Dying to Learn","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116188091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0005
Michael A. Hunzeker
This chapter begins with the British Expeditionary Force's (BEF) experience with doctrinal learning. It analyses how the prewar British Army practiced moderately centralized command and control. The BEF increased control over tactics and operations from early 1915 until at least mid-1916. The BEF also lacked a doctrinal assessment mechanism for the first half of the war and maintained a loose grip over training. The chapter then shifts to discuss the establishment of a formal assessment mechanism, called the Training Branch, in February 1917. It explores how the BEF's command practices, assessment mechanism, and training systems changed over the course of the war. Ultimately, this chapter looks at a causal link that existed between the British Army's organizational structure and practices and its ability to learn. The chapter then investigates how the Training Branch enabled the BEF to systematically capture, test, analyze, and disseminate new ideas.
{"title":"The British Army on the Western Front","authors":"Michael A. Hunzeker","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501758454.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter begins with the British Expeditionary Force's (BEF) experience with doctrinal learning. It analyses how the prewar British Army practiced moderately centralized command and control. The BEF increased control over tactics and operations from early 1915 until at least mid-1916. The BEF also lacked a doctrinal assessment mechanism for the first half of the war and maintained a loose grip over training. The chapter then shifts to discuss the establishment of a formal assessment mechanism, called the Training Branch, in February 1917. It explores how the BEF's command practices, assessment mechanism, and training systems changed over the course of the war. Ultimately, this chapter looks at a causal link that existed between the British Army's organizational structure and practices and its ability to learn. The chapter then investigates how the Training Branch enabled the BEF to systematically capture, test, analyze, and disseminate new ideas.","PeriodicalId":187046,"journal":{"name":"Dying to Learn","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122471152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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