Pub Date : 2021-10-21DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_17
Siddhartha Banerjee, D. Kempe, Robert D. Kleinberg
{"title":"Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy","authors":"Siddhartha Banerjee, D. Kempe, Robert D. Kleinberg","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_17","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":192438,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131006118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-13DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_14
Ildikó Schlotter, P'eter Bir'o, T. Fleiner
{"title":"The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?","authors":"Ildikó Schlotter, P'eter Bir'o, T. Fleiner","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":192438,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","volume":"334 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133731107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-17DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_9
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, S. Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhauser
{"title":"Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness","authors":"Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, S. Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhauser","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":192438,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114564747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a player's output if the output of the player is very low or very high. We model this using two objective functions: binary threshold, where a player's contribution to the designer's utility is 1 if her output is above a certain threshold, and 0 otherwise; and linear threshold, where a player's contribution is linear if her output is between a lower and an upper threshold, and becomes constant below the lower and above the upper threshold. For both of these objectives, we study (1) rank-order allocation contests that use only the ranking of the players to assign prizes and (2) general contests that may use the numerical values of the players' outputs to assign prizes. We characterize the contests that maximize the designer's objective and indicate techniques to efficiently compute them. We also prove that for the linear threshold objective, a contest that distributes the prize equally among a fixed number of top-ranked players offers a factor-2 approximation to the optimal rank-order allocation contest.
{"title":"Contest Design with Threshold Objectives","authors":"E. Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, P. Goldberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4155267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4155267","url":null,"abstract":"We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a player's output if the output of the player is very low or very high. We model this using two objective functions: binary threshold, where a player's contribution to the designer's utility is 1 if her output is above a certain threshold, and 0 otherwise; and linear threshold, where a player's contribution is linear if her output is between a lower and an upper threshold, and becomes constant below the lower and above the upper threshold. For both of these objectives, we study (1) rank-order allocation contests that use only the ranking of the players to assign prizes and (2) general contests that may use the numerical values of the players' outputs to assign prizes. We characterize the contests that maximize the designer's objective and indicate techniques to efficiently compute them. We also prove that for the linear threshold objective, a contest that distributes the prize equally among a fixed number of top-ranked players offers a factor-2 approximation to the optimal rank-order allocation contest.","PeriodicalId":192438,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121166989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-20DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_24
Mark York, M. Dahleh, D. Parkes
{"title":"Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment","authors":"Mark York, M. Dahleh, D. Parkes","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_24","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":192438,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122372059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-04DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_18
Grzegorz Pierczy'nski, P. Skowron
{"title":"Core-Stable Committees under Restricted Domains","authors":"Grzegorz Pierczy'nski, P. Skowron","doi":"10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_18","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":192438,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130003328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-26DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_6
Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos
{"title":"Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances","authors":"Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":192438,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124757891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-26DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_13
Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel, N. Nisan
{"title":"Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis","authors":"Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel, N. Nisan","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":192438,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127605743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-21DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_3
D. Bergemann, A. Bonatti, A. Haupt, Alex Smolin
{"title":"The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing","authors":"D. Bergemann, A. Bonatti, A. Haupt, Alex Smolin","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":192438,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126255392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-17DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_19
Denizalp Goktas, Enrique Areyan Viqueira, A. Greenwald
{"title":"A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria","authors":"Denizalp Goktas, Enrique Areyan Viqueira, A. Greenwald","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_19","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":192438,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121854123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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