Pub Date : 2018-07-23DOI: 10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0002
Laurence R. Jurdem
In the opinion of these media outlets, America’s failure to achieve victory in Southeast Asia was due to an inherent weakness at the foundation of the nation’s foreign policy. Those who wrote for Human Events and National Review argued that the misdirection and uncertainty that plagued the war strategy of the Johnson and Nixon administrations were due to the divisiveness in the country over the ramifications of the civil rights movement and the Great Society. Conservative commentators believed that the disunity among the nation’s citizenry, combined with the failure of the two administrations to do whatever was necessary to win the war, caused the United States’ credibility as a combatant in the Cold War to be questioned around the world.
{"title":"An Erosion of Credibility","authors":"Laurence R. Jurdem","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"In the opinion of these media outlets, America’s failure to achieve victory in Southeast Asia was due to an inherent weakness at the foundation of the nation’s foreign policy. Those who wrote for Human Events and National Review argued that the misdirection and uncertainty that plagued the war strategy of the Johnson and Nixon administrations were due to the divisiveness in the country over the ramifications of the civil rights movement and the Great Society. Conservative commentators believed that the disunity among the nation’s citizenry, combined with the failure of the two administrations to do whatever was necessary to win the war, caused the United States’ credibility as a combatant in the Cold War to be questioned around the world.","PeriodicalId":19749,"journal":{"name":"Paving the Way for Reagan","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79265507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-23DOI: 10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0006
Laurence R. Jurdem
In a similar manner to the United Nations, the Panama Canal was an image that represented a powerful reminder of America’s great historical legacy. However, a large number of Americans believed the international waterway symbolized much more. Those that supported the American Right saw President Jimmy Carter’s decision to return the canal in 1977 as another example of the decline of American power in the world. Conservatives were upset that the United States was acquiescing to the demands of another emerging Third World nation that, like those within the General Assembly, appeared unwilling to appreciate America’s past generosity. The loss of the canal also reverberated with the US defeat in Vietnam. In the wake of the loss of American military prestige, conservatives were irate that a significant reminder of the country’s industrial greatness was now on the verge of being given away.
{"title":"A Loss of National Pride","authors":"Laurence R. Jurdem","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"In a similar manner to the United Nations, the Panama Canal was an image that represented a powerful reminder of America’s great historical legacy. However, a large number of Americans believed the international waterway symbolized much more. Those that supported the American Right saw President Jimmy Carter’s decision to return the canal in 1977 as another example of the decline of American power in the world. Conservatives were upset that the United States was acquiescing to the demands of another emerging Third World nation that, like those within the General Assembly, appeared unwilling to appreciate America’s past generosity. The loss of the canal also reverberated with the US defeat in Vietnam. In the wake of the loss of American military prestige, conservatives were irate that a significant reminder of the country’s industrial greatness was now on the verge of being given away.","PeriodicalId":19749,"journal":{"name":"Paving the Way for Reagan","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83679288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-23DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813175843.003.0004
Laurence R. Jurdem
Nixon’s policy of détente eventually led the United States and the Soviet Union to sign an arms agreement in Moscow in 1972 at what became known as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). While symbolically the negotiations were considered significant, they did not do a great deal to limit the arms race. Nixon’s resignation in 1974 left the future of SALT in the hands of Vice President Gerald Ford. The treaty was scheduled to expire that year, and the longtime congressman from Michigan was determined to make progress with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. However, due to difficulties during the SALT II negotiations and Ford’s abbreviated presidency, Jimmy Carter inherited the unfinished arms control negotiations when he took the oath of office in early 1977. As American and Soviet negotiators focused on finalizing the SALT II arms agreement, Commentary, National Review, and Human Events expressed their concern over the ongoing debate between the two superpowers about nuclear and chemical weapons. That contentious public policy issue was not simply about arms control but was symbolic of the state of American foreign policy itself.
{"title":"An Illusion of Security","authors":"Laurence R. Jurdem","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813175843.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813175843.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Nixon’s policy of détente eventually led the United States and the Soviet Union to sign an arms agreement in Moscow in 1972 at what became known as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). While symbolically the negotiations were considered significant, they did not do a great deal to limit the arms race. Nixon’s resignation in 1974 left the future of SALT in the hands of Vice President Gerald Ford. The treaty was scheduled to expire that year, and the longtime congressman from Michigan was determined to make progress with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. However, due to difficulties during the SALT II negotiations and Ford’s abbreviated presidency, Jimmy Carter inherited the unfinished arms control negotiations when he took the oath of office in early 1977. As American and Soviet negotiators focused on finalizing the SALT II arms agreement, Commentary, National Review, and Human Events expressed their concern over the ongoing debate between the two superpowers about nuclear and chemical weapons. That contentious public policy issue was not simply about arms control but was symbolic of the state of American foreign policy itself.","PeriodicalId":19749,"journal":{"name":"Paving the Way for Reagan","volume":"514 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90859006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-23DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813175843.003.0009
Laurence R. Jurdem
Over the course of the Reagan presidency, those who had written for National Review and Commentary shifted from their roles as policy analysts to putting their policy recommendations into practice as members of the foreign, domestic, and speechwriting staff in the Reagan administration. Figures like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Carl Gershman, Aram Bakshian, Anthony Dolan, and many others played a key role in the creation of one of the most ideological administrations in recent memory. While neither William F. Buckley Jr. nor Norman Podhoretz had active roles in the administration, their influence was nonetheless felt as those who had worked for them utilized their ideas and language in helping construct a consistent ideology that played a significant role in how rhetoric was designed and policy was implemented.
{"title":"A Friend in the White House","authors":"Laurence R. Jurdem","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813175843.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813175843.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Over the course of the Reagan presidency, those who had written for National Review and Commentary shifted from their roles as policy analysts to putting their policy recommendations into practice as members of the foreign, domestic, and speechwriting staff in the Reagan administration. Figures like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Carl Gershman, Aram Bakshian, Anthony Dolan, and many others played a key role in the creation of one of the most ideological administrations in recent memory. While neither William F. Buckley Jr. nor Norman Podhoretz had active roles in the administration, their influence was nonetheless felt as those who had worked for them utilized their ideas and language in helping construct a consistent ideology that played a significant role in how rhetoric was designed and policy was implemented.","PeriodicalId":19749,"journal":{"name":"Paving the Way for Reagan","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86620125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-23DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813175843.003.0003
Laurence R. Jurdem
As the American public became increasingly disenchanted over the nation’s ongoing presence in Southeast Asia, the Nixon administration initiated a diplomatic strategy toward the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Nixon, who early in his political career had been a passionate anticommunist, began to consider ways in which he might bring China into the international community. The president believed that this strategy had the potential to decrease the Cold War tensions that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. The foreign policy strategy that Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, developed came to be known as détente. The initiatives that composed Nixon’s policy were based on Kissinger’s realist view of international affairs. That perspective embraced the idea of accepting the world as it was rather than trying to change it. By deemphasizing the importance of the conflict between international communism and democracy, pundits on the Right believed Nixon was not only withdrawing America from its global responsibilities, but in doing so was giving the communist world free reign to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy.
{"title":"The De-moralization of the Cold War","authors":"Laurence R. Jurdem","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813175843.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813175843.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"As the American public became increasingly disenchanted over the nation’s ongoing presence in Southeast Asia, the Nixon administration initiated a diplomatic strategy toward the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Nixon, who early in his political career had been a passionate anticommunist, began to consider ways in which he might bring China into the international community. The president believed that this strategy had the potential to decrease the Cold War tensions that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. The foreign policy strategy that Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, developed came to be known as détente. The initiatives that composed Nixon’s policy were based on Kissinger’s realist view of international affairs. That perspective embraced the idea of accepting the world as it was rather than trying to change it. By deemphasizing the importance of the conflict between international communism and democracy, pundits on the Right believed Nixon was not only withdrawing America from its global responsibilities, but in doing so was giving the communist world free reign to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":19749,"journal":{"name":"Paving the Way for Reagan","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85512861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-23DOI: 10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0007
Laurence R. Jurdem
The strain of Black Nationalism that existed within the United Nations also worried conservatives as they monitored the evolution of events in Southern Africa. In their intense desire to rid the world of communism, other issues, such as race, were either marginalized or ignored. The chapter analyzes the three publications’ view of race as it relates to the issue of Rhodesia during the height of the Cold War. In ignoring the suppression of an entire race of people, Human Events and National Review contrasted what they perceived to be a stable, anticommunist, biracial society with the militarism and lawlessness that they argued defined the 1960s and 1970s. While the two conservative publications viewed Rhodesia as a model of biracial success, Commentary focused on the Carter administration’s dismissive attitude about the dangers of Soviet encroachment within the African hemisphere. The Right argued that the Carter White House, in its refusal to endorse Rhodesia’s 1979 parliamentary elections due to a lack of representation of militant nationalist groups, and its belief in the policy of détente, continued to send a message of American weakness and indifference to totalitarianism around the world.
{"title":"Democratic Fantasies vs. Cold War Realities","authors":"Laurence R. Jurdem","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The strain of Black Nationalism that existed within the United Nations also worried conservatives as they monitored the evolution of events in Southern Africa. In their intense desire to rid the world of communism, other issues, such as race, were either marginalized or ignored. The chapter analyzes the three publications’ view of race as it relates to the issue of Rhodesia during the height of the Cold War. In ignoring the suppression of an entire race of people, Human Events and National Review contrasted what they perceived to be a stable, anticommunist, biracial society with the militarism and lawlessness that they argued defined the 1960s and 1970s. While the two conservative publications viewed Rhodesia as a model of biracial success, Commentary focused on the Carter administration’s dismissive attitude about the dangers of Soviet encroachment within the African hemisphere. The Right argued that the Carter White House, in its refusal to endorse Rhodesia’s 1979 parliamentary elections due to a lack of representation of militant nationalist groups, and its belief in the policy of détente, continued to send a message of American weakness and indifference to totalitarianism around the world.","PeriodicalId":19749,"journal":{"name":"Paving the Way for Reagan","volume":"132 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89017840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-23DOI: 10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0008
Laurence R. Jurdem
Throughout the 1970s, Human Events, National Review, and Commentary drew connections to argue that the nation’s dependence on foreign oil continued to grow because of numerous regulations imposed on energy producers by the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. The three media outlets also concluded that America’s inability to respond to the economic aggression of OPEC represented another example of the weakness that had been at the heart of the American worldview for decades. Finally, the seizure of the US embassy in Iran in 1979 by Islamic fundamentalists led writers for these publications to contend that in order for the United States to regain national greatness it must free itself from limitations imposed on it by hostile forces at home and abroad. That goal of national revival was a key theme that Ronald Reagan and his supporters at Human Events, National Review, and Commentary capitalized on as the country moved into the presidential election of 1980.
{"title":"The Pathology of Inaction","authors":"Laurence R. Jurdem","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout the 1970s, Human Events, National Review, and Commentary drew connections to argue that the nation’s dependence on foreign oil continued to grow because of numerous regulations imposed on energy producers by the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. The three media outlets also concluded that America’s inability to respond to the economic aggression of OPEC represented another example of the weakness that had been at the heart of the American worldview for decades. Finally, the seizure of the US embassy in Iran in 1979 by Islamic fundamentalists led writers for these publications to contend that in order for the United States to regain national greatness it must free itself from limitations imposed on it by hostile forces at home and abroad. That goal of national revival was a key theme that Ronald Reagan and his supporters at Human Events, National Review, and Commentary capitalized on as the country moved into the presidential election of 1980.","PeriodicalId":19749,"journal":{"name":"Paving the Way for Reagan","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89209022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-23DOI: 10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0005
Laurence R. Jurdem
One of the major concerns of writers for the publications of conservative opinion was the growth of leftist ideology that permeated much of the newly independent Third World. Many of the activist leaders who led their nations’ independence movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the decades following World War II viewed the Soviet Union as an ally that was philosophically opposed to European imperialism. It was within the General Assembly of the United Nations that these new states began to exert their influence. Since the founding of the institution in 1945, the United States had been able to exert a large amount of influence in the major decisions taken up by the UN. The independent nations that now occupied the diplomatic chamber were determined to redress the economic injustices they believed had been committed against them by the West. Commentators who contributed to these publications were frustrated by the inability of American policy makers to stand up to the rampant criticism of the United States and its democratic values and believed that this represented another example of the decline of US foreign policy.
{"title":"A Symbol of Appeasement","authors":"Laurence R. Jurdem","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"One of the major concerns of writers for the publications of conservative opinion was the growth of leftist ideology that permeated much of the newly independent Third World. Many of the activist leaders who led their nations’ independence movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the decades following World War II viewed the Soviet Union as an ally that was philosophically opposed to European imperialism. It was within the General Assembly of the United Nations that these new states began to exert their influence. Since the founding of the institution in 1945, the United States had been able to exert a large amount of influence in the major decisions taken up by the UN. The independent nations that now occupied the diplomatic chamber were determined to redress the economic injustices they believed had been committed against them by the West. Commentators who contributed to these publications were frustrated by the inability of American policy makers to stand up to the rampant criticism of the United States and its democratic values and believed that this represented another example of the decline of US foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":19749,"journal":{"name":"Paving the Way for Reagan","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80354464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-20DOI: 10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0001
Laurence R. Jurdem
The introduction puts forward the basic thesis of the book that the three publications discussed played a key role in crafting a particular ideology in the area of foreign policy. These ideas created an ideological platform that revived the fortunes of the Republican Party, culminating in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. The chapter also gives background on the history of National Review, Human Events, and Commentary. It discusses the publications’ key personalities and ideological points of view. It also analyzes the underlying historical themes and background of how the issues discussed in the book emerged.
{"title":"Paving the Way for Reagan","authors":"Laurence R. Jurdem","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9780813175843.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"The introduction puts forward the basic thesis of the book that the three publications discussed played a key role in crafting a particular ideology in the area of foreign policy. These ideas created an ideological platform that revived the fortunes of the Republican Party, culminating in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. The chapter also gives background on the history of National Review, Human Events, and Commentary. It discusses the publications’ key personalities and ideological points of view. It also analyzes the underlying historical themes and background of how the issues discussed in the book emerged.","PeriodicalId":19749,"journal":{"name":"Paving the Way for Reagan","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88498387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The following is a slightly abbreviated version of an address given by Dr. Goldmann at a special session of the Zionist Action Committee in Jerusalem on February 20, 1974, commemorating the late David Ben-Gurion who died in December of last year.
{"title":"The End of an Era:","authors":"N. Goldmann","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1h9dkc8.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1h9dkc8.11","url":null,"abstract":"The following is a slightly abbreviated version of an address given by Dr. Goldmann at a special session of the Zionist Action Committee in Jerusalem on February 20, 1974, commemorating the late David Ben-Gurion who died in December of last year.","PeriodicalId":19749,"journal":{"name":"Paving the Way for Reagan","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90795556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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