Pub Date : 2026-02-10DOI: 10.1177/17456916251409785
Lingyan Hu, Martha J. Farah
The “socioeconomic achievement gap” refers to socioeconomic disparities in children’s academic outcomes. Do these gaps invariably reflect cognitive processes that are similar in kind across the socioeconomic status (SES) spectrum but differ quantitatively in their efficacy? Or, in some cases, do they reflect cognitive processes that differ, in kind, between higher and lower SES, that is, qualitatively? In this systematic review, we used the ways in which brain structure and function relate to cognitive performance to answer these questions, focusing on academically relevant cognitive abilities. Specifically, the brain correlates of performance served as a signal regarding the underlying cognitive processes used to perform cognitive tasks. The literature was searched for studies that reported whether SES moderated the brain–cognition relation. In 15 cases, significant moderation was found, suggesting that children from diverse SES backgrounds may use underlying brain systems differently to achieve cognitive task performance. Three general mechanisms are reviewed, as are the broader implications of qualitative differences for teaching and for the causal relations leading to socioeconomic disparities in cognition.
{"title":"Socioeconomic Status Disparities in Children’s Cognition—Differences in Degree or Kind?","authors":"Lingyan Hu, Martha J. Farah","doi":"10.1177/17456916251409785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916251409785","url":null,"abstract":"The “socioeconomic achievement gap” refers to socioeconomic disparities in children’s academic outcomes. Do these gaps invariably reflect cognitive processes that are similar in kind across the socioeconomic status (SES) spectrum but differ quantitatively in their efficacy? Or, in some cases, do they reflect cognitive processes that differ, in kind, between higher and lower SES, that is, qualitatively? In this systematic review, we used the ways in which brain structure and function relate to cognitive performance to answer these questions, focusing on academically relevant cognitive abilities. Specifically, the brain correlates of performance served as a signal regarding the underlying cognitive processes used to perform cognitive tasks. The literature was searched for studies that reported whether SES moderated the brain–cognition relation. In 15 cases, significant moderation was found, suggesting that children from diverse SES backgrounds may use underlying brain systems differently to achieve cognitive task performance. Three general mechanisms are reviewed, as are the broader implications of qualitative differences for teaching and for the causal relations leading to socioeconomic disparities in cognition.","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":"299 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":12.6,"publicationDate":"2026-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146153568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-10DOI: 10.1177/17456916251414030
Oliver Singleton, Aikaterini Fotopoulou
The sense of presence is typically defined as the feeling of “being there” in a virtual environment, whereas the sense of reality is defined as the ability to discriminate between real and unreal phenomena. We challenge this rigid dichotomy, arguing that presence and reality can be considered conceptually, mechanistically, and phenomenologically continuous. We first demonstrate that both cognitive sciences and virtual reality (VR) studies use the terms inconsistently and interchangeably. We then go on to identify and combine perceptual and cognitivist accounts of presence, arguing that presence, like reality, is likely to be formed from integrative mechanisms. We then go further to identify converging psychophysical findings from the two fields in multisensory integration, self-embodiment, and agency. This is further supported by results from preliminary neuroimaging studies, indicating a shared frontolimbic substrate for generating the feeling of “realness.” This reconceptualization has significant implications, including validating the use of VR as a tool for studying the sense of reality and its clinical disorders. We conclude by advocating for directly comparing these phenomena in future research to systematically test for their functional and neural equivalence.
{"title":"Presence Is Reality: Rethinking Virtual and Real-World Consciousness","authors":"Oliver Singleton, Aikaterini Fotopoulou","doi":"10.1177/17456916251414030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916251414030","url":null,"abstract":"The sense of presence is typically defined as the feeling of “being there” in a virtual environment, whereas the sense of reality is defined as the ability to discriminate between real and unreal phenomena. We challenge this rigid dichotomy, arguing that presence and reality can be considered conceptually, mechanistically, and phenomenologically continuous. We first demonstrate that both cognitive sciences and virtual reality (VR) studies use the terms inconsistently and interchangeably. We then go on to identify and combine perceptual and cognitivist accounts of presence, arguing that presence, like reality, is likely to be formed from integrative mechanisms. We then go further to identify converging psychophysical findings from the two fields in multisensory integration, self-embodiment, and agency. This is further supported by results from preliminary neuroimaging studies, indicating a shared frontolimbic substrate for generating the feeling of “realness.” This reconceptualization has significant implications, including validating the use of VR as a tool for studying the sense of reality and its clinical disorders. We conclude by advocating for directly comparing these phenomena in future research to systematically test for their functional and neural equivalence.","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":12.6,"publicationDate":"2026-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146153352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-02-04DOI: 10.1177/17456916251404372
Leher Singh
Although academic departments and institutions frequently champion ideals of egalitarianism and inclusion, many are defined by status hierarchies that can undermine their stated commitment to these ideals. This article examines the distinct and interconnected influences of power, privilege, and positionality in the defense of progressive norms, with a particular focus on psychology departments as a context for epistemic and cultural analysis. The article proposes three orienting principles to guide departments toward greater equity and inclusion: (a) triangulating policies, ideals, and norms through participatory equity; (b) fostering an inclusive climate that values diverse forms of knowledge; and (c) establishing the preconditions for sustainable culture change, including alignment of rewards, acknowledgment of resistance, the need for restorative sacrifice, and measurement of progress. Collectively, these principles offer a practical framework for reconfiguring the academic department toward cultural inclusivity and socially situated scholarship that is meaningfully aligned with the civic responsibilities of higher education.
{"title":"Power, Privilege, and Positionality in Psychology Departments: Toward a Framework for Inclusive Excellence","authors":"Leher Singh","doi":"10.1177/17456916251404372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916251404372","url":null,"abstract":"Although academic departments and institutions frequently champion ideals of egalitarianism and inclusion, many are defined by status hierarchies that can undermine their stated commitment to these ideals. This article examines the distinct and interconnected influences of power, privilege, and positionality in the defense of progressive norms, with a particular focus on psychology departments as a context for epistemic and cultural analysis. The article proposes three orienting principles to guide departments toward greater equity and inclusion: (a) triangulating policies, ideals, and norms through participatory equity; (b) fostering an inclusive climate that values diverse forms of knowledge; and (c) establishing the preconditions for sustainable culture change, including alignment of rewards, acknowledgment of resistance, the need for restorative sacrifice, and measurement of progress. Collectively, these principles offer a practical framework for reconfiguring the academic department toward cultural inclusivity and socially situated scholarship that is meaningfully aligned with the civic responsibilities of higher education.","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":"241 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":12.6,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146115936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-30DOI: 10.1177/17456916251408052
Philipp Musfeld,Klaus Oberauer
In 1961, Donald Hebb established a classic paradigm for studying repetition learning: He asked participants to remember several memory sets for an immediate serial recall task and repeated one set multiple times throughout the experiment. Participants' ability to recall the repeated set improved gradually with repetitions, thereby demonstrating repetition learning. Explaining this effect has concerned researchers for decades because it provides key insights into how we form durable memory representations through repeated exposure. In this article, we revisit the dominant views on the mechanisms underlying repetition learning, thereby challenging the central assumption that repetition learning is gradual and implicit. We show how these views have emerged from flawed analytical approaches, summarize recent evidence strongly contradicting these claims, and reanalyze previously published data to illustrate how correcting implausible analytical assumptions leads to different theoretical conclusions. We propose an updated theoretical framework of the cognitive mechanisms underlying repetition learning that integrates elements from previous models of the Hebb repetition effect with established models of episodic memory, thereby joining two branches of the memory literature.
{"title":"Revisiting Hebb: The Mechanisms of Repetition Learning.","authors":"Philipp Musfeld,Klaus Oberauer","doi":"10.1177/17456916251408052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916251408052","url":null,"abstract":"In 1961, Donald Hebb established a classic paradigm for studying repetition learning: He asked participants to remember several memory sets for an immediate serial recall task and repeated one set multiple times throughout the experiment. Participants' ability to recall the repeated set improved gradually with repetitions, thereby demonstrating repetition learning. Explaining this effect has concerned researchers for decades because it provides key insights into how we form durable memory representations through repeated exposure. In this article, we revisit the dominant views on the mechanisms underlying repetition learning, thereby challenging the central assumption that repetition learning is gradual and implicit. We show how these views have emerged from flawed analytical approaches, summarize recent evidence strongly contradicting these claims, and reanalyze previously published data to illustrate how correcting implausible analytical assumptions leads to different theoretical conclusions. We propose an updated theoretical framework of the cognitive mechanisms underlying repetition learning that integrates elements from previous models of the Hebb repetition effect with established models of episodic memory, thereby joining two branches of the memory literature.","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":"3 1","pages":"17456916251408052"},"PeriodicalIF":12.6,"publicationDate":"2026-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146072953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-29DOI: 10.1177/17456916251404394
Ryan L Boyd,David M Markowitz
As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly embedded in social life, understanding its interpersonal and psychological implications is urgent yet undertheorized. This article introduces the machine-integrated relational adaptation (MIRA) model, a transdisciplinary, middle-range theoretical framework that provides a foundational account of when, how, and why AI functions as a relational entity in human ecosystems. MIRA distinguishes two crucial roles of AI: relational partner (direct-interaction companion) and relational mediator (shaping human-to-human communication). Synthesizing psychosocial theories of human relationships, interpersonal communication theory, psycholinguistics, and human-computer interaction, MIRA structures AI's relational impact within antecedents, processes, moderators, and outcomes. Central to MIRA are four principles describing how AI fosters social adaptation: linguistic reciprocity, psychological proximity, interpersonal trust, and relational substitution versus enhancement. These principles illuminate how adaptive AI language and behavior can elicit emotional investment, simulate mutual understanding, or even supplant human interaction. MIRA integrates established theories-attachment theory, social exchange theory, and epistemic trust frameworks-and proposes a research agenda that bridges foundational psychology with emerging sociotechnical contexts. Rather than offering a deterministic view, MIRA provides a generative, testable structure for investigating the evolving role of AI in relational life and guiding future human-AI-connection research.
{"title":"Artificial Intelligence and the Psychology of Human Connection.","authors":"Ryan L Boyd,David M Markowitz","doi":"10.1177/17456916251404394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916251404394","url":null,"abstract":"As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly embedded in social life, understanding its interpersonal and psychological implications is urgent yet undertheorized. This article introduces the machine-integrated relational adaptation (MIRA) model, a transdisciplinary, middle-range theoretical framework that provides a foundational account of when, how, and why AI functions as a relational entity in human ecosystems. MIRA distinguishes two crucial roles of AI: relational partner (direct-interaction companion) and relational mediator (shaping human-to-human communication). Synthesizing psychosocial theories of human relationships, interpersonal communication theory, psycholinguistics, and human-computer interaction, MIRA structures AI's relational impact within antecedents, processes, moderators, and outcomes. Central to MIRA are four principles describing how AI fosters social adaptation: linguistic reciprocity, psychological proximity, interpersonal trust, and relational substitution versus enhancement. These principles illuminate how adaptive AI language and behavior can elicit emotional investment, simulate mutual understanding, or even supplant human interaction. MIRA integrates established theories-attachment theory, social exchange theory, and epistemic trust frameworks-and proposes a research agenda that bridges foundational psychology with emerging sociotechnical contexts. Rather than offering a deterministic view, MIRA provides a generative, testable structure for investigating the evolving role of AI in relational life and guiding future human-AI-connection research.","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":"30 1","pages":"17456916251404394"},"PeriodicalIF":12.6,"publicationDate":"2026-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146073118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-28DOI: 10.1177/17456916251413523
Kaitlyn A Kaiser
In 2025, U.S. policy changes imposed sweeping limits on the scope of research eligible for federal support alongside sharp reductions to science-agency budgets, threatening the foundations of psychological science. This article examines the consequences of these shifts across three interrelated domains. First, topic-based restrictions curtail inquiry into key areas such as gender and sexual identity, social determinants of mental health, and systemic disparities, jeopardizing the continuation and expansion of research essential to evidence-based policy and interventions. Second, shrinking budgets and reduced funding opportunities destabilize graduate and postdoctoral training systems, constraining opportunities for emerging scholars and weakening the pipeline of future researchers. Third, cutbacks to health-agency budgets and programs diminish the delivery of mental-health services, with immediate and long-term consequences for public well-being. Although the analysis centers on the United States, the implications extend globally given the reach of U.S. investments, collaborations, and training infrastructure. The article concludes that although systemic challenges are formidable, psychologists at all career stages retain tools to resist their most harmful effects and to safeguard the field's scientific integrity and societal impact.
{"title":"How U.S. Funding Restrictions Endanger the Future of Psychology: Consequences for Research, Training, and Clinical Care.","authors":"Kaitlyn A Kaiser","doi":"10.1177/17456916251413523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916251413523","url":null,"abstract":"In 2025, U.S. policy changes imposed sweeping limits on the scope of research eligible for federal support alongside sharp reductions to science-agency budgets, threatening the foundations of psychological science. This article examines the consequences of these shifts across three interrelated domains. First, topic-based restrictions curtail inquiry into key areas such as gender and sexual identity, social determinants of mental health, and systemic disparities, jeopardizing the continuation and expansion of research essential to evidence-based policy and interventions. Second, shrinking budgets and reduced funding opportunities destabilize graduate and postdoctoral training systems, constraining opportunities for emerging scholars and weakening the pipeline of future researchers. Third, cutbacks to health-agency budgets and programs diminish the delivery of mental-health services, with immediate and long-term consequences for public well-being. Although the analysis centers on the United States, the implications extend globally given the reach of U.S. investments, collaborations, and training infrastructure. The article concludes that although systemic challenges are formidable, psychologists at all career stages retain tools to resist their most harmful effects and to safeguard the field's scientific integrity and societal impact.","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":"296 1","pages":"17456916251413523"},"PeriodicalIF":12.6,"publicationDate":"2026-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146069857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-22DOI: 10.1177/17456916251401850
Caspar J Van Lissa,Aaron Peikert,Maximilian S Ernst,Noah N N van Dongen,Felix D Schönbrodt,Andreas M Brandmaier
Open science innovations have focused on rigorous theory testing, yet methods for specifying, sharing, and iteratively improving theories remain underdeveloped. To address this limitation, we introduce FAIR theory, a standard for specifying theories as findable, accessible, interoperable, and reusable digital objects. FAIR theories are findable in well-established archives; accessible in terms of their availability and ability to be understood; interoperable for specific purposes, such as selecting control variables; and reusable in that they can be iteratively and collaboratively improved on. This article adapts the FAIR principles for theory; reflects on current FAIR practices in relation to psychological theory; and discusses FAIR theories' potential impact in terms of reducing research waste, enabling metaresearch on theories' structure and development, and incorporating theory into reproducible research workflows-from hypothesis generation to simulation studies. We present a conceptual workflow for FAIRifying theory that builds on existing open science principles and infrastructures. More detailed tutorials, worked examples, and convenience functions to automate this workflow are available in the theorytools R package. FAIR theory constitutes a structured protocol for archiving, communicating about, and iteratively improving theory, addressing a critical gap in open scholarly practices and potentially increasing the efficiency of cumulative knowledge acquisition in psychology and beyond.
{"title":"To Be FAIR: Theory Specification Needs an Update.","authors":"Caspar J Van Lissa,Aaron Peikert,Maximilian S Ernst,Noah N N van Dongen,Felix D Schönbrodt,Andreas M Brandmaier","doi":"10.1177/17456916251401850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916251401850","url":null,"abstract":"Open science innovations have focused on rigorous theory testing, yet methods for specifying, sharing, and iteratively improving theories remain underdeveloped. To address this limitation, we introduce FAIR theory, a standard for specifying theories as findable, accessible, interoperable, and reusable digital objects. FAIR theories are findable in well-established archives; accessible in terms of their availability and ability to be understood; interoperable for specific purposes, such as selecting control variables; and reusable in that they can be iteratively and collaboratively improved on. This article adapts the FAIR principles for theory; reflects on current FAIR practices in relation to psychological theory; and discusses FAIR theories' potential impact in terms of reducing research waste, enabling metaresearch on theories' structure and development, and incorporating theory into reproducible research workflows-from hypothesis generation to simulation studies. We present a conceptual workflow for FAIRifying theory that builds on existing open science principles and infrastructures. More detailed tutorials, worked examples, and convenience functions to automate this workflow are available in the theorytools R package. FAIR theory constitutes a structured protocol for archiving, communicating about, and iteratively improving theory, addressing a critical gap in open scholarly practices and potentially increasing the efficiency of cumulative knowledge acquisition in psychology and beyond.","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":"4 1","pages":"17456916251401850"},"PeriodicalIF":12.6,"publicationDate":"2026-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146021572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-06DOI: 10.1177/17456916251401849
Jack W Klein,William B Swann
Since the early 20th century, an emphasis on the causal power of situations in social psychology has fostered the view that the self is an empty vessel filled by the contents of the situation. We label this the "empty-self metaphor," with incarnations including situationism and elements of theories of self-presentation, self-perception, social identity, the dramaturgical movement, and others. The persistence of this metatheoretical assumption has led to an underappreciation of an enduring, unique self and to the development of contemporary paradigms (e.g., social priming and embodied cognition) that have hinged on the implicit premise that the self is empty or passive. The self is not empty, of course, and new preliminary evidence we have collected indicates that research predicated on the empty-self metaphor is far less likely to replicate. Although we emphasize that the power of the situation has yielded important theoretical and practical insights, we propose that the field would be strengthened by better accounting for the chronic, dispositional motivations that emanate from an enduring self. We offer suggestions-both theoretical and methodological-that can help social psychologists achieve this goal.
{"title":"Social Psychology's Empty-Self Metaphor and the Replication Crisis.","authors":"Jack W Klein,William B Swann","doi":"10.1177/17456916251401849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916251401849","url":null,"abstract":"Since the early 20th century, an emphasis on the causal power of situations in social psychology has fostered the view that the self is an empty vessel filled by the contents of the situation. We label this the \"empty-self metaphor,\" with incarnations including situationism and elements of theories of self-presentation, self-perception, social identity, the dramaturgical movement, and others. The persistence of this metatheoretical assumption has led to an underappreciation of an enduring, unique self and to the development of contemporary paradigms (e.g., social priming and embodied cognition) that have hinged on the implicit premise that the self is empty or passive. The self is not empty, of course, and new preliminary evidence we have collected indicates that research predicated on the empty-self metaphor is far less likely to replicate. Although we emphasize that the power of the situation has yielded important theoretical and practical insights, we propose that the field would be strengthened by better accounting for the chronic, dispositional motivations that emanate from an enduring self. We offer suggestions-both theoretical and methodological-that can help social psychologists achieve this goal.","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":"84 1","pages":"17456916251401849"},"PeriodicalIF":12.6,"publicationDate":"2026-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145907524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-06DOI: 10.1177/17456916251404872
Shalom N Jaffe,Aaron J Moss,Rachel Hartman,Cheskie Rosenzweig,Richa Gautam,Jonathan Robinson,Leib Litman
Researchers who employ online data collection from human subjects currently face a conundrum: It is both essential to how behavioral science functions and threatened by low-quality data. It is often assumed that random, inconsistent, and otherwise incomprehensible data in online surveys comes mainly from bots. Despite this assumption, few studies have directly examined where problematic data comes from, even though identifying the source has important implications for creating the right solutions. We examined this issue on several popular participant-recruitment platforms, including Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Lucid. Across four studies spanning 5 years using multiple methods, we here provide evidence that most of the data-quality problems affecting online research using online panels can be tied to fraudulent users from outside of the United States-not bots. We identify many of the telltale signs that humans leave behind and describe the most effective ways of blocking problematic human responses to address the online data-quality problem.
利用在线收集人类受试者数据的研究人员目前面临一个难题：这对行为科学的功能至关重要，但又受到低质量数据的威胁。人们通常认为，在线调查中的随机、不一致和其他不可理解的数据主要来自机器人。尽管有这种假设，但很少有研究直接检查问题数据的来源，尽管确定来源对创建正确的解决方案具有重要意义。我们在几个流行的参与者招聘平台上研究了这个问题，包括Mechanical Turk （MTurk）和Lucid。在跨越5年的四项研究中，我们使用了多种方法，我们在这里提供了证据，证明大多数影响在线研究的数据质量问题都与来自美国以外的欺诈用户有关，而不是机器人。我们确定了人类留下的许多迹象，并描述了阻止有问题的人类反应以解决在线数据质量问题的最有效方法。
{"title":"The Bots Ruining Social Science Are Not Bots at All.","authors":"Shalom N Jaffe,Aaron J Moss,Rachel Hartman,Cheskie Rosenzweig,Richa Gautam,Jonathan Robinson,Leib Litman","doi":"10.1177/17456916251404872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916251404872","url":null,"abstract":"Researchers who employ online data collection from human subjects currently face a conundrum: It is both essential to how behavioral science functions and threatened by low-quality data. It is often assumed that random, inconsistent, and otherwise incomprehensible data in online surveys comes mainly from bots. Despite this assumption, few studies have directly examined where problematic data comes from, even though identifying the source has important implications for creating the right solutions. We examined this issue on several popular participant-recruitment platforms, including Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Lucid. Across four studies spanning 5 years using multiple methods, we here provide evidence that most of the data-quality problems affecting online research using online panels can be tied to fraudulent users from outside of the United States-not bots. We identify many of the telltale signs that humans leave behind and describe the most effective ways of blocking problematic human responses to address the online data-quality problem.","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":"29 1","pages":"17456916251404872"},"PeriodicalIF":12.6,"publicationDate":"2026-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145907523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-06DOI: 10.1177/17456916251404368
Roy F Baumeister,Michaela T Bibby,Dianne M Tice,Brad J Bushman
This article pulls together diverse published findings on computer-mediated communication (CMC) to test the hypothesis that it reduces psychological engagement and impact compared with face-to-face (FTF) interactions. Although gaps and questions remain, the evidence mostly confirms reduced engagement and impact. Compared with FTF interactions, CMC elicits less positive emotion, with mixed results for negative emotions. Physiological arousal is often lower. Relationships, trust, and group cohesion develop more slowly (although perhaps eventually reaching the same levels). Information processing is reduced. Inhibitions are also reduced, leading to greater willingness to criticize, to bring up alternate perspectives and suggestions, and to neglect to respond. The disinhibition may improve participation by shy persons. Group performance and group decision-making are often impaired, although some studies found no difference. Teaching and learning go less well. Impact and engagement lose more with asynchronous than synchronous CMC. FTF interactions boost well-being compared with not interacting, but CMC is in between. When CMC augments FTF relationships, there may be benefits, but when it replaces them, there are psychological costs. Technology has enabled marvelous advances in long-distance communication, but there is still no fully satisfactory substitute for actually being together in person.
{"title":"Socializing While Alone: Loss of Impact and Engagement When Interacting Remotely via Technology.","authors":"Roy F Baumeister,Michaela T Bibby,Dianne M Tice,Brad J Bushman","doi":"10.1177/17456916251404368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916251404368","url":null,"abstract":"This article pulls together diverse published findings on computer-mediated communication (CMC) to test the hypothesis that it reduces psychological engagement and impact compared with face-to-face (FTF) interactions. Although gaps and questions remain, the evidence mostly confirms reduced engagement and impact. Compared with FTF interactions, CMC elicits less positive emotion, with mixed results for negative emotions. Physiological arousal is often lower. Relationships, trust, and group cohesion develop more slowly (although perhaps eventually reaching the same levels). Information processing is reduced. Inhibitions are also reduced, leading to greater willingness to criticize, to bring up alternate perspectives and suggestions, and to neglect to respond. The disinhibition may improve participation by shy persons. Group performance and group decision-making are often impaired, although some studies found no difference. Teaching and learning go less well. Impact and engagement lose more with asynchronous than synchronous CMC. FTF interactions boost well-being compared with not interacting, but CMC is in between. When CMC augments FTF relationships, there may be benefits, but when it replaces them, there are psychological costs. Technology has enabled marvelous advances in long-distance communication, but there is still no fully satisfactory substitute for actually being together in person.","PeriodicalId":19757,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Psychological Science","volume":"29 1","pages":"17456916251404368"},"PeriodicalIF":12.6,"publicationDate":"2026-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145907525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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