Perspectives on Psychological Science最新文献

There is growing interest in the field of cooperative artificial intelligence (AI), that is, settings in which humans and machines cooperate. By now, more than 160 studies from various disciplines have reported on how people cooperate with machines in behavioral experiments. Our systematic review of the experimental instructions reveals that the implementation of the machine payoffs and the information participants receive about them differ drastically across these studies. In an online experiment (N = 1,198), we compare how these different payoff implementations shape people's revealed social preferences toward machines. When matched with machine partners, people reveal substantially stronger social preferences and reciprocity when they know that a human beneficiary receives the machine payoffs than when they know that no such "human behind the machine" exists. When participants are not informed about machine payoffs, we found weak social preferences toward machines. Comparing survey answers with those from a follow-up study (N = 150), we conclude that people form their beliefs about machine payoffs in a self-serving way. Thus, our results suggest that the extent to which humans cooperate with machines depends on the implementation and information about the machine's earnings.

Humans now understand the world as multilevel in nature. For example, societies emerge from individuals, and general experiences of life consist of specific aspects and momentary episodes. A critical feature of multilevel phenomena is between-level incongruences. Applied to human positivity, this means that positive higher-level units are not simply composed of positive lower-level units and that what is good for lower-level units may not be good for higher-level units (and vice versa). For example, killjoys may improve societal well-being, personal achievement may require giving up on certain goals, and a happy life may not arise from simply happy moments. In this article, I provide examples (organized by the positive outcome of well-being and performance and by the social, structural, and temporal forms of multilevel phenomena) to show that such between-level incongruences are ubiquitous. Next, I analyze a few mechanisms that may govern the diverse instantiations of between-level incongruences in positivity. Finally, I discuss implications of this perspective, such as why positivity claims should always qualify their level of analysis; how psychological science may benefit from a multilevel, dynamical, and computational perspective; and how to improve human positivity in light of between-level incongruences.

We propose an account of individual differences in risk preferences called "reference-point theory" for choices between sure things and gambles. Like most descriptive theories of risky choice, preferences depend on two drivers-hedonic sensitivities to change and beliefs about risk. But unlike most theories, these drivers are estimated from judged feelings about choice options and gamble outcomes. Furthermore, the reference point is assumed to be the less risky option (i.e., sure thing). Loss aversion (greater impact of negative change than positive change) and pessimism (belief the worst outcome is likelier) predict risk aversion. Gain seeking (greater impact of positive change than negative change and optimism (belief the best outcome is likelier) predict risk seeking. But other combinations of hedonic sensitivities and beliefs are possible, and they also predict risk preferences. Finally, feelings about the reference point predict hedonic sensitivities. When decision makers feel good about the reference point, they are frequently loss averse. When they feel bad about it, they are often gain seeking. Three studies show that feelings about reference points, feelings about options and feelings about outcomes predict risky choice and help explain why individuals differ in their risk preferences.

Political polarization is a barrier to enacting policy solutions to global issues. Social psychology has a rich history of studying polarization, and there is an important opportunity to define and refine its contributions to the present political realities. We do so in the context of one of the most pressing modern issues: climate change. We synthesize the literature on political polarization and its applications to climate change, and we propose lines of further research and intervention design. We focus on polarization in the United States, examining other countries when literature was available. The polarization literature emphasizes two types of mechanisms of political polarization: (1) individual-level psychological processes related to political ideology and (2) group-level psychological processes related to partisan identification. Interventions that address group-level processes can be more effective than those that address individual-level processes. Accordingly, we emphasize the promise of interventions leveraging superordinate identities, correcting misperceived norms, and having trusted leaders communicate about climate change. Behavioral interventions like these that are grounded in scientific research are one of our most promising tools to achieve the behavioral wedge that we need to address climate change and to make progress on other policy issues.

Embodied cognition-the idea that mental states and processes should be understood in relation to one's bodily constitution and interactions with the world-remains a controversial topic within cognitive science. Recently, however, increasing interest in predictive processing theories among proponents and critics of embodiment alike has raised hopes of a reconciliation. This article sets out to appraise the unificatory potential of predictive processing, focusing in particular on embodied formulations of active inference. Our analysis suggests that most active-inference accounts invoke weak, potentially trivial conceptions of embodiment; those making stronger claims do so independently of the theoretical commitments of the active-inference framework. We argue that a more compelling version of embodied active inference can be motivated by adopting a diachronic perspective on the way rhythmic physiological activity shapes neural development in utero. According to this visceral afferent training hypothesis, early-emerging physiological processes are essential not only for supporting the biophysical development of neural structures but also for configuring the cognitive architecture those structures entail. Focusing in particular on the cardiovascular system, we propose three candidate mechanisms through which visceral afferent training might operate: (a) activity-dependent neuronal development, (b) periodic signal modeling, and (c) oscillatory network coordination.

Suspicion probes are the traditional tool employed to assess the extent to which participants suspect intentional misdirection or deception within the research context. A primary reason psychologists use deception in research settings is to prevent participants from altering their behavior in light of knowing what is being studied, which could undermine internal validity as well as threaten the generalizability of findings to the real world (i.e., external validity). The present article elucidates a number of challenges with suspicion probes. A definition and framework for conceptualizing the construct of suspicion in research settings are proposed. Following a literature review, an analysis of existing evidence, and new data on the prevalence of using and reporting suspicion probes, we conclude that suspicion is a likely problem in research practice. We provide a decision guide to help researchers navigate the numerous choices involved in addressing potential suspicion and call for a combination of (a) renewed research leading to empirically supported tools and best practices and (b) systemic changes to editorial policies, funding practices, professional standards, and research training that would increase rigor and focus on this aspect of research methodology.

Faces are socially important surfaces of the body on which various meanings are attached. The widespread physiognomic belief that faces inherently contain socially predictive value is why they make a generative stimulus for perception research. However, critical problems arise in studies that simultaneously investigate faces and race. Researchers studying race and racism inadvertently engage in various research practices that transform faces with specific phenotypes into straightforward representatives of their presumed race category, thereby taking race and its phenotypic associations for granted. I argue that research practices that map race categories onto faces using bioessentialist ideas of racial phenotypes constitute a form of racecraft ideology, the dubious reasoning of which presupposes the reality of race and mystifies the causal relation between race and racism. In considering how to study racism without reifying race in face studies, this article places these practices in context, describes how they reproduce racecraft ideology and impair theoretical inferences, and then suggests counterpractices for minimizing this problem.

Interoception has been the subject of renewed interest over the past 2 decades. The involvement of interoception in a variety of fundamental human abilities (e.g., decision-making and emotional regulation) has led to the hypothesis that interoception is a central transdiagnostic process that causes and maintains mental disorders and physical diseases. However, interoception has been inconsistently defined and conceptualized. In the first part of this article, we argue that the widespread practice of defining interoception as the processing of signals originating from within the body and limiting it to specific physiological pathways (lamina I spinothalamic afferents) is problematic. This is because, in humans, the processing of internal states is underpinned by other physiological pathways generally assigned to the somatosensory system. In the second part, we explain that the consensual dimensions of interoception are empirically detached from existing measures, the latter of which capture loosely related phenomena. This is detrimental to the replicability of findings across measures and the validity of interpretations. In the general discussion, we discuss the main insights of the current analysis and suggest a more refined way to define interoception in humans and conceptualize its underlying dimensions.

Although chemical signaling is an essential mode of communication in most vertebrates, it has long been viewed as having negligible effects in humans. However, a growing body of evidence shows that the sense of smell affects human behavior in social contexts ranging from affiliation and parenting to disease avoidance and social threat. This article aims to (a) introduce research on human chemical communication in the historical context of the behavioral sciences; (b) provide a balanced overview of recent advances that describe individual differences in the emission of semiochemicals and the neural mechanisms underpinning their perception, that together demonstrate communicative function; and (c) propose directions for future research toward unraveling the molecular principles involved and understanding the variability in the generation, transmission, and reception of chemical signals in increasingly ecologically valid conditions. Achieving these goals will enable us to address some important societal challenges but are within reach only with the aid of genuinely interdisciplinary approaches.

History counts and cannot be overlooked. As a case in point, the origins of major theoretical tensions in the field of developmental psychology are traced back to Piaget (1896-1980), who paved the way to major discoveries regarding the origins and development of cognition. His theory framed much of the new ideas on early cognitive development that emerged in the 1970s, in the footsteps of the 1960s' cognitive revolution. Here, I retrace major conceptual changes since Piaget and provide a metaview on empirical findings that may have triggered the call for such changes. Nine theoretical views and intuitions are identified, all in strong reaction to some or all of the four cornerstone assumptions of Piaget's developmental account (i.e., action realism, domain generality, stages, and late representation). As a result, new and more extreme stances are now taken in the nature-versus-nurture debate. These stances rest on profoundly different, often clashing theoretical intuitions that keep shaping developmental research since Piaget.