Robert S. Harris, T. Jenkinson, S. Kaplan, Rüdiger Stucke
The conventional wisdom for investors in private equity funds is to invest in partnerships that have performed well in the past. This is based on the belief that performance in private equity persists across funds of the same partnership. We present new evidence on the persistence of U.S. private equity (buyout and venture capital) funds using a research-quality dataset from Burgiss, sourced from over 200 institutional investors. Relying on detailed cash-flow data for funds, we study the persistence of buyout and venture capital fund performance of the same general partners across different funds. We pay particular attention to persistence pre- and post-2000. Previous research, studying largely pre-2000 data, has found strong persistence for both buyout and venture capital firms. We confirm the previous findings on persistence in pre-2000 funds. There is persistence for buyout funds and, particularly, for venture funds. Post-2000, we find little evidence of persistence for buyout funds, except at the lower end of the performance distribution. When funds are sorted by the quartile of performance of their previous funds, performance of the current fund is statistically indistinguishable regardless of quartile. Performance for partnerships in all previous fund quartiles exceeds those of public markets as measured by the S&P 500. Regression results confirm the absence of persistence post-2000 except for funds in the lower end of the performance distribution. Post-2000, we find that performance in venture capital funds remains as persistent as pre-2000. Partnerships whose previous venture capital funds are below the median for their vintage year subsequently tend to be below median and have returns below those of the public markets (S&P 500). Partnerships in the top two quartiles tend to stay above the median and their returns exceed those of the public markets.
{"title":"Has Persistence Persisted in Private Equity? Evidence from Buyout and Venture Capital Funds","authors":"Robert S. Harris, T. Jenkinson, S. Kaplan, Rüdiger Stucke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2304808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2304808","url":null,"abstract":"The conventional wisdom for investors in private equity funds is to invest in partnerships that have performed well in the past. This is based on the belief that performance in private equity persists across funds of the same partnership. We present new evidence on the persistence of U.S. private equity (buyout and venture capital) funds using a research-quality dataset from Burgiss, sourced from over 200 institutional investors. Relying on detailed cash-flow data for funds, we study the persistence of buyout and venture capital fund performance of the same general partners across different funds. We pay particular attention to persistence pre- and post-2000. Previous research, studying largely pre-2000 data, has found strong persistence for both buyout and venture capital firms. We confirm the previous findings on persistence in pre-2000 funds. There is persistence for buyout funds and, particularly, for venture funds. Post-2000, we find little evidence of persistence for buyout funds, except at the lower end of the performance distribution. When funds are sorted by the quartile of performance of their previous funds, performance of the current fund is statistically indistinguishable regardless of quartile. Performance for partnerships in all previous fund quartiles exceeds those of public markets as measured by the S&P 500. Regression results confirm the absence of persistence post-2000 except for funds in the lower end of the performance distribution. Post-2000, we find that performance in venture capital funds remains as persistent as pre-2000. Partnerships whose previous venture capital funds are below the median for their vintage year subsequently tend to be below median and have returns below those of the public markets (S&P 500). Partnerships in the top two quartiles tend to stay above the median and their returns exceed those of the public markets.","PeriodicalId":197588,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms (Including VC & Buyout Firms) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125873857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For almost every type of company, the United States has just one body of securities regulation. Pet stores, hospitals, for-profit universities, and iron mines all have to comply with the same securities laws in basically the same way. There is, however, one important exception: investment funds. Mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds have their own special body of securities regulation that applies in place of or in addition to the regular securities laws that apply to other types of companies. Why? This 7,000-word essay, prepared for publication in the Research Handbook of Mutual funds, contemplates a number of possible answers and concludes that the most distinctive and legally salient feature of an investment fund is its structure. Investment funds divide their assets from their managements in much more radical ways than other types of companies. The surprising implication is that for purposes of regulation, an investment fund’s investments are much less important than its pattern of organization.
对于几乎所有类型的公司，美国只有一个证券监管机构。宠物店、医院、盈利性大学和铁矿都必须以基本相同的方式遵守同样的证券法。然而，有一个重要的例外:投资基金。共同基金、封闭式基金、交易所交易基金、对冲基金、私募股权基金和风险投资基金都有自己的特殊证券监管机构，这些机构适用于适用于其他类型公司的常规证券法，或在这些法律之外适用。为什么?这篇准备发表在《共同基金研究手册》(Research Handbook of Mutual funds)上的7000字文章，考虑了许多可能的答案，并得出结论:投资基金最独特、在法律上最显著的特征是它的结构。与其他类型的公司相比，投资基金将资产与管理层分开的方式要激进得多。令人惊讶的是，出于监管目的，投资基金的投资远不如其组织模式重要。
{"title":"Why Do Investment Funds Have Special Securities Regulation?","authors":"J. Morley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3375450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3375450","url":null,"abstract":"For almost every type of company, the United States has just one body of securities regulation. Pet stores, hospitals, for-profit universities, and iron mines all have to comply with the same securities laws in basically the same way. There is, however, one important exception: investment funds. Mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds have their own special body of securities regulation that applies in place of or in addition to the regular securities laws that apply to other types of companies. Why? This 7,000-word essay, prepared for publication in the Research Handbook of Mutual funds, contemplates a number of possible answers and concludes that the most distinctive and legally salient feature of an investment fund is its structure. Investment funds divide their assets from their managements in much more radical ways than other types of companies. The surprising implication is that for purposes of regulation, an investment fund’s investments are much less important than its pattern of organization.","PeriodicalId":197588,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms (Including VC & Buyout Firms) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122421990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T. Jenkinson, Stefan Morkoetter, Tobias Schori, Thom Wetzer
When investors commit capital to a private equity fund, the money is not immediately invested but is called by the fund manager throughout an investment period of up to five years. This business model allows private equity fund managers to invest the committed capital at their own discretion, which gives them the flexibility to time the markets. Based on 5,366 private equity deals, which are benchmarked against around 11,000 transaction market multiples and 170,000 trading market multiples, we find evidence that on average private equity funds are able to add value by timing the markets. Throughout the holding period, private equity funds achieve on average a 0.5 EBITDA market multiple expansion. Market timing ability is not captured by performance measures such as the PME, yet it is a potential source of returns for investors.
{"title":"Buy Low, Sell High? Do Private Equity Fund Managers Have Market Timing Abilities?","authors":"T. Jenkinson, Stefan Morkoetter, Tobias Schori, Thom Wetzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3152734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3152734","url":null,"abstract":"When investors commit capital to a private equity fund, the money is not immediately invested but is called by the fund manager throughout an investment period of up to five years. This business model allows private equity fund managers to invest the committed capital at their own discretion, which gives them the flexibility to time the markets. Based on 5,366 private equity deals, which are benchmarked against around 11,000 transaction market multiples and 170,000 trading market multiples, we find evidence that on average private equity funds are able to add value by timing the markets. Throughout the holding period, private equity funds achieve on average a 0.5 EBITDA market multiple expansion. Market timing ability is not captured by performance measures such as the PME, yet it is a potential source of returns for investors.","PeriodicalId":197588,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms (Including VC & Buyout Firms) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115524099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A wide range of definitions exists of what constitutes value creation and generation in private equity buyouts. At the core of the problem is that our understanding of the diverse set of levers, drivers and mechanisms by which financial value is generated has been inconsistent and incomplete. This paper attempts to address extant deficiencies in the literature by proposing a novel and cohesive conceptual model of value generation that connects various strands of research in the field.
{"title":"The Price of Nothing – The Value of Everything: Towards an Understanding of Value Creation in Private Equity Buyouts","authors":"Simon Hannus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2612841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2612841","url":null,"abstract":"A wide range of definitions exists of what constitutes value creation and generation in private equity buyouts. At the core of the problem is that our understanding of the diverse set of levers, drivers and mechanisms by which financial value is generated has been inconsistent and incomplete. This paper attempts to address extant deficiencies in the literature by proposing a novel and cohesive conceptual model of value generation that connects various strands of research in the field.","PeriodicalId":197588,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms (Including VC & Buyout Firms) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131716683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corporate Governance has evolved considerably over the last hundred years and gained momentum through the various corporate scandals that plagued the economies in the world. Intertwined in business management and law, Corporate Governance has been the subject of many debates and theories. Originally rooted in the principle that its sole purpose is the maximization of shareholders' value, various theories have helped shed light and shape laws on the true meaning and implications of Corporate Governance.However, not every country has the same understanding of what shareholders' value entails for the day-to-day management of a corporation by its directors.Liberals such as Milton Friedman are strong advocates of a self-regulation of companies under a free market principle where directors are stewards acting in good faith on behalf of the shareholders. The Agency Theory, based on the work of Berle and Means 1948, highlights the conflict that may arise for a director who has to act solely for the company's shareholders in defiance of his own preferences or interests. This moral hazard recognised in this theory is the agency cost. Other theories like the Transaction Cost Economics had gained some interests in taking an economic view at corporations, but the Stakeholders Theory is the one that has had the most influence and in particular in European and Asian countries.Using five key countries, namely United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan and South Korea, a legal review of those countries is conducted in light of their historical, cultural, economic background to understand the strategies taken on Corporate Governance over time. But first a practical and financial review of what constitute shareholders' value is performed and this helps uncover the relations between shareholders' value and the various stakeholders of any given corporation.This dissertation concludes on the convergence achieved in those countries, the similarities and differences and suggests a balanced approach to contribute to overcome corporate governance challenges.
在过去的一百年里，公司治理已经发生了很大的变化，并通过困扰世界经济的各种公司丑闻获得了动力。公司治理与商业管理和法律交织在一起，一直是许多争论和理论的主题。公司治理的唯一目的是股东价值最大化，这一原则最初植根于这一原则，各种理论有助于阐明和塑造有关公司治理的真正含义和含义的法律。然而，并非每个国家都对股东价值对公司董事日常管理的影响有相同的理解。米尔顿•弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)等自由主义者强烈主张在自由市场原则下对公司进行自我监管，在这种原则下，董事是代表股东真诚行事的管家。基于Berle and Means 1948年著作的代理理论(Agency Theory)，强调了一名董事不顾自己的偏好或利益，只能为公司股东行事时可能出现的冲突。这一理论所承认的道德风险就是代理成本。其他理论，如交易成本经济学，在企业的经济观点中获得了一些兴趣，但利益相关者理论是最有影响力的理论，特别是在欧洲和亚洲国家。本文以英国、德国、法国、日本和韩国五个主要国家为例，根据这些国家的历史、文化和经济背景，对这些国家进行法律审查，以了解它们在公司治理方面所采取的策略。但首先对股东价值的构成进行了实际和财务审查，这有助于揭示股东价值与任何给定公司的各种利益相关者之间的关系。本文总结了这些国家实现的趋同，异同，并提出了一种平衡的方法来帮助克服公司治理挑战。
{"title":"Cross-Country Comparison of the Evolution of Corporate Governance from a Shareholder to a Stakeholder Perspective","authors":"Jacques Deguest","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2723706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2723706","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate Governance has evolved considerably over the last hundred years and gained momentum through the various corporate scandals that plagued the economies in the world. Intertwined in business management and law, Corporate Governance has been the subject of many debates and theories. Originally rooted in the principle that its sole purpose is the maximization of shareholders' value, various theories have helped shed light and shape laws on the true meaning and implications of Corporate Governance.However, not every country has the same understanding of what shareholders' value entails for the day-to-day management of a corporation by its directors.Liberals such as Milton Friedman are strong advocates of a self-regulation of companies under a free market principle where directors are stewards acting in good faith on behalf of the shareholders. The Agency Theory, based on the work of Berle and Means 1948, highlights the conflict that may arise for a director who has to act solely for the company's shareholders in defiance of his own preferences or interests. This moral hazard recognised in this theory is the agency cost. Other theories like the Transaction Cost Economics had gained some interests in taking an economic view at corporations, but the Stakeholders Theory is the one that has had the most influence and in particular in European and Asian countries.Using five key countries, namely United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan and South Korea, a legal review of those countries is conducted in light of their historical, cultural, economic background to understand the strategies taken on Corporate Governance over time. But first a practical and financial review of what constitute shareholders' value is performed and this helps uncover the relations between shareholders' value and the various stakeholders of any given corporation.This dissertation concludes on the convergence achieved in those countries, the similarities and differences and suggests a balanced approach to contribute to overcome corporate governance challenges.","PeriodicalId":197588,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms (Including VC & Buyout Firms) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121038067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines diversification as a source of value creation and destruction in private equity. The literature has focused on the `diversification discount' in corporations. It has not analyzed diversification in PE-funds, where diversification might increase value by ameliorating managerial risk aversion and by facilitating knowledge sharing. Thus, I examine a sample of 1505 PE-funds to show that industry and geographic diversification increases PE-fund returns on average, this is likely due to knowledge-sharing/learning, and is not due to mere risk-reduction or endogeneity. Diversification can also destroy value if it spreads staff too thinly across industries/regions or is motivated by risk-aversion over performance bonuses.
{"title":"Diversification in Private Equity Funds: On Knowledge-Sharing, Risk-Aversion and Limited-Attention","authors":"M. Humphery‐Jenner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1710948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1710948","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines diversification as a source of value creation and destruction in private equity. The literature has focused on the `diversification discount' in corporations. It has not analyzed diversification in PE-funds, where diversification might increase value by ameliorating managerial risk aversion and by facilitating knowledge sharing. Thus, I examine a sample of 1505 PE-funds to show that industry and geographic diversification increases PE-fund returns on average, this is likely due to knowledge-sharing/learning, and is not due to mere risk-reduction or endogeneity. Diversification can also destroy value if it spreads staff too thinly across industries/regions or is motivated by risk-aversion over performance bonuses.","PeriodicalId":197588,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms (Including VC & Buyout Firms) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123847470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
LBOs that file for bankruptcy are routinely challenged under fraudulent transfer law, where plaintiffs allege that the LBO unreasonably reduced the target’s liquidity and capital adequacy, saddled it with debt and was completed as a means of funneling company assets to both current and former shareholders. These cases will bestow upon bankruptcy courts the responsibility and power of efficiently allocating billions of dollars to classes of creditors and clawing back funds from shareholders. Since these cases will have a crucial impact on the overall economy, it is imperative that bankruptcy courts wield their authority and power in a predictable, fair, and consistent fashion.In this paper, we will seek to understand (I) the nature of LBOs, (II) the fundamental mechanisms in place under fraudulent transfer laws and (III) the remedies available to creditors who have been harmed by a LBO. Once this has been achieved, we will explore (IV) the means by which Courts determine whether a firm is solvent pursuant to fraudulent transfer laws and (V) the potential shortfalls and issues inherent to this analysis before (VI) elaborating on a recommended method of analysis that can reduce uncertainty and return control of the analysis to the Court.
{"title":"Improving Fraudulent Transfer Law in Leverage Buy-Outs Through Judicial Certainty & Reliability","authors":"Vincent V. Hilldrup","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2351695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2351695","url":null,"abstract":"LBOs that file for bankruptcy are routinely challenged under fraudulent transfer law, where plaintiffs allege that the LBO unreasonably reduced the target’s liquidity and capital adequacy, saddled it with debt and was completed as a means of funneling company assets to both current and former shareholders. These cases will bestow upon bankruptcy courts the responsibility and power of efficiently allocating billions of dollars to classes of creditors and clawing back funds from shareholders. Since these cases will have a crucial impact on the overall economy, it is imperative that bankruptcy courts wield their authority and power in a predictable, fair, and consistent fashion.In this paper, we will seek to understand (I) the nature of LBOs, (II) the fundamental mechanisms in place under fraudulent transfer laws and (III) the remedies available to creditors who have been harmed by a LBO. Once this has been achieved, we will explore (IV) the means by which Courts determine whether a firm is solvent pursuant to fraudulent transfer laws and (V) the potential shortfalls and issues inherent to this analysis before (VI) elaborating on a recommended method of analysis that can reduce uncertainty and return control of the analysis to the Court.","PeriodicalId":197588,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms (Including VC & Buyout Firms) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131229967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Private equity is best understood not as a financing method but as a governance structure, one that emphasizes strong performance incentives, rules over discretion, and a strong alignment between ownership and management. Briefly, private equity governance makes owners into active managers and makes managers behave like owners. As such, private equity is often regarded as a more “entrepreneurial” form of governance than that associated with the publicly traded corporation. We argue for a balanced view in which private equity is best regarded as a governance structure that, like all forms of organization, has benefits and costs that vary according to circumstances. Building on the “judgment-based” view of entrepreneurship, we note that managers of privately held firms, as owners, exercise a strong degree of entrepreneurial judgment over the use of assets, unlike salaried executives of publicly held companies. At the same time, however, privately held firms are often constrained from pursuing potentially at...
{"title":"Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Governance: Time for a Balanced View","authors":"Peter G. Klein, J. Chapman, Mario P. Mondelli","doi":"10.5465/AMP.2012.0132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AMP.2012.0132","url":null,"abstract":"Private equity is best understood not as a financing method but as a governance structure, one that emphasizes strong performance incentives, rules over discretion, and a strong alignment between ownership and management. Briefly, private equity governance makes owners into active managers and makes managers behave like owners. As such, private equity is often regarded as a more “entrepreneurial” form of governance than that associated with the publicly traded corporation. We argue for a balanced view in which private equity is best regarded as a governance structure that, like all forms of organization, has benefits and costs that vary according to circumstances. Building on the “judgment-based” view of entrepreneurship, we note that managers of privately held firms, as owners, exercise a strong degree of entrepreneurial judgment over the use of assets, unlike salaried executives of publicly held companies. At the same time, however, privately held firms are often constrained from pursuing potentially at...","PeriodicalId":197588,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms (Including VC & Buyout Firms) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116107898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-10-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00431.x
Wouter De Maeseneire, Samantha Brinkhuis
This paper examines leverage in European private equity‐led leveraged buyouts (LBOs). We use a unique, self‐constructed sample of 126 European private equity (PE)‐sponsored buyouts completed between June 2000 and June 2007. We find that determinants derived from classical capital structure theories do not explain leverage in LBOs, while they do drive leverage in a control group of comparable public firms. Rather, we document that leverage levels in LBOs are related to the prevailing conditions in the debt market. In addition, our results indicate that reputed private equity sponsors use more debt and that secondary buyouts have higher leverage levels.
{"title":"What Drives Leverage in Leveraged Buyouts? An Analysis of European Leveraged Buyouts’ Capital Structure","authors":"Wouter De Maeseneire, Samantha Brinkhuis","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00431.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00431.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines leverage in European private equity‐led leveraged buyouts (LBOs). We use a unique, self‐constructed sample of 126 European private equity (PE)‐sponsored buyouts completed between June 2000 and June 2007. We find that determinants derived from classical capital structure theories do not explain leverage in LBOs, while they do drive leverage in a control group of comparable public firms. Rather, we document that leverage levels in LBOs are related to the prevailing conditions in the debt market. In addition, our results indicate that reputed private equity sponsors use more debt and that secondary buyouts have higher leverage levels.","PeriodicalId":197588,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms (Including VC & Buyout Firms) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116831623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Private equity investors seek to rank potential investment opportunities in growth stage private companies within an industry sector. The sparsity of historical investment transaction data for many growth stage private companies' may present a major obstacle to using statistical methods to discern industry specific features associated with successful and failed companies.This paper describes a Bayesian ranking approach based on i extracting and selecting features; ii training support vector machine classifiers from feature pairs of labeled companies in an industry; iii non-parametric estimation of posterior probabilities of success and failure; and iv ranking unlabeled companies within a cohort based on scores derived from posterior probability estimates. We anticipate that this approach will not only be of interest to statisticians and machine learning specialists with an interest in venture capital and private equity but extend to a broader readership whose interests lie in classification methods where missing data is the primary obstacle.
{"title":"A Bayesian Approach to Ranking Private Companies Based on Predictive Indicators","authors":"M. Dixon, J. Chong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2096425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2096425","url":null,"abstract":"Private equity investors seek to rank potential investment opportunities in growth stage private companies within an industry sector. The sparsity of historical investment transaction data for many growth stage private companies' may present a major obstacle to using statistical methods to discern industry specific features associated with successful and failed companies.This paper describes a Bayesian ranking approach based on i extracting and selecting features; ii training support vector machine classifiers from feature pairs of labeled companies in an industry; iii non-parametric estimation of posterior probabilities of success and failure; and iv ranking unlabeled companies within a cohort based on scores derived from posterior probability estimates. We anticipate that this approach will not only be of interest to statisticians and machine learning specialists with an interest in venture capital and private equity but extend to a broader readership whose interests lie in classification methods where missing data is the primary obstacle.","PeriodicalId":197588,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms (Including VC & Buyout Firms) (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132669094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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