The doctrine of the Trinity maintains that there are exactly three divine Persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) but only one God. The philosophical problem raised by this doctrine is well known. On the one hand, the doctrine seems clearly to imply that the divine Persons are numerically distinct. How else could they be ‘three’ rather than one? On the other hand, it seems to imply that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are identical. If each Person is divine, how else could there be exactly ‘one’ God? But the divine Persons can’t be both distinct and identical. Thus, the doctrine appears to be incoherent. Some try to solve this problem by appeal to the view that identity is sortal-relative. This chapter argues that this strategy is unsuccessful as a stand-alone solution to the problem of the Trinity.
{"title":"Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity","authors":"Michael Rea","doi":"10.5840/PC20035247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PC20035247","url":null,"abstract":"The doctrine of the Trinity maintains that there are exactly three divine Persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) but only one God. The philosophical problem raised by this doctrine is well known. On the one hand, the doctrine seems clearly to imply that the divine Persons are numerically distinct. How else could they be ‘three’ rather than one? On the other hand, it seems to imply that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are identical. If each Person is divine, how else could there be exactly ‘one’ God? But the divine Persons can’t be both distinct and identical. Thus, the doctrine appears to be incoherent. Some try to solve this problem by appeal to the view that identity is sortal-relative. This chapter argues that this strategy is unsuccessful as a stand-alone solution to the problem of the Trinity.","PeriodicalId":202769,"journal":{"name":"Essays in Analytic Theology","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121769564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-27DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866817.003.0007
Michael Rea
The most prominent objection against sceptical theism is that the sceptical theses typically adduced in support of it have ramifications that range far more widely than sceptical theists hope or should tolerate: they lead to scepticism about various aspects of commonsense morality, about divine honesty and goodness, about the evidential value of religious experience, and much else besides. This chapter responds to various different defences of this objection presented by Stephen Maitzen, David O’Connor, and Ian Wilks.
{"title":"Sceptical Theism and the ‘Too-Much-Scepticism’ Objection","authors":"Michael Rea","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198866817.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866817.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The most prominent objection against sceptical theism is that the sceptical theses typically adduced in support of it have ramifications that range far more widely than sceptical theists hope or should tolerate: they lead to scepticism about various aspects of commonsense morality, about divine honesty and goodness, about the evidential value of religious experience, and much else besides. This chapter responds to various different defences of this objection presented by Stephen Maitzen, David O’Connor, and Ian Wilks.","PeriodicalId":202769,"journal":{"name":"Essays in Analytic Theology","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133031640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-27DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866817.003.0006
Michael Rea
In Evil and the Justice of God, N. T. Wright suggests that attempting to solve the philosophical problem of evil is an immature response to the existence of evil—one that belittles the real problem, which is just that evil is bad and needs to be dealt with. If he is correct, then the vast majority of work on the problem of evil in the analytic philosophical tradition has been worthless at best, and possibly even pernicious (by virtue of trivializing a serious theological issue). This chapter identifies a kernel of truth in Wright’s objection to philosophical attempts to solve the problem of evil, and goes on to argue that some such attempts avoid Wright’s objection.
{"title":"Wright on Theodicy","authors":"Michael Rea","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198866817.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866817.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"In Evil and the Justice of God, N. T. Wright suggests that attempting to solve the philosophical problem of evil is an immature response to the existence of evil—one that belittles the real problem, which is just that evil is bad and needs to be dealt with. If he is correct, then the vast majority of work on the problem of evil in the analytic philosophical tradition has been worthless at best, and possibly even pernicious (by virtue of trivializing a serious theological issue). This chapter identifies a kernel of truth in Wright’s objection to philosophical attempts to solve the problem of evil, and goes on to argue that some such attempts avoid Wright’s objection.","PeriodicalId":202769,"journal":{"name":"Essays in Analytic Theology","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124912775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-27DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198866817.003.0003
Michael Rea
This chapter offers a metaphysical account of the incarnation that starts from substantive assumptions about the nature of natures and about the metaphysics of the Trinity and develops in light of these a story about the relations among the elements involved in the incarnation. Central to the view described are two features of Aristotle’s metaphysics: (i) a hylomorphic understanding of material objects, (ii) a doctrine of numerical sameness without identity, and (iii) the view that the nature of a thing can appropriately be identified with its form. These ideas, along with other important aspects of the metaphysical framework which are discussed, form the bulk of the chapter. They are followed by a brief sketch of the account of the Trinity that the author and Jeffrey Brower have presented in detail elsewhere. In the final section, the author’s account of the incarnation is presented.
{"title":"Hylomorphism and the Incarnation","authors":"Michael Rea","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198866817.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866817.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter offers a metaphysical account of the incarnation that starts from substantive assumptions about the nature of natures and about the metaphysics of the Trinity and develops in light of these a story about the relations among the elements involved in the incarnation. Central to the view described are two features of Aristotle’s metaphysics: (i) a hylomorphic understanding of material objects, (ii) a doctrine of numerical sameness without identity, and (iii) the view that the nature of a thing can appropriately be identified with its form. These ideas, along with other important aspects of the metaphysical framework which are discussed, form the bulk of the chapter. They are followed by a brief sketch of the account of the Trinity that the author and Jeffrey Brower have presented in detail elsewhere. In the final section, the author’s account of the incarnation is presented.","PeriodicalId":202769,"journal":{"name":"Essays in Analytic Theology","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122780426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-17DOI: 10.24204/EJPR.V11I1.2568
Michael Rea
Eleonore Stump’s Atonement is a masterful and historic contribution to the project of Christian soteriology. Among its many virtues is the fact that it manages to be richly novel and innovative while at the same time hewing close and doing justice to what has been most widely and traditionally affirmed about the salvific work of Christ. One of the most interesting and important novelties in the book is her treatment of what she, following Aquinas, calls the problem of the stain on the soul. Chapter 3 presents this problem and Stump’s solution to it, explains why her solution falls short, and then suggests an alternative way of addressing it.
{"title":"The Ill-Made Knight and the Stain on the Soul","authors":"Michael Rea","doi":"10.24204/EJPR.V11I1.2568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.V11I1.2568","url":null,"abstract":"Eleonore Stump’s Atonement is a masterful and historic contribution to the project of Christian soteriology. Among its many virtues is the fact that it manages to be richly novel and innovative while at the same time hewing close and doing justice to what has been most widely and traditionally affirmed about the salvific work of Christ. One of the most interesting and important novelties in the book is her treatment of what she, following Aquinas, calls the problem of the stain on the soul. Chapter 3 presents this problem and Stump’s solution to it, explains why her solution falls short, and then suggests an alternative way of addressing it.","PeriodicalId":202769,"journal":{"name":"Essays in Analytic Theology","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114907108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-23DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198826019.003.0004
Michael Rea
For over two decades, the philosophical literature on divine hiddenness has been concerned with just one problem about divine hiddenness that arises out of one very particular concept of God. The problem—call it the Schellenberg problem—has J. L. Schellenberg as both its inventor and its most ardent defender. This chapter argues that the Schellenberg problem is an attack on a straw deity. More specifically, it proposes that Schellenberg’s argument against the existence of God depends on certain theological claims that are not commitments of traditional Christian theology and that would, furthermore, be repudiated by many of the most important and influential theologians in the Christian tradition. The chapter closes with some very brief remarks about the implications of this conclusion for what is taken to be the real import of the Schellenberg problem.
{"title":"Hiddenness and Transcendence","authors":"Michael Rea","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198826019.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198826019.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"For over two decades, the philosophical literature on divine hiddenness has been concerned with just one problem about divine hiddenness that arises out of one very particular concept of God. The problem—call it the Schellenberg problem—has J. L. Schellenberg as both its inventor and its most ardent defender. This chapter argues that the Schellenberg problem is an attack on a straw deity. More specifically, it proposes that Schellenberg’s argument against the existence of God depends on certain theological claims that are not commitments of traditional Christian theology and that would, furthermore, be repudiated by many of the most important and influential theologians in the Christian tradition. The chapter closes with some very brief remarks about the implications of this conclusion for what is taken to be the real import of the Schellenberg problem.","PeriodicalId":202769,"journal":{"name":"Essays in Analytic Theology","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123302546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christian philosophers and theologians have long been concerned with the question of how to reconcile their belief in three fully divine Persons with their commitment to monotheism. The most popular strategy for doing this—the social trinitarian strategy—argues that, though the divine Persons are in no sense the same God, monotheism is secured by certain relations that obtain among them. It is argued that if the social trinitarian understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity is correct, then Christianity is not interestingly different from the polytheistic Amun-Re theology of Egypt’s New Kingdom period. Thus, social trinitarianism should be classified as a version of polytheism rather than monotheism.
{"title":"Polytheism and Christian Belief","authors":"Michael Rea","doi":"10.1093/JTS/FLJ007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JTS/FLJ007","url":null,"abstract":"Christian philosophers and theologians have long been concerned with the question of how to reconcile their belief in three fully divine Persons with their commitment to monotheism. The most popular strategy for doing this—the social trinitarian strategy—argues that, though the divine Persons are in no sense the same God, monotheism is secured by certain relations that obtain among them. It is argued that if the social trinitarian understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity is correct, then Christianity is not interestingly different from the polytheistic Amun-Re theology of Egypt’s New Kingdom period. Thus, social trinitarianism should be classified as a version of polytheism rather than monotheism.","PeriodicalId":202769,"journal":{"name":"Essays in Analytic Theology","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128429810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：