Ran Ben Basat, Gil Einziger, Junzhi Gong, Jalil Moraney, D. Raz
Network measurement is an essential building block for a variety of network applications such as traffic engineering, quality of service, load-balancing and intrusion detection. Maintaining a per-flow state is often impractical due to the large number of flows, and thus modern systems use complex data structures that are updated with each incoming packet. Therefore, designing measurement applications that operate at line speed is a significant challenge in this domain. In this work, we address this challenge by providing a unified mechanism that improves the update time of a variety of network algorithms. We do so by identifying, studying, and optimizing a common algorithmic pattern that we call q-MAX. The goal is to maintain the largest q values in a stream of packets. We formally analyze the problem and introduce interval and sliding window algorithms that have a worst-case constant update time. We show that our algorithms perform up to X20 faster than library algorithms, and using these new algorithms for several popular measurement applications yields a throughput improvement of up to X12 on real network traces. Finally, we implemented the scheme within Open vSwitch, a state of the art virtual switch. We show that q-MAX based monitoring runs in line speed while current monitoring techniques are significantly slower.
{"title":"q-MAX: A Unified Scheme for Improving Network Measurement Throughput","authors":"Ran Ben Basat, Gil Einziger, Junzhi Gong, Jalil Moraney, D. Raz","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355569","url":null,"abstract":"Network measurement is an essential building block for a variety of network applications such as traffic engineering, quality of service, load-balancing and intrusion detection. Maintaining a per-flow state is often impractical due to the large number of flows, and thus modern systems use complex data structures that are updated with each incoming packet. Therefore, designing measurement applications that operate at line speed is a significant challenge in this domain. In this work, we address this challenge by providing a unified mechanism that improves the update time of a variety of network algorithms. We do so by identifying, studying, and optimizing a common algorithmic pattern that we call q-MAX. The goal is to maintain the largest q values in a stream of packets. We formally analyze the problem and introduce interval and sliding window algorithms that have a worst-case constant update time. We show that our algorithms perform up to X20 faster than library algorithms, and using these new algorithms for several popular measurement applications yields a throughput improvement of up to X12 on real network traces. Finally, we implemented the scheme within Open vSwitch, a state of the art virtual switch. We show that q-MAX based monitoring runs in line speed while current monitoring techniques are significantly slower.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85278249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
V. Adarsh, Michael Nekrasov, E. Zegura, E. Belding-Royer
Over 87% of US mobile wireless subscriptions are currently held by LTE-capable devices [34]. However, prior work has demonstrated that connectivity may not equate to usable service. Even in well-provisioned urban networks, unusually high usage (such as during a public event or after a natural disaster) can lead to overload that makes the LTE service difficult, if not impossible to use, even if the user is solidly within the coverage area. A typical approach to detect and quantify overload on LTE networks is to secure the cooperation of the network provider for access to internal metrics. An alternative approach is to deploy multiple mobile devices with active subscriptions to each mobile network operator (MNO). Both approaches are resource and time intensive. In this work, we propose a novel method to estimate overload in LTE networks using only passive measurements, and without requiring provider cooperation. We use this method to analyze packet-level traces for three commercial LTE service providers, T-Mobile, Verizon and AT&T, from several locations during both typical levels of usage and during public events that yield large, dense crowds. This study presents the first look at overload estimation through the analysis of unencrypted broadcast messages. We show that an upsurge in broadcast reject and cell barring messages can accurately detect an increase in network overload.
{"title":"Packet-level Overload Estimation in LTE Networks using Passive Measurements","authors":"V. Adarsh, Michael Nekrasov, E. Zegura, E. Belding-Royer","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355574","url":null,"abstract":"Over 87% of US mobile wireless subscriptions are currently held by LTE-capable devices [34]. However, prior work has demonstrated that connectivity may not equate to usable service. Even in well-provisioned urban networks, unusually high usage (such as during a public event or after a natural disaster) can lead to overload that makes the LTE service difficult, if not impossible to use, even if the user is solidly within the coverage area. A typical approach to detect and quantify overload on LTE networks is to secure the cooperation of the network provider for access to internal metrics. An alternative approach is to deploy multiple mobile devices with active subscriptions to each mobile network operator (MNO). Both approaches are resource and time intensive. In this work, we propose a novel method to estimate overload in LTE networks using only passive measurements, and without requiring provider cooperation. We use this method to analyze packet-level traces for three commercial LTE service providers, T-Mobile, Verizon and AT&T, from several locations during both typical levels of usage and during public events that yield large, dense crowds. This study presents the first look at overload estimation through the analysis of unencrypted broadcast messages. We show that an upsurge in broadcast reject and cell barring messages can accurately detect an increase in network overload.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82999115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stephen McQuistin, Sree Priyanka Uppu, Marcel Flores
Anycast is a popular tool for deploying global, widely available systems, including DNS infrastructure and content delivery networks (CDNs). The optimization of these networks often focuses on the deployment and management of anycast sites. However, such approaches fail to consider one of the primary configurations of a large anycast network: the set of networks that receive anycast announcements at each site (i.e., an announcement configuration). Altering these configurations, even without the deployment of additional sites, can have profound impacts on both anycast site selection and round-trip times. In this study, we explore the operation and optimization of any-cast networks through the lens of deployments that have a large number of upstream service providers. We demonstrate that these many-provider anycast networks exhibit fundamentally different properties when interacting with the Internet, having a greater number of single AS hop paths and reduced dependency on each provider, compared with few-provider networks. We further examine the impact of announcement configuration changes, demonstrating that in nearly 30% of vantage point groups, round-trip time performance can be improved by more than 25%, solely by manipulating which providers receive anycast announcements. Finally, we propose DailyCatch, an empirical measurement methodology for testing and validating announcement configuration changes, and demonstrate its ability to influence user-experienced performance on a global anycast CDN.
{"title":"Taming Anycast in the Wild Internet","authors":"Stephen McQuistin, Sree Priyanka Uppu, Marcel Flores","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355573","url":null,"abstract":"Anycast is a popular tool for deploying global, widely available systems, including DNS infrastructure and content delivery networks (CDNs). The optimization of these networks often focuses on the deployment and management of anycast sites. However, such approaches fail to consider one of the primary configurations of a large anycast network: the set of networks that receive anycast announcements at each site (i.e., an announcement configuration). Altering these configurations, even without the deployment of additional sites, can have profound impacts on both anycast site selection and round-trip times. In this study, we explore the operation and optimization of any-cast networks through the lens of deployments that have a large number of upstream service providers. We demonstrate that these many-provider anycast networks exhibit fundamentally different properties when interacting with the Internet, having a greater number of single AS hop paths and reduced dependency on each provider, compared with few-provider networks. We further examine the impact of announcement configuration changes, demonstrating that in nearly 30% of vantage point groups, round-trip time performance can be improved by more than 25%, solely by manipulating which providers receive anycast announcements. Finally, we propose DailyCatch, an empirical measurement methodology for testing and validating announcement configuration changes, and demonstrate its ability to influence user-experienced performance on a global anycast CDN.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88472104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The internationalized domain name (IDN) is a mechanism that enables us to use Unicode characters in domain names. The set of Unicode characters contains several pairs of characters that are visually identical with each other; e.g., the Latin character 'a' (U+0061) and Cyrillic character 'a' (U+0430). Visually identical characters such as these are generally known as homoglyphs. IDN homograph attacks, which are widely known, abuse Unicode homoglyphs to create lookalike URLs. Although the threat posed by IDN homograph attacks is not new, the recent rise of IDN adoption in both domain name registries and web browsers has resulted in the threat of these attacks becoming increasingly widespread, leading to large-scale phishing attacks such as those targeting cryptocurrency exchange companies. In this work, we developed a framework named "ShamFinder," which is an automated scheme to detect IDN homographs. Our key contribution is the automatic construction of a homoglyph database, which can be used for direct countermeasures against the attack and to inform users about the context of an IDN homograph. Using the ShamFinder framework, we perform a large-scale measurement study that aims to understand the IDN homographs that exist in the wild. On the basis of our approach, we provide insights into an effective countermeasure against the threats caused by the IDN homograph attack.
{"title":"ShamFinder: An Automated Framework for Detecting IDN Homographs","authors":"Hiroaki Suzuki, Daiki Chiba, Yoshiro Yoneya, Tatsuya Mori, Shigeki Goto","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355587","url":null,"abstract":"The internationalized domain name (IDN) is a mechanism that enables us to use Unicode characters in domain names. The set of Unicode characters contains several pairs of characters that are visually identical with each other; e.g., the Latin character 'a' (U+0061) and Cyrillic character 'a' (U+0430). Visually identical characters such as these are generally known as homoglyphs. IDN homograph attacks, which are widely known, abuse Unicode homoglyphs to create lookalike URLs. Although the threat posed by IDN homograph attacks is not new, the recent rise of IDN adoption in both domain name registries and web browsers has resulted in the threat of these attacks becoming increasingly widespread, leading to large-scale phishing attacks such as those targeting cryptocurrency exchange companies. In this work, we developed a framework named \"ShamFinder,\" which is an automated scheme to detect IDN homographs. Our key contribution is the automatic construction of a homoglyph database, which can be used for direct countermeasures against the attack and to inform users about the context of an IDN homograph. Using the ShamFinder framework, we perform a large-scale measurement study that aims to understand the IDN homographs that exist in the wild. On the basis of our approach, we provide insights into an effective countermeasure against the threats caused by the IDN homograph attack.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82215333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Daniel Kopp, M. Wichtlhuber, Ingmar Poese, Jair Santanna, O. Hohlfeld, C. Dietzel
Booter services continue to provide popular DDoS-as-a-service platforms and enable anyone irrespective of their technical ability, to execute DDoS attacks with devastating impact. Since booters are a serious threat to Internet operations and can cause significant financial and reputational damage, they also draw the attention of law enforcement agencies and related counter activities. In this paper, we investigate booter-based DDoS attacks in the wild and the impact of an FBI takedown targeting 15 booter websites in December 2018 from the perspective of a major IXP and two ISPs. We study and compare attack properties of multiple booter services by launching Gbps-level attacks against our own infrastructure. To understand spatial and temporal trends of the DDoS traffic originating from booters we scrutinize 5 months, worth of inter-domain traffic. We observe that the takedown only leads to a temporary reduction in attack traffic. Additionally, one booter was found to quickly continue operation by using a new domain for its website.
{"title":"DDoS Hide & Seek: On the Effectiveness of a Booter Services Takedown","authors":"Daniel Kopp, M. Wichtlhuber, Ingmar Poese, Jair Santanna, O. Hohlfeld, C. Dietzel","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355590","url":null,"abstract":"Booter services continue to provide popular DDoS-as-a-service platforms and enable anyone irrespective of their technical ability, to execute DDoS attacks with devastating impact. Since booters are a serious threat to Internet operations and can cause significant financial and reputational damage, they also draw the attention of law enforcement agencies and related counter activities. In this paper, we investigate booter-based DDoS attacks in the wild and the impact of an FBI takedown targeting 15 booter websites in December 2018 from the perspective of a major IXP and two ISPs. We study and compare attack properties of multiple booter services by launching Gbps-level attacks against our own infrastructure. To understand spatial and temporal trends of the DDoS traffic originating from booters we scrutinize 5 months, worth of inter-domain traffic. We observe that the takedown only leads to a temporary reduction in attack traffic. Additionally, one booter was found to quickly continue operation by using a new domain for its website.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88822314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T. Böttger, F. Cuadrado, G. Antichi, E. L. Fernandes, Gareth Tyson, Ignacio Castro, S. Uhlig
DNS is a vital component for almost every networked application. Originally it was designed as an unencrypted protocol, making user security a concern. DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) is the latest proposal to make name resolution more secure. In this paper we study the current DNS-over-HTTPS ecosystem, especially the cost of the additional security. We start by surveying the current DoH landscape by assessing standard compliance and supported features of public DoH servers. We then compare different transports for secure DNS, to highlight the improvements DoH makes over its predecessor, DNS-over-TLS (DoT). These improvements explain in part the significantly larger take-up of DoH in comparison to DoT. Finally, we quantify the overhead incurred by the additional layers of the DoH transport and their impact on web page load times. We find that these overheads only have limited impact on page load times, suggesting that it is possible to obtain the improved security of DoH with only marginal performance impact.
{"title":"An Empirical Study of the Cost of DNS-over-HTTPS","authors":"T. Böttger, F. Cuadrado, G. Antichi, E. L. Fernandes, Gareth Tyson, Ignacio Castro, S. Uhlig","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355575","url":null,"abstract":"DNS is a vital component for almost every networked application. Originally it was designed as an unencrypted protocol, making user security a concern. DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) is the latest proposal to make name resolution more secure. In this paper we study the current DNS-over-HTTPS ecosystem, especially the cost of the additional security. We start by surveying the current DoH landscape by assessing standard compliance and supported features of public DoH servers. We then compare different transports for secure DNS, to highlight the improvements DoH makes over its predecessor, DNS-over-TLS (DoT). These improvements explain in part the significantly larger take-up of DoH in comparison to DoT. Finally, we quantify the overhead incurred by the additional layers of the DoH transport and their impact on web page load times. We find that these overheads only have limited impact on page load times, suggesting that it is possible to obtain the improved security of DoH with only marginal performance impact.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79023806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aravindh Raman, Sagar Joglekar, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Nishanth R. Sastry, Gareth Tyson
The Decentralised Web (DW) has recently seen a renewed momentum, with a number of DW platforms like Mastodon, PeerTube, and Hubzilla gaining increasing traction. These offer alternatives to traditional social networks like Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook, by enabling the operation of web infrastructure and services without centralised ownership or control. Although their services differ greatly, modern DW platforms mostly rely on two key innovations: first, their open source software allows anybody to setup independent servers ("instances") that people can sign-up to and use within a local community; and second, they build on top of federation protocols so that instances can mesh together, in a peer-to-peer fashion, to offer a globally integrated platform. In this paper, we present a measurement-driven exploration of these two innovations, using a popular DW microblogging platform (Mastodon) as a case study. We focus on identifying key challenges that might disrupt continuing efforts to decentralise the web, and empirically highlight a number of properties that are creating natural pressures towards re-centralisation. Finally, our measurements shed light on the behaviour of both administrators (i.e., people setting up instances) and regular users who sign-up to the platforms, also discussing a few techniques that may address some of the issues observed.
{"title":"Challenges in the Decentralised Web: The Mastodon Case","authors":"Aravindh Raman, Sagar Joglekar, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Nishanth R. Sastry, Gareth Tyson","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355572","url":null,"abstract":"The Decentralised Web (DW) has recently seen a renewed momentum, with a number of DW platforms like Mastodon, PeerTube, and Hubzilla gaining increasing traction. These offer alternatives to traditional social networks like Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook, by enabling the operation of web infrastructure and services without centralised ownership or control. Although their services differ greatly, modern DW platforms mostly rely on two key innovations: first, their open source software allows anybody to setup independent servers (\"instances\") that people can sign-up to and use within a local community; and second, they build on top of federation protocols so that instances can mesh together, in a peer-to-peer fashion, to offer a globally integrated platform. In this paper, we present a measurement-driven exploration of these two innovations, using a popular DW microblogging platform (Mastodon) as a case study. We focus on identifying key challenges that might disrupt continuing efforts to decentralise the web, and empirically highlight a number of properties that are creating natural pressures towards re-centralisation. Finally, our measurements shed light on the behaviour of both administrators (i.e., people setting up instances) and regular users who sign-up to the platforms, also discussing a few techniques that may address some of the issues observed.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78129329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michalis Pachilakis, P. Papadopoulos, E. Markatos, N. Kourtellis
In recent years, Header Bidding (HB) has gained popularity among web publishers, challenging the status quo in the ad ecosystem. Contrary to the traditional waterfall standard, HB aims to give back to publishers control of their ad inventory, increase transparency, fairness and competition among advertisers, resulting in higher ad-slot prices. Although promising, little is known about how this ad protocol works: What are HB's possible implementations, who are the major players, and what is its network and UX overhead? To address these questions, we design and implement HBDetector: a novel methodology to detect HB auctions on a website at realtime. By crawling 35,000 top Alexa websites, we collect and analyze a dataset of 800k auctions. We find that: (i) 14.28% of top websites utilize HB. (ii) Publishers prefer to collaborate with a few Demand Partners who also dominate the waterfall market. (iii) HB latency can be significantly higher (up to 3X in median case) than waterfall.
{"title":"No More Chasing Waterfalls: A Measurement Study of the Header Bidding Ad-Ecosystem","authors":"Michalis Pachilakis, P. Papadopoulos, E. Markatos, N. Kourtellis","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355582","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, Header Bidding (HB) has gained popularity among web publishers, challenging the status quo in the ad ecosystem. Contrary to the traditional waterfall standard, HB aims to give back to publishers control of their ad inventory, increase transparency, fairness and competition among advertisers, resulting in higher ad-slot prices. Although promising, little is known about how this ad protocol works: What are HB's possible implementations, who are the major players, and what is its network and UX overhead? To address these questions, we design and implement HBDetector: a novel methodology to detect HB auctions on a website at realtime. By crawling 35,000 top Alexa websites, we collect and analyze a dataset of 800k auctions. We find that: (i) 14.28% of top websites utilize HB. (ii) Publishers prefer to collaborate with a few Demand Partners who also dominate the waterfall market. (iii) HB latency can be significantly higher (up to 3X in median case) than waterfall.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84456365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Illicit crypto-mining leverages resources stolen from victims to mine cryptocurrencies on behalf of criminals. While recent works have analyzed one side of this threat, i.e.: web-browser cryptojacking, only commercial reports have partially covered binary-based crypto-mining malware. In this paper, we conduct the largest measurement of crypto-mining malware to date, analyzing approximately 4.5 million malware samples (1.2 million malicious miners), over a period of twelve years from 2007 to 2019. Our analysis pipeline applies both static and dynamic analysis to extract information from the samples, such as wallet identifiers and mining pools. Together with OSINT data, this information is used to group samples into campaigns. We then analyze publicly-available payments sent to the wallets from mining-pools as a reward for mining, and estimate profits for the different campaigns. All this together is is done in a fully automated fashion, which enables us to leverage measurement-based findings of illicit crypto-mining at scale. Our profit analysis reveals campaigns with multi-million earnings, associating over 4.4% of Monero with illicit mining. We analyze the infrastructure related with the different campaigns, showing that a high proportion of this ecosystem is supported by underground economies such as Pay-Per-Install services. We also uncover novel techniques that allow criminals to run successful campaigns.
{"title":"A First Look at the Crypto-Mining Malware Ecosystem: A Decade of Unrestricted Wealth","authors":"S. Pastrana, Guillermo Suarez-Tangil","doi":"10.1145/3355369.3355576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355576","url":null,"abstract":"Illicit crypto-mining leverages resources stolen from victims to mine cryptocurrencies on behalf of criminals. While recent works have analyzed one side of this threat, i.e.: web-browser cryptojacking, only commercial reports have partially covered binary-based crypto-mining malware. In this paper, we conduct the largest measurement of crypto-mining malware to date, analyzing approximately 4.5 million malware samples (1.2 million malicious miners), over a period of twelve years from 2007 to 2019. Our analysis pipeline applies both static and dynamic analysis to extract information from the samples, such as wallet identifiers and mining pools. Together with OSINT data, this information is used to group samples into campaigns. We then analyze publicly-available payments sent to the wallets from mining-pools as a reward for mining, and estimate profits for the different campaigns. All this together is is done in a fully automated fashion, which enables us to leverage measurement-based findings of illicit crypto-mining at scale. Our profit analysis reveals campaigns with multi-million earnings, associating over 4.4% of Monero with illicit mining. We analyze the infrastructure related with the different campaigns, showing that a high proportion of this ecosystem is supported by underground economies such as Pay-Per-Install services. We also uncover novel techniques that allow criminals to run successful campaigns.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74164997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference","authors":"","doi":"10.1145/3355369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77573234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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