This paper presents an erasure-coded Byzantine fault-tolerant block storage protocol that is nearly as efficient as protocols that tolerate only crashes. Previous Byzantine fault-tolerant block storage protocols have either relied upon replication, which is inefficient for large blocks of data when tolerating multiple faults, or a combination of additional servers, extra computation, and versioned storage. To avoid these expensive techniques, our protocol employs novel mechanisms to optimize for the common case when faults and concurrency are rare. In the common case, a write operation completes in two rounds of communication and a read completes in one round. The protocol requires a short checksum comprised of cryptographic hashes and homomorphic fingerprints. It achieves throughput within 10% of the crash-tolerant protocol for writes and reads in failure-free runs when configured to tolerate up to 6 faulty servers and any number of faulty clients.
{"title":"Low-overhead byzantine fault-tolerant storage","authors":"James Hendricks, G. Ganger, M. Reiter","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294269","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an erasure-coded Byzantine fault-tolerant block storage protocol that is nearly as efficient as protocols that tolerate only crashes. Previous Byzantine fault-tolerant block storage protocols have either relied upon replication, which is inefficient for large blocks of data when tolerating multiple faults, or a combination of additional servers, extra computation, and versioned storage. To avoid these expensive techniques, our protocol employs novel mechanisms to optimize for the common case when faults and concurrency are rare. In the common case, a write operation completes in two rounds of communication and a read completes in one round. The protocol requires a short checksum comprised of cryptographic hashes and homomorphic fingerprints. It achieves throughput within 10% of the crash-tolerant protocol for writes and reads in failure-free runs when configured to tolerate up to 6 faulty servers and any number of faulty clients.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73443783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Oren Laadan, Ricardo A. Baratto, Dan B. Phung, S. Potter, Jason Nieh
As users interact with the world and their peers through their computers, it is becoming important to archive and later search the information that they have viewed. We present DejaView, a personal virtual computer recorder that provides a complete record of a desktop computing experience that a user can playback, browse, search, and revive seamlessly. DejaView records visual output, checkpoints corresponding application and file system state, and captures displayed text with contextual information to index the record. A user can then browse and search the record for any visual information that has been displayed on the desktop, and revive and interact with the desktop computing state corresponding to any point in the record. DejaView combines display, operating system, and file system virtualization to provide its functionality transparently without any modifications to applications, window systems, or operating system kernels. We have implemented DejaView and evaluated its performance on real-world desktop applications. Our results demonstrate that DejaView can provide continuous low-overhead recording without any user noticeable performance degradation, and allows browsing, search and playback of records fast enough for interactive use.
{"title":"DejaView: a personal virtual computer recorder","authors":"Oren Laadan, Ricardo A. Baratto, Dan B. Phung, S. Potter, Jason Nieh","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294289","url":null,"abstract":"As users interact with the world and their peers through their computers, it is becoming important to archive and later search the information that they have viewed. We present DejaView, a personal virtual computer recorder that provides a complete record of a desktop computing experience that a user can playback, browse, search, and revive seamlessly. DejaView records visual output, checkpoints corresponding application and file system state, and captures displayed text with contextual information to index the record. A user can then browse and search the record for any visual information that has been displayed on the desktop, and revive and interact with the desktop computing state corresponding to any point in the record. DejaView combines display, operating system, and file system virtualization to provide its functionality transparently without any modifications to applications, window systems, or operating system kernels. We have implemented DejaView and evaluated its performance on real-world desktop applications. Our results demonstrate that DejaView can provide continuous low-overhead recording without any user noticeable performance degradation, and allows browsing, search and playback of records fast enough for interactive use.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73755858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manuel Costa, M. Castro, Lidong Zhou, Lintao Zhang, Marcus Peinado
Attackers exploit software vulnerabilities to control or crash programs. Bouncer uses existing software instrumentation techniques to detect attacks and it generates filters automatically to block exploits of the target vulnerabilities. The filters are deployed automatically by instrumenting system calls to drop exploit messages. These filters introduce low overhead and they allow programs to keep running correctly under attack. Previous work computes filters using symbolic execution along the path taken by a sample exploit, but attackers can bypass these filters by generating exploits that follow a different execution path. Bouncer introduces three techniques to generalize filters so that they are harder to bypass: a new form of program slicing that uses a combination of static and dynamic analysis to remove unnecessary conditions from the filter; symbolic summaries for common library functions that characterize their behavior succinctly as a set of conditions on the input; and generation of alternative exploits guided by symbolic execution. Bouncer filters have low overhead, they do not have false positives by design, and our results show that Bouncer can generate filters that block all exploits of some real-world vulnerabilities.
{"title":"Bouncer: securing software by blocking bad input","authors":"Manuel Costa, M. Castro, Lidong Zhou, Lintao Zhang, Marcus Peinado","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294274","url":null,"abstract":"Attackers exploit software vulnerabilities to control or crash programs. Bouncer uses existing software instrumentation techniques to detect attacks and it generates filters automatically to block exploits of the target vulnerabilities. The filters are deployed automatically by instrumenting system calls to drop exploit messages. These filters introduce low overhead and they allow programs to keep running correctly under attack. Previous work computes filters using symbolic execution along the path taken by a sample exploit, but attackers can bypass these filters by generating exploits that follow a different execution path. Bouncer introduces three techniques to generalize filters so that they are harder to bypass: a new form of program slicing that uses a combination of static and dynamic analysis to remove unnecessary conditions from the filter; symbolic summaries for common library functions that characterize their behavior succinctly as a set of conditions on the input; and generation of alternative exploits guided by symbolic execution. Bouncer filters have low overhead, they do not have false positives by design, and our results show that Bouncer can generate filters that block all exploits of some real-world vulnerabilities.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75206599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ben Vandiver, H. Balakrishnan, B. Liskov, S. Madden
This paper describes the design, implementation, and evaluation of areplication scheme to handle Byzantine faults in transaction processing database systems. The scheme compares answers from queries and updates on multiple replicas which are unmodified, off-the-shelf systems, to provide a single database that is Byzantine fault tolerant. The scheme works when the replicas are homogeneous, but it also allows heterogeneous replication in which replicas come from different vendors. Heterogeneous replicas reduce the impact of bugs and security compromises because they are implemented independently and are thus less likely to suffer correlated failures. The main challenge in designing a replication scheme for transactionprocessing systems is ensuring that the different replicas execute transactions in equivalent serial orders while allowing a high degreeof concurrency. Our scheme meets this goal using a novel concurrency control protocol, commit barrier scheduling (CBS). We have implemented CBS in the context of a replicated SQL database, HRDB(Heterogeneous Replicated DB), which has been tested with unmodified production versions of several commercial and open source databases as replicas. Our experiments show an HRDB configuration that can tolerate one faulty replica has only a modest performance overhead(about 17% for the TPC-C benchmark). HRDB successfully masks several Byzantine faults observed in practice and we have used it to find a new bug in MySQL.
{"title":"Tolerating byzantine faults in transaction processing systems using commit barrier scheduling","authors":"Ben Vandiver, H. Balakrishnan, B. Liskov, S. Madden","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294268","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes the design, implementation, and evaluation of areplication scheme to handle Byzantine faults in transaction processing database systems. The scheme compares answers from queries and updates on multiple replicas which are unmodified, off-the-shelf systems, to provide a single database that is Byzantine fault tolerant. The scheme works when the replicas are homogeneous, but it also allows heterogeneous replication in which replicas come from different vendors. Heterogeneous replicas reduce the impact of bugs and security compromises because they are implemented independently and are thus less likely to suffer correlated failures.\u0000 The main challenge in designing a replication scheme for transactionprocessing systems is ensuring that the different replicas execute transactions in equivalent serial orders while allowing a high degreeof concurrency. Our scheme meets this goal using a novel concurrency control protocol, commit barrier scheduling (CBS). We have implemented CBS in the context of a replicated SQL database, HRDB(Heterogeneous Replicated DB), which has been tested with unmodified production versions of several commercial and open source databases as replicas. Our experiments show an HRDB configuration that can tolerate one faulty replica has only a modest performance overhead(about 17% for the TPC-C benchmark). HRDB successfully masks several Byzantine faults observed in practice and we have used it to find a new bug in MySQL.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76581136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Olivier Crameri, N. Knežević, Dejan Kostic, R. Bianchini, W. Zwaenepoel
Despite major advances in the engineering of maintainable and robust software over the years, upgrading software remains a primitive and error-prone activity. In this paper, we argue that several problems with upgrading software are caused by a poor integration between upgrade deployment, user-machine testing, and problem reporting. To support this argument, we present a characterization of softwareupgrades resulting from a survey we conducted of 50 system administrators. Motivated by the survey results, we present Mirage, a distributed framework for integrating upgrade deployment, user-machine testing, and problem reporting into the overall upgrade development process. Our evaluation focuses on the most novel aspect of Mirage, namely its staged upgrade deployment based on the clustering of usermachines according to their environments and configurations. Our results suggest that Mirage's staged deployment is effective for real upgrade problems.
{"title":"Staged deployment in mirage, an integrated software upgrade testing and distribution system","authors":"Olivier Crameri, N. Knežević, Dejan Kostic, R. Bianchini, W. Zwaenepoel","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294283","url":null,"abstract":"Despite major advances in the engineering of maintainable and robust software over the years, upgrading software remains a primitive and error-prone activity. In this paper, we argue that several problems with upgrading software are caused by a poor integration between upgrade deployment, user-machine testing, and problem reporting. To support this argument, we present a characterization of softwareupgrades resulting from a survey we conducted of 50 system administrators. Motivated by the survey results, we present Mirage, a distributed framework for integrating upgrade deployment, user-machine testing, and problem reporting into the overall upgrade development process. Our evaluation focuses on the most novel aspect of Mirage, namely its staged upgrade deployment based on the clustering of usermachines according to their environments and configurations. Our results suggest that Mirage's staged deployment is effective for real upgrade problems.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83994178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Max Krohn, A. Yip, Micah Z. Brodsky, Natan Cliffer, F. Kaashoek, E. Kohler, R. Morris
Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC) is an approach to security that allows application writers to control how data flows between the pieces of an application and the outside world. As applied to privacy, DIFC allows untrusted software to compute with private data while trusted security code controls the release of that data. As applied to integrity, DIFC allows trusted code to protect untrusted software from unexpected malicious inputs. In either case, only bugs in the trusted code, which tends to be small and isolated, can lead to security violations. We present Flume, a new DIFC model that applies at the granularity of operating system processes and standard OS abstractions (e.g., pipes and file descriptors). Flume was designed for simplicity of mechanism, to ease DIFC's use in existing applications, and to allow safe interaction between conventional and DIFC-aware processes. Flume runs as a user-level reference monitor onLinux. A process confined by Flume cannot perform most system calls directly; instead, an interposition layer replaces system calls with IPCto the reference monitor, which enforces data flowpolicies and performs safe operations on the process's behalf. We ported a complex web application (MoinMoin Wiki) to Flume, changingonly 2% of the original code. Performance measurements show a 43% slowdown on read workloadsand a 34% slowdown on write workloads, which aremostly due to Flume's user-level implementation.
{"title":"Information flow control for standard OS abstractions","authors":"Max Krohn, A. Yip, Micah Z. Brodsky, Natan Cliffer, F. Kaashoek, E. Kohler, R. Morris","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294293","url":null,"abstract":"Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC) is an approach to security that allows application writers to control how data flows between the pieces of an application and the outside world. As applied to privacy, DIFC allows untrusted software to compute with private data while trusted security code controls the release of that data. As applied to integrity, DIFC allows trusted code to protect untrusted software from unexpected malicious inputs. In either case, only bugs in the trusted code, which tends to be small and isolated, can lead to security violations.\u0000 We present Flume, a new DIFC model that applies at the granularity of operating system processes and standard OS abstractions (e.g., pipes and file descriptors). Flume was designed for simplicity of mechanism, to ease DIFC's use in existing applications, and to allow safe interaction between conventional and DIFC-aware processes. Flume runs as a user-level reference monitor onLinux. A process confined by Flume cannot perform most system calls directly; instead, an interposition layer replaces system calls with IPCto the reference monitor, which enforces data flowpolicies and performs safe operations on the process's behalf. We ported a complex web application (MoinMoin Wiki) to Flume, changingonly 2% of the original code. Performance measurements show a 43% slowdown on read workloadsand a 34% slowdown on write workloads, which aremostly due to Flume's user-level implementation.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90151537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AutoBash is a set of interactive tools that helps users and system administrators manage configurations. AutoBash leverages causal tracking support implemented within our modified Linux kernel to understand the inputs (causal dependencies) and outputs (causal effects) of configuration actions. It uses OS-level speculative execution to try possible actions, examine their effects, and roll them back when necessary. AutoBash automates many of the tedious parts of trying to fix a misconfiguration, including searching through possible solutions, testing whether a particular solution fixes a problem, and undoing changes to persistent and transient state when a solution fails. Our results show that AutoBash correctly identifies the solution to several CVS, gcc cross-compiler, and Apache configuration errors. We also show that causal analysis reduces AutoBash's search time by an average of 35% and solution verification time by an average of 70%.
{"title":"AutoBash: improving configuration management with operating system causality analysis","authors":"Ya-Yunn Su, Mona Attariyan, J. Flinn","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294284","url":null,"abstract":"AutoBash is a set of interactive tools that helps users and system administrators manage configurations. AutoBash leverages causal tracking support implemented within our modified Linux kernel to understand the inputs (causal dependencies) and outputs (causal effects) of configuration actions. It uses OS-level speculative execution to try possible actions, examine their effects, and roll them back when necessary. AutoBash automates many of the tedious parts of trying to fix a misconfiguration, including searching through possible solutions, testing whether a particular solution fixes a problem, and undoing changes to persistent and transient state when a solution fails. Our results show that AutoBash correctly identifies the solution to several CVS, gcc cross-compiler, and Apache configuration errors. We also show that causal analysis reduces AutoBash's search time by an average of 35% and solution verification time by an average of 70%.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73833179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Helen J. Wang, Xiaofeng Fan, Jon Howell, Collin Jackson
Web browsers have evolved from a single-principal platform on which one site is browsed at a time into a multi-principal platform on which data and code from mutually distrusting sites interact programmatically in a single page at the browser. Today's "Web 2.0" applications (or mashups) offer rich services, rivaling those of desktop PCs. However, the protection andcommunication abstractions offered by today's browsers remain suitable onlyfor a single-principal system--either no trust through completeisolation between principals (sites) or full trust by incorporating third party code as libraries. In this paper, we address this deficiency by identifying and designing the missing abstractions needed for a browser-based multi-principal platform. We have designed our abstractions to be backward compatible and easily adoptable. We have built a prototype system that realizes almost all of our abstractions and their associated properties. Our evaluation shows that our abstractions make it easy to build more secure and robust client-side Web mashups and can be easily implemented with negligible performance overhead.
{"title":"Protection and communication abstractions for web browsers in MashupOS","authors":"Helen J. Wang, Xiaofeng Fan, Jon Howell, Collin Jackson","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294263","url":null,"abstract":"Web browsers have evolved from a single-principal platform on which one site is browsed at a time into a multi-principal platform on which data and code from mutually distrusting sites interact programmatically in a single page at the browser. Today's \"Web 2.0\" applications (or mashups) offer rich services, rivaling those of desktop PCs. However, the protection andcommunication abstractions offered by today's browsers remain suitable onlyfor a single-principal system--either no trust through completeisolation between principals (sites) or full trust by incorporating third party code as libraries. In this paper, we address this deficiency by identifying and designing the missing abstractions needed for a browser-based multi-principal platform. We have designed our abstractions to be backward compatible and easily adoptable. We have built a prototype system that realizes almost all of our abstractions and their associated properties. Our evaluation shows that our abstractions make it easy to build more secure and robust client-side Web mashups and can be easily implemented with negligible performance overhead.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76330180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose SecVisor, a tiny hypervisor that ensures code integrity for commodity OS kernels. In particular, SecVisor ensures that only user-approved code can execute in kernel mode over the entire system lifetime. This protects the kernel against code injection attacks, such as kernel rootkits. SecVisor can achieve this propertyeven against an attacker who controls everything but the CPU, the memory controller, and system memory chips. Further, SecVisor can even defend against attackers with knowledge of zero-day kernel exploits. Our goal is to make SecVisor amenable to formal verificationand manual audit, thereby making it possible to rule out known classes of vulnerabilities. To this end, SecVisor offers small code size and small external interface. We rely on memory virtualization to build SecVisor and implement two versions, one using software memory virtualization and the other using CPU-supported memory virtualization. The code sizes of the runtime portions of these versions are 1739 and 1112 lines, respectively. The size of the external interface for both versions of SecVisor is 2 hypercalls. It is easy to port OS kernels to SecVisor. We port the Linux kernel version 2.6.20 by adding 12 lines and deleting 81 lines, out of a total of approximately 4.3 million lines of code in the kernel.
{"title":"SecVisor: a tiny hypervisor to provide lifetime kernel code integrity for commodity OSes","authors":"Arvind Seshadri, M. Luk, Ning Qu, A. Perrig","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294294","url":null,"abstract":"We propose SecVisor, a tiny hypervisor that ensures code integrity for commodity OS kernels. In particular, SecVisor ensures that only user-approved code can execute in kernel mode over the entire system lifetime. This protects the kernel against code injection attacks, such as kernel rootkits. SecVisor can achieve this propertyeven against an attacker who controls everything but the CPU, the memory controller, and system memory chips. Further, SecVisor can even defend against attackers with knowledge of zero-day kernel exploits.\u0000 Our goal is to make SecVisor amenable to formal verificationand manual audit, thereby making it possible to rule out known classes of vulnerabilities. To this end, SecVisor offers small code size and small external interface. We rely on memory virtualization to build SecVisor and implement two versions, one using software memory virtualization and the other using CPU-supported memory virtualization. The code sizes of the runtime portions of these versions are 1739 and 1112 lines, respectively. The size of the external interface for both versions of SecVisor is 2 hypercalls. It is easy to port OS kernels to SecVisor. We port the Linux kernel version 2.6.20 by adding 12 lines and deleting 81 lines, out of a total of approximately 4.3 million lines of code in the kernel.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87778868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Klues, V. Handziski, Chenyang Lu, A. Wolisz, D. Culler, David E. Gay, P. Levis
Energy management is a critical concern in wireless sensornets. Despite its importance, sensor network operating systems today provide minimal energy management support, requiring applications to explicitly manage system power states. To address this problem, we present ICEM, a device driver architecture that enables simple, energy efficient wireless sensornet applications. The key insight behind ICEMis that the most valuable information an application can give the OS for energy management is its concurrency. Using ICEM, a low-rate sensing application requires only a single line of energy management code and has an efficiency within 1.6% of a hand-tuned implementation. ICEM's effectiveness questions the assumption that sensornet applications must be responsible for all power management and sensornets cannot have a standardized OS with a simple API.
{"title":"Integrating concurrency control and energy management in device drivers","authors":"K. Klues, V. Handziski, Chenyang Lu, A. Wolisz, D. Culler, David E. Gay, P. Levis","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294286","url":null,"abstract":"Energy management is a critical concern in wireless sensornets. Despite its importance, sensor network operating systems today provide minimal energy management support, requiring applications to explicitly manage system power states. To address this problem, we present ICEM, a device driver architecture that enables simple, energy efficient wireless sensornet applications. The key insight behind ICEMis that the most valuable information an application can give the OS for energy management is its concurrency. Using ICEM, a low-rate sensing application requires only a single line of energy management code and has an efficiency within 1.6% of a hand-tuned implementation. ICEM's effectiveness questions the assumption that sensornet applications must be responsible for all power management and sensornets cannot have a standardized OS with a simple API.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83590689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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