{"title":"The virtuous circle","authors":"I. Scott, Ting Gong","doi":"10.4324/9781351184496-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351184496-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":214608,"journal":{"name":"Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114571990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Enforcing the law","authors":"I. Scott, Ting Gong","doi":"10.4324/9781351184496-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351184496-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":214608,"journal":{"name":"Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128234405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In many countries, ‘free and fair’ parliament elections precede a process of cabinet selection which, in contrast, is often far from transparent. In single party majority rule, the party which wins the election then forms the government, its leader becomes the premier, and he/she then has the power to hire and fire ministers, as it pleases. Where elections result in a number of parties being represented in parliament, none of which has a majority, there invariably follows a very opaque part of the democratic process: inter-party meetings, wherein various parties try to form a majority coalition, with ministries allocated to party functionaries in deals perhaps shady or worse. A third structure relates primarily to conflict zones, all-party power-sharing; in these situations, any negotiations by which a government is formed can be both problematic and protracted. It need not be so. In either a single-party majority rule, a majority or grand coalition, or a unity government, the parliamentary party or parties concerned could use a transparent voting procedure, a tabular mechanism by which every mp can vote, not only for those whom they wish to see in government, but also for each nominee’s ministerial post. It is called a matrix vote. This article will examine different government structures – one-party, two-party and multi-party states; it will examine the assumptions on which democracy is based, with particular regard to the fact that the right of a majority to rule is often interpreted to mean that political decisions can best be resolved by binary votes; it will consider a hypothetical example of the matrix vote; and finally, it will discuss the feasibility of an inclusive, all-party political structure. as identified by their subscript: I W … L W , M X … P X, Q Y … S Y, and T Z … V Z .
在许多国家，“自由和公平”的议会选举先于内阁选举，而内阁选举往往远不透明。在一党多数统治下，赢得选举的政党组成政府，其领导人成为总理，然后他/她有权随心所欲地雇用和解雇部长。当选举导致许多政党在议会中有代表，但没有一个政党拥有多数席位时，民主过程中总会出现一个非常不透明的部分:政党间会议，各政党试图组成一个多数联盟，各部委被分配给政党的工作人员，这些交易可能是阴暗的，甚至更糟。第三种结构主要涉及冲突地区，各党派权力分享;在这种情况下，任何组建政府的谈判都可能是有问题的，而且旷日持久。其实不必如此。无论是一党多数统治、多数或大联合政府，还是联合政府，议会政党或相关政党都可以使用透明的投票程序，即每个议员都可以投票的表格机制，不仅可以投票给他们希望在政府中看到的人，还可以投票给每个被提名的部长职位。这被称为矩阵投票。本文将考察不同的政府结构——一党制、两党制和多党制国家;它将审查民主所基于的假设，特别是关于多数人统治的权利往往被解释为政治决定最好通过二元投票来解决这一事实;它将考虑一个矩阵投票的假设例子;最后，它将讨论一个包容性的、跨党派的政治结构的可行性。用它们的下标表示:I W…L W, M X…P X, Q Y…S Y, tz…V Z。
{"title":"Good governance","authors":"I. Scott, Ting Gong","doi":"10.4324/9781351184496-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351184496-9","url":null,"abstract":"In many countries, ‘free and fair’ parliament elections precede a process of cabinet selection which, in contrast, is often far from transparent. In single party majority rule, the party which wins the election then forms the government, its leader becomes the premier, and he/she then has the power to hire and fire ministers, as it pleases. Where elections result in a number of parties being represented in parliament, none of which has a majority, there invariably follows a very opaque part of the democratic process: inter-party meetings, wherein various parties try to form a majority coalition, with ministries allocated to party functionaries in deals perhaps shady or worse. A third structure relates primarily to conflict zones, all-party power-sharing; in these situations, any negotiations by which a government is formed can be both problematic and protracted. It need not be so. In either a single-party majority rule, a majority or grand coalition, or a unity government, the parliamentary party or parties concerned could use a transparent voting procedure, a tabular mechanism by which every mp can vote, not only for those whom they wish to see in government, but also for each nominee’s ministerial post. It is called a matrix vote. This article will examine different government structures – one-party, two-party and multi-party states; it will examine the assumptions on which democracy is based, with particular regard to the fact that the right of a majority to rule is often interpreted to mean that political decisions can best be resolved by binary votes; it will consider a hypothetical example of the matrix vote; and finally, it will discuss the feasibility of an inclusive, all-party political structure. as identified by their subscript: I W … L W , M X … P X, Q Y … S Y, and T Z … V Z .","PeriodicalId":214608,"journal":{"name":"Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125766856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-07DOI: 10.4324/9781351184496-10
I. Scott, Ting Gong
{"title":"Bad governance","authors":"I. Scott, Ting Gong","doi":"10.4324/9781351184496-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351184496-10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":214608,"journal":{"name":"Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong","volume":"231 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115826748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political will","authors":"I. Scott, Ting Gong","doi":"10.4324/9781351184496-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351184496-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":214608,"journal":{"name":"Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115941324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-07DOI: 10.4324/9781351184496-11
I. Scott, Ting Gong
{"title":"Institutionalising ACAs","authors":"I. Scott, Ting Gong","doi":"10.4324/9781351184496-11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351184496-11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":214608,"journal":{"name":"Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133808037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Concepts, approaches and institutions","authors":"I. Scott, Ting Gong","doi":"10.4324/9781351184496-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351184496-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":214608,"journal":{"name":"Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong","volume":"2008 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127317882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Changing perceptions of corruption","authors":"I. Scott, Ting Gong","doi":"10.4324/9781351184496-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351184496-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":214608,"journal":{"name":"Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116814207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Organising for success","authors":"I. Scott, Ting Gong","doi":"10.4324/9781351184496-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351184496-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":214608,"journal":{"name":"Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114712541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crisis and challenge","authors":"I. Scott, Ting Gong","doi":"10.4324/9781351184496-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351184496-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":214608,"journal":{"name":"Corruption Prevention and Governance in Hong Kong","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126817622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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