Pub Date : 2017-12-16DOI: 10.30965/26664275-02001005
N. Baima
Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness ( mËjh ) is surprisingly positive in the Laws , especially as compared to his negative treatment of intoxication in the Republic . 1 In the Republic , Plato maintains that intoxication causes cowardice and intemperance (3.398e–399e, 3.403e, and 9.571c–573b), while in the Laws , Plato holds that it can produce courage and temperance (1.635b, 1.645d–650a, and 2.665c–672d). This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind, and if he did, why? 2 Ultimately, this paper answers affirmatively and argues that this marks a substantive shift in Plato’s attitude towards anti-rational desires. 3 More precisely, this paper argues that in the Republic , Plato holds that anti-rational desires are always detrimental to health and virtue, while in the Laws , Plato maintains that anti-rational desires can be instrumental to health and virtue.
{"title":"On the Value of Drunkenness in the Laws","authors":"N. Baima","doi":"10.30965/26664275-02001005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02001005","url":null,"abstract":"Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness ( mËjh ) is surprisingly positive in the Laws , especially as compared to his negative treatment of intoxication in the Republic . 1 In the Republic , Plato maintains that intoxication causes cowardice and intemperance (3.398e–399e, 3.403e, and 9.571c–573b), while in the Laws , Plato holds that it can produce courage and temperance (1.635b, 1.645d–650a, and 2.665c–672d). This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind, and if he did, why? 2 Ultimately, this paper answers affirmatively and argues that this marks a substantive shift in Plato’s attitude towards anti-rational desires. 3 More precisely, this paper argues that in the Republic , Plato holds that anti-rational desires are always detrimental to health and virtue, while in the Laws , Plato maintains that anti-rational desires can be instrumental to health and virtue.","PeriodicalId":218144,"journal":{"name":"Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130583147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-04-05DOI: 10.30965/26664275-01801011
A. Kok
{"title":"Contemporary social contract theory and Hegel's master/bondsman-relation","authors":"A. Kok","doi":"10.30965/26664275-01801011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01801011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":218144,"journal":{"name":"Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116949726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-04-05DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-2825-7_2
P. Phemister
{"title":"Relational Space and Places of Value","authors":"P. Phemister","doi":"10.1007/978-94-007-2825-7_2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2825-7_2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":218144,"journal":{"name":"Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy","volume":"338 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133880488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-04-05DOI: 10.30965/26664275-01301009
S. Uckelman, S. Johnston
In this paper we look at the suitability of modern interval-based temporal logic for modeling John Buridan’s treatment of tensed sentences in his Sophismata. Building on the paper [Ohrstrom 1984], we develop Buridan’s analysis of temporal logic, paying particular attention to his notions of negation and the absolute/relative nature of the future and the past. We introduce a number of standard modern propositional interval temporal logics (ITLs) to illustrate where Buridan’s interval-based temporal analysis differs from the standard modern approaches. We give formal proofs of some claims in [Ohrstrom 1984], and sketch how the standard modern systems could be defined in terms of Buridan’s proposals, showing that his logic can be taken as more basic.
{"title":"John Buridan's Sophismata and interval temporal semantics","authors":"S. Uckelman, S. Johnston","doi":"10.30965/26664275-01301009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01301009","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we look at the suitability of modern interval-based temporal logic for modeling John Buridan’s treatment of tensed sentences in his Sophismata. Building on the paper [Ohrstrom 1984], we develop Buridan’s analysis of temporal logic, paying particular attention to his notions of negation and the absolute/relative nature of the future and the past. We introduce a number of standard modern propositional interval temporal logics (ITLs) to illustrate where Buridan’s interval-based temporal analysis differs from the standard modern approaches. We give formal proofs of some claims in [Ohrstrom 1984], and sketch how the standard modern systems could be defined in terms of Buridan’s proposals, showing that his logic can be taken as more basic.","PeriodicalId":218144,"journal":{"name":"Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121963844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-12-08DOI: 10.30965/26664275-01201008
P. Needham
{"title":"An Aristotelian Theory of Chemical Substance","authors":"P. Needham","doi":"10.30965/26664275-01201008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01201008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":218144,"journal":{"name":"Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121531803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-04-05DOI: 10.30965/26664275-01201013
S. Uckelman
The origins of treating agency as a modal concept go back at least to the 11th century when Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, provided a modal explication of the Latin facere ‘to do’, which can be formalized within the context of modern modal logic and neighborhood semantics. The agentive logic induced by his conception satisfies the traditional square of opposition, but also has some unique properties which reflect the fact that Anselm’s modal view of agency is grounded strongly in non-logical philosophical and theological considerations. We show that the logic modeling Anselm’s theory of agency provides an interesting alternative to standard logics of agency based on stit-theory.
将代理作为一个模态概念的起源至少可以追溯到11世纪，当时坎特伯雷大主教Anselm提供了拉丁语facere ' to do '的模态解释，可以在现代模态逻辑和邻里语义的背景下形式化。安塞勒姆的代理逻辑不仅满足传统的对立法，而且还具有一些独特的性质，这些性质反映了安塞勒姆的代理模态观强烈地建立在非逻辑的哲学和神学考虑基础之上。我们证明了Anselm代理理论的逻辑建模为基于stit理论的标准代理逻辑提供了一个有趣的选择。
{"title":"Anselm's logic of agency","authors":"S. Uckelman","doi":"10.30965/26664275-01201013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01201013","url":null,"abstract":"The origins of treating agency as a modal concept go back at least to the 11th century when Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, provided a modal explication of the Latin facere ‘to do’, which can be formalized within the context of modern modal logic and neighborhood semantics. The agentive logic induced by his conception satisfies the traditional square of opposition, but also has some unique properties which reflect the fact that Anselm’s modal view of agency is grounded strongly in non-logical philosophical and theological considerations. We show that the logic modeling Anselm’s theory of agency provides an interesting alternative to standard logics of agency based on stit-theory.","PeriodicalId":218144,"journal":{"name":"Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125600989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-04-05DOI: 10.30965/26664275-01201011
A. Hájek
Four different conditionals were known to the Stoics. The so-called 'first' (Philonian) conditional has been interpreted fairly uncontroversially as an ancient counterpart to the material conditional of modern logic; the 'fourth' conditional is obscure, and seemingly of little historical interest, as it was probably not held widely by any group in antiquity. The 'second' (Diodorean) and 'third' (Chrysippean) conditionals, on the other hand, pose challenging interpretive questions, raising in the process issues in philosophical logic that are as relevant today as they were then. This paper is a critical survey of some modern answers to four of the most tantalizing of these questions; the issues that I will discuss arise out of interpretations of the Diodorean and Chrysippean conditionals as expressions of natural law, and as strict implications. I will reject these interpretations, concluding with my own proposal for where they should be located on a 'ladder' of logical strength. The following passage from Sextus will form the basis of my discussion (from Outlines of Pyrrhonism [Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes], as presented by Long and Sedley 1987b, 211). He has just introduced Philo's account of " a sound conditional " —by which I understand a true conditional—with the example " when it is day and I am talking, 'If it is day, I am talking' ". He then continues:
{"title":"Two Interpretations of Two Stoic Conditionals","authors":"A. Hájek","doi":"10.30965/26664275-01201011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01201011","url":null,"abstract":"Four different conditionals were known to the Stoics. The so-called 'first' (Philonian) conditional has been interpreted fairly uncontroversially as an ancient counterpart to the material conditional of modern logic; the 'fourth' conditional is obscure, and seemingly of little historical interest, as it was probably not held widely by any group in antiquity. The 'second' (Diodorean) and 'third' (Chrysippean) conditionals, on the other hand, pose challenging interpretive questions, raising in the process issues in philosophical logic that are as relevant today as they were then. This paper is a critical survey of some modern answers to four of the most tantalizing of these questions; the issues that I will discuss arise out of interpretations of the Diodorean and Chrysippean conditionals as expressions of natural law, and as strict implications. I will reject these interpretations, concluding with my own proposal for where they should be located on a 'ladder' of logical strength. The following passage from Sextus will form the basis of my discussion (from Outlines of Pyrrhonism [Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes], as presented by Long and Sedley 1987b, 211). He has just introduced Philo's account of \" a sound conditional \" —by which I understand a true conditional—with the example \" when it is day and I am talking, 'If it is day, I am talking' \". He then continues:","PeriodicalId":218144,"journal":{"name":"Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123363029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-12-08DOI: 10.30965/26664275-01001003
J. Doomen
This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one is able to be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important methods are concerned.
{"title":"The Problems of Scepticism","authors":"J. Doomen","doi":"10.30965/26664275-01001003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01001003","url":null,"abstract":"This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one is able to be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important methods are concerned.","PeriodicalId":218144,"journal":{"name":"Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy","volume":"185 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121360772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-04-05DOI: 10.30965/26664275-00801008
R. Bittner
{"title":"Freiheit durch Erkenntnis der Notwendigkeit bei Spinoza","authors":"R. Bittner","doi":"10.30965/26664275-00801008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-00801008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":218144,"journal":{"name":"Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134644582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-04-05DOI: 10.30965/26664275-00201012
V. Harte, M. Lane
{"title":"Pyrrhonism and Protagoreanism: catching Sextus out?","authors":"V. Harte, M. Lane","doi":"10.30965/26664275-00201012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-00201012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":218144,"journal":{"name":"Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115371472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：