Facta Philosophica最新文献_第10页

Alles nur Illusionen? - Philosophische (In-)Konsequenzen der Neurobiologie 谎言?哲学思想和神经生物学的结果

Facta Philosophica

Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.3726/93520_189

W. Lenzen

引用次数: 2

'Encouragement in Darwin'? 达尔文的鼓励"？

Facta Philosophica

Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/factaphil2002425

Patrick Rysiew

引用次数: 3

Anticipation of a Final Reckoning: American Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century 最终清算的预期：二十世纪末的美国哲学

Facta Philosophica

Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/factaphil20024112

J. Margolis

引用次数: 0

How to Be a Contextualist 如何成为语境主义者

Facta Philosophica

Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.3726/93520_261

C. Bianchi

According to Keith DeRose, epistemological contextualism is the position that “the truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing and knowledge denying sentences (sentences of the form “S knows that p” and “S doesn’t know that p”...) vary in certain ways according to the context in which they are uttered. What so varies is the epistemic standards that S must meet... in order for such a statement to be true”.1 According to the contextualist, a sentence of the form “S knows that p” does not express a complete proposition. Different utterances of the sentence, in different contexts of utterance, can express different propositions: “know” is context-dependent. Little attention has been paid to a precise formulation of the semantic contextualist thesis grounding epistemological contextualism. Many scholars refer to some kind of “hidden-indexical” theory of knowledge sentences, or claim that “know” is itself indexical. My goal is then to assess differences and similarities between “know” and context-sensitive terms in natural language—in particular pure indexicals, on the one hand, and demonstratives, on the other hand. This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I briefly present a standard version of epistemological contextualism. In section 3, I sketch the contextualist response to scepticism. In section 4, I present the general semantic thesis grounding epistemological contextualism. In section 5 and 6, I examine and criticise a strategy in terms of pure indexicals. In section 7 and 8, I examine and criticise a strategy in terms of demonstratives. In the conclusion, I argue that only an accurate analysis of the different varieties of context sensitivity secures us a better understanding and a clearer evaluation of the contextualist approach, and of its response to the sceptic.

根据Keith DeRose的观点，认识论语境主义认为“知识归属和知识否定的句子(“S知道p”和“S不知道p”这种形式的句子……)的真理条件会根据它们所处的语境而以某种方式变化。”如此不同的是S必须满足的认知标准……为了使这样的陈述是真实的根据语境主义者的观点，一个形式为" S知道p "的句子并不表达一个完整的命题。句子的不同话语，在不同的话语语境中，可以表达不同的命题:“知道”是语境依赖的。很少有人关注基于认识论语境主义的语义语境主义命题的精确表述。许多学者提出了某种知识句的“隐含索引”理论，或者声称“知道”本身就是索引的。然后，我的目标是评估自然语言中“知道”和上下文敏感术语之间的异同——特别是一方面是纯索引词，另一方面是指示词。本文的结构如下。在第二节中，我简要地介绍了认识论语境主义的标准版本。在第3节中，我概述了对怀疑主义的语境主义回应。在第四节中，我提出了基于认识论语境主义的一般语义命题。在第5节和第6节中，我从纯指数的角度考察和批评了一种策略。在第7节和第8节中，我从指示语的角度考察和批评了一种策略。在结论部分，我认为只有对不同类型的语境敏感性进行准确的分析，才能使我们更好地理解和更清晰地评价语境主义方法及其对怀疑论的回应。

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引用次数: 1

Much Ado About Nothing: Co-Referential Names and Belief Reports 无事生非：同义名称与信仰报告

Facta Philosophica

Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/factaphil2004624

S. Predelli