Pub Date : 1988-06-27DOI: 10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9630
R. Mccarthy
Computer-based control systems have gradually assumed control of the national energy consumption. Computers have gone from control of a few percent of the nation's total prime-mover (engine) horsepower to an overwhelming majority through application to vehicle engines, which are 95% of total national prime-mover horsepower. If an accident is defined as an undesired release of energy causing injury or loss, then unintended computer-control operations or malfunction could affect the national safety picture. As computer-controlled systems move from military/space applications to mass consumer products, these systems are subject to abuse and operating conditions that tax any program design. Such systems will enter the national product-liability situation, where computer-system designs will be judged not only on their ability to operate as intended, but on their ability to compensate safely for foreseeable misuse. Present and future problems of computer control are discussed in this context.<>
{"title":"Present and future safety challenges of computer control","authors":"R. Mccarthy","doi":"10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9630","url":null,"abstract":"Computer-based control systems have gradually assumed control of the national energy consumption. Computers have gone from control of a few percent of the nation's total prime-mover (engine) horsepower to an overwhelming majority through application to vehicle engines, which are 95% of total national prime-mover horsepower. If an accident is defined as an undesired release of energy causing injury or loss, then unintended computer-control operations or malfunction could affect the national safety picture. As computer-controlled systems move from military/space applications to mass consumer products, these systems are subject to abuse and operating conditions that tax any program design. Such systems will enter the national product-liability situation, where computer-system designs will be judged not only on their ability to operate as intended, but on their ability to compensate safely for foreseeable misuse. Present and future problems of computer control are discussed in this context.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":224212,"journal":{"name":"Computer Assurance, 1988. COMPASS '88","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117207134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-06-27DOI: 10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9633
J. Farrell
A historical perspective of the calendar is presented, and the discontinuities introduced into date-sensitive computations by those conventions is pointed out. It is shown how the side effects of discontinuities can be avoided through the use of a canonical system of dates, the Julian date. A BASIC program for calculating this calendar system is presented.<>
{"title":"Date computations into the third millennium","authors":"J. Farrell","doi":"10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9633","url":null,"abstract":"A historical perspective of the calendar is presented, and the discontinuities introduced into date-sensitive computations by those conventions is pointed out. It is shown how the side effects of discontinuities can be avoided through the use of a canonical system of dates, the Julian date. A BASIC program for calculating this calendar system is presented.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":224212,"journal":{"name":"Computer Assurance, 1988. COMPASS '88","volume":"52 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132531115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-06-27DOI: 10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9639
W. Bryan, S. Siegel
It is shown how software product assurance can improve the reliability of critical systems by reducing the system development risks of unsatisfied requirements, cost overruns, and schedule slippages. The thesis is that product assurance increases visibility into the development process, thereby making it more manageable. The visibility needs of three classes of people-senior managers, project managers, and product assurance practitioners-are discussed. Two examples of systems critically dependent on software-a computer-driven insulin-infusion pump and a bank financial-transaction processor-are used to illustrate in specific terms how product assurance would improve safety and reliability by mitigating software development risk.<>
{"title":"Software product assurance-reducing software risk in critical systems","authors":"W. Bryan, S. Siegel","doi":"10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9639","url":null,"abstract":"It is shown how software product assurance can improve the reliability of critical systems by reducing the system development risks of unsatisfied requirements, cost overruns, and schedule slippages. The thesis is that product assurance increases visibility into the development process, thereby making it more manageable. The visibility needs of three classes of people-senior managers, project managers, and product assurance practitioners-are discussed. Two examples of systems critically dependent on software-a computer-driven insulin-infusion pump and a bank financial-transaction processor-are used to illustrate in specific terms how product assurance would improve safety and reliability by mitigating software development risk.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":224212,"journal":{"name":"Computer Assurance, 1988. COMPASS '88","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127471503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-06-27DOI: 10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9634
M. Brown
The software systems safety discipline is discussed, along with the various areas where human errors impact the design and development of software-controlled systems. Techniques used in software systems safety, as set forth in MIL-STD-882B, are also discussed along with a recommendation for an early, integrated software systems safety and human factors analysis of the software-user interface. The article forms the basis for recommended modifications to Task 306 of MIL-STD-882B.<>
{"title":"Software systems safety and human errors","authors":"M. Brown","doi":"10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9634","url":null,"abstract":"The software systems safety discipline is discussed, along with the various areas where human errors impact the design and development of software-controlled systems. Techniques used in software systems safety, as set forth in MIL-STD-882B, are also discussed along with a recommendation for an early, integrated software systems safety and human factors analysis of the software-user interface. The article forms the basis for recommended modifications to Task 306 of MIL-STD-882B.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":224212,"journal":{"name":"Computer Assurance, 1988. COMPASS '88","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130761763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-06-27DOI: 10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9635
P. Shebalin, S. Son, C. Chang
A software safety analysis approach for distributed systems, based on a technique called component-message fault analysis, is presented. This technique checks the safety-critical logic, using the safety specification for different categories of component fault events, to uncover ambiguous safety requirements or design deficiencies. To demonstrate the power of this technique, a dual-purpose missile system is introduced and analyzed with regard to its software safety requirements.<>
{"title":"An approach to software safety analysis in a distributed real-time system","authors":"P. Shebalin, S. Son, C. Chang","doi":"10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9635","url":null,"abstract":"A software safety analysis approach for distributed systems, based on a technique called component-message fault analysis, is presented. This technique checks the safety-critical logic, using the safety specification for different categories of component fault events, to uncover ambiguous safety requirements or design deficiencies. To demonstrate the power of this technique, a dual-purpose missile system is introduced and analyzed with regard to its software safety requirements.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":224212,"journal":{"name":"Computer Assurance, 1988. COMPASS '88","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115958705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-06-27DOI: 10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9636
P. Jorgensen
An important class of system errors is defined and initial results with two prototype requirements-analysis tools are described. A requirements-specification technique that is highly operational is presented; it expresses the sequential behavior of a system in terms of processes that are equivalent to Petri nets. Subsequent definitions based on directed graphs describe the possible ways in which individual processes might interact, thereby providing a basis for requirements-analysis tools that can detect class two errors at the end of the requirements-specification phase, rather than after system delivery.<>
{"title":"Early detection of requirements specification errors","authors":"P. Jorgensen","doi":"10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9636","url":null,"abstract":"An important class of system errors is defined and initial results with two prototype requirements-analysis tools are described. A requirements-specification technique that is highly operational is presented; it expresses the sequential behavior of a system in terms of processes that are equivalent to Petri nets. Subsequent definitions based on directed graphs describe the possible ways in which individual processes might interact, thereby providing a basis for requirements-analysis tools that can detect class two errors at the end of the requirements-specification phase, rather than after system delivery.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":224212,"journal":{"name":"Computer Assurance, 1988. COMPASS '88","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127725328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-06-27DOI: 10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9643
B. Kolkhorst, A. Macina
The complexity of the onboard software for the Space Shuttle is discussed and analyzed. Steps taken to improve quality are discussed. Inserting new technology into the software development process is examined in terms of lessons learned.<>
{"title":"Developing error-free software","authors":"B. Kolkhorst, A. Macina","doi":"10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9643","url":null,"abstract":"The complexity of the onboard software for the Space Shuttle is discussed and analyzed. Steps taken to improve quality are discussed. Inserting new technology into the software development process is examined in terms of lessons learned.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":224212,"journal":{"name":"Computer Assurance, 1988. COMPASS '88","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130835479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-06-27DOI: 10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9632
H. O. Lubbes, A. W. Friend, M. Brown
COMPASS, a contraction of the words computer assurance, is an organization dedicated to the study of critical systems, especially those using digital computers, or other new technologies. The history of this organization is discussed, along with its interests and objectives.<>
{"title":"COMPASS past and future","authors":"H. O. Lubbes, A. W. Friend, M. Brown","doi":"10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9632","url":null,"abstract":"COMPASS, a contraction of the words computer assurance, is an organization dedicated to the study of critical systems, especially those using digital computers, or other new technologies. The history of this organization is discussed, along with its interests and objectives.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":224212,"journal":{"name":"Computer Assurance, 1988. COMPASS '88","volume":" 839","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120829189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-06-27DOI: 10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9640
D. Good
The major scientific and mathematical problems that need to be solved to advance the state of digital-system engineering practice are identified. Mathematics for digital systems is discussed for describing system behavior, defining acceptable behavior, demonstrating acceptable behavior, and scaling up. Current and future digital system engineering on the basis of these foundations is examined.<>
{"title":"Predicting computer behavior","authors":"D. Good","doi":"10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9640","url":null,"abstract":"The major scientific and mathematical problems that need to be solved to advance the state of digital-system engineering practice are identified. Mathematics for digital systems is discussed for describing system behavior, defining acceptable behavior, demonstrating acceptable behavior, and scaling up. Current and future digital system engineering on the basis of these foundations is examined.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":224212,"journal":{"name":"Computer Assurance, 1988. COMPASS '88","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114896733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-06-27DOI: 10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9647
T. F. Buckley, P. Garratt, T. Gough
The lessons learned from the experience of designing and implementing a high-integrity, high-security and high-reliability computer-based data collection and monitoring system are discussed. The project involved the collection and monitoring of data by computer in a plant that produced wine, and the use of the computer to calculate the amount of tax to be paid by the producer of the wine. Large sums of money are involved in these transactions and both the company and the government tax collection office had to be convinced of the validity of the computer-generated figures. The lessons to be applied to future projects are simplicity in the hardware, layered security in the software, and the recognition that the time spent in explaining and justifying design concepts and design details is as valuable as time spent in actual design.<>
{"title":"A case study of system integrity for alcohol taxation","authors":"T. F. Buckley, P. Garratt, T. Gough","doi":"10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CMPASS.1988.9647","url":null,"abstract":"The lessons learned from the experience of designing and implementing a high-integrity, high-security and high-reliability computer-based data collection and monitoring system are discussed. The project involved the collection and monitoring of data by computer in a plant that produced wine, and the use of the computer to calculate the amount of tax to be paid by the producer of the wine. Large sums of money are involved in these transactions and both the company and the government tax collection office had to be convinced of the validity of the computer-generated figures. The lessons to be applied to future projects are simplicity in the hardware, layered security in the software, and the recognition that the time spent in explaining and justifying design concepts and design details is as valuable as time spent in actual design.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":224212,"journal":{"name":"Computer Assurance, 1988. COMPASS '88","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116403275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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